Vol. 74 December 1980 No. 4

The American Political Science Review

Published Quarterly by
The American Political Science Association

In this election year, Harper & Ro
has more than one winner.

Here are some facts about our '80–81 ticket—

Bollens & Schmandt—The **fourth edition** of **THE METROPOLIS: It People, Politics, and Economic Life,** due in February, includes the most recent research on major problems in the field.

Christenson, Engel, Jacobs, Rejai, & Waltzer—The **third edition** of **IDEOLOGIES AND MODERN POLITICS,** due in February, offers students revised and expanded coverage.

Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff—The **second edition** of **CONTENDING THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A Comprehensive Survey,** published in November, is one of the most objective and comprehensive surveys of classical and contemporary theories availabl

Hitchner & Levine—The **second edition** of **COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS,** just published, bases its coverage a conclusions on data from the 170 + states now in existence.

Holzer & Rosen—Their new text, **CURRENT CASES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION,** due in February, emphasizes contemporary problems in public administration at all levels of government.

Kingdon—The **second edition** of **CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS,** due in February, now reflects research into changes ove the last decade.

Rosenthal—A new text, **LEGISLATIVE LIFE: People, Process, and Performance in the States,** due in January, is unique in its combination of the analysis of the professional political scientist and t insights of an insider.

Request examination copies by writing to Suite 3D, Harper & Row, 10 East 53d St., New York, N.Y., 10022. Or contact your local Harper & Row representative. Please include cou title, enrollment, and present text.

Harper & Ro

The American Political Science Review

Vol. 74 December 1980 No. 4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem of Many Hands .... Dennis F. Thompson 905

An Expected Utility Theory of International Conflict .... Bruce Bueno de Mesquita 917

Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics, and the Spread of War .. Benjamin A. Most & Harvey Starr 932

War and the Cycle of Relative Power .... Charles F. Doran & Wes Parsons 947

The Succession Connection: Political Cycles and Political Change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe .... Valerie Jane Bunce 966

Systemic Power in Community Decision Making: A Restatement of Stratification Theory .... Clarence N. Stone 978

The Urban Bureaucracy and the Chicago Political Machine: Who Gets What and the Limits to Political Control ...... Kenneth R. Mladenka 991

Urban Policy: Does Political Structure Matter? .... David R. Morgan & John P. Pelissero 999

Reason and Authority in Habermas: A Critique of the Critics .... Stephen K. White 1006

Rousseau and the Problem of Bourgeois Society .... Arthur M. Melzer 1019

Rousseau's Inhibited Radicalism: An Analysis of His Political Thought in Light of His Economic Ideas .... Yoav Peled 1034

Communications 1046

Editorial Note 1050

Book Reviews

- Political Theory and Methodology 1052
- American Politics 1075
- Comparative Politics 1102
- International Politics 1134

Index to Vol. 74 1149

Office of publication: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.
Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional mailing ofices.
Composition by TypoGraphics, Columbia, Maryland.
Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.
Copyright 1980 by The American Political Science Association, publisher of *The American Political Science Review*
(ISSN-0003-0554).

BOOK REVIEWS

Political Theory and Methodology

Abbott, Philip. *Furious Fancies: American Political Thought in the Post-Liberal Era* . . . . . Darryl Baskin 1052
Caws, Peter. *Sartre: The Arguments of the Philosophers* . . . . . William S. Corlett, Jr. 1053
Curti, Merle. *Human Nature in American Thought: A History* . . . . . Alan P. Grimes 1054
Eldridge, Albert F. *Images of Conflict* . . . . . Betty A. Nesvold 1054
Giddens, Anthony. *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis* . . . . . James Miller 1055
Kamenka, Eugene, and Alice E. Tay, eds. *Justice: Ideas and Ideologies* . . . . . John G. Gunnell 1056
Margolis, Michael. *Viable Democracy* . . . . . Stuart A. Lilie 1057
Moe, Terry M. *The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups* . . . . . David B. Truman 1058
Mouffe, Chantal, ed. *Gramsci and Marxist Theory* . . . . . Mark E. Kann 1059
Pennock, J. Roland. *Democratic Political Theory* . . . . . Giovanni Sartori 1060
Pennock, J. Roland, and John W. Chapman, eds. *Constitutionalism: Nomos XX* . . . . . Harvey Wheeler 1061
Roth, Jack J. *The Cult of Violence: Sorel and the Sorelians* . . . . . Mark N. Hagopian 1063
Roxborough, Ian. *Theories of Underdevelopment* . . . . . Mark B. Rosenberg 1064
Sabrosky, Judith A. *From Rationality to Liberation: The Evolution of Feminist Ideology* . . . . . Mary L. Shanley 1065
Simmons, A. John. *Moral Principles and Political Obligations* . . . . . Karen Johnson 1066
Smith, Michael P. *The City and Social Thought* . . . . . Elinor R. Bowen 1066
Starr, John B. *Continuing the Revolution: The Political Thought of Mao* . . . . . Raymond F. Wylie 1067
Steuernagel, Gertrude A. *Political Philosophy as Therapy: Marcuse Reconsidered* . . . . . Jean B. Elshtain 1068
Thom, Gary. *Bringing the Left Back Home: A Critique of American Social Criticism* . . . . . Paul Peterson 1070
Tilly, Charles. *From Mobilization to Revolution* . . . . . Edward N. Muller 1071
Tuck, Richard. *Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development* . . . . . Gary L. Jones 1073
Verene, Donald P., ed. *Symbol, Myth, and Culture: Essays and Lectures of Ernst Cassirer, 1935-1945* . . . . . Patrick Riley 1073

American Politics

Barsh, Russel L., and James Y. Henderson. *The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty* . . . . . Janna Merrick 1075
Boyd, Steven R. *The Politics of Opposition: Antifederalists and the Acceptance of the Constitution* . . . . . Gordon Lloyd 1076
Destler, I. M. *Making Foreign Economic Policy* . . . . . R. Harrison Wagner 1077
Dorn, Edwin. *Rules and Racial Equality* . . . . . Robert H. Stern 1078
Edwards, George C., III. *Presidential Influence in Congress* . . . . . David C. Kozak 1079
Ely, John H. *Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review* . . . . . Tinsley E. Yarbrough 1080
Gabin, Sanford B. *Judicial Review and the Reasonable Doubt Test* . . . . . Neil D. McFeeley 1081
George, Alexander L. *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* . . . . . David S. McLellan 1082
Hechler, Ken. *Toward the Endless Frontier: History of the Committee on Science and Technology, 1959-79* . . . . . Charles O. Jones 1083
Hutchins, Francis G. *Mashpee: The Story of Cape Cod's Indian Town* . . . . . Vine Deloria, Jr. 1084
Hyneman, Charles S., et al. *Voting in Indiana: A Century of Persistence and Change* . . . . . Austin Ranney 1085
Jacobson, Gary C. *Money in Congressional Elections* . . . . . Robert J. Huckshorn 1086
Johansen, Robert C. *The National Interest and the Human Interest: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy* . . . . . Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. 1086
Kincaid, Diane D., ed. *Silent Hattie Speaks: The Personal Journal of Senator Hattie Caraway* . . . . . Virginia Gray 1088

Larson, David L. *United States Foreign Policy Toward Yugoslavia, 1943-1963* .... Paul E. Zinner 1088
Lester, Richard A. *Reasoning About Discrimination: The Analysis of Professional and Executive Work in Federal Antibias Programs* .... Robert S. Friedman 1089
Lipset, Seymour M., ed. *The Third Century: America as a Post-Industrial Society* .... Anthony King 1090
Malbin, Michael J., ed. *Parties, Interest Groups, and Campaign Finance Laws* .... Linda L. Fowler 1092
Mandelbaum, Michael. *The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976* .... Gary L. Guertner 1093
Marshall, Dale R., ed. *Urban Policy Making* .... W. E. Lyons 1093
Murphy, Paul L. *World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States* .... Robert J. Steamer 1094
Pechman, Joseph A., ed. *Setting National Priorities: Agenda for the 1980's* .... Randall B. Ripley 1095
Porter, David L. *The Seventy-sixth Congress and World War II, 1939-1940* .... Leroy N. Rieselbach 1096
Rakove, Milton L. *We Don't Want Nobody Nobody Sent: An Oral History of the Daley Years* .... Charles R. Adrian 1096
Russett, Bruce M., and Elizabeth C. Hanson. *Interest and Ideology: The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen* .... David H. Blake 1097
Stoessinger, John G. *Crusaders and Pragmatists: Movers of Modern American Foreign Policy* .... Stephen G. Walker 1098
Tutchings, Terrence R. *Rhetoric and Reality: Presidential Commissions and the Making of Public Policy* .... Dorothy B. James 1099
Wilson, David E. *The National Planning Idea in U.S. Public Policy: Five Alternative Approaches* .... Russ Smith 1099
Wilson, Evan M. *Decision on Palestine: How the U.S. Came to Recognize Israel* .... H. Field Haviland 1100

Comparative Politics

Adam, Heribert, and Hermann Giliomee. *Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change?* .... Richard Dale 1102
Banting, Keith G. *Poverty, Politics and Policy: Britain in the 1960's* .... Paul Kantor 1102
Benjamin, Roger. *The Limits of Politics: Collective Goods and Political Change in Postindustrial Societies* .... Garry D. Brewer 1104
Berry, R. Albert, et al., eds. *Politics of Compromise: Coalition Government in Colombia* .... John D. Martz 1104
Bissell, Richard E., and Chester A. Crocker, eds. *South Africa into the 1980s* .... Gwendolen M. Carter 1105
Collier, David, ed. *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* .... Mitchell A. Seligson 1107
Comisso, Ellen T. *Workers' Control Under Plan and Market: Implications of Yugoslav Self-Management* .... Fedor I. Cicak 1109
Cowart, Andrew T., and Karl E. Brofoss. *Decisions, Politics, and Change: A Study of Norwegian Urban Budgeting* .... Bertil L. Hanson 1110
Finer, S. E. *The Changing British Party System, 1945-1979* .... C. F. Poke 1110
Franda, Marcus. *India's Rural Development: An Assessment of Alternatives* .... Manindra K. Mohapatra 1111
Gelber, Harry G. *Technology, Defense, and External Relations in China, 1975-1978* .... Ikua Chou 1112
Germani, Gino. *Marginality* .... Wilber A. Chaffee, Jr. 1113
Gregor, A. James. *Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship* .... Charles F. Delzell 1114
Gregor, A. James. *Young Mussolini and the Intellectual Origins of Fascism* .... Charles F. Delzell 1114
Greiffenhagen, Martin, and Sylvia Greiffenhagen. *Ein schwieriges Vaterland: Zur Politischen Kultur Deutschlands* .... Kai Hildebrandt 1115
Hayward, J. E. S., and R. N. Berki, eds. *State and Society in Contemporary Europe* .... Valerie Bunce 1117
Kofele-Kale, Ndiva, ed. *An African Experiment in Nation*

Building: The Bilingual Cameroon Republic Since Reunification . . . . Christian P. Potholm 1118
Lehmbruch, Gerhard. *Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat* . . . . David P. Conradt 1118
Litt, Edgar, and Michael Parkinson. *US and UK Educational Policy: A Decade of Reform* . . . . Edward P. Morgan 1119
McHenry, Dean E., Jr. *Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages: The Implementation of a Rural Development Strategy* . . . . Joel Samoff 1120
McMillen, Donald H. *Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949-1977* . . . . Hong Yung Lee 1121
Merkl, Peter H., ed. *Western European Party Systems: Trends and Prospects* . . . . Elijah B.-Z. Kaminsky 1122
Narayan, Jayaprakash; edited by Brahmanand. *Towards Total Revolution:* Vol. 1, *Search for an Ideology;* Vol. 2, *Politics in India;* Vol. 3, *India and Her Problems;* Vol. 4, *Total Revolution* . . . . Leo E. Rose 1123
Oyediran, Oyeleye, ed. *Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule, 1966-79* . . . . Mark W. DeLancey 1124
Penniman, Howard R., ed. *The Australian National Elections of 1977* . . . . Henry S. Albinski 1125
Rosberg, Carl G., and Thomas M. Callaghy, eds. *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment* . . . . Frances Hill 1126
Serfaty, Simon, ed. *The Foreign Policies of the French Left* . . . . Frank L. Wilson 1127
Smith, Gordon. *Democracy in Western Germany: Parties and Politics in the Federal Republic* . . . . Jutta A. Helm 1128
Smith, Joel, and Lloyd D. Musolf, eds. *Legislatures in Development: Dynamics of Change in New and Old States* . . . . Marvin G. Weinbaum 1128
Weart, Spencer R. *Scientists in Power* . . . . Joseph Haberer 1130
Weinberg, Leonard B. *After Mussolini: Italian Neo-Fascism and the Nature of Fascism* . . . . Anthony J. Joes 1130
Wiarda, Howard J., ed. *The Continuing Struggle for Democracy in Latin America* . . . . Robert J. Alexander 1131
Zuckerman, Alan S. *The Politics of Faction: Christian Democratic Rule in Italy* . . . . Ernest E. Rossi 1133

International Politics

Cohen, Raymond. *Threat Perception in International Crisis* . . . . Charles Lockhart 1334
Fagen, Richard R., ed. *Capitalism and the State in U.S.-Latin American Relations* . . . . Douglas A. Chalmers 1135
Falkowski, Lawrence S., ed. *Psychological Models of International Politics* . . . . Robert Mandel 1136
Hanrieder, Wolfram F., ed. *West German Foreign Policy: 1949-1979* . . . . Richard D. Partch 1137
Heradstveit, Daniel. *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Psychological Obstacles to Peace* . . . . Noel Kaplowitz 1138
Lesch, Ann M. *Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917-1939: The Frustration of a Nationalist Movement* . . . . Richard H. Dekmejian 1139
Mahler, Vincent A. *Dependency Approaches to International Political Economy: A Cross-National Study* . . . . Arthur S. Banks 1141
Orr, David W., and Marvin S. Soroos, eds. *The Global Predicament: Ecological Perspectives on World Order* . . . . Michael E. Kraft 1142
Paarlberg, Robert L., ed., with Eul Y. Park and Donald L. Wyman. *Diplomatic Dispute: U.S. Conflict With Iran, Japan, and Mexico* . . . . Charles A. Raith 1143
Rummel, R. J. *Understanding Conflict and War:* Vol. 4, *War, Power, Peace* . . . . Harvey Starr 1144
Singer, J. David, ed. *The Correlates of War:* Vol. 1, *Reseach Origins and Rationale;* Vol. 2, *Testing Some Realpolitik Models* . . . . Harold Guetzkow 1145

Announcing . . .


DIRECTORY
OF
BLACK
AMERICANS
IN
POLITICAL
SCIENCE
apsa

ORDER FORM

Single copies are available for $5.00 for non-members and $3.00 for members.

Send to: ____

____

______________________________________ Zip__________

Return to:

Directory of Black Americans in Political Science
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036


The Case of the Unreturned Cafeteria Trays
Lloyd S. Etheredge

A concise guide to theories on motivation used in the analysis of political behavior. Exercises are included on the applications of the theories to political events and situations.

$2.00 (prepaid)

ORDER FORM

Please send me ____________ copies of *The Case of the Unreturned Cafeteria Trays*.

Name ____

Address ____

____

Send form prepaid to:

American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

The American Political Science Association

1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

PRESIDENT: Charles E. Lindblom, *Yale University*; VICE-PRESIDENTS: Lucius J. Barker, *Washington University*; Sidney Verba, *Harvard University*; Dina A. Zinnes, *University of Illinois*; SECRETARY: Roberta Sigel, *Rutgers University*; TREASURER: James L. Sundquist, *The Brookings Institution*; PROGRAM CHAIRPERSON: Jack Dennis, *University of Wisconsin, Madison*; EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Evron M. Kirkpatrick; MANAGING EDITOR, *APSR*: Charles O. Jones, *University of Pittsburgh*.

COUNCIL: (Above-named Officers *ex officiis*), 1979–81: William C. Havard, *Vanderbilt University*; Chalmers Johnson, *University of California, Berkeley*; Anthony King, *University of Essex*; Ruth Morgenthau, *Brandeis University*; Richard Rosecrance, *Cornell University*; Allen Schick, *The Urban Institute*; Philip Siegelman, *San Francisco State University*; Ann R. Willner, *University of Kansas*; 1980–82: Nazli Choucri, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*; Milton C. Cummings, Jr., *Johns Hopkins University*; John Ferejohn, *California Institute of Technology*; Francine R. Frankel, *University of Pennsylvania*; Robert Jervis, *Columbia University*; Malcolm E. Jewell, *University of Kentucky*; Abraham F. Lowenthal, *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars*; Raymond Tanter, *University of Michigan*.

FORMER PRESIDENTS: Frank J. Goodnow, Albert Shaw, Frederic N. Judson, James Bryce, A. Lawrence Lowell, Woodrow Wilson, Simeon E. Baldwin, Albert Bushnell Hart, W. W. Willoughby, John Bassett Moore, Ernest Freund, Jesse Macy, Munroe Smith, Henry Jones Ford, Paul S. Reinsch, Leo S. Rowe, William A. Dunning, Harry A. Garfield, James W. Garner, Charles E. Merriam, Charles A. Beard, William B. Munro, Jesse S. Reeves, John A. Fairlie, Benjamin F. Shambaugh, Edward S. Corwin, William F. Willoughby, Isidor Loeb, Walter J. Shepard, Francis W. Coker, Arthur N. Holcombe, Thomas Reed Powell, Clarence A. Dykstra, Charles Grove Haines, Robert C. Brooks, Frederic A. Ogg, William Anderson, Robert E. Cushman, Leonard D. White, John M. Gaus, Walter F. Dodd, Arthur W. Macmahon, Henry R. Spencer, Quincy Wright, James K. Pollock, Peter H. Odegard, Luther H. Gulick, Pendleton Herring, Ralph J. Bunche, Charles McKinley, Harold D. Lasswell, E. E. Schattschneider, V. O. Key, Jr., R. Taylor Cole, Carl B. Swisher, Emmette S. Redford, Charles S. Hyneman, Carl J. Friederich, C. Herman Pritchett, DAvid B. Truman, Gabriel A. Almond, Robert A. Dahl, Merle Fainsod, David Easton, Karl W. Deutsch, Robert E. Lane, Heinz Eulau, Robert E. Ward, Avery Leiserson, Austin Ranney, James MacGregor Burns, Samuel H. Beer, John C. Wahlke, Leon D. Epstein, Warren E. Miller.

MEMBERSHIP INFORMATION: *The American Political Science Review,* published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Membership dues are charged according to the following schedule:

Membership Category	*Dues*
Regular	
Annual Income: Under $12,000	$ 25
$12,000–14,999	$ 30
$15,000–19,999	$ 35
$20,000–24,999	$ 40
$25,000–29,999	$ 45
$30,000 and over	$ 50
Student and Retired	$ 12
Family	$ 5
Life	$1000
Institutional (includes *APSR* and *PS*)	$50 domestic

Student memberships are limited to five years per person. Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of $4 per year for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

Current issues are priced at $10.50 per copy; for back issues prior to 1970 address Walter J. Johnson, Inc., 355 Chestnut St., Norwood, New Jersey 07648; for issues 1970 and later send request directly to the American Political Science Association.

Applications for membership, orders for the *Review,* and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Notices of change of address should be received in the Washington office by the 25th day of the months before publication.

INDEXING: Articles and notes appearing in the *Review* before the June 1953 issues were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature.* Current issues are indexed by *The International Political Science Abstracts,* the *United States Political Science Documents,* and the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index.* Microfilm of the *Review,* beginning with Volume 1, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. A *Cumulative Index of the Review,* Volumes 1–62; 1906–1968, may also be obtained from University Microfilms. Articles appearing in the *Review* are listed regularly in *ABC Pol Sci* and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences.* Book reviews are indexed in *Book Review Index.*

The American Political Science Review

Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260

EDITORIAL BOARD: Charles O. Jones, *Managing Editor, University of Pittsburgh*; Robert M. Axelrod, *University of Michigan*; Steven J. Brams, *New York University*; Richard A. Brody, *Stanford University*; William J. Daniels, *Union College*; Jorge I. Dominguez, *Harvard University*; Ada W. Finifter, *Michigan State University*; Dante Germino, *University of Virginia*; J. Woodford Howard, *Johns Hopkins University*; George A. Kateb, *Amherst College*; Henry C. Kenski, *University of Arizona*; Nannerl O. Keohane, *Stanford University*; Anthony King, *University of Essex*; Gerald H. Kramer, *Yale University*; Arend Lijphart, *University of California, San Diego*; Jesse M. McCorry, *Department of Health and Human Services*; Joseph L. Nogee, *University of Houston*; Elinor Ostrom, *Indiana University*; Samuel C. Patterson, *University of Iowa*; Nelson W. Polsby, *University of California, Berkeley*; Kenneth Prewitt, *Social Science Research Council*; Jorgen S. Rasmussen, *Iowa State University*; Bert A. Rockman, *University of Pittsburgh*; Donald D. Searing, *University of North Carolina*; James L. Sundquist, *The Brookings Institution*; Henry Teune, *University of Pennsylvania*; Edward R. Tufte, *Yale University*; Susan Welch, *University of Nebraska*; Dina A. Zinnes, *University of Illinois.* EDITORIAL ASSISTANT: Kendall S. Stanley.

BOOK REVIEW EDITORIAL BOARD: Holbert N. Carroll, *Book Review Editor, University of Pittsburgh*; Paul Allen Beck, *Florida State University*; James R. Kurth, *Swarthmore College*; Richard L. Park, *University of Michigan*; Mary L. Shanley, *Vassar College.* EDITORIAL ASSISTANT: Nancy Majeski.

MANUSCRIPT EDITOR: Jane Flanders.

EDITORIAL INTERNS: Christopher J. Bosso, Sharon K. Fitzgerald, Lewis M. Stern, Susan K. Sowinski.

Instructions to Contributors: Address correspondence about contributions to the *Review* to Charles O. Jones, *American Political Science Review,* Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260. Please submit *four* copies of a manuscript to be considered for publication. *Unfortunately, due to increased postage costs, we can no longer return manuscripts to the author.* Manuscripts must be typed and mimeographed or photocopied, with all written material *double-spaced* (including quotations and footnotes). Use standard typewriter paper—avoid colored and light-weight stock. The typewritten lines should not exceed 5½ or 6 inches in length. Please do not send the original typescript. Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for evaluation, the author's name and affiliation should appear only on a separate covering sheet. An abstract of *less than 150 words* should accompany the manuscript.

The reference form is that used by most scientific journals (for illustration, see any issue of the *Review,* June 1978, and after); brief parenthetical references are included in the text and all sources are listed alphabetically at the end of the article. The work of classical authors such as Aristotle or Plato may be cited by the standardized code familiar to scholars in the field and passing allusions to such authors do not require mention in the list of references. Conventional foot-of-column notes are used only for explanatory comments or in unusual cases to avoid lengthy in-text references.

Articles which draw on survey data not documented through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research should include the following information in an appendix: (1) a description of the population sampled, including definition of the geographical area covered, and details about how the sample was drawn sufficient to permit fairly exact replication; (2) response rate (for quota designs, the number of refusals); (3) exact question wordings; and (4) interviewer characteristics.

Manuscripts over 30 pages will be reviewed with particular care to determine if such length is warranted. Those over 50 pages will be returned to the author. Resubmission may follow compliance with the page limit. Manuscripts must be double-spaced throughout, with standard margins. Tables, charts, footnotes, and references will be included in the page count.

Figures should be professionally presented: use high-quality white paper and India ink for maximum sharpness and clarity of line. Copies only should accompany the submitted manuscript, original art work being retained until requested by the editorial office. Tables should be typed on separate pages, with guides, e.g., "Table 1 about here" at the appropriate places in the manuscript.

Communications must follow the form of regular manuscripts (including reference listings where appropriate). They must not exceed five double-spaced pages, including references, footnotes, and tables. All but the briefest letters will be refereed.

Books intended for review and all book review correspondence should be sent to Holbert N. Carroll, Book Review Editor, *American Political Science Review,* Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260. Authors are urged to call their books to the attention of the Book Review Editor to insure that the books will be considered for review.

Information, including News and Notes, for the Association's news-journal, *PS,* should be sent to 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Advertising, reprint and circulation correspondence should be sent to the Executive Director at the Washington office. Domestic claims for non-receipt of issues must be made within four months of the month of publication; overseas claims, eight months. Advertising information and rates are available from Eloise French, Advertising Manager, APSA, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem of Many Hands

DENNIS F. THOMPSON
Princeton University

That many different officials contribute in many different ways to decisions and policies in the modern state makes it difficult to ascribe moral responsibility to any official. The usual responses to this problem—based on concepts of hierarchical and collective responsibility—distort the notion of responsibility. The idea of personal responsibility—based on causal and volitional criteria—constitutes a better approach to the problem of ascribing responsibility to public officials. Corresponding to each of these criteria are types of excuses that officials use in defending the decisions they make. An analysis of the conditions under which the excuses eliminate or mitigate responsibility provides a foundation for accountability in a democracy.

Philosophers and political scientists in recent years have begun to apply moral principles to public policy and to public officials.[1] None of these scholars supposes that moral principles can, without modification, be directly deployed in politics. Indeed, one of their preoccupations is the possibility that public life may require officials to act in ways that would be wrong in private life, raising the classic problem of "dirty hands" (Walzer, 1973). But in a significant respect, their analyses are often apolitical: the official they portray agonizing over a moral dilemma seems a solitary figure, single-handedly gathering information and implementing decisions. This paradigm of the lonely leader obscures a pervasive feature of modern government—a feature that stands in the way of applying moral principles, whatever their content, to individual officials. Because many different officials contribute in many ways to decisions and policies of government, it is difficult even in principle to identify who is morally responsible for political outcomes. This is what I call the problem of many hands.

I shall argue that the two most common ways of ascribing responsibility to officials—the hierarchical and the collective models—do not adequately respond to this problem; and that personal responsibility, suitably interpreted, can be imputed to officials more often than these models suggest. The criteria for personal responsibility I adopt are common to a wide range of moral theories; they hold us responsible for outcomes insofar as we cause them and do not act in ignorance or under compulsion. On these criteria we can say that one official is more or less responsible than another official without implying, as in the law, that degrees of fault correspond to proportionate shares of compensation or match the standard categories of criminal liability. Legal responsibility, though suggestive, is not a reliable guide to moral responsibility (see Hart, 1968, pp. 211–30; and Feinberg, 1970, pp. 24–54).

Corresponding to each of the criteria of personal responsibility are types of excuses officials use to eliminate or mitigate their responsibility for political outcomes.[2] Drawing examples from episodes in contemporary American government (chiefly the executive branch), I shall outline some of the conditions under which the excuses seem to be acceptable or unacceptable. From such an outline, we should not expect to derive anything so systematic as a general theory of excuses, but we should be able to develop a set of considerations based on a body of cases, more like traditional moral casuistry than modern ethical and political theory. In most political contexts, this set of considerations will have to be supplemented by substantive principles of political ethics grounded in concepts such as justice and the public interest. But even by itself an analysis of excuses can serve to inform our judgments about those who govern us, and thus enrich our understanding of political responsibility.[3] Its use might even influence the

---

I am grateful to Joel Feinberg, Amy Gutmann, Geoffrey Hawthorn, Albert Hirschman, and Marion Smiley for advice on earlier versions of this article. I am also indebted to the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, which provided a congenial environment in which to write the article.

[1] E.g., Anderson, 1979; Bok, 1978; Hampshire, 1979; Rohr, 1978; and Walzer, 1973. For a survey of the growing literature in this field, see Fleishman and Payne, 1980.

[2] Austin's classic essay (1956–57) is a valuable source on this topic, but more directly relevant are Hart and Honoré, 1959; and Feinberg, 1970.

[3] Generally on the concept of political responsibility, see Pennock, 1979, pp. 260–308.

conduct of public officials. Those who took the idea of personal responsibility seriously would perhaps make decisions with greater care, and if they did not, citizens or other officials could reinforce ascriptions of responsibility with sanctions, such as public criticism, dismissal from office, or exclusion from public office in the future. Whether personal responsibility could actually support democratic accountability in this way depends partly on the nature of the social and political structure in which citizens and officials act. But as important as it is to analyze this structure, the prior task, and the one on which I concentrate here, is to establish a framework for the discourse of responsibility.

Hierarchical Responsibility

According to the hierarchical model, responsibility for political outcomes falls on the person who stands highest in the (formal or informal) chain of authority. Weber provides the classic statement of the model. He holds, first, that modern government recognizes "fixed jurisdictional areas" and "office hierarchy" in which "there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones" (Gerth and Mills, pp. 196–97). Second, he sharply distinguishes between administration and politics: administrators merely execute the policies set by politicians (pp. 95; 214–16). Finally, the administrator and the politician are therefore subject to "exactly the opposite principle of responsibility":

> The honor of the civil servant is vested in his ability to execute conscientiously the order of the superior authority, exactly as if the order agreed with his own conviction. . . . The honor of the political leader . . . however, lies precisely in an exclusive personal responsibility for what he does, a responsibility he cannot and must not reject or transfer.[4]

Weber's model vastly simplifies the task of ascribing responsibility to public officials since it places most public officials most of the time beyond the province of moral responsibility. As long as they follow the orders of their superiors and the procedures of the organization, they are not responsible for any harmful results of their actions. We are of course still left with the chore of sorting out the responsibility of the various politicians who have a hand in making the policies that the administrators carry out, but because the hands are fewer and because the jurisdictions are well defined, the problem is much more tractable.

Weber's model, however, does not correspond to the portrait of politics that emerges from modern studies of the making of public policy. Instead of functioning within well-defined jurisdictions and settled lines of authority, officials act within overlapping "issue networks" whose membership is shifting and partially drawn from outside government (Heclo, 1978, pp. 87–124); they engage in a "bargaining game" where victory depends more on "skill and will in using [other] bargaining advantages" and "other players' perceptions" than on positions in a hierarchy (Allison, 1971, pp. 144–84). Instead of respecting a clear distinction between politics and administration, bureaucrats exercise discretionary authority either delegated to them, or simply assumed by them, to shape and often to make policy; meanwhile, elected politicians concern themselves with the details of implementation (Altshuler, 1977, pp. 2–17; Lowi, 1979, pp. 92–126; and Rourke, 1978, p. 253).

The empirical deficiencies of the hierarchical model do not necessarily defeat it as a normative standard. Weber himself anticipated some of the developments that impugn the model (pp. 232–33), and later writers continue to commend the model in spite of—or because of—the growth of administrative discretion and the dispersion of authority in the modern state (e.g., Lowi, 1979, pp. 295–313; and Krasner, 1972, p. 160). But even if a more hierarchical structure of government is desirable, the hierarchical model is not a satisfactory basis on which to ascribe responsibility in the structure of government that now prevails—at least not where discretion and dispersion abound. Insofar as officials holding the top positions in a hierarchy cannot be expected to have control over political outcomes, hierarchical responsibility does not coincide with moral responsibility. To try to impute moral responsibility according to hierarchical position would in these circumstances violate a fundamental presupposition of morality, namely, that a person should be blamed only if he or she could have acted otherwise. The difficulty is not that it would be unfair to hold top officials responsible for failures beyond their control. Officials know in advance that they may lose their jobs because of events over which they could have had little or no influence, and they thus tacitly consent to the risk of this kind of political "punishment." Such risk, moreover, may be a useful feature in the design of political institutions, encouraging officials to take every possible precaution to avoid mistakes. But these considerations show only that strict liability in politics may be morally justifiable; they do not establish that such liability is equivalent to moral responsibility. Even when we hold officials strictly accountable in this way, we usually do not condemn them morally.

---

[4] Gerth and Mills, p. 95. This distinction does not depend on accepting Weber's further claim that the political leader should act on an "ethic of responsibility" rather than an "ethic of ultimate ends" (pp. 120–28).

That hierarchical responsibility imparts scarcely any moral force explains why political leaders are often quite ready to declare themselves fully responsible for some pernicious decision or policy. Taking responsibility becomes a kind of political ritual that has no negative effect on a leader. Indeed, leaders can often turn this ritual to their advantage (cf. Thompson, 1961, pp. 129–37; and Edelman, 1964, p. 79). With regular incantations of "I accept full responsibility," an official strengthens his or her own political standing—by reassuring the public that someone is in charge and by projecting an image of a courageous leader who does not pass the buck. Also, as one becomes known as a leader who takes the blame for subordinates, one gains gratitude and thus greater obedience from those subordinates in the future. Most significantly, the ritual often quells public debate about a controversial decision or policy, effectively blocking further inquiry into the genuine moral responsibility of all of the officials involved, especially that of the leader. After the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy privately blamed the CIA, the Joint Chiefs, and just about everyone who knew about the invasion in advance. But publicly he accepted the "sole responsibility" and objected to anyone's "attempting to shift responsibility" away from him (Schlesinger, 1965, pp. 289–90). The hierarchical model, reinforcing this ritual taking of responsibility, in this case not only cut short public inquiry into other officials' responsibility for the failure of the invasion, but more importantly, also forestalled public debate about each official's failure to consider whether subversion of this kind is morally justified at all. It seems, further, that the more personally blameworthy an official, the more strenuously the official is likely to insist on accepting hierarchical responsibility. In the spring of 1973, as Watergate intruded more and more into the office of the president itself, Nixon invoked the ritualistic formula of responsibility in almost its pure form:

> Who is to blame for what happened in this case? . . . The easiest course would be for me to blame those to whom I delegated the responsibility to run the campaign. But that would be a cowardly thing to do. . . . In any organization, the man at the top must bear the responsibility. That responsibility, therefore, belongs here in this office. I accept it (transcribed from tape of CBS broadcast of Nixon's address to the nation, April 30, 1973).

Collective Responsibility

The argument underlying the collective model begins by posing a version of the problem of many hands: many political outcomes are the product of the actions of many different people whose individual contributions may not be identifiable at all, and certainly cannot be distinguished significantly from other people's contributions. The second step is the claim that no one individual, therefore, can be morally blamed for these outcomes. At the final stage of the argument, its proponents reach two seemingly contradictory conclusions: one stating that every individual associated with the collectivity should be charged with moral responsibility, the other holding that only the collectivity can be so charged. But the conclusions are not so different since neither ascribes responsibility to persons on the basis of their specific and distinct connections to the outcome in question.

The first version of the collective model can be illustrated by Herbert Kaufman's effort to pin the blame for the (immoral as well as inefficient) consequences of bureaucratic "red tape":

> It would not surprise me . . . if [public officers and employees] are merely scapegoats. . . . We may accuse them because, intuitively, we want to divert the guilt from the real cause: ourselves. No one element of the population is responsible for all red tape or even for most of it . . . we all have a hand in it.[5]

W. H. Walsh (1970) has offered a general theoretical defense for this sort of dispersion of responsibility. Walsh rejects non-collective ideas of moral responsibility because they incorrectly assume that the individual is "self-contained and self-subsistent" (p. 4). We are morally responsible for the actions of people with whom we have any "special relationship" (p. 5); that includes all our fellow citizens, and even earlier generations, but fortunately does not encompass all humanity since we are not, Walsh concedes, culpable for the actions of Genghis Khan. While Walsh thus radically expands the responsibility of citizens, he drastically diminishes the responsibility of public officials. Because officials act as representatives, limited by the demands of citizens and bound by long-standing commitments their predecessors have made, their decisions are not fully voluntary, and, Walsh concludes, they are therefore not fully responsible for the decisions.

This version of the collective model, however, cannot account for many distinctions that we intuitively wish to draw in apportioning blame. We normally distinguish degrees of responsibility that citizens and officials bear for policies of the government or of the groups with which they are associated. For example, those who do not protest against an unjust policy are normally thought to be more responsible for it than those who do protest; and among those who do not protest, those who have greater resources with which to influence the policy are more responsible than those with fewer such resources. These and many other similar distinctions presuppose some form of the principle Walsh must reject (at least for citizens), namely, that responsibility for a policy depends in part on the contribution an individual actually made, or could have made, to the policy.

---

[5] Kaufman, 1977, pp. 27–28. For discussion of similar arguments in the context of war crimes, see French, 1972.

The second version of the collective model—blaming the collectivity rather than any specific member of it—is sometimes represented by the hypothetical example of the old-time train robbery (Feinberg, 1970, p. 248). An armed bandit holds up a carful of passengers and escapes with all their money. All of the passengers, or even a few of them, could have prevented the robbery, had they coordinated their actions. In this way the passengers were collectively responsible for their own losses, but since no passenger was obligated to resist the bandit, none was individually responsible. The fault lay not in individual actions or omissions, but in the structure of the group.[6]

Similarly, a political system may suffer from structural faults that block the efforts of all but the heroic bureaucrat or politician to accomplish morally respectable ends. An example appears in "The Blast in Centralia No. 5," the introductory case in a widely used casebook in public administration:

> Responsibility [for the mine disaster that killed 111 men] here transcends individuals. The miners at Centralia, seeking somebody who would heed their conviction that their lives were in danger, found themselves confronted with officialdom, a huge organism scarcely mortal. . . . As one strives to fix responsibility for the disaster, again and again one is confronted, as were the miners, not with any individual but with a host of individuals fused into a vast, unapproachable, insensate organism. Perhaps this immovable juggernaut is the true villain in the piece.[7]

However, the responsibility of the private and public officials in this case differs from that of the passengers in the train robbery example. Officials act in the context of an ongoing institution, not an isolated incident, and they or other officials therefore may be culpable for creating the structural faults of the institution, or for neglecting to notice them, or for making inadequate efforts to correct them. The responsibility of officials is no more temporally bounded than is the existence of the institutions in which they act.

Because both versions of the collective model distort the idea of responsibility, neither can serve as the foundation for judgments we wish to make about public officials. The first version blurs moral distinctions not only among various officials but also between officials and citizens. The second version recognizes no connection between structural faults and individual responsibility for making structural criticisms or changes. The hierarchical model has the advantage of locating responsibility in determinate positions, but it neglects the problem of many hands. Proponents of the collective model take that problem all too seriously, reproducing it in the model itself and as a result weakening democratic accountability. I do not want to deny that hierarchical position is relevant in imputing responsibility, or that collective responsibility sometimes makes sense. But I do wish to suggest that an approach that preserves a traditional notion of personal responsibility—with its advantages for democratic accountability—can accommodate many of the complexities of a political process in which many different officials contribute to policies and decisions.

Personal Responsibility

Ascribing responsibility to officials as persons rather than simply as occupants of certain offices or as members of a collectivity relies on two criteria of moral responsibility. An official is morally responsible for an outcome insofar as (1) the official's actions or omissions are a cause of the outcome; and (2) these actions or omissions are not done in ignorance or under compulsion. These are notoriously difficult ideas, and I can provide only a few general comments about them before turning to the excuses they underlie.

The criterion of causal responsibility, as I interpret it, is quite weak: it requires only that one be a cause of an outcome in the sense that the outcome would not have happened but for one's act or omission.[8] To say that a person is a cause merely connects his or her action with the outcome—along with the action of many other hands and the influence of many other forces. It does not establish that the person is the most important cause or even an agent on whom we should pin responsibility at all. If we wish to select an individual from among all the other causal factors in this "cone of causation," we have to invoke other moral and political considerations, chiefly the importance of the outcome in question and the formal and informal expectations of the individual's official role.

---

[6] I put aside the question of whether it makes sense to hold a collectivity morally responsible. Even if it does, individual responsibility for collective faults is not necessarily or usually extinguished.

[7] Stillman, 1976, p. 34. For some other examples (drawn from the Vietnam War), see Weisband and Franck, 1976, pp. 79–80.

[8] The interpretation of this statement is not only much more complex than I can indicate here, but it is also a chief point of controversy between the two best works in the theory of responsibility. Cf. Hart and Honoré, 1959, pp. 61–62, 103–22; and Feinberg, 1970, pp. 201–07, 184. My interpretation more closely follows Feinberg.

It might be objected that we should not use the causal criterion at all. Ladd (1970) argues that the part played by any single official is neither necessary nor sufficient to bring about an organizational decision; therefore, to require, as a necessary condition of responsibility, that an official be a cause of the decision is to "give aid and comfort to officials who want to avoid responsibility" (pp. 513–15). Ladd is surely correct in refusing to assimilate moral responsibility to causal responsibility: we should not want to say that an official is less responsible to the degree that he or she is less causally effective. But the weak causal criterion does not have this implication since it is not sufficient to determine moral responsibility, let alone degrees of moral responsibility. Yet unless an official's action is at least a causal factor of an outcome, it is hard to see why the question should arise of holding that official, rather than anyone or everyone else, responsible for it.

The second criterion—volitional responsibility—in its most general form stipulates that a person is responsible for an action insofar as he or she could have done otherwise.[9] Inability to act otherwise takes many different forms, ranging from general incapacity (such as insanity) to specific defects in particular actions (such as inadvertence). Most relevant for assessing the actions of public officials are these specific faults, which may be considered under the traditional Aristotelian categories of ignorance and compulsion (Aristotle, 1109b–1111b; cf. Glover, 1970, esp. pp. 60–61; and Donagan, 1977, pp. 112–42). Ignorance of what one does (not knowing that a certain description applies to one's action) counts as an excuse only if the ignorance is not negligent. In the case of public officials, the standards of negligence depend on moral and political considerations, such as an assessment of the outcomes in question and the nature of the role of the official. So does the question of whether compulsion should count as an excuse. The compulsion that public officials cite to excuse their conduct is rarely the extreme physical and psychological kind that philosophers and lawyers usually discuss. When officials proclaim, "I had no choice," we seldom take them literally. They can usually be understood as implying that they did not choose the *range* of alternatives within which they made some decision. Like Aristotle's sea captain (1110a 8–15), they confront two undesirable options (jettisoning the cargo or sinking the ship); the duties of office conspire with the forces of nature to pose a choice between disagreeable alternatives. Limitations on the range of alternatives do not eliminate an official's responsibility, but they do warrant our specifying, in any ascription of praise or blame, what alternatives were realistically accessible.

Causal Excuses

In "Centralia No. 5," one of the persons blamed for the deaths of the miners was Inspector Scanlan, who had the authority to close the mine he knew to be unsafe but failed to do so. Scanlan's defense (in part) was that "had he closed the Centralia mine, Medill [the Director of the Illinois Department of Mines and Minerals] simply would have fired him and appointed a more tractable inspector" (Stillman, 1980, p. 33). This is an example of the excuse from alternative cause: "If I hadn't done it, someone else would have," or "If I don't do it, someone else will." The excuse is more common in official than in personal life because in organizations the empirical assumption on which it depends is more likely to be true; in organizations persons often are fungible.

In a general and unqualified form, the excuse seems incoherent. To relieve one person of responsibility, the excuse asserts that other people (the alternative causal agents) would be responsible for the action; but if the excuse is valid, each of the other people would be exonerated, seriatim, in the same way as the first person. In other words, if the excuse is valid, no one is responsible. In any case, the excuse evidently has not been accepted in civil or criminal law (Hart and Honoré, 1959, pp. 225–26), and moral judgment seems to agree with the law in this regard.

Nevertheless, the excuse may sometimes be acceptable in a modified form. One such form is as a criterion of causal relevance. Here an official claims not that someone else would have made the same mistake, but rather that someone else would have made a different mistake that would have been sufficient to cause the harmful outcome. The excuse is thus used to show that the respect in which the official's action is faulty is not a cause of the outcome.[10] In the political process, however, judgments about causal connections or their absence are often uncertain. Consider the case of an FDA official who permits a drug, which subsequently turns out to be unsafe, to be placed on the agency's list of substances "generally recognized as safe"—without ordering certain standard laboratory tests on the drug. We might perhaps not blame this official for any harm suffered by users of the drug if we believe that the technicians charged with performing the tests would have approved the drug anyhow. But to the extent that the causal relevance remains uncertain (e.g., we doubt that the technicians would have approved the drug), then other factors will influence our judgment about the validity of the excuse. Specifically, we will be more likely to accept the excuse if the fault is relatively minor (e.g., failing to order the tests because of overlooking some technicality rather than because of accepting a bribe), or if the consequences to which the fault allegedly contributed are relatively harmless. It is perhaps odd that these factors should affect our judgment at all, since in principle an official should be blamed only if his fault was a cause of the outcome, but given the inevitable uncertainty of causal connections in organizations, we may be justified, as a practical matter, in considering these other factors when assessing even causal excuses.

---

[9] I hope that I will be excused for disregarding the relevant but complex metaphysical problems raised by this criterion. Two of the best contemporary discussions are: Frankfurt, 1971; and Strawson, 1968.

The excuse from alternative cause is also acceptable if it is combined with certain kinds of justifications. To the plea that someone else would have committed the wrong is added the claim that he or she would have committed a worse wrong, or in some other way would have made the consequences worse. This excuse comes most naturally to officials who do not resign from a government that is pursuing an admittedly wrong policy. During the Vietnam War, many officials, including Hubert Humphrey and Robert McNamara, privately told friends that they were staying on to keep the escalation from getting worse; others, like Charles Frankel (Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs) pointed to benefits they could accomplish that in their judgment outweighed any effect their resignations might have on the war (Weisband and Franck, 1976, pp. 92–93). We are right to be suspicious of such pleas; the heady mixture of exercising power while believing oneself to be doing good can easily forestall a sober assessment of the consequences of alternative courses of action. Still, the plea is sometimes surely acceptable. Even when the government an official serves is utterly evil, resignation may not be the most appropriate course. It has been argued that the S.S. Officer Kurt Gerstein, by continuing in his post during the Second World War, "prevented worse things from happening" (Friedlander, 1969, p. 199). In less extreme circumstances, the range of choice is usually greater, but an argument based on the worse alternative may still seem plausible. After Attorney General Elliot Richardson and then his deputy resigned rather than carry out Nixon's order to fire the Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, the Solicitor General Robert Bork decided to stay on the job and dismiss Cox. Bork argued (in part) that he would be more likely to protect the integrity of the Justice Department and the independence of any future Special Prosecutor than anyone Nixon would appoint as his replacement (Lukas, 1977, p. 592). In this way, the justifiability of Bork's use of the argument from the worse alternative comes to depend on his subsequent conduct.

It might be argued that the validity of this sort of excuse-cum-justification should not turn on simply a comparison of the consequences of an official's actions and the consequences of the actions of alternative causal agents. Bernard Williams (1973) maintains that this way of ascribing responsibility (which he associates with utilitarianism) ignores the value of personal integrity (pp. 97–98). He argues that a young scientist who opposes research on chemical and biological warfare should not take a job in a government laboratory engaged in such research, even if as a result another scientist will take the job and pursue the research much more zealously. Agents should be primarily responsible for their own "projects" (actions based on commitments that form part of their personal character) and should not abandon them simply because the calculation of general social utility dictates that they should (p. 116). While Williams may be correct in criticizing utilitarianism for permitting an impersonal perspective to dominate a personal one, his own account of personal integrity remains insufficiently developed to support the radically circumscribed responsibility he evidently favors. Acting to protect one's personal integrity, at the expense of avoidable and serious harm to other people, seems too close to moral self-indulgence; it could represent an effort to keep one's hands clean no matter what happens to the rest of society.

A second category of causal excuses comprises those pleas that would disconnect an official completely from the chain of events leading to a harmful outcome. These may be called excuses from null cause. Since it is often possible to cite as a cause almost any act or omission by an official in the organization that brings about the outcome, an official who uses the excuse must distinguish his or her act or omission from that of others. One way to do this is the familiar plea, "It's not my job." In this form the excuse is usually intended to cut short any argument about whether the official could have made any difference, or could make any difference in the future. Because the duties of the official's role do not concern the policy in question, failure to oppose the policy or to resign from the government that pursues it should not be considered a cause of its perpetuation. As George Ball said in an interview in 1973, "Why *should* I have resigned in protest over Vietnam policy just because I disagreed with it? My main responsibility . . . was Western Europe. Perhaps five per cent of my time was spent on Vietnam. It simply wasn't my responsibility; . . . it wasn't as if I were the Honduras desk officer being put in the position of having to approve a U.S. military action in Honduras" (quoted in Weisband and Franck, 1976, p. 139). Ball is surely right to suppose that the nature of an office circumscribes an official's responsibility to some extent; one cannot be culpable for all the policies on which one could have had any influence. That Ball's "main responsibility" did not concern Vietnam at least counts as a reason for ascribing less responsibility to him than to those officials whose main duties did concern Vietnam. By the same token, as a high-ranking State Department official, Ball shares more blame than (say) an official in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The nature of the role or office, however, should not be understood rigidly. Contrary to the implication of Ball's reference to the Honduras desk officer, it is not enough to claim that one's role does not require specific positive decisions in the area in question. Omissions, acquiescence, tacit approval, even ritualized opposition —all may gain one a place in the causal chain.

---

[10] Feinberg, 1970, pp. 196, 207–12. In this form, then, the excuse from alternative cause becomes the basis of what I call below the excuse from null cause. Both kinds of excuse should be distinguished from the excuse from additional cause (see Hart and Honoré, 1959, pp. 216–25).

Similarly, a narrowly technical definition of an office does not necessarily exonerate the person who holds that office. Scientific personnel, for example, may be responsible for the uses others make of their work, especially if the risks of harm from these uses are great. The case for ascribing responsibility to scientists for their discoveries increases if, like J. Robert Oppenheimer, they continue to have influence on how politicians use their discoveries. Defending himself in 1954, Oppenheimer disclaimed any such responsibility: "I did my job . . . I was not in a policy-making position. . ." (U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1971, p. 236). But earlier he evidently accepted a rather extreme form of such responsibility. According to Truman, Oppenheimer in 1946 "came into my office . . . and spent most of his time wringing his hands and telling me that had blood on them because of the discovery of atomic energy" (Donovan, 1977, p. 97). To say that scientists or other officials who are engaged in technical work may be morally responsible for the consequences of their work is not necessarily to claim that they should not perform the work when its use offends their conscience (they may have an overriding duty to contribute their talents and skills to society in some circumstances). But it does imply that their choice of whether to perform the work is a moral one, and that they have a continuing obligation to consider and question the uses to which their contributions are put. Even if the duties of office do not require (or perhaps do not permit) an official to do anything about an immoral policy, we may wish to criticize the official for remaining in office as part of an immoral regime. But this would be an accusation of complicity (claiming that one's association with this regime is itself immoral or dishonorable), rather than an ascription of responsibility (asserting that by some act or omission, one actually furthered specific immoral politics) (see Hill, 1979, pp. 83–102).

In another form of the excuse from null cause, an official cites a *novus actus interveniens*—a subsequent act by another official who can control whether the first official's action has any effect and therefore supposedly bears the entire responsibility for any harmful consequences. It is sometimes said, for example, that advisers are not responsible for the results of policies since the person whom they advise is free to accept or reject their counsel (e.g., Nelson, 1968, p. 119). Hobbes put forward such a view maintaining the innocence of advisers, but he recognized that it makes sense only if advisers are understood as providing instrumental counsel for achieving ends that are not in dispute (1962, pp. 191–92). The trouble is that beyond the boundaries of the Leviathan, ends usually are controversial, and so then is the question of whether instrumental analysis of means or advocacy of ends is the appropriate role for an adviser to assume. A report by a professional association (Operations Research, 1971) criticizing six scientists for engaging in advocacy instead of analysis in the controversy over the Anti-Ballistic Missile System in 1969 itself generated further controversy. Reaction to the society's definition of the proper role of an adviser evidently depended on where one stood on the substance of the ABM issue (Doty, 1972, p. 281).

In general, we assume that even an adviser who advocates a position bears less responsibility than the official who decides to follow the advice. However, this assumption depends on the personal relationship between the adviser and the advisee, and on the ways the adviser perceives the advice. If an official adopts a proposal mostly because he trusts the adviser personally—as President Kennedy was said to have decided for a blockade because those with whom he was "personally most compatible" recommended it (Allison, 1971, pp. 203-04)—we might want to say that the adviser should accept equal responsibility for the decision, or in some cases even more responsibility than the official who makes the decision. Similarly, in deciding whether to press the perspective of a particular office or to advocate a more general perspective, an adviser must assess how other people are likely to react—including how other advisers are performing their own jobs, and how the balance of advice is likely to come out. For this reason even devil's advocates, if their opposition begins to legitimize the course of action they oppose, may come to share some responsibility for it (cf. Hirschman, 1970, pp. 115–19). A *novus actus interveniens* therefore does not in general, and certainly not in any simple way, cancel an adviser's responsibility for the policies about which he or she offers counsel.

Volitional Excuses

Some theories of responsibility would obviate the problem of many hands by making officials responsible only for what they intend, not at all (or at least never as much) for what anyone else does as a result of their decisions. Kant expresses this view in its most absolute form. Kant insists, for example, that you must tell the truth even to a murderer who asks where your friend, his intended victim, is hiding (1949, pp. 346–50). You are responsible for your own intentional act (truth-telling or lying), and if you tell the truth you cannot be blamed for what other people do as a result of your honesty. The implausibility of this view in ordinary moral life is magnified in public life. Even if we deny that a public official should let utilitarian calculation determine whether he or she lies or commits other acts that are absolutely wrong on a Kantian view, we would surely hold the official morally responsible for failing to take precautions to avoid harmful consequences of others' responses to his or her decisions. Even a traditional morality, which otherwise disregards consequences, "commands" that we carefully consider "what bad consequences, flow from abiding by it" and "what dispositions [we] can make to avoid them. . ." (Donagan, 1977, pp. 206–07). To say that intention is not a necessary condition for charging an official with responsibility is not inevitably to embrace a consequentialism that holds that we are all "equally morally responsible for all consequences."[11] It is simply to recognize that, at least for public officials, the contours of responsibility are likely to be more irregular than the criterion of intention would draw. In tracing the bounds of responsibility, we shall also have to pay attention to other criteria, specifically those of ignorance and compulsion.

If ignorance in general were a valid excuse, the innocence of some public officials would be irreproachable. But the kind of ignorance relevant to the problem of many hands concerns an official's lack of specific knowledge about the actions of other officials. An official who admittedly contributes to an objectionable outcome may seek to excuse the contribution by claiming that he or she did not know, and should not have been expected to know, that other officials had acted wrongly or would act wrongly. When as UN Ambassador in 1961 Adlai Stevenson stated that the U.S. did not have anything to do with the invasion of Cuba, he could not have been expected to realize that his statement was false, and therefore escapes responsibility for any wrong that was committed (Muller, 1967, pp. 283–84). Whether Stevenson should have been told is another matter, but ambassadors, spokespersons and others in similar roles have to trust that they are being told the truth, or at least that they are being told everything they need to know about governmental activities within their purview.

At the other end of the causal chain, an official may sometimes be excused for consequences of a decision when he or she could not be expected to foresee the wrongs that other officials would commit in implementing the decision. President Truman, after the surrender of Germany, signed an order terminating the shipment of food, clothing and other goods that our allies had been receiving under Lend-Lease; the abrupt disruption of these supplies threatened significant hardship for many citizens in these countries until Truman rescinded the order. Truman defended himself by claiming that his aides had executed the order too literally (1955, pp. 227–28). Such an excuse will not work when officials are the instruments of their own ignorance. They may, for example, encourage subordinates not to tell them about certain possibly objectionable plans so that they can deny knowledge of the plans if they go awry. Or officials may elicit misleading information from subordinates by indicating, sometimes unwittingly, what kind of conclusions they wish to hear, as when Rusk and McNamara, considering an American intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, asked the acting U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic if "he agreed with their view that a rebel victory would probably lead to a pro-Communist government" (Martin, 1966, p. 659). Not surprisingly, the acting ambassador agreed.

---

[11] Fried, 1978, pp. 34–35. Fried himself defends a qualified version of the Kantian theory, conceding that we are morally responsible for some of the unintended consequences of our actions but insisting that we are "primarily" responsible for only what we intend in the sense that we may never do intentional harm in order to avoid greater unintended harm (pp. 21–22, 26, 28, 42, 168).

To reject a plea of ignorance, we do not have to show that an official should have foreseen the specific act of some particular official (for example, that an aide would misinterpret an order in exactly this way). It is sufficient that the official should have realized that mistakes of the kind that occurred were likely. In bureaucracies, certain patterns of fault are common enough that we should expect any competent official to anticipate them and to take reasonable precautions to avoid them or at least to minimize their harmful consequences. During the early months of the Peace Corps, Sargent Shriver, disappointed in the small number of requests foreign governments had submitted for Corps programs, urged his "programmers" to seek out more requests. According to one account, those who failed to come back with programs "in their pockets" were fired or fell into disfavor; consequently, some programmers created fictitious programs. It has been argued that Shriver should bear some responsibility for these consequences since he should have foreseen that his own injunction could induce such behavior by some of his staff (Peters, 1973, p. 22; for a different account, see Ashabranner, 1971, pp. 19–42). When a superior puts great pressure on subordinates to produce results and gives the impression that questionable practices to achieve these results will be condoned—as allegedly occurred in the army recruiting scandals reported in the fall of 1979—then the blame falls at least equally on the superior. Ignorance ceases even to mitigate responsibility.

But that an official apply pressure, even of the mild sort Shriver evidently exerted, is not a necessary condition for making an official responsible for the subsequent actions of others. An official who sets in motion bureaucratic routines cannot escape culpability for the consequences even if he or she is no longer involved in the process when the consequences occur. The system of double-bookkeeping that Henry Kissinger approved in 1969, supposedly to conceal a single bombing attack on Cambodia, persisted "by rote and without a special new decision" and led other officials in 1973 to give Congress false information (Kissinger, 1979a, p. 7; 1979b, pp. 239–54). Even if the initial bombing and secrecy could somehow be justified, Kissinger would not escape blame for the subsequent deception. Whether the bureaucratic routines are pathological or conventional (or both), that they have a life of their own, often roaming beyond their original purpose, is a fact of organizational behavior that officials should be expected to appreciate. The more that the consequences of a decision fit such bureaucratic patterns, the less an official can plausibly appeal to the excuse from ignorance.

Yet an official may still have an escape. Some of the most normal and expected patterns of behavior in bureaucracies are also the most difficult for anyone to change, and some of these may obligate an official to act in certain ways despite harmful consequences he or she may be able to foresee. Thus, just as the excuse from ignorance begins to falter, the excuse from compulsion comes to the rescue. Of the many kinds of constraints that officials cite to reduce their responsibility for decisions, those that derive from other officials' actions, rather than from forces of nature or reactions of the public, most directly bear on the problem of many hands.

The question of responsibility certainly arises when an official issues an explicit order to carry out some morally objectionable policy, but I pass over such cases because they are extensively discussed in the literature on war crimes (Walzer, 1977, pp. 287–327), and also because they are less prevalent in the workaday life of administrators in modern bureaucracies. More common are cases where no explicit order has been given but a subordinate believes that a superior expects him or her to pursue what is seen as a morally dubious course of action. This is the gray area between command and discretion. When a superior relies on subordinates to know what to do without being told, the superior can no more escape responsibility for the subordinates' actions than they can. No one ordered FBI Director L. Patrick Gray to destroy the incriminating files from E. Howard Hunt's safe, but, as Gray later testified, "The clear implication . . . was that these two files were to be destroyed. . ." (Congressional Quarterly, 1975, p. 226).

But perhaps an even more common constraint than orders from a superior, however implicit, is that of various practices and procedures established by other officials who may not be identifiable, or, for that matter, may no longer be alive. Such practices circumscribe an official's range of choices, and thus may mitigate his or her responsibility. Consider Mayor Beame's dilemma during the New York City fiscal crisis before the market for city securities collapsed in the spring of 1975 (Thompson, 1981). Among other charges, critics accused Beame of misleading the public by failing to disclose the true state of the city's finances. Beame insisted that it was not his fault if the budget misrepresented the city's financial condition. He had inherited the questionable accounting practices ("gimmicks," the critics called them) that gave rise to any misrepresentation. Those practices that he knew about, he could neither change nor even publicize (he believed) without risking the bankruptcy of the city, and jeopardizing the welfare of millions of the city's residents and employees. For example, the budget overstated the amount of federal and state aid the city expected to receive because city officials recorded, as receivable, funds that federal and state authorities did not intend to allocate. Beame argued that if he had removed the disputed receivables from the books, or even had conceded that they were in dispute, he would have significantly reduced the chances for collecting these funds from the federal and state governments. There were other such "gimmicks"—nearly all difficult to change and none of them of the mayor's making. We may be prepared to excuse Beame as mayor for the existence of these practices, and blame him less for any decisions constrained by these practices. We would normally impute more responsibility to the mayor's predecessors. But in this case there is a twist: among his predecessors were Abe Beame, Controller, 1969–73, 1962–65; Abe Beame, Budget Director, 1952–61; and Abe Beame, Assistant Budget Director, 1946–52. Personal responsibility, unlike role responsibility, pursues officials through time.

Some bureaucratic practices, unobjectionable in intent, turn out to constrain the performances of officials in harmful ways. Such constraints particularly affect those officials who have been called "street-level bureaucrats"—social workers, policemen and the like, who deal frequently with citizens, and exercise considerable discretion in an uncertain environment (Lipsky, 1980, pp. 81–156). Because these officials face demanding standards of job performance and rarely have sufficient resources to meet them, they develop "bureaucratic mechanisms" to evade responsibility for their failures. For example, because the performance of officials in the Job Corps program was measured by the number of trainees who received a job after completing the program, officials tended to recruit those youths who already seemed disposed to succeed in a job; these turned out to be youths with more middle-class than lower-class orientations (Sjoberg et al., 1978, pp. 42–43). A seemingly neutral procedure of evaluation thus gave rise to discriminatory bureaucratic conduct. In these circumstances, we would want to impute major responsibility to the higher-level officials who set up the procedures—if we can locate these officials.

But street-level bureaucrats themselves cannot be considered blameless no matter what they do. Even within the constraints of fixed routines, some officials perform worse than others; and these variations open some space for ascribing responsibility. A measure of actual variation—for example, an average performance—would not serve as a satisfactory base line from which to assess responsibility since all officials may be doing less well than they could, even given the constraints. We would need some criterion based on a hypothetical average performance—what the average official could reasonably be expected to do under the circumstances (a "reasonable bureaucrat" test?). Moreover, when these lower-level officials come to recognize how certain bureaucratic routines cause them to perform in morally questionable ways, they acquire, as do other officials who work within defective structures, a special responsibility to call attention to the defects, even if they cannot correct them.

Conclusion

The conditions under which excuses eliminate or mitigate the responsibility of a public official depend not only on factors to which the excuses refer directly (causality and volition) but also on factors that help interpret the excuses (the nature of the policy in question and the role the official holds). The interaction of these factors is best captured not by a general theory of responsibility but by a casuistic analysis of a range of exemplary cases. I have given reasons for rejecting the simpler approaches of the hierarchical and collective models, as well as for avoiding formulas (such as alternative cause) that would simplify the ascription of personal responsibility itself.

Insofar as we can locate those officials who are personally responsible and thus most closely connected with the policies and decisions that governments promulgate, we refine and fortify the praise and blame that, as democratic citizens, we direct toward public officials. Personal responsibility in this way can lay a foundation for democratic accountability of the officials who make objectionable decisions and policies. But it also supports accountability for harmful policies and decisions that are less attributable to any current officials as moral agents than to bureaucratic routines and structural defects of the organization in which the officials act. Because personal responsibility attaches to persons, not to offices or collectivities, it follows an official wherever he or she goes. We can trace it through time—to the past when the mayor was the controller, or to the future when the solicitor general makes good on his claim that he was the least bad alternative. Moreover, our assessment of an official's responsibility for harmful decisions made within a defective structure, even if the official did the best job possible in face of the constraints imposed by this structure, depends on the efforts he or she makes to criticize and change those defects. The grounds for this extension of responsibility derive from the volitional criteria. Officials who operate within faulty machinery of government may be presumed to know more than others about its faults; the excuse of ignorance is usually less accessible to them. They are also often in the best position to refute or to fulfill the claim that they cannot do anything about the defects; hence, the excuse from compulsion becomes less plausible to the extent that an official fails to make efforts toward criticism or reform.

We can hardly expect to identify officials who are responsible for all, or perhaps even the worst, evils that governments visit upon their citizens; nor for that matter can we always identify officials who deserve credit for the good that governments occasionally accomplish. But the pursuit of personal responsibility provides the best foundation for understanding the role that human agency plays in good and bad government, and therefore, establishes some basis for initiating whatever political change may be necessary.

References

Allison, Graham (1971). *Essence of Decision.* Boston: Little, Brown.

Altshuler, Alan A. (1977). "The Study of American Public Administration." In Alan A. Altshuler and Norman C. Thomas (eds.), *The Politics of the Federal Bureaucracy.* New York: Harper and Row.

Anderson, Charles W. (1979). "The Place of Principles in Policy Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 73: 711-23.

Aristotle (1963). Ethica Nicomachea. In W. D. Ross (ed.), *The Works of Aristotle.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ashabranner, Brent (1971). *A Moment in History.* Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.

Austin, J. L. (1956-57). "A Plea for Excuses." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 57: 1-30.

Bok, Sissela (1978). *Lying.* New York: Pantheon.

Congressional Quarterly (1975). *Watergate.* Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly.

Donagan, Alan (1977). *The Theory of Morality.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Donovan, Robert J. (1977). *Conflict and Crisis.* New York: Norton.

Doty, Paul (1972). "Can Investigations Improve Scientific Advice? The Case of the ABM." *Minerva* 10: 280-94.

Edelman, Murray (1964). *The Symbolic Uses of Politics.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Feinberg, Joel (1970). *Doing and Deserving.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Fleishman, Joel, and Bruce Payne (1980). *Ethical Dilemmas and the Education of Policymakers.* Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hastings Center.

Frankfurt, Harry G. (1971). "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." *Journal of Philosophy* 68: 5-20.

French, Peter A., ed. (1972). *Individual and Collective Responsibility.* Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman.

Fried, Charles (1978). *Right and Wrong.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Friedlander, Saul (1969). *Kurt Gerstein.* New York: Knopf.

Gerth, H. H., and C. Wright Mills (1958). *From Max Weber.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Glover, Jonathan (1970). *Responsibility.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Hampshire, Stuart, ed. (1978). *Public and Private Morality.* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Hart, H. L. A. (1968). *Punishment and Responsibility.* New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

______, and A. M. Honoré (1959). *Causation in the Law.* Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.

Heclo, Hugh (1978). "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment." In Anthony King (ed.), *The New American Political System.* Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute.

Hill, Thomas E. (1979). "Symbolic Protest and Calculated Silence." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 9: 83-102.

Hirschman, Albert O. (1970). *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Hobbes, Thomas (1962). *Leviathan.* New York: Collier.

Kant, Immanuel (1949). "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives." In L. W. Beck (ed.), *Critique of Practical Reason.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kaufman, Herbert (1977). *Red Tape.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings.

Kissinger, Henry (1979a). "Letters." *Economist* 272: 6-7.

______ (1979b). *White House Years.* Boston: Little, Brown.

Krasner, Stephen D. (1972). "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison in Wonderland)." *Foreign Policy* 7: 159-79.

Ladd, John (1970). "Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in Formal Organizations." *Monist* 54: 488-516.

Lipsky, Michael (1980). *Street-Level Bureaucracy.* New York: Russell Sage.

Lowi, Theodore J. (1979). *The End of Liberalism,* 2d ed. New York: W.W. Norton.

Lukas, J. Anthony (1977). *Nightmare.* New York: Bantam.

Martin, John Bartlow (1966). *Overtaken by Events.* Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.

Muller, Robert J. (1967). *Adlai Stevenson.* New York: Harper and Row.

Nelson, William R., ed. (1968). *The Politics of Science.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Operations Research Society of America (1971). "Guidelines for the Practice of Operations Research." *Operations Research* 19: 1123-58.

Pennock, J. Roland (1979). *Democratic Political Theory.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Peters, Charles (1973). "The Culture of Bureaucracy." *Washington Monthly* 5: 22-24.

Rohr, John A. (1978). *Ethics for Bureaucrats.* New York and Basel: Dekker.

Rourke, Francis E., ed. (1978). *Bureaucratic Power in National Politics,* 3rd ed. Boston: Little, Brown.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. (1965). *A Thousand Days.* Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.

Sjoberg, Gideon et al. (1978). "Bureaucracy and the Lower Class." In Francis E. Rourke (ed.), *Bureaucratic Power in National Politics.* Boston: Little, Brown.

Stillman, Richard J. (1980). *Public Administration: Concepts and Cases,* 2d ed. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.

Strawson, P. F. (1968). "Freedom and Resentment." In Strawson (ed.), *Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Thompson, Dennis (1981). "Excuses Officials Use: Moral Responsibility and the New York City Fiscal Crisis." In Joel Fleishman et al. (eds.). *Ethics in Government.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, forthcoming.

Thompson, Victor (1961). *Modern Organizations.* New York: Random House.

Truman, Harry (1955). *Memoirs,* Vol. 1, *Years of Decisions.* New York: Doubleday.

U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (1971). *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Walsh, W. H. (1970). "Pride, Shame and Responsibility." *Philosophical Quarterly* 20: 1-13.

Walzer, Michael (1973). "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 2: 160-80.

______ (1977). *Just and Unjust Wars.* New York: Basic Books.

Weisband, Edward, and Thomas M. Franck (1976). *Resignation in Protest.* New York: Penguin Books.

Williams, Bernard (1973). "A Critique of Utilitarianism." In J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, *Utilitarianism for and Against.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

An Expected Utility Theory of International Conflict

BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA
University of Rochester

An expected utility theory of necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the initiation and escalation of serious international conflicts, including war, is proposed. The theory leads to the seemingly obvious generalization that actors do not initiate wars—or serious disputes—if they do not expect to gain from doing so. Underlying that generalization are a number of counterintuitive deductions. For instance, I show that though a weak nonaligned state cannot rationally attack a stronger nonaligned nation, it might be able to attack a stronger adversary that, in addition to its own strength, expects to derive support from allies. I also show that serious conflict is more likely between very close allies than between enemies. Systematic tests, using data on serious international threats, military interventions, and interstate wars, as well as 17 cases of known attempts at deterrence, show very substantial support for the expected utility propositions deduced from the theory.

My purpose here is to develop and test an expected utility theory of necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the initiation of serious interstate conflicts, including war. In avoiding a quest for a causal theory, I am implicitly assuming that ultimate responsibility for turning toward war or peace rests with each individual decision maker, and not with some compulsion of circumstance. Beyond the calculation of material costs and benefits lie considerations of individual moral values, but these considerations become crucial only if the necessary material requirements for conflict are satisfied.

My principal assumptions are that (a) decisions to initiate war-threatening conflicts can be viewed *as if* they are the product of the calculations of a single, all-important decision maker; (b) decision makers are rational expected utility maximizers; (c) differences in leaders' orientations toward risk-taking influence their decision making; (d) uncertainty about the likely behavior of other states in the event of conflict affects decision making; and (e) national power decays over distance (Boulding, 1960).

The first assumption is necessitated by my intention to treat nation-states *as if* they are unitary actors. To do so while avoiding the possibility that national policies are the product of socially intransitive preferences, I must either assume that decision making is unanimous, dominated by a strong leader, or takes place in an environment in which one or more of the conditions for Arrow's paradox does not obtain. Since it is difficult to know in advance that a socially intransitive set of preferences will not occur, and since unanimity is rare, the assumption of a strong leader ultimately responsible for foreign policy decisions seems most reasonable. Of course, many individuals play important roles in shaping decisions pertaining to war and peace, probably so much so that no decision is precisely controlled by one individual. One cannot disregard the importance of advisers, cabinet ministers, constitutional provisions regarding declarations of war, legislative actions, or public opinion. All these, and other sources of information, help encourage or discourage a strong leader from pursuing one or another course of action. The positions, the arguments, and most importantly, the potential of others to withhold or contribute resources, may dissuade the leader from taking a preferred course of action, but it is still the leader's decision and not theirs. This assumption should not be construed to mean that these key leaders may start wars whenever they want to, but rather that they may stop policies leading to war if they want to.[1]

This article is part of a larger body of research, the international policy assessment project (IPAP), which is generously funded by the Scaife Family Charitable Trusts. Portion of this research were also supported by the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation. I have received particularly helpful comments and suggestions from Bruce Berkowitz, Richard Fenno, C. H. Huang, Jacek Kugler, James Morrow, David Newman, Richard Niemi, Dina Zinnes, and a number of anonymous referees for the *Review*. Although I have not always been wise enough to follow their advice, I have benefited greatly from their asssistance. I alone, of course, must bear responsibility for any remaining errors.

[1] Many of the assumptions may appear controversial or unrealistic, especially the treatment of nations as if they were unitary actors. Space limitations preclude dealing at length with the justifications for my assumptions, or for exploring alternative assumptions. The in-

The assumption of rational expected utility maximization is merely intended to convey the notion that choices between war and peace are made *as if* to maximize the strong leader's welfare and, by assumption, the welfare of those at whose pleasure the leader remains in a position of leadership. My particular approach to the maximizing behavior of key leaders is shaped by two additional assumptions. First, I postulate that one nation's utility for another nation is a direct, positive function of the degree to which they share a common policy perspective. Thus, while power may be instrumental to achieving particular ends in international politics, I postulate that utilities are determined by the congruence of policy ends between states. Second, I assume that one nation's probability of success in a contest with another nation (or coalitions of nations) is a direct, positive function of each relevant nation's power compared to that of each other relevant nation. All other things being equal (and, as I will show, they often are not equal), a stronger state has a higher probability of success against a weaker nation than it does against a stronger nation.

In expected utility calculations, one must estimate cardinal utilities. In the formulation of expected utility decision rules here, I assume that utility values are bounded such that the perception of perfect agreement on the relevant policy dimensions is reflected in a utility score of +1, and the perception of complete disagreement is reflected in a utility score of −1.

Assumptions (c) and (d) recognize the possibility that individuals, even with the same preference ordering on outcomes, and with the same information, may make different decisions because of their sensitivity to risks and to uncertainty. The final assumption acknowledges that it is difficult to sustain supply lines, morale, and support at home for long-distance wars.

Risk and Uncertainty

In conventional usage, risk-taking refers to a situation in which an actor chooses between two or more outcomes from a lottery in which the probability of each outcome is known. Uncertainty refers to times when decisions must be made even though the objective probability values attached to alternative outcomes are unknown. Conventional usage distinguishes, then, between decisions made under conditions of risk and those made under uncertainty. I wish, however, to extend these distinctions somewhat beyond conventional usage:

Some individuals are more tolerant of risk than others. Some, for instance, attach added value to risky situations, such as lotteries, because they enjoy taking chances, independent of the outcome. Such people are risk-acceptant. Conversely, some people shy away from "high"-risk situations, disliking taking chances. Such people are risk-averse. Even in the absence of uncertainty, risk-averse people require that more conditions are satisfied before they will enter a lottery—or risky situation—than individuals who are risk-acceptant. When a risk-averse individual confronts the additional pressure of making decisions in an uncertain environment, then s/he is even more constrained, requiring that even more conditions be satisfied before being willing to "take a chance." Some risk-acceptant decision makers may, when faced with an uncertain environment, become more cautious and risk-averse, while others, enjoying the added challenge imposed by uncertainty, may become even more willing to accept risk (or, of course, such individuals may be unchanged in their attitude toward risk taking).

In principle, a decision maker's responses to risk and to environmental conditions can vary across a continuum from extreme risk aversion to extreme risk acceptance and (in the case of environmental conditions) from extreme uncertainty to nearly perfect confidence in their information. Indeed, some earlier research on uncertainty in the international environment has treated this condition as a continuous variable (Midlarsky, 1975; Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972). In this study, and in the larger study from which this is drawn (Bueno de Mesquita, forthcoming), however, I have chosen to treat risk taking and the environmental information condition as dichotomous variables. While I leave a description of my operational procedures for a later section, I would like to digress briefly to explain the decision to limit the variation on each of these important dimensions.

Unlike earlier examinations of relationships between war and uncertainty (or risk taking), this study investigates relationships emerging deductively from explicit decision rules. I am not attempting to assess the specific impact of uncertainty or risk, nor am I attempting to ascertain how much variance in any aspect of war is accounted for by the level of uncertainty or the distribution of risk-taking propensities in

---

terested reader, however, will find an extensive examination of each of the assumptions in Bueno de Mesquita (forthcoming), Ch. 2.

the international system. In the absence of any theoretical basis for deriving decision rules that respond to risk and/or uncertainty along a continuum, I have chosen to define four discrete decision rules; one for decisions by risk-averse actors choosing under risky, but not uncertain, conditions, one for risk-averse actors deciding under uncertainty, one for risk-acceptant individuals acting in a risky environment, and one for risk-acceptant individuals in an uncertain environment. These decision rules, described later, satisfy what I view as the minimal theoretical requirements for distinguishing among the four individual/environmental combinations of risk and uncertainty that actors face, so that while risk-averse actors may, in some cases, be even more risk-averse than my rules stipulate, at least the rules capture the gross distinction between those who value risks and those who discount their expectations because of risks.

The Expected Utility Theory

Seven types of nations can be identified in considering those actors that might have an effect on calculations about the initiation of such serious international conflicts as wars. The seven types are:

1. The potential initiator (hereafter called *i*);
2. The potential defender (hereafter called *j*);
3. Those nations with policies viewed by *i* as friendly toward *i*, but not toward *j* (hereafter called k_1);
4. Those nations with policies viewed by *i* as friendly toward *j*, but not toward *i* (hereafter called k_2);
5. Those nations with policies viewed by *i* as friendly toward both *i* and *j* (hereafter called k_3);
6. Those nations whose policies are viewed by *i* as neither friendly toward *i*, nor toward *j*, but as friendly toward other third parties (hereafter called k_4); and
7. Nonaligned nations with policies viewed by *i* as neither friendly toward *i*, nor toward *j*, nor toward other states (hereafter called k_5).[2]

The last two types are similar in that they are not perceived as friendly toward the would-be initiator or the initiator's would-be victim. Since a policy of nonalignment is of particular interest, I treat nonaligned nations separately from those which are aligned, but not with *i* or *j*. This is done strictly for convenience and clarity and does not involve any special assumptions about either type of nation.

When a leader contemplates the expected utility of the initiation of a conflict, the following variables are significant:

1. The relative strength of *i* and *j*;
2. The value *i* places on changing *j*'s policies to be more in line with its own preferences, relative to the possible changes in policy *i* might be forced to accept if it loses to *j*; and
3. The relative strength and perceived policy interests of all k_1, k_2, k_3, k_4, and k_5 (as seen through the eyes of *i*) that might intervene in the ensuing conflict.

Relative strength is important because, as noted earlier, the probability of gaining or losing in a conflict is directly related to the relative ability of the antagonists to bring power to bear in the conflict. The value, or interest, attached to a conflict by *i*, *j*, and all k_l is important because it determines the range of possible policy gains or losses that might be experienced if the contemplated conflict is initiated.[3] These factors may be combined into three expected utility lotteries, as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} E(U_i)_b = {} & (P_i(U_{ii} - U_{ij} \\ & + (1 - P_i)(U_{ij} - U_{ii}))_{t0} \\ & + P_{i_{t_0}}(\Delta(U_{ii} - U_{ij}))_{t0 \to t+n} \\ & + (1 - P_i)_{t0}(\Delta(U_{ij} - U_{ii}))_{t0 \to t+n} \end{aligned} \qquad (1)$$

$$\begin{aligned} E(U_i)_{k_l 1} = {} & (P_{ik}\, U_{iki} + (1 - P_{ik})U_{ikj})_{t0} \\ & + P_{ik_{t0}}(\Delta U_{iki})_{t0 \to t+n} \\ & + (1 - P_{ik})_{t0}(\Delta U_{ikj})_{t0 \to t+n} \end{aligned} \qquad (2)$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} E(U_i)_{k_l 2} = {} & ((1 - P_{jk})U_{iki} + P_{jk}U_{ikj})_{t0} \\ & + (1 - P_{jk})_{t0}(\Delta U_{iki})_{t0 \to t+n} \\ & + P_{jk_{t0}}(\Delta U_{ikj})_{t0 \to t+n}, \end{aligned} \qquad (3)$$

---

[2] K_1 states are characterized by the fact that they prefer *i*'s policies to *j*'s, and by the fact that their utility for *i* is positive, while their utility for *j* is negative. K_2 nations prefer *j* to *i*, having positive utility for *j*, and negative utility for *i*. K_3 have positive utility for *i* and *j*, with the relative magnitude of their utilities indicating whether they prefer *i* to *j* or *j* to *i*. K_4 and K_5 have negative utility for *i* and *j*, with their preferences being indicated by the relative magnitude of those utilities.

[3] Of course, any objective that a nation pursues may be construed as a policy, whether it be territorial acqui-

where

U_{ii} = *i*'s utility for *i*'s own policies. $U_{ii} = 1$ by definition.

U_{ij} = *i*'s utility for *j*'s policies. U_{ij} can vary between +1 and −1.

$(U_{ii} - U_{ij})_{t0}$ = *i*'s perception of what might be gained by succeeding in a bilateral conflict with *j* in which *i* can then impose new policies on *j*. This term reflects *i*'s current evaluation of the difference between *i*'s current policies and *i*'s perception of *j*'s current policies (hence it is evaluated at time *t*0). Thus, the greater the perceived similarity between *i*'s current policies and *j*'s current policies (i.e., $U_{ij} \rightarrow U_{ii}$), the less utility *i* expects to derive from altering *j*'s policies.

$(U_{ij} - U_{ii})_{t0}$ = *i*'s perception of what might be lost by failing in a bilateral contest with *j* in which *j* can then impose new policies on *i*. This term reflects *i*'s current evaluation of how much *j* could shift *i*'s policies to make them more in line with *j*'s interests as perceived by *i*. Like the previous term, this term is evaluated based on current policies (at *t*0).

P_i = *i*'s current perception of its probability of succeeding against *j* in a bilateral conflict.

$1 - P_i$ = *i*'s current perception of its probability of losing against *j* in a bilateral conflict.

U_{iki} = *i*'s perception of the utility to be derived from each third-party actor.

U_{ikj} = *i*'s perception of the utility to be derived by *j* from each third-party actor.

P_{ik} = *i*'s perception of its probability of success against *j*, given that third parties *k* aid *i*.

$1 - P_{ik}$ = *i*'s perception of its probability of failing against *j*, given that third parties *k* aid *i*.

P_{jk} = *i*'s perception of its probability of failing against *j*, given that third parties *k* aid *j*.

$1 - P_{jk}$ = *i*'s perception of its probability of succeeding against *j*, given that third parties *k* aid *j*.

$\Delta(U_{ii} - U_{ij})_{t0 \rightarrow t+n}$ = *i*'s perception of anticipated change in the difference between *i*'s policies and *j*'s policies over the period *t*0 (the present) to some future time (*t*+*n*).

$\Delta(U_{ij} - U_{ii})_{t0 \rightarrow t+n}$ = *i*'s perception of anticipated change in how much *j* would want to alter *i*'s policies in the future compared to *j*'s current perceived policy differences with *i*. Thus, this term represents *i*'s perception of anticipated future potential policy losses (over the period *t*0 to the future period *t*+*n*) to *j*, while the previous term represents *i*'s perception of future potential policy gains to be derived from imposing *i*'s will on *j*. Both this and the previous term represents *i*'s estimates under the assumption of no war.

$\Delta U_{iki_{t0 \rightarrow t+n}}$ = *i*'s perception of anticipated future changes in the utility *i* can expect to derive from *(over the time span t* 0 to *t*+*n*).

$\Delta U_{ikj_{t0 \rightarrow t+n}}$ = *i*'s perception of anticipated future changes in the utility *j* can expect to derive from *k* (over the time span *t*0 to *t*+*n*).

*t*0 = the time at which *i* is calculating expected utility. Thus, any terms with a *t*0 subscript are computed based on *current* values.

$t0 \rightarrow t+n$ = the time span over which *i* estimates expected changes in utility values.[4]

$E(U_i)_b$ = *i*'s expected utility from a bilateral conflict with *j*.

$E(U_i)_{k_l 1}$ = *i*'s expected utility from a multilateral conflict with *j*, given that *i* treats all third parties k_l (where *l* includes third parties of types 1 through 5, as defined above) as potentially aiding *i*.

$\Sigma E(U_i)_{k_l 2}$ = *i*'s expected utility from a multilateral conflict with *j*, given that *i* treats all third parties k_l as potentially aiding *j*.

Since the two multilateral lotteries entertain the possibilities that some third parties can try to help or hinder both *i* and *j* (i.e., U_{iki} and U_{ikj} can be greater than, less than, or equal to zero, for any one third party *k*), *i* is interested in the net—not gross—contribution to be expected from each such third party *k*. Consequently, the overall expected utility derived from third parties (hereafter $E(U_i)_{k_l}$) is:

$$\sum_{l=1}^{5} E(U_i)_{k_l} = \sum_{l=1}^{5} E(U_i)_{k_l 1} - \sum_{l=1}^{5} E(U_i)_{k_l 2}. \quad (4)$$

---

sitions, expansion of power, support for poor nations, pursuit of disarmament, or whatever.

[4] The expected utility equations include terms for assessing expected changes in utility values, but not for assessing expected changes in probability values. Probabilities are treated only at the current time period of *t*0 because I am evaluating a leader's *current* judgment of the likelihood of success or failure in a conflict and the current perspective on present and future policy differences between the would-be initiator and its would-be foe. The expectation of future improved or deteriorated relations may affect current motivations to wage war, but future expectations about the probability of success cannot materially alter the current perception of whether success is likely or not. Of course, future probability values may affect whether now or later is the most propitious time for a nation to act. Since the theory is concerned only with necessary, and not with necessary and sufficient, conditions, I am merely interested in whether the current probability of success (combined with utilities) is adequate to warrant the contemplation of conflict.

Recapitulating, we can see that Equation (1) indicates that i's expected utility from a bilateral conflict with j depends on i's perception of the current and future policy differences between i and j, and on i's perception of its current probability of success against j compared to its perception of the current probability of losing against j. The difference between Equations (2) and (3), as depicted by Equation (4) indicates the *net* expected impact of third parties on a conflict between i and j in the event the conflict becomes multilateral. Equation (4) indicates that i calculates the probability of success and failure under each of the possible contingent conditions. These include the possibility that i succeeds, given k's support, i succeeds, given k's opposition, i loses even with k's support and i loses, given k supports j. Because Equation (4) reflects i's calculation across all the k_l's, $l = 1$ to 5, it is based on the sums across those actors for Equations (2) and (3).

Letting $E(U_i)$ represent i's overall expected utility from initiating a conflict with j, I can now define the minimal expected utility decision rules for risk-acceptant and risk-averse actors, whether making choices in an environment that is risky, but not uncertain, or in an uncertain environment. The decision rules are depicted in Table 1.

Note that I have definitionally constrained risk-averse actors to require that more conditions be satisfied before they are convinced of having positive expected utility than risk-acceptant actors. Similarly, I have definitionally constrained the decision rules so that uncertain environments impose greater limitations on expected utility calculations than are imposed by risky environments. Thus, under risk, risk-acceptant actors need merely find that:

$$E(U_i) = E(U_i)_b + \sum_{l=1}^{5} E(U_i)_{k_l} \geqslant 0,$$ while

risk-averse actors are constrained to require that:

$E(U_i) \geqslant 0$ and, because I assume their risk aversion makes them relatively unwilling to count on aid from third parties,
$E(U_i)_b \geqslant 0$.

Under uncertainty, risk-acceptant actors are assumed to find estimating the utility they might derive from states other than those directly linked either to themselves or to j (i.e., k_1's and k_2's) to be too unreliable to enter into their expected utility estimates. Risk-averse actors making decisions in an uncertain environment are assumed to be constrained to such an extent that they assume any third parties positively disposed toward them (i.e., those for whom $U_{iki} > U_{ikj}$) are actually indifferent, while continuing to assume that j will derive some utility from third parties positively disposed toward j (i.e., those for whom $U_{iki} < U_{ikj}$).

Table 1. Expected Utility Decision Rules

Actor's Risk Orientation	Environmental Constraint	
	Risk	Uncertainty
Risk-Acceptant	$E(U_i) = E(U_i)_b + \sum_{l=1}^{5} E(U_i)_{k_l}$. If $E(U_i) \geqslant 0$, then i can, but need not, initiate a conflict with j. If $E(U_i) < 0$, then i cannot rationally initiate a conflict with j.	$E(U_i) = E(U_i)_b + \sum_{l=1}^{2} E(U_i)_{k_l}$. If $E(U_i) \geqslant 0$, then i can, but need not, initiate a conflict with j. If $E(U_i) < 0$, then i cannot rationally initiate a conflict with j.
Risk-Averse	$E(U_i) = E(U_i)_b + \sum_{l=1}^{5} E(U_i)_{k_l}$. If $E(U_i) \geqslant 0$ and $E(U_i)_b \geqslant 0$, then i can, but need not, initiate a conflict with j. If $E(U_i) < 0$ or $E(U_i) \geqslant 0$ but $E(U_i)_b < 0$, i cannot rationally initiate a conflict with j.	$E(U_i) = E(U_i)_b + E(U_i)_{k_l}$ given that only those third parties for whom $U_{iki} < U_{ikj}$ are entered into the calculation so that, $E(U_i)_{k_l} < 0$ by definition. If $E(U_i) \geqslant 0$, then i can, but need not, initiate a conflict with j. If $E(U_i) < 0$, given that it is defined to exclude third parties where $U_{iki} \geqslant U_{ikj}$, then i cannot rationally initiate a conflict with j.

Source: Compiled by the author.

A Note on Expected Future Changes in Utility Values

The expected utility decision rules focus on current decisions to initiate or not initiate conflicts. Such calculations are defined to be based on current probability expectations, current utility values, and the anticipation of future changes in utility values. Of course, decision makers do not have crystal balls. Consequently, they usually do not have enough information to judge with confidence what policy changes the future holds for j or for third parties k, and hence are assumed not to rely generally on such estimates of future utility changes. However, there are circumstances under which, without knowing the particular policy changes that are likely, actors can have reasonable confidence in their estimates of the direction of future changes in utility values. If we think of changes in utility scores as a random walk in a bounded environment (remembering that I have assumed utility ranges between +1, indicating perfect commonality of interests between actors, and −1, indicating complete disagreement among actors), then it should be clear that as a utility value approaches zero, one is just as likely to anticipate that it will increase as that it will decrease, making a reliable estimate of its future value extremely difficult. On the other hand, if we consider utility values that approach either extreme (+1 or −1), we can see that as the value gets closer to a boundary, the decision maker is in a better position to estimate the direction that value might take in the future. Thus, when U_{ij} *or* U_{iki} or U_{ikj} approaches +1, the leader of i can be reasonably confident that the future holds either no change or a movement toward −1, signifying a deterioration in i's relationship with $j(U_{ij})$ or k (U_{iki}), or a deterioration in i's perception of j's relationship with k (U_{ikj}). Similarly, if U_{ij}, U_{iki}, or U_{ikj} at $t0$ approaches −1, then i has reason to believe the value will not change or else will move toward +1. Clearly, as utility values approach the maximum or minimum, the prospect declines that they will continue to increase or decrease, respectively. Consequently, only when the relevant values approach the extremes should we expect anticipated future values to be treated as a reliable part of decision makers' calculations. When the utility values suggest indifference or weak preferences, it is unlikely that future values can be reliably enough anticipated to play a part in expected utility estimates, and so, in such cases, I treat such values as if they are zero in the expected utility calculations.

Implications of the Theory

Several propositions can be derived as associated with three combinations of combatants, including (a) conflicts between nonaligned states; (b) conflicts between aligned states; and (c) conflicts between nonaligned and aligned states. By nonaligned I mean states that have revealed no preferences among the policies of other states. By aligned I mean states that have revealed policy preferences.

War Between Nonaligned States. Nonaligned states are nations whose leaders have chosen not to identify or associate themselves with the policy interests of any other nation. Of course, in reality no nation exists in such complete isolation, but for now, remember that while no theory's assumptions or conditions are perfectly satisfied in reality, they may be sufficiently approximated to render interesting results from theoretical conditions. If both i and j are nonaligned, and hence have not revealed their preferences for other states, then i's best guess about the impact of third parties in a conflict between i and j may be assumed to be that $U_{iki} = U_{ikj}$. Substituting U_{iki} for U_{ikj} in Equations (2) and (3) reveals that:

$$\begin{aligned} E(U_i)_{k_l 1} &= (P_{ik}U_{iki} + (1 - P_{ik})U_{iki})_{t0} \\ &+ P_{ik_{t0}}(\Delta U_{iki})_{t0\to t+n} \\ &+ (1 - P_{ik})_{t0}(\Delta U_{iki})_{t0\to t+n} \\ &= U_{iki_{t0}} + \Delta U_{iki_{t0\to t+n}} \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} E(U_i)_{k_l 2} &= ((1 - P_{jk})U_{iki} + P_{jk}U_{iki})_{t0} \\ &+ (1 - P_{jk})_{t0}(\Delta U_{iki})_{t0\to t+n} \\ &+ P_{jk_{t0}}(\Delta U_{iki})_{t0\to t+n} = U_{iki_{t0}} \\ &+ \Delta U_{iki_{t0\to t+n}} \end{aligned}$$

so that

$$E(U_i)_{k_l} = E(U_i)_{k_l 1} - E(U_i)_{k_l 2} = 0.$$

Since the multilateral calculations reduce to zero, it follows that regardless of risk or uncertainty, all decision rules in conflicts involving a nonaligned initiator and a nonaligned opponent reduce to the value of $E(U_i)_b$ having to be greater than or equal to zero for an actor to satisfy my specified expected utility conditions for the initiation of an international conflict. Since $(U_{ii} - U_{ij}) + (U_{ij} - U_{ii})$ from Equation (1) must be equal to zero, it is clear that the sign of $E(U_i)_b$ is determined by the relative magnitude of P_i and $(1 - P_i)$, so that $E(U_i)_b$ can only be positive if nonaligned i is stronger (and hence more likely to succeed) than nonaligned j. This leads to the first proposition deduced from the theory.

PROPOSITION 1: *Nonaligned states cannot rationally attack more powerful nonaligned states, regardless of whether they are choosing under risk or uncertainty, and regardless of whether the choice is being made by a risk taker or risk averter.*

This first proposition is consistent with a common balance-of-power hypothesis that suggests that stronger states are the initiators of international conflicts (Zinnes, North, and Koch, 1961; Organski and Kugler, 1980).

War Between Aligned and Nonaligned States. Although nonaligned states cannot initiate conflicts with stronger nonaligned states according to Proposition 1, it does not follow that nonaligned nations can never initiate conflicts against stronger adversaries. Unlike conflicts between two nonaligned countries, when at least one adversary has revealed its policy preferences among other states by becoming aligned, U_{iki} is not expected to be equal to U_{ikj}. Thus it is possible, even if both U_{iki} and U_{ikj} are negative, for i to anticipate correctly that some third parties prefer i to j. When they can—and cannot—is the topic I now turn to.

PROPOSITION 2: *A risk-acceptant leader of a nonaligned state calculating expected utility under risk can initiate a conflict against a stronger, aligned adversary if* $\sum_{l=4}^{5} E(U_i)_{k_l}$ *(there being no nations of types* k_1 *or* k_3 *by the definition of nonalignment) is greater than* $E(U_i)_b + \sum_{l=2} E(U_i)_{k_l}$, *even though* $E(U_i)_b < 0$ *and* $\sum_{l=2} E(U_i)_{k_l} < 0$ *because of the assumptions that* i *is weaker than* j *and* i *is nonaligned.*

Of course, the conditions stipulated in Proposition 2 are not common, although, as the history of the Crimean War indicates, such circumstances not only can, but sometimes do arise. Strong, aligned nations do sometimes attract sufficient animosity that a weak, nonaligned adversary can hope to acquire enough third-party support to overcome its stronger opponent and its opponent's allies. More commonly, however, the nonaligned would-be initiator is stronger than its intended foe, although it might be weaker than the combined forces of the foe and the foe's allies. This is the focus of the third proposition.

PROPOSITION 3: *A risk-averse or a risk-acceptant leader of a nonaligned state calculating expected utility under risk can initiate a conflict with an aligned state, even if the aligned state and allies combined are stronger than the initiator, provided* $E(U_i)b + \sum_{l=4}^{5} E(U_i)_{k_l} \geqslant 0$ *and* $|E(U_i)_b + \sum_{l=4}^{5} E(U_i)_{k_l}| \geqslant |\sum_{l=2} E(U_i)_{k_l}|$. *Of course,* $E(U_i)_b > 0$ *because of the assumption that nonaligned* i *is stronger than aligned* j. *Given the decision rules stipulated in Table 1, all third-party types are included in the calculations. However, since* i *is nonaligned, there are, by definition, no states that satisfy the conditions for being either of the type* k_1 *or of the type* k_3.

Of course, if i is aligned and j is not, the likelihood that i can initiate a conflict with j is higher than if i were nonaligned and j were aligned. Given the decision rules stipulated in Table 1, nonaligned i, for instance, can never initiate a conflict with aligned j under conditions of uncertainty, while an aligned i can initiate a conflict with j under uncertainty, provided, of course, $E(U_i) \geqslant 0$. Still, Proposition 3 is but one of many circumstances that arise under the decision rules I have specified in which the theory implies that a weaker state can initiate a conflict against a stronger state, in direct contradiction to a commonly held viewpoint that suggests that a power advantage is critical to success in war.

War Between Aligned States. What if i's opponent is a country that, like i, has expressed its preferences, and attracted supporters? Then several interesting results can be deduced. First, we should recognize that there are three situations in which both i and j may be aligned:

1. i and j are each aligned, but have no alignments in common.
2. i and j share the same set of international alignments, including alignment with each other.
3. i and j have some shared and some unshared alignments.

Let us consider states in the first situation, for which there is sufficient antagonism that U_{ij} approaches the minimum possible value of -1.

PROPOSITION 4: *When* $U_{ii} - U_{ij}$ *approaches its maximum value (i.e., when* $U_{ij} \rightarrow -1$*), the probability, given the random walk assumption discussed earlier, that* i *anticipates that* $\Delta(U_{ii} - U_{ij})_{t0 \rightarrow t+n}$ *is negative increases, as does the likelihood that* i *anticipates that* $\Delta(U_{ij} - U_{ii})_{t0 \rightarrow t+n}$ *is positive. That is,* i, *under these circumstances, is fairly likely to anticipate an improvement in relations with* j. *Such anticipated improvements in future relations reduce the current value of* $E(U_i)_b$. *Thus, with* $E(U_i)_b$ *being more likely to be negative than if future values could not be reliably anticipated (as is the case when* $U_{ij} \rightarrow 0$*), the fact that* i *and* j *currently are diametrically opposed may, paradoxically, reduce the likelihood that either one of them anticipates positive expected utility from initiating a conflict rather than waiting for relations to improve as a result of the expected course of future developments. That is, if the anticipation of future improvement in relations is strong enough, then even* $E(U_i) \geqslant 0$ *based solely on current values (at* t0*) may be turned to* $E(U_i) < 0$ *when future expectations are calculated, thereby precluding the initiation of a conflict with* j.

While Proposition 4 suggests a reason for arch-enemies not to fight with one another, Proposition 5 suggests why close allies might come into conflict with one another.

PROPOSITION 5: *Let* $U_{ij} = U_{ii} = 1$*, so that* $U_{ii} - U_{ij} = 0$*. If* $U_{ij} = U_{ii}$*, then the policies of* i *and* j *are, by definition, indistinguishable. Since utility is assumed to be a function of the commonality of policy interests among states, it must be true that when* $U_{ii} = U_{ij} = 1$, $U_{iki} = U_{ikj}$. *As shown earlier, when* $U_{iki} = U_{ikj}$, *indicating that third parties have the same policy relationship with* i *as with* j, $\sum_{l=1}^{5} E(U_i)_{k_l} = 0$*. Consequently, regardless of whether* i *is risk-acceptant or risk-averse, and regardless of whether a decision is being made under risk or under uncertainty, in this circumstance, it is always true that* $E(U_i) = E(U_i)_b$*. Now, by the random walk assumption (in the absence of a crystal ball), if* $U_{ii} - U_{ij} \rightarrow 0$*, it is likely that* $\Delta(U_{ii} - U_{ij})_{t0 \rightarrow t+n} \geqslant 0$ *and* $\Delta(U_{ij} - U_{ii})_{t0 \rightarrow t+n} < 0$*. Since the sign of* $E(U_i)_b$ *is determined by the magnitude of* P_i *relative to* $1-P_i$*, it follows that, among closest allies, if* i *is stronger than* j, $E(U_i)$ *cannot be less than zero, and if* i *anticipates a deterioration in relations in the future,* $E(U_i)$ *must be greater than zero. Paradoxically, then, one should expect conflict initiation by the stronger nation when* i *and* j *are very close allies, provided* i *anticipates a decline in relations, even though such initiation was seen as relatively unlikely when* i *and* j *were diametrically opposed enemies. As Thucydides explained the logic of conflict among allies, one is justified in revolting "upon the expectation of evil intended without staying to be certain whether they would do it or not" where "they" are one's allies (1959, 3:12).*

The juxtaposition of Propositions 4 and 5 lead to the deduction that one should expect conflict to be more common among allies than between enemies. This conclusion seems rather perverse and counterintuitive, yet, as the empirical portion of this article shows, such conflicts between allies not only occur, but they also occur with the relative frequency anticipated by the logic of the expected utility perspective.

Although a number of other propositions about interstate conflict can be deduced from the theory, and have been elsewhere (Bueno de Mesquita, forthcoming), I would like to turn now to some preliminary empirical tests of the theory's implications.

Research Design

The first problem in evaluating the theory's performance[5] is to select relevant cases for analysis. In the analysis that follows I examine the expected utility scores of war initiators and opponents (as defined by Singer and Small, 1972) between 1816 and 1974. We should expect initiators to have negative expected utility less often than their opponents and less often than the general frequency with which such scores occur within the population of dyads. In the case of initiators and their opponents, the difference in the frequency of positive or negative expected utility scores is particularly important because these states clearly had reason to attend to each other. According to the theory, since only an actor with positive expected utility can rationally initiate a conflict, we should expect an overwhelming preponderance of such scores among initiators, while we have no reason to expect a disproportionate number of such scores among the opponents. The same expectations regarding the distribution of expected utility scores among initiators and opponents involved in serious international dyadic disputes short of war should also hold. I have data on over 170 such disputes involving at least one major power between 1816 and 1970. This data set, developed by Gochman (1975), is listed in the appendix to Bueno de Mesquita (forthcoming), and forms the core of a study currently under way under the auspices of the Correlates of War Project. Finally, I examine the 17 cases of attempted deterrence identified by Russett (1963) in which a major power was involved on each side.

---

[5] Space limitations preclude a thorough discussion of my procedures for coding and operationalizing my variables. A much more detailed explanation, along with some discussion of alternative methods, of my operationalizations can be found in Bueno de Mesquita (forthcoming), Ch. 4.

Measuring Probability Terms. The expected utility equations contain 6 different probability terms. These are the probability of gaining or losing in a bilateral war (i.e., P_i and $1 - P_i$), the probability of gaining or losing with the aid of friendly nations (P_{ik} and $1 - P_{ik}$), and the probability of gaining or losing when opposed by nations friendly toward one's adversary ($1 - P_{jk}$ and P_{jk}). Each of these is operationalized using the composite national capabilities scores developed by the Correlates of War Project.

Before explaining how these scores are combined to yield estimates of the probable outcome of a war, however, I must digress to explain briefly how the composite capabilities of a nation are adjusted to reflect the impact of distance.

The adjustment in national capabilities to reflect the debilitating impact of distance must reflect three considerations. First, a nation's power must decline monotonically with distance. (At least its conventional power must. Nuclear missiles, if anything, are a more powerful source of power far from home than they are close to home because of the potentially lethal effects of radioactive fallout.) Second, the rate at which that decline occurs must be greater, the weaker the nation is at home. Third, the rate of decline must, itself, decline with major advances in technology.

Using estimates derived from conversations with officers in the armed forces of the United States, and corroborated by military history, I have assumed the transport range for the years 1816–1918 to be 250 miles per day. From 1919 through 1945 I define the range as 375 miles per day, while after 1945 it is 500 miles per day. Of course, small airlifts to anywhere in the world can be completed within one day, but major operations, involving naval transport, require one day for each 500 miles traveled. I have estimated, for instance, that it would take the United States 10 days to launch a full-scale operation in the Middle East, about 5000–6000 miles away.

Distances between nations were computed from several sources, including *Distances Between Ports* (1965), the *Official Airline Guide* (1978), and a variety of atlases. In each case, I attempted to derive the shortest distance between the locus of power of the potential attacker and the closest point of its intended victim. In most cases, the locus of power is not meaningfully different from the closest point to the victim. However, in a few cases, such as the U.S.A. in the nineteenth century and Russia/Soviet Union, the countries were so large, and their industrial, military, and demographic base so concentrated that the locus of power is not simply the border closest to the adversary. For Russia/Soviet Union, I define the locus of power as, basically, European Russia. For the U.S.A. today it is the closest relevant point in the contiguous 48 states, but in the nineteenth century, I treated the locus of power as the area from Boston to Washington. For more details, see Bueno de Mesquita (forthcoming).

By my operational procedure, the distance between nation A and nation B is usually, but not always, the same as the distance from B to A.

Once the distance from each place to each other place was ascertained, national capabilities were computed in the following manner:

$$\text{Adjusted Cap.} = \text{Composite Cap.}^{\log[(\text{miles}/\text{miles per day}) + 10 - e]}$$

with the number of miles per day varying as indicated earlier.

This function satisfies all the theoretical requirements I imposed on the loss of strength gradient, while yielding projected national capabilities that seem intuitively "believable."

With the adjustment for distance having been explained, I can now return to the question of how the probability terms of the expected utility theory are operationalized. Denoting adjusted composite capabilities[6] for nation i at j as cap_{ij}, for i at home as cap_{ii}, for nation j at i as cap_{ji} and j at home as cap_{jj}, P_i and $(1 - P_i)$ are defined as follows:

$$P_i = \text{cap}_{ij}/(\text{cap}_{ij} + \text{cap}_{jj}), \text{ and}$$

$$1 - P_i = 1 - [\text{cap}_{ij}/(\text{cap}_{ij} + \text{cap}_{jj})].$$

---

[6] The composite capabilities index consists of separate indicators of each nation's share of the world's military personnel, military expenditures, total population, urban population, iron and steel production, and commercial fuel consumption.

The terms involving third-party nations are defined analogously, with each third party projecting its power to either *i* or *j*, depending on where it is stronger.

Measuring Utility. Military alliances—with their focus on war-related considerations—provide a suitable data base from which to develop indicators of utility. The similarity in the pattern of *i* and *j*'s alliance commitments—including defense pacts, nonaggression pacts, ententes, and no commitment—with all other states, when calculated as the tau-*b* association between each pair of nation's array of commitments, in accordance with the method developed by Bueno de Mesquita (1975), and used as in Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979) is the indicator of U_{ij} . U_{iki} and U_{ikj} are also measured as the dyadic similarity in the array of *i* and *k*'s, and *j* and *k*'s alliances, respectively.

Measuring Uncertainty. The core components of the expected utility theory—those concerned with probability and utility—have now been operationalized. The particular version of the expected utility equations that is actually used in computing national expected utilities from war depends on the risk-taking orientation of the relevant leader of the nation in question and on whether or not that leader's decision must be made in the presence of uncertainty. Since the operationalization of risk-taking will partially depend on the measurement of uncertainty, I turn my attention first to constructing the indicator of uncertainty.

A state's expected utility calculation is assumed to be made under uncertainty if the cohesiveness of its geopolitical region[7] has declined during the two years preceding the observation and if either its own coalition's cohesiveness has declined or if its opponent's coalition's cohesiveness has declined. Cohesiveness of regions and of coalitions is measured using the indicators developed by Bueno de Mesquita (1975) and used by Bueno de Mesquita (1978), Ostrom and Aldrich (1978), Altfeld (1979), and others.

Whenever the uncertainty conditions just stipulated obtain, those nations for which the conditions obtain are treated as if their decision makers follow the decision rules defined for uncertainty in Table 1. Whether the particular rule followed is for risk-acceptant or risk-averse leaders, of course, depends on the nation's categorization on my risk-taking indicator, to which I now turn.

Measuring Risk-Taking. One implication of the general structure of the expected utility theory is that weak nations, through the judicious formation of alliances, may be able to achieve as much security against foreign aggression as some great powers achieve. Conversely, some powerful states, despite their inherent strength, may follow foreign policies that leave them vulnerable to attack, perhaps even by much weaker nations. Thus the combination of a nation's own power and the additional power it may gain access to through direct and indirect alliance commitments, sometimes enhances and sometimes reduces its security against outside aggression.

In each state's case, its degree of jeopardy or security can be assessed directly from the results of the expected utility calculations. First, I calculate each nation's expected utility as if its leader were risk-acceptant and deciding under risk, so that the least-constrained version of the theory is evaluated. I define a state's orientation as being risk-acceptant if it expects to derive positive expected utility against fewer states than expect to derive positive expected utility from attacking it.

Conversely, states have achieved a fairly high degree of security if they have constructed their foreign policy so that fewer nations can credibly threaten to attack them than they can threaten to attack. Such a posture is what one would expect of a nation following a risk-averse foreign policy. Depending, then, on whether more nations can expect to gain from attacking *A* than *A* can expect to gain against, or vice versa, *A*'s risk orientation is assumed to be risk-acceptant or risk-averse.

Following the procedures just outlined, then, I have categorized nations as risk-acceptant or risk-averse. I then apply the risk-averse decision rules in evaluating expected utility to those categorized as risk-averse, while I apply the risk-acceptant decision rules from Table 1 to those nations categorized as being risk-acceptant. Thus, depending on whether a nation's environment fits my coding rules for uncertainty or for risk, and depending on whether a nation's foreign policy fits my coding rules for risk-acceptance or risk-aversion, I treat decisions as if they are made under the appropriate one of my four expected utility decision rules.

---

[7] The geopolitical regions are Europe, Asia, the Americas, the Middle East and Africa. Membership in such a region includes all nations physically located in the region and all those—such as many colonial powers or most major powers—with a sustained interest in the region. For more details, see Bueno de Mesquita (forthcoming).

The risk indicator is especially problematic when applied to the major powers. Many great powers, such as the United States throughout most of this century, and Britain throughout most of the nineteenth century, are so powerful that even without any allies they are likely to be secure against outside aggression. Since the indicator of risk is insensitive in their case, I am compelled to treat all major powers as if they were risk-neutral (and so I apply the least-constrained decision rules to them).

Evidence for the Theory

The least interesting, but most general, law-like statement emerging from the expected utility theory developed here is that actors do not initiate serious international conflicts when their expected losses outweigh expected gains. Gochman's data on interstate threats and interventions plus Singer's and Small's data on interstate wars yields 248 disputes for which I have data. I find that the initiators had positive expected utility 191 times, while the opponents' expected utility was positive only 38 times.[8] How meaningful is this difference? If we assume that initiators are no more likely than their opponents to have positive expected utility (implying that the theory is false), then we should not expect a significant difference in the distribution of expected utility scores among initiators and opponents. Yet, as the theory suggests, initiators are far more likely to have positive expected utility than are their opponents, with the *t*-statistic associated with the difference in means being 17.54 ($p < .001$, 494 degrees of freedom). From a somewhat different viewpoint, we can examine the distribution of expected utility scores among initiators and opponents for each type of conflict, and for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, respectively. If the theory is to be supported, we should not find any meaningful difference in the goodness of fit between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, nor between types of serious conflict.[9] This is contrary to the expectations one would derive from reading the balance-of-power literature, which suggests that the classical balance-of-power period ended sometime around the end of the nineteenth century, or from reading other analyses using data from the Correlates of War Project. Perhaps the most widely cited result from that project is that the correlates of war in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are generally different in terms of the direction of association (see, for instance, studies by Singer and Small, 1968; Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972; Bueno de Mesquita, 1978). Using Yule's Q as the measure of one-way association (because the theory posits necessary, but not sufficient conditions for conflict initiation), Table 2 reveals that the theory is strongly supported whether we focus on war, interventions, or threats, and whether the focus is on the entire period under investigation, or on either of the centuries that comprise the total period. Furthermore, focusing on a measure of proportionate reduction in error—to indicate how much information the theory provides about likely initiators and opponents—indicates that knowing the expected utility scores for a dyad greatly enhances one's ability to specify which is the likely initiator and which is the likely opponent in the event of a conflict.

Turning now to the relationship between conflict initiation and the alignment status of the initiators and opponents, we can examine some of the propositions discussed earlier. Nonaligned states, it will be recalled, may rationally initiate conflicts against weaker nonaligned states, while other initiator-opponent combinations are expected to be less dependent on the initiator's power.

---

[8] In the population of annual nation dyads from 1816 through 1974 (including more than 500,000 dyads) expected utility scores were negative 86 percent of the time and positive only 14 percent of the time. Thus, of 248 decisions to initiate conflict, we should expect only 35 positive scores by chance. This is just about the number of such scores (38) found among the opponents in the conflicts under analysis. Yet, initiators held positive expected utility, even using my crude indicators, more than 77 percent of the time, thus supporting the contention that expected utility needs to be positive for conflict initiation to take place. On the expected utility dimension, initiators appear to be quite different from their opponents (who, presumably, share a sense of animosity with those initiating conflict against them) and quite different from nations in general. The comparison with opponents (rather than with all other states) is particularly interesting because, given that both sides feel hostile toward each other in most conflict situations, it is interesting to see how different on expected utility are those who took action (i.e., initiated conflict) from those who did not. Considerably more detail, including some discussion of those who initiated conflict when they held negative expected utility, can be found in Bueno de Mesquita (forthcoming).

[9] According to the theory, positive expected utility is necessary for conflict initiation. Therefore, regardless of region or temporal period, the theory always leads to the same lawlike expectations. Hence, the patterns of "goodness of fit" with the theory's propositions should be equally good from period to period and from place to place. Of course, in some places, or during some periods, it may be easier or harder for actors to satisfy the conditions of my theory. In that sense, periods and regions may differ.

Of the 48 dyadic conflicts between nonaligned states, 43–or just under 90 percent–were initiated by the stronger adversary. Only 77 percent of all other initiator opponent pairs find the initiator with more power than the opponent. Using a *t*-test reveals that the difference between 77 percent and 90 percent would occur by chance (with 246 degrees of freedom) fewer than one time in 100. Only 69 percent of nonaligned initiators were stronger than their aligned foes, indicating that Proposition 2, as well as Proposition 1, seems empirically supported, as well as being logically true.

Propositions 1 and 2 establish conditions that directly contradict a principal expectation derived by some power-determinist balance-of-power theorists, namely, that wars are initiated by stronger states against weaker states. The expected utility theory, on the other hand, stipulates that, with the exception of nonaligned combatants, the initiator can be stronger or weaker than the foe, provided the initiator has positive expected utility. Table 3 examines the associations between war initiation and power, and expected utility, respectively, for those cases where the expected utility theory could–but need not–disagree with this power-based hypothesis. Table 3 may be viewed as a critical test because the cases included are only those in which the predictions of the two theories can differ. As can be seen, the expected utility theory yields an association of .97, and a reduction in error of 76 percent, while the power perspective yields an association of .63, and only a 35-percent reduction in error. Clearly, the expected utility perspective provides a substantially more powerful and accurate portrayal of the relationship between initiators and opponents than does a perspective, such as some balance-of-power perspectives, based purely on power differentials.

The next proposition that I wish to explore concerns the tendency for allies to come into conflict with each other. Of the 76 interstate war initiations between 1816 and 1974, 23 were between two nations each of which had at least one ally. Of these, 15 pairs were nations with a formal defense agreement between them.

Table 2. Explaining Conflict Initiation with Expected Utility Scores

	1816–1974		1816–1899		1900–1974	
	i	*j*	*i*	*j*	*i*	*j*
Interstate War						
Positive Expected Utility	66	11	30	4	36	7
Negative	10	65	3	29	7	36
Yule's Q	.95		.97		.93	
Proportionate Reduction in Error	.72		.79		.67	
Interstate Intervention						
Positive Expected Utility	78	14	27	0	53	14
Negative	24	85	2	29	20	59
Yule's Q	.90		1.00		.84	
Proportionate Reduction in Error	.62		.93		.53	
Interstate Threats						
Positive Expected Utility	47	12	24	4	23	8
Negative	23	58	13	33	10	25
Yule's Q	.82		.88		.76	
Proportionate Reduction in Error	.50		.54		.45	

Sources: J. D. Singer and M. Small, *The Wages of War* (New York: Free Press, 1972); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981, forthcoming).

Table 3. Critical Test of Two War-Initiation Hypotheses: Expected Utility versus the Balance of Power, 1816–1974

		Initiator (*i*)		Opponent (*j*)
Power	Stronger	25		12
	Weaker	12		25
Yule's Q			.63	
Proportionate Reduction in Error			.35	
Expected Utility	Positive	31		3
	Negative	6		34
Yule's Q			.97	
Proportionate Reduction in Error			.76	

Sources: J. D. Singer and M. Small, *The Wages of War* (New York: Free Press, 1972); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981, forthcoming).

About 6 percent of all dyads involve nations with alliances with each other. Yet 20 percent of the war initiator-opponent pairs are allies, more than three times the number found in the population in general. The initiator has been stronger than the adversary in all but one of these wars, as anticipated by the theory. What is more, conflicting allies remain allied after the conflict ends, with the "offending" opponent usually undergoing a regime change. Thus even the perverse deductions concerning war between allies are supported by the evidence.

Extending the Analysis. Thus far I have presented propositions and analyses concerning the initiation of conflict. The expected utility theory, however, is capable of providing deductions about a number of other interesting conflict-related phenomena. Although many other deductions are explored in depth elsewhere (Bueno de Mesquita, forthcoming), I would like to touch briefly on two conditions under which the theory leads to the expectation that a conflict will not escalate into a war.

Suppose that a would-be initiator's expected gains from a conflict are smaller in absolute value than the losses anticipated by the intended opponent. Given such an inequality in expected utility values, both the opponent and the initiator can be better off by settling the dispute before it escalates into costly open warfare. The opponent, by yielding to the initiator's demands, reduces expected losses below the suffering anticipated in a war. The initiator satisfies its expectations and so has no reason to escalate. Of the 248 conflicts for which I have data, 80 satisfy the expected utility inequality stipulated here. Only 12 of these conflicts, or 15 percent, eventually escalated into warfare. Of the 168 disputes that do not satisfy the expected utility inequality, 64, or more than 38 percent, did become wars. The likelihood that this difference occurred by chance is less than one percent.

Another circumstance under which a conflict is unlikely to escalate into a war is when the initiator finds itself facing an unexpected counter-threat from a third party attempting to deter the conquest of the initiator's opponent. Of course, such a counter-threat must be credible. One potential form of credibility arises if the third party possesses positive expected utility against the initiator, implying that the third party can rationally take military steps against the initiator. Russett's study, "The Calculus of Deterrence" (1963) identifies 17 cases between 1935 and 1961 of a major power threatening a "pawn," only to find itself facing a counter-threat from another major power. Russett describes 10 of these cases as instances of unsuccessful deterrence, and 7 as instances of successful deterrence. The expected utility theory implies that for successful deterrence it is necessary, though not sufficient, that the second major power have positive expected utility against the first. Table 4, which tests this proposition, reveals considerable support for the hypothesis, with a Yule's Q of .87 and a proportionate reduction in error of 43 percent.

Conclusions

A principal purpose of scientific investigation is to expand our theoretical and empirical knowledge so that seemingly anomalous or disparate phenomena can be joined together within a single theoretical framework. Nowhere is such an enterprise more critical to the future of mankind than in the study of international conflict. The threat of global war, whether it emerges out of direct confrontations between the superpowers or from initially limited, "brushfire" conflicts, must be understood theoretically before we can hope to deal with it politically. This study represents one of many exploratory investigations in the broad area of international conflict. It differs, however, from earlier efforts in two important ways.

The theory presented here (and elaborated in much greater detail in Bueno de Mesquita,

Table 4. Explaining Successful Deterrence with Expected Utility Scores

	Deterrence	
	Successful	Unsuccessful
Second MP's Expected Utility Against MP_i		
Positive	6	3
Negative	1	7
Yule's Q	.87	
Proportionate Reduction in Error	.43	

Source: Bruce Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 7: 97–109.

forthcoming), draws its assumptions from what one hopes is an informed view of history, but it draws its hypotheses exclusively from logic. The "formal" deductive nature of this undertaking both facilitates the discovery of "results" that were not part of any preconceived notions about international conflict, and reduces the danger that any propositions result from the changed meaning or use of terms. By relying on such a formal approach, I have permitted, even compelled, myself to look for logically true and empirically useful associations that my intuition did not suggest to me. Most notable among these is the discovery that conflict among nations allied together is not only not rare, but also amenable to explanation in the same way as other forms of conflict.

The expected utility theory integrates and expands upon many of the disparate hypotheses found in the literature concerned with international conflict. Using the few decision rules outlined in Table 1, I have been able to distinguish between initiators and opponents in a sufficiently general manner that, unlike other researchers, I find equally strong associations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and also in each of the major geopolitical regions of the world. Furthermore, although this is not demonstrated in this study, the expected utility theory succeeds in explaining cases that fit such well-known theories as the balance of power, or the power transition, and also succeeds in explaining cases that do not fit those and other theories. The expected utility theory is able to identify the complex circumstances that make alliances entangling some of the time, and make them a source of security at others (Bueno de Mesquita, forthcoming). The expected utility theory succeeds in explaining such seemingly anomalous phenomena as wars between close allies, the occasional initiation of war by a weak nonaligned state against a stronger state with allies, the conditions under which conflicts are contained short of war, with the initiator emerging victorious, and also with the initiator losing and with the opponent emerging victorious, while also explaining less exotic conflicts.

Although only a few of the expected utility theory's propositions are explored here, the attentive reader will be able to discern ways in which the theory can be used to address not only who initiates conflicts, or when conflicts do not escalate into war, but also who is likely to win such conflicts, and at what cost they are likely to be settled. However, even by just focusing on the propositions and analyses developed here, I believe we can discern the potential power of an expected utility framework as an approach to explaining international conflict. The propositions outlined here help clarify when a nation's own power is or is not *the central determinant of its ability to initiate* a conflict. These propositions clarify circumstances when alliances provide the margin of success for a combatant, and when the revelation of preferences implied by such alliances render a nation more vulnerable to attack. Alliance membership, like issue positions in a Downsian model of voting (see Downs, 1957), may attract or repel supporters, with their net impact depending on the totality of the circumstances under which alliances—as sources of information—are formed or terminated.

Many of the elements in the expected utility theory can be manipulated by policy makers. Consequently, with suitably sensitive data (rather than the crude indicators I use here), one can both use national expected utility scores as an early warning indicator, and as a means of "simulating" the effect of potential policy shifts. The theory provides a vehicle with which one can observe potential unintended sources of destabilization that might arise from particular policy shifts before such shifts are actually implemented. For instance, the theory could have been used to reveal the likely impact of the Egyptian-Israeli peace on the stability of other portions of the Middle East. One such analysis, for instance, revealed that the states in the Arabian Peninsula would likely experience an increase in their vulnerability to external threats, particularly from Iraq and (after the fall of the Shah) from Iran. Alternative peace plans might then have been devised that both insure Israeli and Egyptian security, and that minimize threats to Saudi Arabian stability. The analysis of expected utility inequalities suggests means by which decision makers can manage crises so as to achieve *limited* objectives while reducing the risk of war. Limiting objectives can help to *decrease* the magnitude of a nation's positive expected utility, thereby increasing the likelihood of satisfying the expected utility theory. I hope that my research and that of others will explore the strengths and weaknesses of this approach.

References

Altfeld, M. (1979). "The Reactions of Third States Toward Wars." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Rochester.

______, and B. Bueno de Mesquita (1979). "Choosing Sides in Wars." *International Studies Quarterly* 23: 87–112.

Boulding, K. (1960). *Conflict and Defense.* New York: Harper and Row.

Bueno de Mesquita, B. (1975). "Measuring Systemic Polarity." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 19: 187–216.

______ (1978). "Systemic Polarization and the Occurrence and Duration of War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22: 241–67.

______ (1981). *The War Trap.* New Haven: Yale University Press, forthcoming.

Distance Between Ports (1965). Washington, D.C.: United States Naval Oceanographic Office.

Downs, A. (1957). *An Economic Theory of Democracy.* New York: Harper and Row.

Gochman, C. (1975). "Status, Conflict, and War: The Major Powers, 1820–1970." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan.

Midlarsky, M. (1975). *On War: Political Violence in the International System.* New York: Free Press.

Official Airline Guide: Worldwide Edition (1978). New York: Reuben H. Donnelly Corporation.

Organski, A. F. K., and J. Kugler (1980). *The War Ledger.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ostrom, C., and J. Aldrich (1978). "The Relationship Between Size and Stability in the Major Power International System." *American Journal of Political Science* 22: 743–71.

Russett, B. (1963). "The Calculus of Deterrence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 7: 97–109.

Singer, J. D., S. Bremer and J. Stuckey (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965." In B. Russett (ed.), *Peace, War, and Numbers.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

Singer, J. D., and M. Small (1968). "Alliance Aggregation and the Onset of War, 1815–1945." In J. D. Singer (ed.), *Quantitative International Politics.* New York: Free Press.

___________ (1972). *The Wages of War.* New York: Free Press.

Thucydides (1959). *The Peloponnesian War.* Translated by T. Hobbes. Edited by D. Grene. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Zinnes, D., R. North and H. Koch, Jr. (1961). "Capability, Threat, and the Outbreak of War." In J. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory.* New York: Free Press.

Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics, and the Spread of War

BENJAMIN A. MOST
Brown University

HARVEY STARR
Indiana University

The discussion reports the results of an examination of the possible diffusion of new war participations during the 1946–65 era. A theoretical argument is developed to yield more precise expectations about when, where, why, and how diffusion processs might operate. Four diffusion-related processes (positive spatial diffusion, positive reinforcement, negative spatial diffusion, and negative reinforcement) are discussed and analyzed. A series of simple turnover tables and a focus on nations' borders are used to go beyond the authors' previous stochastic modeling efforts. The results provide strong evidence that is consistent with both the authors' theoretical argument and the general war diffusion hypothesis. The analyses seem to indicate that certain types of wars may indeed have tended to diffuse across space from one nation to another between 1946 and 1965.

The notion that an event may alter the probability of subsequent events through diffusion or contagion processes is not new. The work of scholars on a variety of topics suggests that wars may also diffuse.[1] As Rapoport (1960) observes, international conflicts may spread from one nation to another in patterns that are similar to those followed by contagious diseases. Participation in war at one point in time may affect the likelihood of subsequent war participations. The French retreat from Indochina, the Middle East and Africa as one after another of its colonial possessions erupted in wars of independence may be one example of such a process. The involvement of South Africa in Angola and the intervention of both Israel and Syria in the Lebanese Civil War may be others.

Most of the analyses of the causes of war have ignored the theoretical and empirical evidence that at least some wars have significant consequences for subsequent conflicts. Only a small number of analysts have focused on the war diffusion possibility, and such work has failed to do more than scratch the surface of the problem.[2]

Support for this research has been provided by the Center for International Policy Studies, Indiana University, under Grant 750–9514 from the Ford Foundation, and from an Indiana University Grant-in-Aid of Faculty Research. While a number of colleagues have been helpful to us in this research, the authors would like to extend a special word of gratitude to the late John V. Gillespie. His support, advice, ideas and criticisms were invaluable.

[1] Scholars such as Naroll (1961, 1965, 1973), Lieberson and Silverman (1965), Walker (1969), Spilerman (1970), Midlarsky (1970, 1974a, 1978), Gillespie (1970), Gray (1973), Job (1973), Most (1973), Collier and Messick (1975), Li and Thompson (1975), Siverson and Duncan (1976), Ross and Homer (1976), Eyestone (1977) and others have examined the diffusion of phenomenon such as race riots, coups and other types of domestic violence, alliance behaviors and policy innovations. The possibility that wars may similarly diffuse is suggested in research on the cyclical patterns in the onset of war and the amount of war that is underway in the system at any given point in time (Moyal, 1949; Wright, 1965; Denton, 1966; Denton and Phillips, 1968; and Singer and Small, 1972), the linkages between the international environment and foreign policy (Rosenau, 1969, 1971; Wilkenfeld, 1973), the impact of external conditions on violence within nations (Stohl, 1975), the relationship between domestic violence and foreign policy actions (Wilkenfeld, 1968, 1969, 1972) and research on arms races (Richardson, 1960a; North, Brody and Holsti, 1964: Zinnes, 1976; and Alcock, 1972). 1972).

[2] See, for example, Richardson (1960a, 1960b), Singer and Small (1974), Starr and Most (1976), Davis, Duncan and Siverson (1976, 1978), and Yamamoto and Bremer (1976). Richardson (1960b) investigated whether or not wars occurred randomly through time. Singer and Small (1974) probed whether the acceptance of war leads to more war, but their analysis focused on reinforcement patterns within nations rather than on diffusion from one nation to another. Siverson and Duncan (1977) used fairly sophisticated stochastic models to examine diffusion/reinforcement processes as they affected the temporal clusters of warring dyads drawn exclusively from the international wars included in the Correlates of War data set. These studies are similar to this article and our own earlier war diffusion research, but they are also sufficiently distinct from our work that comparative evaluations are precluded. Differences in the data sets used,

The Argument

The general war diffusion hypothesis concerns the possibility that the occurrence of one new war participation will alter the probability of subsequent occurrences. It is helpful, however, to disaggregate this general hypothesis in order to distinguish the four following diffusion-related processes:

> *Positive Reinforcement:* The process in which the occurrence of a new war participation in a nation *increases* the likelihood that the *same* nation will experience subsequent war participations;
>
> *Negative Reinforcement:* The process in which the occurrence of a new war participation in a nation *decreases* the likelihood that the *same* nation will experience subsequent war participations;
>
> *Positive Spatial Diffusion:* The process in which the occurrence of a new war participation in a nation *increases* the likelihood that *other* nations will experience subsequent war participations; and,
>
> *Negative Spatial Diffusion:* The process in which the occurrence of a new war participation in a nation *decreases* the likelihood that *other* nations will experience subsequent war participations.

That all four of these processes are related to the general war diffusion hypothesis should be clear. In each, a war experience at one point in time affects the probability of subsequent conflicts. Positive reinforcement (see path A in Figure 1) is a within-nation, temporal diffusion process. It is an historical possibility: A nation's decision to go to war at some time increases the probability that it will make a similar decision at some subsequent time. Positive spatial diffusion (path B in Figure 1) more directly entails the transfer of one nation's war behavior to *other* nations. The two remaining possibilities—negative reinforcement (path C) and negative spatial diffusion (path D)—are somewhat more difficult to deal with because the researcher is placed in the awkward position of trying to analyze "events" that do not occur. It is, nevertheless, entirely plausible that such processes operate. Just as the toppling of the Allende government in Chile at least temporarily led Latin Americans in other nations to forestall coup efforts of their own, a nation's own war experiences or its interpretation of the war experiences of others may discourage a nation from going to war.

Intra-Nation Reinforcement Processes

Some initial assumptions can be made about the possible linkages between a nation's own war experiences at one time and some subsequent time:

1. The decision makers in any nation are confronted by an "operational milieu" (Sprout and Sprout, 1965, p. 30) that comprises the risks and opportunities that effectively impinge on the nation in question;


X_{it_0}
+
A. Positive Reinforcement
X_{it_1}
X_{it_2}
B. Positive Spatial Diffusion
+
−
D. Negative Spatial Diffusion
X_{jt_0}
X_{jt_1}
−
C. Negative Reinforcement
X_{jt_2}

Source: Prepared by the authors.

Key: X = War behavior of nations i and j, respectively, at times t_0, t_1, and t_2.

Figure 1. Diffusion-Related Processes

---

in the units of analysis examined, in the ways in which distinct phenomena are hypothesized to diffuse, and in basic questions and methodologies indicate that there is very little overlap with our discussion.

2. The operational milieu (and hence, the perceived risks and opportunities) may change through time, and such changes may induce decision makers to reassess their situations;
3. If decision makers are to protect themselves from the risks or avail themselves of the opportunities they perceive in their environment, they must possess both the capacity and the willingness to do so (Starr, 1978); and,
4. Just as changes in decision makers' operational milieus may alter their perceptions of the risks and opportunities, changes in the perceived environment may also result in changes in decision makers' willingness to undertake particular policies in response to the risks and opportunities confronting them.

The importance of these assumptions can be demonstrated by considering Boulding's "theory of viability" (1962, Ch. 4). Focusing on zones in which a nation is dominant ("unconditionally viable") and dominated ("conditionally viable"), Boulding argues that a nation will increase its defense expenditures in an effort to expand the first area and contract the second. Decisions to arm or disarm at one time thus have some effect on a nation's zones of unconditional and conditional viability at some later time.

The point to be noted, of course, is that an armaments decision is only one factor that may alter a nation's zones of unconditional and conditional viability, and hence, its decision makers' perceptions of risks and opportunities. Similar linkages can be posited to relate a nation's recent and future war behavior. Regardless of whether a nation wins or loses an initial conflict, the conflict may have some impact on that nation's viability zones. The fighting should induce the leaders of a warring (or a recently warring) nation to reassess risks, opportunities, and policy options. This reevaluation may alter the probability that the nation will soon take up arms again.

Losing a war, for example, may shift a nation from being unconditionally viable at its home to being only conditionally viable and may result in positive reinforcement. A defeat may frustrate a nation's leaders and encourage them to avenge the loss, recoup national pride, recover lost territory, and so on by waging a subsequent conflict (e.g., Germany's reaction to World War I and the Arab nations' reaction to successive Israeli victories in the Middle East). The shift from unconditional to conditional viability could also produce a negative reinforcement effect. An initial loss might decrease the likelihood of subsequent wars by reducing a nation's fighting capacity, increasing the nation's fear of war, or persuading leaders of the futility of the war option (e.g., Japan since World War II).

A victory which shifts a nation from being conditionally viable at its home to being unconditionally viable could produce similar results. In a process of positive reinforcement, success may embolden a nation's leaders—see Blainey's (1973) notions of "confidence" and "optimism"—and thereby stimulate their entry into subsequent conflicts (e.g., Hitler at the outset of World War II or the Vietnamese and their decision to attack Kampuchea). Alternatively, an initial victory may produce negative reinforcement and decrease the likelihood of subsequent wars if leaders are satiated or the nation's dominance over some territory is secured (e.g., wars of colonial conquest and national expansion or integration).

These scenarios could be extended, of course. The Vietnam defeat clearly did not shift the United States from a state of unconditional to conditional viability at its home, for example. Nevertheless, that conflict may have had a negative reinforcement effect insofar as it apparently induced the U.S. to forego subsequent overt war participations in Angola and Ethiopia. Despite the relative simplicity of these scenarios, however, their point should be clear: Just as a nation's decision to arm at one point in time may affect that nation's risks and opportunities and hence its armaments decisions at some subsequent time, fighting a war may have similar impacts. Because a war at one time will alter the risks, opportunities, and policy options facing decision makers, the likelihood that they will decide to become involved in another conflict may also be shifted.

Inter-Nation Spatial Diffusion Processes

The possible operation of intra-nation reinforcement processes seems clear in comparison with inter-nation spatial diffusion effects. Even if a war participation by one nation alters the probability that other nations will become involved in wars, it seems unreasonable to expect that a new war participation by Cambodia, for example, would have more than a negligible impact on Bolivia's decision calculus. At a minimum, it seems more reasonable to hypothesize that *if* wars tend to diffuse, the process is most likely to operate among those nations that share high levels of *interaction*. In other words, it is plausible that spatial diffusion processes exist, but they may operate only within those groups of nations that interact most strongly rather than at the global level.

The difficulty, of course, is that nations interact with each other in different ways. Nevertheless, simple *geographic proximity* seems to constitute a very basic and at least initially useful basis for identifying those groups of interacting nations within which diffusion processes are most likely. The importance of geographic proximity in determining the amount of interaction between nations and how it may create awareness, risks and opportunities have been discussed extensively by Zipf (1949), Richardson (1960a, p. 176), Gleditsch (1969), Gleditsch and Singer (1970), Weede (1970, 1973, 1975), Cobb and Elder (1970, p. 89), Pearson (1974), Starr (1975), and Garnham (1976). Nations that are "close" to one another in terms of distance are likely to interact and perceive each other's conditions and behaviors as important.

Simple distance—and especially the commonly used distance between nation's capitals—may not be the most useful indicator of the interaction/proximity concepts, however. As we have argued elsewhere (Most and Starr, 1975, 1976), it seems preferable to operationalize the concepts on the basis of shared borders. Nations possess both non-colonial frontiers (those that exist directly between nations) and colonial borders (those that exist indirectly between nations as a result of their colonies or territorial possessions). Simple distance measures and non-colonial borders seem roughly analogous. What the distance operationalization overlooks, however, is the possibility that even distant nations may interact with one another as a result of their colonial or territorial extensions. More important, a nation that borders on a large number of other nations is faced with a potentially high risk that it may be threatened or attacked by at least some of its neighbors. At the same time, of course, nations bordering on many other nations are provided with numerous opportunities for launching attacks of their own (Starr, 1978).

Two of the existing treatments of geographic proximity (as measured either by "short" distance or shared borders) are worthy of note. The first is Boulding's above-mentioned theory of viability (1962, Ch. 4). Boulding argues that the "power" of some entity is greatest at home and that the increases in the cost and time necessary to transport that power cause it to diminish along a "loss of strength gradient" (LSG) as the distance from home is increased. Each nation possesses some home strength in Boulding's formulation, and that strength is affected by the LSG. Hence, the LSGs of different nations overlap, thereby creating the zones of unconditional and conditional viability.

Arms races develop in Boulding's formulation because a nation that is unsatisfied either with the area in which it is dominant (its "sphere of influence") or with the area in which it is dominated begins to increase its home strength by arming. This will expand that nation's zone of unconditional viability, but at the same time it will expand the area in which neighboring nations are conditionally viable. In response, those proximate nations may also begin to arm in order to reduce *their* areas of uncertainty and risk. In contrast, distant nations would be less likely to perceive a threat in increasing armaments because any increases would be offset or reduced by distance.[3]

According to Boulding's key tenet, "the further the weaker," one would expect that proximate nations would be perceived as more threatening than distant ones. Nations possessing many neighbors are given many targets or opportunities to use their power without being greatly affected by distance. At the same time, however, such nations are confronted with great risks and uncertainty because they must protect and defend themselves against many potential opponents. Nations with many close neighbors thus might seek to reduce their uncertainty by arming, by forming alliances, or by going to war.

Midlarsky's investigation (1974b, 1975) of the role of uncertainty in the occurrence of war brings one to a similar conclusion by an alternative route. In a variation of the frustration-aggression theory of violence (1975, pp. 37–38), Midlarsky argues that nations desire to reduce uncertainty, but they may be constrained from doing so even when they have the necessary capabilities. Political violence is more probable when such a nation is constrained and uncertainty not only cannot be reduced but actually grows. As Midlarsky and others hypothesize, more bordering nations may create more uncertainty by reducing control over the environment and nations may go to war to reduce uncertainty.

One should be extremely cautious in considering the relationship between borders and uncertainty. More borders may indeed contribute to increased interaction among nations, more opportunities for possible attack, greater risks of attack, and heightened levels of uncertainty, but it is unlikely that borders cause wars in a deterministic sense. It is more plausible to expect that they may —probably in combination with other factors— create structures of risks and opportunities that constrain the range of possible inter-nation interactions and make certain types of conflictual behavior more or less likely.

The important point, however, is that each nation's structure of risks and opportunities is likely to be changed once a war is under way and these changes may be most dramatic for those nations which are proximate to the warring nations. Two nations may wage a war to reduce their own uncertainty, but the fact that they are reallocating and expending some of their "power" in the fighting may alter their immediate neighbors' uncertainty, LSGs and zones of conditional and unconditional viability. For example, if a nation shifts from conditional to unconditional viability as a result of a war between other nations, it may join the conflict or initiate a war of its own in a process of positive spatial diffusion. Negative spatial diffusion might also develop in such a situation. Nations which would have gone to war in the prewar period may no longer need to do so if a war is initiated by other nations.

---

[3] For a more formal summary of Boulding's thesis by two geographers, see Cox and Agnew (1974).

Recapitulation

In summary, we have the beginnings of an argument that may explain when, where, why, and how new war participations at one point in time may alter the likelihood of subsequent occurrences in either the same (reinforcement) or different (spatial diffusion) nations. The thesis is not deterministic. Factors affecting decision makers' willingness to avail themselves of opportunities are omitted. Other factors that might also be related to war reinforcement and spatial diffusion patterns are not included.

While the linkages are neither complete nor fully specified, the basic outlines of the argument should be apparent. As Boulding and Midlarsky suggest, borders do not cause wars but the more borders a nation has,

1. the greater the number of risks and opportunities that confront that nation;
2. the greater the likelihood that that nation or its colonial or extra-territorial extensions will be only conditionally viable; and
3. the greater the level of that nation's uncertainty.

If nations are conditionally viable or have high levels of uncertainty, they should have a high likelihood of:

4. arming and becoming involved in arms races; and
5. going to war.

Regardless of why a "first war" is begun, however, that initial conflict may change the world for its participants and their immediate neighbors. The warring (or recently warring) nations and the countries bordering them may find themselves confronted with changed levels of uncertainty and altered viability zones. Depending on the nature of those changes and on the willingness of the decision makers in each nation to avail themselves of the risks and opportunities presented by the altered situation, the shifts in levels of uncertainty and viability zones may induce these nations to:

6. participate in wars that they had no intention of waging in the prewar context; or
7. forego their participation in wars that they had intended to fight before the first conflict began.

Recent events in Indochina may exemplify at least some of these effects. Having fought and eventually won wars against France and the U.S., the Vietnamese may have been encouraged or emboldened—in what we call a reinforcement process—to attack Kampuchea. The effects of that war may have altered Chinese perceptions and been instrumental in inducing them—in a spatial diffusion process—to launch their own attack against Vietnam.

While the empirical evidence and a new theoretical rationale seem suficient for investigating the war diffusion possibility, a new attack on the problem is buttressed by a second set of considerations. Most analyses of the causes of war have ignored the diffusion/reinforcement possibility and assumed that each occurrence of war was independent of all other occurrences. Such an omission may be significant. If strong diffusion/reinforcement processes undermined the validity of the standard parametric statistical assumption of the independence of observations and such processes went unrecognized, then spurious correlations may have been obtained between systemic variables or national attributes, for example, and the amount of war (Naroll, 1965). The results of correlation and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses may have been misinterpreted. The standard tests of significance may have been invalid. The sampling variances of the estimates may have been underestimated. The predictions obtained from OLS regressions may have been inefficient (Johnston, 1972, p. 246). Simply, the development of theories about the causes of war *may* have been impeded as a result of strong (but unrecognized) diffusion/reinforcement processes. Wrong decisions may have been made about which variables to retain and which to exclude from subsequent analysis.

For these theoretical and methodological reasons, a more thorough investigation of the diffusion/reinforcement argument seems warranted. The initial efforts to test certain aspects of that formulation are presented below.

The Analyses

Preliminary Findings. In a series of earlier studies, two stochastic models—a simple Poisson model of random or independent occurrences and a Modified Poisson with diffusion model—were used to focus on the possibility that reinforcement or spatial diffusion processes influenced nations' participations in wars between 1946 and 1965 (Most and Starr, 1976, 1977). Following a rationale for a comparative focus on three sets of war data and a discussion of the various advantages of each (Most and Starr, 1976), we drew data from: the Correlates of War (COW) project (Singer and Small, 1972, Ch. 2); a combined Wright and Richardson (WR) list as presented by Singer and Small (1972, Ch. 5); and the list of 53 wars reported in SIPRI (1970, Table 4A.1) for which there was at least some reported Richardson magnitude of deadliness.

The conclusions drawn from those analyses were fairly straightforward. Application of the Poisson/Modified Poisson procedures to the COW new war participations during the 1946–65 period yielded no evidence that such events had tended to diffuse. When identical procedures were applied to the SIPRI new war participations, however, the evidence was consistent with the proposition that such occurrences had tended to diffuse and that the nations that existed as of 1945 had had heterogeneous propensities to engage in such conflicts. Finally, tests on the WR data failed to provide clear conclusions either for or against the diffusion possibility.

These findings were intriguing, if not entirely conclusive. That such divergent results could be obtained from different, commonly used data sets had clear implications for scholars interested in the causes of war. The time may have come to develop a consensus about just what constitutes such a conflict. Even though the three war data sets overlap to a certain extent and thereby preclude any firm conclusions, the preliminary analyses provided some support for the contentions that different types of war may exist and that the dominant type of war may have changed through time (Kende, 1971; Starr, 1976). Even when allowances were made for the differences in the nations' rates of proneness to events, preliminary studies suggested that different types of conflicts may have had different propensities to diffuse.[4] The most important result from the pilot analyses, however, was that the diffusion problem could not be simply ignored. The theoretical argument was clearly not confirmed, but it was also quite clear that—under certain conditions—at least some war participations might not have been mutually independent during the 1946–65 period. If the argument was not verified, it was not rejected either. Further examination of the diffusion possibility seemed warranted.

The new analyses reported here are not meant as an exhaustive test of the theoretical formulation; they simply focus on the more important facets of that argument. Once again taking a nation's new war participations during the 1946–65 period as the objects of the analysis (as reported by the COW, WR, and SIPRI lists) the new studies abandon the use of stochastic models and use two much simpler sets of procedures.

A. Number of New War Participations at t_1

Number of New War Participations at t_0	0	1	2	⩾3
0	a	b	c	d
1	e	f	g	h
2	i	j	k	l
⩾3	m	n	o	p

B. Number of New War Participations at t_1

Number of New War Participations at t_0	0	1	2	⩾3
0	CR/NS	PS	PS	PS
1	NR/NS	CR	PS/PR	PS/PR
2	NR/NS	NR/NS	CR	PS/PR
⩾3	NR/NS	NS/NR	NS/NR	CR

Source: Prepared by the authors.

Key: CR = Constant Rate
PS = Positive Spatial Diffusion
PR = Positive Reinforcement
NS = Negative Spatial Diffusion
NR = Negative Reinforcement

Figure 2. Turnover Tables: Expected Patterns under the Four Diffusion/Reinforcement Hypotheses

---

[4] The evidence is only preliminary, but it appears at this stage that large-scale interstate wars such as those tapped by the COW list did not tend to spread during the interval. In contrast, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that small-scale, guerrilla and colonial conflicts (such as those that dominate the SIPRI list) may have diffused quite readily. This is merely a working hypothesis, however.

The Turnover Tables. Potentially valuable insights on the diffusion problem can be obtained by considering simple turnover tables or transition matrices (see Figure 2A). If a nation had no war experience in some interval and none in a second period, it would fall into cell "a." If a nation had two occurrences in the first period and none in the second, it would fall into cell "i," and so on.

Using tables of this sort make it possible to develop expectations about where nations "should have fallen if" one or another of the four processes was operating. (A number of these expectations, developed originally in Most (1973) and Most and Starr (1975, 1976), are shown in Figure 2B and Table 1). There is some convergence in these expectations, of course, making it impossible to distinguish completely between positive reinforcement and positive spatial diffusion. Similar problems will be encountered in handling the two negative alternatives. Even with these overlaps, however, the expectations are sufficiently distinct to permit at least a modest step toward distinguishing among the four processes.

The application of these procedures begins with a comparison of new war participation experiences between ten- and five-year periods: 1946–55 versus 1956–65, and 1956–60 versus 1961–65 (see Figures 3 and 4). (Figure 3 concerns only those nations that Singer and Small (1972) classed as members of the international system during the entire 1946–65 interval. Figure 4 considers only those nations that were system members during the entire 1956–65 period.)

The results of these simple turnover procedures are summarized in Table 2. Regarding the comparison of the two ten-year periods (1946–55 versus 1956–65), it is immediately apparent that the expectations for positive reinforcement and positive spatial diffusion are generally not satisfied in any of the three data sets. Almost no signs of positive reinforcement appear, and there is only weak evidence of positive spatial diffusion. The results obtained for the second positive spatial diffusion expectation should not be completely overlooked, however. Three points should be noted. First, the nations that are included in this set of ratios fall precisely in the areas in which the positive spatial diffusion and positive reinforcement arguments *do not* overlap (see Figure 2B). Of the two positive possibilities, only positive spatial diffusion can account for the patterns observed. Second, these ratios are low—4.2 percent (2 of 47) for the COW data, 13.6 percent (6 or 44) for the WR data, and 22.0 percent (9 of 41 for SIPRI—and quite clearly do not strongly support the conclusion that at least the SIPRI new war participations tended to diffuse from one nation to another during the 1946–65 period. Nevertheless, the progression from COW to WR to SIPRI in the magnitude of these ratios does once again suggest that SIPRI (rather than COW) new war participations were more likely to diffuse.

It should be emphasized, however, that neither the positive spatial diffusion nor the positive reinforcement arguments provide an accurate description of the overall patterns observed in the turnover tables. It is difficult to determine whether negative spatial diffusion or negative reinforcement provides a better accounting for those patterns, although the negative spatial diffusion possibility appears more likely. Leaving that consideration aside, however, the important point is that the Poisson/Modified Poisson procedures failed to tap such negative tendencies. This analysis indicates that nations that were at peace generally tended to remain at peace. Nations that were at war in one period may have had higher rates of proneness to subsequent new war participations, but they appear to have followed some natural "regression" toward (if not actually to)


COW:
1956–65
0 1 2 3
1946–55
0 45 2
1 15 2 1
2
3 1
W-R:
1956–63
0 1 2 3 4 5
1946–55
0 38 6
1 14 2 1
2 2
3 1 1
4
5 1
SIPRI:
1956–65
0 1 2 3 4 5
1946–55
0 32 9
1 8 4
2 5 3 1
3 1
4 1 1
5 1

Source: Prepared by the authors.

Figure 3. Turnovers in the Number of New War Participations, 1946–55 vs. 1956–65

COW:

		1965–65	
		0	1
1956–60	0	79	1
	1	6	1

W-R:

		1961–63		
		0	1	2
1956–60	0	70	6	
	1	8	1	
	2	2		

SIPRI:

		1961–65			
		0	1	2	3
1956–60	0	59	12		1
	1	11	1		1
	2			1	
	3		1		

Source: Prepared by the authors.

Figure 4. Turnovers in the Number of New War Participations, 1956–60 vs. 1961–65

peace, becoming involved in fewer war participations in subsequent intervals.

Those findings generally hold up, moreover, when the 1956–60 period is contrasted with the 1961-65 interval. The exception is the slight shift that may be observed in the SIPRI data set. Of the 15 nations experiencing at least one SIPRI new war participation between 1956 and 1960, 12 (80.0 percent) had fewer new war participations during the 1961-65 period. Hence, the negative trend is once again dominant, although to a lesser extent. At the same time, however, the positive spatial diffusion inequality is satisfied: The number of nations with no new war participations between 1956 and 1960 is greater than those having none between 1961 and 1965. In addition, 18.0 percent (13 of 72) of those nations with no new war participations in the first interval had at least one such event in the second period. (Although that percentage is smaller than the comparable one obtained when the two ten-year periods were contrasted, only 9 nations made the transition from peace to new war participations. The marked difference between the number of nations that were initially at peace in the two SIPRI turnover tables is at least partially accounted for by the fact that the five-year period comparison permits an increase in the number of nations from 66 to 87.)

In summary, while negative spatial diffusion or negative reinforcement tendencies may have influenced those nations with at least one new war participation between 1956 and 1960, a positive spatial diffusion effect may have operated on those nations that had no new war participations between 1956 and 1960.

These simple turnover table analyses have not demonstrated, of course, that any of the four processes actually did operate. When an expected pattern was not observed, as in the case of positive reinforcement, it is legitimate to conclude that the process in question did not operate. When expectations were satisfied, however, similar categorical statements cannot be made. Nevertheless, the application of even these simple approaches has shown that *patterns that are consistent with* initial assumptions of negative spatial diffusion, negative reinforcement, and, to a lesser extent, positive spatial diffusion can be observed empirically.

Such demonstrations are not unimportant. They weaken the Poisson/Modified Poisson conclusion that at least the SIPRI new war participations tended to diffuse quite readily from one nation to another, even though some evidence was consistent with the positive spatial diffusion hypothesis. These simple analyses provide insight into an area almost completely untapped by our preliminary studies; namely, that rather strong negative spatial diffusion and negative reinforcement processes may have discouraged nations from beginning new war participations.[5]

One other point should be made. Both the Poisson/Modified Poisson and turnover table analyses focus on possible diffusion phenomena where such processes are the *least likely* to operate. The results are therefore somewhat surprising. Both sets of procedures yield some evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that the diffusion/reinforcement processes were operating even at the global level where the theoretical argument predicted that the influence of those effects would not be particularly strong.

Diffusion Among Sets of Interacting Nations. The theoretical formulation developed above suggests that diffusion/reinforcement processes should be most likely to operate—if indeed they operate at all—at a group level among those nations that share high levels of interaction. As we have argued, nations close to one another or sharing some common border should interact and demonstrate high levels of mutual awareness. If this is the case and if new war participations do actually diffuse, then it seems reasonable to expect nations with a nation at war on their border at a given time will have a higher propensity to become involved in new war participations at some later time than those nations whose bordering nations are initially at peace. In other words, one would expect nations to catch "the war disease," to borrow Alcock's (1972) phrase, if they border on a nation already stricken with the malaise.

---

[5] At the same time, the applications of these turnover tables have provided at least a partial escape from two limitations of the Poisson/Modified Poisson approach. It has been shown, for example, that these analyses can yield results that are generally consistent over at least ten- and five-year periods of aggregation, and that they can be applied to focus on different numbers of nations. Moreover, these tests have shown that it is at least partially possible to distinguish among the four alternatives under consideration.

As a first step toward testing this border operationalization of the general diffusion argument, we coded each nation in the international system for the number of borders it possessed in each year between 1945 and 1965. While details on

Table 1. Diffusion/Reinforcement Hypotheses and Empirical Expectations

Positive Reinforcement

Expectation: The ratio between (a) the number of nations which participated in at least one war at t_0 and which participated in a greater number of wars at t_1 than at t_0 and (b) the number of nations which participated in at least one war at t_0 approaches 1.00.

Rationale: If positive reinforcement is operative, then one would expect:

That if a nation was involved in one or more wars at t_0, it will have been involved in even more wars at t_1.

Positive Spatial Diffusion

Expectations:

a. The number of nations not participating in any war at $t_0 >$ the number of nations not participating at t_1;

b. The ratio between (a) the number of nations which participated in zero wars at t_0 and which participated in at least one war at t_1 and (b) the number of nations which participated in zero wars at t_0 approaches 1.00; and

c. The ratio between (a) the number of nations which participated in a greater number of wars at t_1 than at t_0 and (b) the total number of nations approaches 1.00.

Rationale: If positive spatial diffusion is operative, then one would expect:

1. That if a nation was involved in one or more wars at t_0, it will have been involved in even more wars at t_1; and,
2. That even if a nation was not involved in any wars at t_0, it could still become involved in a war at t_1.

Negative Reinforcement

Expectation: The proportion between (a) the number of nations which participated in at least one war at t_0 and which participated in a smaller number of wars at t_1 than at t_0 and (b) the number of nations which participated in at least one war at t_0 approaches 1.00.

Rationale: If negative reinforcement is operative, then one would expect:

That if a nation was involved in one or more wars at t_0, it will have been involved in fewer wars at t_1.

Negative Spatial Diffusion

Expectations:

a. The number of nations not participating in any war at $t_0 <$ the number of nations not participating in a war at t_1;

b. The ratio between (a) the number of nations which were not participating in any war at either t_0 and t_1 and (b) the number of nations not participating in any war at t_0 approaches 1.00; and

c. The ratio between (a) the number of nations which participated in at least one war at t_0 and which participated in a smaller number of wars at t_1 than at t_0 plus those which participated in zero wars in both periods and (b) the number of nations approaches 1.00.

Rationale: If negative spatial diffusion is operative, then one would expect:

That whether a nation is at peace or at war at t_0, it will refrain from becoming involved in any (or as many) wars at t_1.

Source: Prepared by the authors.

these codings are available in Most and Starr (1975, 1976) and Starr and Most (1976, 1978), suffice it to say that they are based on a mutually exclusive and cumulative six-way classification scheme that taps the following types of international frontiers:

1. Non-colonial borders (those that exist directly between two members of the international system):
   a. contiguous land borders
   b. 200-mile limit water borders
   c. proximity zone borders.
2. Colonial borders (those that indirectly exist between two members of the international system as a result of colonies or territorial possessions):
   a. contiguous land borders
   b. 200-mile limit water borders
   c. proximity zone borders.

Additional yearly codings recorded each occasion in which any given nation shared some border with a second nation that was involved in a war. In this way, it was possible to calculate the total number of *warring border nations* that each nation had in each year between 1946 and 1965 and to construct simple contingency tables (see Figure 5).

Regarding the existence of a warring border nation as a "treatment" that nations either did or did not experience in any given year, this strategy permits a focus on the following implicit transitions:[6]

1. From peace to peace with no border nations at war at t_0 (a_{11});
2. From peace to at least one new war participation with no border nations at war at t_0 (a_{12});
3. From peace to peace with at least one warring border nation at t_0 (a_{21}); and
4. From peace to at least one new war participation with at least one warring border nation at t_0 (a_{22}).

If the border operationalization of the positive spatial diffusion hypothesis holds, then two expectations should be satisfied:

Table 2. Summary of Results Relating to the Four Diffusion/Reinforcement Hypotheses

	1946–55 vs. 1956–65						1956–60 vs. 1961–65					
	COW		W-R		SIPRI		COW		W-R		SIPRI	
	%	Ratio	%	Ratio	%	Ratio	%	Ratio	%	Ratio	%	Ratio
Positive Reinforcement Expectation	5.3	1/19	4.5	1/22	4.0	1/25	0.0	0/7	0.0	0/11	6.7	1/15
Positive Spatial Diffusion												
Expectation (a)	No*	–	No	–	No	–	No	–	No	–	Yes	–
Expectation (b)	4.2	2/47	13.6	6/44	22.0	9/41	1.2	1/80	7.9	6/76	18.0	13/72
Expectation (c)	4.5	3/66	10.6	7/66	15.2	10/66	1.1	1/87	6.9	6/87	16.1	14/87
Negative Reinforcement Expectation	84.2	16/19	86.4	19/22	72.0	18/25	85.7	6/7	90.9	10/11	80.0	12/15
Negative Spatial Diffusion												
Expectation (a)	Yes*	–	Yes	–	Yes	–	Yes	–	Yes	–	No	–
Expectation (b)	95.7	45/47	86.4	38/44	78.0	32/41	98.8	79/80	92.1	70/76	81.9	59/72
Expectation (c)	92.4	61/66	86.4	57/66	75.6	50/66	97.7	85/87	92.0	80/87	81.6	71/87

Source: Prepared by the authors.

Note: Calculations are based on the expectations shown in Table 1.

*"Yes" and "No" entries denote whether or not the given expectation was or was not satisfied.

---

[6] These exploratory analyses focus exclusively on nations that were at peace at t_0. Two considerations suggest the need for such a strategy. First, if a nation is already at war, that fact is likely to influence that nation's decision calculus more strongly than the simple existence of warring border nations. Second, a focus on those nations that were at peace at t_0 permits an investigation of positive spatial diffusion in the only area in which the expectations from that hypothesis do not overlap with expectations from the positive reinforcement argument. Thus, a focus on those nations that were at peace at any given point in time serves to maximize the likelihood that evidence of the warring border nation operationalization of the positive spatial diffusion hypothesis will be isolated.

A. Number of New War Participations t_1 to t_5

		0	≥1
Number of Warring Border Nations t_0	0	a_{11}	a_{12}
	≥1	a_{21}	a_{22}

B. Number of SIPRI New War Participations, 1959–63

		0	≥1
Number of SIPRI Warring Border Nations, 1958	0	21	0
	≥1	45	14

Source: Prepared by the authors.

Figure 5. Contingency Table Format, with an Example Using SIPRI Data (for All Nations at Peace at t_0)

$$a_{22} > a_{12}$$

and

$$(a_{22})/(a_{12} + a_{22}) \rightarrow 1.00.$$

In Table 3, the tests for these expectations are presented for the COW, WR, and SIPRI data sets. The first column denotes the appropriate t_0 for each test. The second column identifies the five-year period, subsequent to t_0, during which new war participations were aggregated.

The results of these analyses show impressive evidence in support of the border operationalization of the positive spatial diffusion hypothesis. In the 43 five-year lags examined (15 each in COW and SIPRI; 13 in WR), the inequality is not satisfied only twice. Overwhelmingly, for all three data sets, $a_{22} > a_{12}$. In the same number of tests, the ratio dropped below .50 on only four occasions. (Of the two expectations delineated above, the ratio test is more likely not to be satisfied. The majority of the nations were always at peace. Hence, the implicit transition from peace to at least one new war participation under the condition of 0 warring border nations could carry a low probability and still cause a number of nations to make that shift.)

Perhaps the most useful summary of the test results, however, are the following comparisons of the mean transition rates:

COW: $\bar{a}_{22} = .1499$ $\bar{a}_{12} = .0303$
$(\bar{a}_{22})/(\bar{a}_{12}) = 4.9472;$

WR: $\bar{a}_{22} = .1558$ $\bar{a}_{12} = .0345$
$(\bar{a}_{22})/(\bar{a}_{12}) = 4.5159;$

SIPRI: $\bar{a}_{22} = .1855$ $\bar{a}_{12} = .0589$
$(\bar{a}_{22})/(\bar{a}_{12}) = 3.149,$

where the COW $\bar{a}_{22}$ denotes the mean a_{22} obtained in the 15 five-year lag tests shown in Table 3, and so on.

Even though a nation has at least one warring border nation at some point in time, it should be evident that that nation will *not* necessarily participate in at least one conflict during the subsequent five-year period. Like lung cancer, wars are rare events. Nevertheless, just as in the relationship between smoking and cancer, having a warring border nation *does increase the odds* that a subsequent new war participation will occur within five years. On the SIPRI data set, those chances are increased over three times; on the WR data set, four and a half times; and on the COW data set, nearly five times.

We have again asked the question: What would the world "look like" if there were positive spatial diffusion? This question could best be answered by focusing on a group of nations that could not also be involved in positive reinforcement, those nations that had not been at war at some given time. These nations were submitted to a "treatment"—the presence or absence of warring border nations. The possible effects of this treatment are apparent. The presence of warring border nations may have increased a peaceful nation's probability of going to war from three to five times.

Conclusion

The empirical findings may be readily summarized under the procedures used in this and our earlier analyses:

The Poisson/Modified Poisson Approach: The application and subsequent testing of the Poisson and Modified Poisson models yielded no evidence that COW new war participations diffused from one nation to another between 1946 and 1965. When identical procedures were applied to the SIPRI new war participations, however, exactly the opposite findings were obtained: SIPRI new war participations apparently did diffuse from one nation to another during the 20-year period. Tests on the WR data failed to yield clear conclusions that diffusion processes were or were not operating.

Table 3. Tests of the Positive Spatial Diffusion/Warring Border Nation Hypothesis: Subsequent New War Participations for All Nations at Peace at Each Successive t_0

Row Variable (t_0)	Column Variable (t_1 to t_5)	a_{12}	a_{22}	Ratio: $a_{22}/a_{12} + a_{22}$
A. Results Based on COW Data				
1946	1947–51	.000	.364	100.0
1947	1948–52	.128	.500	72.2
1948	1949–53	.083	.393	78.6
1949	1950–54	.103	.343	73.3
1950	1951–55	.000	.098	100.0
1951	1952–56	.000	.082	100.0
1952	1953–57	.000	.078	100.0
1953	1954–58	.000	.077	100.0
1954	1955–59	.052	.130	50.0
1955	1956–60	.063	.105	33.3
1956	1957–61	.000	.000	0.0*
1957	1958–62	.000	.027	100.0
1958	1959–63	.000	.026	100.0
1959	1960–64	.000	.026	100.0
1960	1961–65	.025	.000	0.0*
B. Results Based on WR Data				
1946	1947–51	.083	.313	93.8
1947	1948–52	.000	.292	100.0
1948	1949–53	.091	.196	90.0
1949	1950–54	.000	.231	100.0
1950	1951–55	.000	.020	100.0
1951	1952–56	.000	.098	100.0
1952	1953–57	.000	.094	100.0
1953	1954–58	.000	.096	100.0
1954	1955–59	.077	.128	62.5
1955	1956–60	.071	.158	66.7
1956	1957–61	.000	.118	100.0
1957	1958–62	.065	.170	81.8
1958	1959–63	.131	.185	38.5
C. Results Based on SIPRI Data				
1946	1947–51	.176	.300	80.0
1947	1948–52	.000	.209	100.0
1948	1949–53	.100	.163	87.5
1949	1950–54	.100	.217	90.9
1950	1951–55	.100	.061	75.0
1951	1952–56	.091	.167	88.9
1952	1953–57	.000	.170	100.0
1953	1954–58	.083	.200	90.9
1954	1955–59	.063	.172	90.9
1955	1956–60	.059	.180	91.7
1956	1957–61	.000	.123	100.0
1957	1958–62	.045	.172	90.9
1958	1959–63	.000	.237	100.0
1959	1960–64	.000	.186	100.0
1960	1961–65	.067	.226	93.3

Source: Prepared by the authors.

*Zero New War Participations occurred in the lagged period. Such occurrences omitted from the error totals.

The Turnover Table Analyses: The turnover tables indicated that strong negative reinforcement and/or negative spatial diffusion processes may have influenced the subsequent war behavior of those nations that experienced at least one new war participation during the initial period. Although those tendencies dominated the results in all three data sets, they were strongest in the COW set and weakest in the SIPRI data. Some evidence to support the hypothesis of positive spatial diffusion was also isolated. Although it was weak in comparison with the above-mentioned negative effects, the strength of the positive spatial diffusion appeared to increase as one moved from the COW to the WR to the SIPRI data sets. No evidence of positive reinforcement was found in any of the analyses.

The Contingency Table Analyses of the Warring Border Nation Operationalization of the Positive Spatial Diffusion Hypothesis: These procedures yielded very strong evidence in support of the warring border nation/positive spatial diffusion hypothesis. While having a warring border nation clearly did not mean that a nation would necessarily have at least one new war participation in the subsequent five-year period, it certainly increased the probabilities that subsequent new war participations would occur. If the numbers of occasions in which the expectations were not satisfied were used as an index, those results were strongest on the SIPRI data and weakest in the COW set. However, calculation and comparison of mean transition rates indicated that having a warring border nation increases the likelihood that a subsequent new war participation would occur over three times on the SIPRI set and nearly fived times on the COW data.

Clearly, further effort is required to synthesize these findings. Different types of wars appear to have different propensities to diffuse, but further exploration of this problem will require the development of new data sets that make more precise distinctions between large- and small-scale conflicts. It will be necessary to probe whether or not different types of borders tend to drive diffusion processes and whether or not major and minor power nations tend to react in similar ways to wars on their frontiers. It will be important to investigate whether warring border nations have varying impacts on nations that are themselves at peace and war. Finally, it may be of interest to consider other, non-border-related operationalizations of the general theoretical argument with a view toward exploring whether factors such as alliance partnerships, trading unions, and linguistic affinities might also define sets of interacting nations within which diffusion processes might operate.

In lieu of such additional work, however, our argument is generally supported by the existing results. War participations during the 1946–65 period do indeed seem to have altered nations' levels of uncertainty and their zones of unconditional and conditional viability. Much like arms races, wars appear to have caused leaders to reassess the situations confronting them. The evidence is consistent with the proposition that conlicts at one point in time affect leaders' decisions to participate in or refrain from subsequent wars. The evidence is weakest in the global-level stochastic modeling analyses; as predicted, it is most apparent in the examination of diffusion processes among groups of bordering nations. With only one exception, however, the analyses yield results that are consistent with the argument. The occurrence of a new war participation by one nation during the 1946–65 period did alter the probability that: (a) that same nation would experience subsequent new war participations, and (b) other nations would experience subsequent new war participations.

References

Alcock, Norman Z. (1972). *The War Disease.* Oakville: CPRI Press.

Blainey, Geoffrey (1973). *The Causes of War.* New York: Free Press.

Boulding, Kenneth E. (1962). *Conflict and Defense.* New York: Harper and Row.

Cobb, Roger W., and Charles Elder (1970). *International Community.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Collier, David, and Richard E. Messick (1975). "Functional Requisites versus Diffusion: Testing Alternative Explanations of Social Security Adoption." *American Political Science Review* 69: 1299–1315.

Cox, Kevin R., and John A. Agnew (1974). "Optimal and Non-Optimal Territorial Partitions, A Possible Approach Toward Conflict." *Peace Science Society Papers* 23: 123–58.

Davis, William W., et al. (1976). "Stochastic Models of the Distribution of Dyadic Warfare in Time." Pittsburgh: Carnegie-Mellon University, Department of Statistics, Technical Report No. 120.

______ (1978). "The Dynamics of Warfare, 1816–1965." *American Journal of Political Science* 22: 772–92.

Denton, Frank H. (1966). "Some Regularities in International Conflict, 1830–1949." *Background* 9: 283–96.

______, and Warren Phillips (1968). "Some Patterns in the History of Violence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 12: 182–95.

Eyestone, Robert (1977). "Confusion, Diffusion and Innovation." *American Political Science Review* 71: 441–47.

Garnham, David (1976). "Dyadic International War, 1816–1965: The Role of Power Parity and Geographical Proximity." *Western Political Quarterly* 29: 231–42.

Gillespie, John V. (1970). "Galton's Problem and Parameter Estimation Error in Comparative Political Analysis." Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.

Gleditsch, D. (1969). "The International Airline Network: A Test of the Zipf and Stouffer Hypotheses." *Peace Research Society Papers* 11: 123–53.

______, and J. D. Singer (1970). "Spatial Predictors of International War, 1816–1965." Presented at the Peace Research Society (International) meetings, Rome.

Gray, Virginia (1973). "Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study." *American Political Science Review* 68: 1174–85.

Job, Brian (1973). "Alliance Formation in the International System: The Application of the Poisson Model." Presented at the International Studies Association convention, New York.

Johnston, J. (1972). *Econometric Methods,* 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Kende, Istvan (1971). "Twenty-Five Years of Local Wars." *Journal of Peace Research* 1: 5–22.

Li, Richard P. Y., and William R. Thompson (1975). "The 'Coup Contagion' Hypothesis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 19: 63–88.

Lieberson, Stanley, and Arnold L. Silverman (1965). "The Precipitants and Underlying Conditions of Race Riots." *American Sociological Review* 30: 887–89.

Midlarsky, Manus (1970). "Mathematical Models of Instability and a Theory of Diffusion." *International Studies Quarterly* 14: 60–84.

______ (1974a). "The Urban Riots: Diffusion or Race War?" Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago.

______ (1974b). "Power, Uncertainty, and the Onset of International Violence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 18: 395–431.

______ (1975). *On War.* New York: Free Press.

______ (1978). "Analyzing Diffusion and Contagion Effects: The Urban Disorders of the 1960s." *American Political Science Review* 72: 996–1008.

Most, Benjamin A. (1973). "Testing for Geographic Contagion: A Cross-National Study of Nine Types of Violent Events, Latin America, 1946–1965." M.A. Thesis, Department of Political Science, Indiana University, Bloomington.

______, and Harvey Starr (1975). "The Consequences of War for War: A Design for the Study of Contagion/Diffusion Effects." Presented at the annual meeting of the Peace Science Society (International), Midwest Section, Chicago.

____________ (1976). "Techniques for the Detection of Diffusion: Geopolitical Considerations in the Spread of War." Presented at the International Studies Association convention, Toronto.

____________ (1977). "The Spread of War: An Empirical Critique of the Poisson/Modified Poisson Approach to the Study of Diffusion." Center for International Policy Studies, Indiana University, Report No. F77-01.

Moyal, J. G. (1949). "Distribution of Wars in Time." *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 112: 446–58.

Naroll, Raoul (1961). "Two Solutions to Galton's Problem." *Philosophy of Science* 28: 15–39.

______ (1965). "Galton's Problem: The Logic of Cross-Cultural Analysis." *Social Research* 32: 428–51.

______ (1973). "Galton's Problem." In Raoul Naroll and Ronald Cohen (eds.), *A Handbook of Methods in Cultural Anthropology.* New York: Columbia University Press.

North, Robert C., Richard A. Brody, and Ole R. Holsti (1964). "Some Empirical Data on the Conflict Spiral." *Papers of the Peace Science Society (International)* 1: 1–14.

Pearson, F. S. (1974). "Geographic Proximity and Foreign Military Intervention." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 18: 432–60.

Rapoport, Anatol (1960). *Fights, Games and Debates.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Richardson, Lewis F. (1960a). *Arms and Insecurity.* Chicago: Quadrangle Books.

______ (1960b). *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels.* Chicago: Quadrangle Books.

Rosenau, James N. (1969). "Toward the Study of National-International Linkages." In James N. Rosenau (ed.), *Linkage Politics.* New York: Free Press.

______ (1971). *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy.* New York: Free Press.

Ross, Marc H., and Elizabeth L. Homer (1976). "Galton's Problem in Cross-National Research." *World Politics* 29: 1–28.

Singer, J. D., and Melvin Small (1972). *The Wages of War, 1816–1965: A Statistical Handbook.* New York: John Wiley.

____________ (1974). "Foreign Policy Indicators: Predictors of War in History and in the State of the World Message." *Policy Sciences* 5: 271–96.

Siverson, Randolph M., and George T. Duncan (1976). "Stochastic Models of International Alliance Initiation." In D. A. Zinnes and J. V. Gillespie (eds.), *Mathematical Models in International Relations.* New York: Praeger.

Spilerman, Seymour (1970). "The Causes of Racial Disturbances: A Comparison of Alternative Explanations." *American Sociological Review* 35: 627–49.

Sprout, Harold, and Margaret Sprout (1965). *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Starr, Harvey (1975). "Coalitions and Future War: A Dyadic Study of Cooperation and Conflict." *Sage Professional Papers in International Studies,* No. 3. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, pp. 2–34.

______ (1976). "An Appraisal of the Substantive Findings of the Correlates of War Project." In F. W. Hoole and D. A. Zinnes (eds.), *Quantitative International Politics: An Appraisal.* New York: Praeger.

______ (1978). " 'Opportunity' and 'Willingness' as Ordering Concepts in the Study of War." *International Interactions* 4: 363–87.

______, and Benjamin A. Most (1976). "The Substance and Study of Borders in International Relations Research." *International Studies Quarterly* 20: 581–620.

____________ (1978). "A Return Journey: Richardson, 'Frontiers' and Wars in the 1946–1965 Era." *Jour-*

nal of Conflict Resolution 22: 441–67.

Stohl, Michael (1975). "War and Domestic Political Violence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 19: 379–416.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (1970). *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1968/69.* New York: Humanities Press.

Walker, Jack L. (1969). "The Diffusion of Innovations Among American States." *American Political Science Review* 63: 880–99.

Weede, E. (1970). "Conflict Behavior of Nations." *Journal of Peace Research* 7: 229–35.

______ (1973). "Nation-Environment Relations as Determinants of Hostilities Among Nations." *Peace Science Society (International) Papers* 20: 67–90.

______ (1975). "World Order in the Fifties and Sixties: Dependence, Deterrence and Limited Peace." *Peace Science Society (International) Papers* 24: 49–80.

Wilkenfeld, Jonathan (1968). "Domestic and Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations." *Journal of Peace Research* 5: 56–69.

______ (1969). "Domestic and Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations." *Journal of Peace Research* 6: 148–56.

______ (1972). "Models for the Analysis of Foreign Conflict Behavior of States." in B. M. Russett (ed.), *Peace, War and Numbers.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.

______, ed. (1973). *Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics.* New York: David McKay.

Wright, Quincy (1965). *A Study of War,* 2d. ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Yamamoto, Yoshinobu, and Stuart A. Bremer (1976). "Wider Wars and Restless Nights: Major Power Intervention in Ongoing Wars, 1818–1965." Mimeographed, University of Michigan.

Zinnes, Dina A. (1976). *Contemporary Research in International Relations.* New York: Free Press.

Zipf, G. K. (1949). *Human Behavior and the Principles of Least Effort.* Cambridge: Addison-Wesley.

War and the Cycle of Relative Power

CHARLES F. DORAN
Johns Hopkins University

WES PARSONS
Rice University

Relative nation-state capability follows a generalized nonlinear pattern over long periods. Empirical evidence indicates that between 1816–1975 nine major powers have traversed at least a segment of this relative capability cycle of political ascendancy, maturation and decline. Specific changes in a state's relative capability dynamics increase its propensity to initiate extensive war. Whether the extensiveness of a war is defined in terms of duration, intensity or magnitude, major powers are likely to initiate more extensive wars at the critical inflection and turning points on the curve of relative capability where the linear role perceptions held by government and society change pervasively. This analysis involves a new theoretical focus for examining the causes of war, shifting attention from interactions between nations to the consequences of changes in relative power and to the political evolution of the nation-state itself.

In this study we probe empirically the impact of long-term nonlinear changes in a state's relative power on its propensity for extensive war, shifting the research focus from the more conventional assessment of interactions between states. The theory of relative capability dynamics and extensive war emerged from examination of the hegemonic behavior of the major powers for the period after 1450 (Doran, 1971).

The Cycle of National Power

We employ a minimal definition of cycle as "a period of time during which something becomes established, reaches a peak, and declines" (*Webster's Dictionary*). The political development of the major power is manifest in this cyclical conception. As a nation gains in power relative to others, its capacity to exercise leadership grows; as it falls behind, the capacity to influence international politics wanes. Repetition of the cycle by a state, although theoretically possible, is not relevant to this discussion; hence, when we speak in the plural of "cycles of development," we refer not to such repetition but to a particular nonlinear pattern of change that seems widely generalized across the principal members of the modern state system (Doran, 1971, pp. 2–11; 1980). Some analysts, however, do use cycle in the sense of a regularly recurring succession of events over the extremely short term (Alcock, 1972), or in the long-term, systems-wide, Kondratieff sense where the repetition is less frequent (Denton and Phillips, 1968; Modelski, 1978). The conception of cycle as a generalizable pattern of long-term evolutionary change is apparent in the writings of George Liska (1967), who considers the cycle specific to a nation's foreign policy role but does not link it to capability, role transformation, or political violence.

For an example of the cycle of relative power, consider the tiny country of Holland, which rose to the height of its power at the end of the sixteenth century, dominating foreign exploration and commerce whle financing the military resistance to Louis XIV's several wars, only to plummet to comparative political obscurity in the century thereafter (Rosecrance, 1968, p. 88). Similarly, Austria-Hungary, one of the five Great Powers in the nineteenth century, succumbed to partition at Versailles and to collapse in the face of Nazi pressure a generation later. Although the periods and amplitudes (heights) of ascendancy differed for these two nations, the dynamic of the path followed was the same. That path, reflecting the capacity of the state to assume a major role in systemic affairs, is termed the *cycle of relative capability* and is depicted in the idealized Weberian sense in Figure 1.

Capability itself is composed of two principal dimensions: *size,* which is most often indexed by GNP, territory, armed forces, military spending, and population, and *development,* which includes such variables as per capita income, urbanization, and technological sophistication. With the obvious exception of territorial size, most of the power variables register in the absolute sense some form of exponential increase for most states (Rus-

---

We wish to thank anonymous referees for their insightful and constructive commentary and Barbara Giusti Doran for important mathematical consultation regarding research design.

sett, 1974). But the state cycle in our conceptualization involves *relative,* not absolute, capability and hence differs fundamentally from that of Fucks (1965) and others. The view that relative capability is an important element underlying major power behavior is well accepted, but conceptions of relative power differ widely regarding choice of significant reference group and/or operationalization (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972; Wallace, 1973; Weede, 1973; Ferris, 1973; Choucri and North, 1974; Galtung, 1966; Rummel, 1971). The concept as used here is again somewhat different: the relative capability of a major power at any time is the percent of the total capability among the major powers it holds at that time. The dynamics of relative capability thus encompasses changes in the interacting state-units and changing systemic structure as inseparable parts of a single


$\frac{dy}{dt} > 0, a < t < c$
$\frac{dy}{dt} < 0, c < t < a'$
$\frac{dy}{dt} = 0, t = a$
$\frac{dy}{dt} = 0, t = c$
$\frac{dy}{dt} = 0, t = a'$
Relative Capability
$\frac{d^2y}{dt^2} = 0, t = b$
$\frac{d^2y}{dt^2} = 0, t = d$
$\frac{d^2y}{dt^2} > 0, a < t < b$
$\frac{d^2y}{dt^2} < 0, b < t < d$
$\frac{d^2y}{dt^2} > 0, d < t < a'$
a
b
c
d
a'
Time

Source: Conceptualized by Charles F. Doran, *The Politics of Assimilation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1971, pp. 46–51, 191–94), utilizing principles of the calculus.

Key: a, b, c, d, a' = critical points
t = time
y = relative capability of the state
$\frac{dy}{dt}$ = rate of change (velocity) in relative capability over time
$\frac{d^2y}{dt^2}$ = rate of change of change (acceleration) in relative capability over time

Figure 1. Generalized Curve of Relative Capability

process, to avoid both second-image overgeneralization (Waltz, 1979) and the ecological fallacy.

According to the theory, relative capability follows a cyclical dynamic (Doran, 1971, pp. 45–51, 191–93). Since capability is limited in part by the size of the nation's territory and initial capital and natural resource endowments, an upper limit on relative growth is somewhat pre-ordained. Institutional factors encouraging saving, investment, and efficiency contribute positively to the early growth phase and may subsequently inhibit the rate of growth if rigidity and overcentralization occur. Diffusion of power away from core development may take place as well in the later phases, for example, through migration (Rostow, 1978, p. 21) or through the export of capital and technology to newer centers where the prospect exists of a higher return to investment (Kindleberger, 1970). Meanwhile, other states, industrializing later but more rapidly, may be in a more advantageous position. The cycle results from differing rates of internal economic and political development experienced by different actors.

The length of the period and the height of the ascendancy will vary from state to state, but the pattern of change remains the same. A major power can escape this dynamic of cyclical change only by remaining at or fluctuating around the same proportionate increase in relative capability as that experienced by the total major power system. While in theory all states are subject to the full cycle of growth, maturation and decline, many states have traversed only a small section of the curve in their entire systemic experience, either relatively new members of the system or older members with longer periods. Hence curve-fitting can be very misleading in the absence of an understanding of the dynamics of the generalized relative power curve. By the same token, each state must be treated in terms of its own individual dynamics within each interval, with the longer intervals yielding a better approximation of the generalized results.

War and the Cycle of Relative Capability: The Theory

The theory of relative capability holds that the capacity of the state to influence international politics and to adopt a principal foreign policy role is determined in large part by its position on the relative capability cycle. As the cycle evolves and the role changes, significant adjustments are required of the government and the society. The theory further asserts that the trauma of role change is most severe for state leaders at each of four critical points on the cycle where an abrupt and ineluctable inversion occurs within the dynamics (Doran, 1971, pp. 193–94, 210). The critical points are the two inflection points *b* and *d* and the two turning points *a* and *c* (Figures 1 and 2). It is at these points according to the theory that the government is most vulnerable to overreaction, misperception, or aggravated use of force which may generate massive war. Several aspects of the theory require further amplification.

Relative power calculations are important to policy makers who conceptualize the role of the state within the international system. Normative expectations of the members of the system, regularized by social and political tradition and shaped by the realities of capability, determine a nation's role (Holsti, 1970). In the late nineteenth century, Great Britain adopted a formula, for example, that attempted to maintain its naval capability at twice the level of the next two naval powers, France and Russia (Art, 1973, p. 22). Admiral Tirpitz argued that Germany had to have sufficient naval capability to reduce the British ratio of superiority below the level of the two-power standard (Berghan, 1973, p. 31). Notwithstanding this precise monitoring of capability, relative capability theory does not require such careful calculation, since the practice of day-to-day diplomacy will itself provide signals regarding the degree of a government's relative ascendancy or decline as perceived and acted upon by other principal competitors. Hence, to some extent its competitors do not allow a government to misread the implications of its changing capacity to implement statecraft.

Accordingly, for the policy maker the principal dichotomy in conceptualizing foreign policy roles is between the leader nation whose security is in large part internally provided, and the follower nation whose security must for the most part be externally obtained. Either role may be stable, but transition from one to the other requires difficult governmental and social adjustments. According to the present theory, these transitions are triggered by passing through the critical points on the relative capability cycle.

Figure 2, depicting three types of change simultaneously operative in the cycle of relative capability, helps explain why the changes occurring at critical points have such an abrupt and unsettling effect on a nation's self-image and foreign policy perspective. Role stability is not seriously threatened between the critical points because during these periods governments can plan. Within these intervals, changes in slope of the tangent lines are not great, so that even simple linear projections from existing conditions provide a fairly good approximation of future capability. The policy maker anticipates future conditions with confidence and success. Even if information accumulates to show that the state's relative capability is



Source: Conceptualized by Charles F. Doran, *The Politics of Assimilation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1971, pp. 191–94, 210), utilizing principles of the calculus.

Key: a, b, c, d, a' = critical points
a, c, a' = turning points (maximum or minimum value)
b, d = inflection points (points where tangent reverses direction) and hence turning points with respect to the derivative
↑ = actual value greater than linear projection
↓ = actual value less than linear projection

Note: Figure 2A is the relative capability curve itself, graphing *level.* Change of level involves either an increase (curve rises) or a decrease (curve falls) in relative capability score. The *rate* at which the level is changing, signified by the slopes of the lines drawn tangent to each point on the curve of Figure 2A, itself varies. Figure 2B graphs this *rate of change* (velocity or first derivative) for each point on the curve; positive velocity signifies rise in level, negative velocity indicates decline. The rate of change graph is also nonlinear and non-monotonic, rising or falling to different degrees (with differing slopes) over time. Figure 2C illustrates this *rate of change of change* (acceleration or second derivative), graphing the changing slopes of tangent lines of the velocity curve; acceleration likewise is neither constant, linear, monotone, nor always positive.

Figure 2. Level, Velocity and Acceleration of Relative Capability: Concurrent Changes

changing in a nonlinear fashion, the tendency will be to view it as monotonic increasing (never decreasing) or monotonic decreasing (never increasing)—until the turn is imminent or past (Jervis, 1976, p. 310). Temporary fluctuations in the process do not destroy the monotonicity of the projected trend, and indeed their possibility further weakens the policy maker's ability to predict crises or turning points. But, again, monotonic projections serve satisfactorily so long as there are no inversions in the process.

Figure 2 shows that each of the critical points involves such unavoidable and unpredictable violations of monotonicity and linearity in level, velocity and/or acceleration of relative capability (as detailed in the next section). The significant change in slope, indeed, inversion within the relationship, which occurs at each of the critical points, calls for a completely different role from that projected along the preceding tangent lines. A nation's role stability thus breaks down at the critical points because there the linear or monotonic projections of the state leaders suddenly become counter to the real trend in direction as well as degree. The leaders perceive that role transformation is needed (or, if foreseen, can no longer be postponed) with equivalent suddenness since turning points defy both early and certain detection. Perception of this now-certain imperative may occur just prior to the impending inversion for the more alert states, perhaps after a short delay for those less observant of their changing relative power.

Forced unexpectedly to search for new foreign policy roles, the state feels threatened by uncertainty and is vulnerable to over-reaction. An analogy between an automobile driver following an unmapped road at night and a government responding to changes in power is perhaps helpful. Even if the driver anticipates an oncoming curve in the road correctly, the dangers of over-steering or under-steering normally become critical only when the curve is reached, although they may be perpetuated for an interval thereafter, depending upon the speed of the vehicle and the ability of the driver to adjust. Intoxication, whether with alcohol in the one case or with power perquisites in the other, further increases the probability of serious accident at these points.

The objective changes in relative capability and the perceptions of them (Deutsch and Merritt, 1965) are thus at once "gradual" and yet involve "abrupt" changes. Mathematically continuous, gradual change occurs throughout the relative capability cycle even at a critical point, but the dynamic relationships are completely inverted on either side of that point where a change in sign abruptly occurs. (Substantively, change at these points is abrupt in the sense that it occurs in an interval of a year or so set against perhaps a century and a half of experience.) Likewise, the leaders' perceptions of change in relative capability cumulate gradually, but a gradual trend may always be interpreted as part of a temporary fluctuation until the approach to the inversion is imminent; and as for the night driver on an unfamiliar road, over-reaction often accompanies abrupt perception. It is our belief that most major powers are similarly constrained regarding early identification of critical points, similarly sensitive to their imminent arrival, and similarly subject to abrupt over-reaction.

Probing the Dynamics of Relative Power: Behavioral Responses. A state's progress through the cycle of relative capability must be measured simultaneously in terms of level, velocity, and acceleration to discover the inversions which abruptly alter the dynamics of the cycle and the leaders' perspectives regarding the role. The continued rise in relative power between points *a* and *c* (Figure 2A) masks an inversion within the process which takes place at *b* and is depicted in Figure 2B. While relative power growth continues after *b*, its rate of growth has maximized and gradually slows to a halt at *c*; monotonicity has been reversed for velocity, although it is retained for relative power level itself. Figure 2C shows the positive acceleration that makes growth approximately exponential prior to *b*; but at *b*, the accelerating growth to which the state has become accustomed ends, and the rise in relative ascendancy increasingly slows until it reaches its maximum level at *c*. Critical point *c* separates the region of growth in relative capability (*a, c*) from the region of decline (*c, a'*); at *c* monotonicity is reversed in the level of relative power itself. The increasing negative acceleration prior to *c* which slowed growth begins to diminish after *c*, changing back to positive acceleration at *d*. The continued decline in relative capability between *c* and *a'* undergoes a critical inversion at *d* as the rate of decline peaks (low point on Figure 2B where monotonicity of velocity is reversed) and then turns up. This upturn in rate of power growth at *d* (although the rate is still negative) and the change from negative to positive acceleration of growth (although the growth itself is still negative) is a complex combination of psychological stimulants to behavior.

How are the state's perceptions of these changes translated into foreign policy responses which lead to extensive war? At the beginning of the cycle, recent entrants into the system reveal expansionist proclivity and heady nationalism (Kohn, 1944) as linear projections of continued growth are shown to be underestimated. If war occurs at this point, it is likely to be serious because the territorial status quo of the system appears threatened. At *b* and *c* the inevitability of decline in the rate and level of relative power, respectively, often generates a sense of insecurity, defensiveness and vulnerability to chauvinism (Wallace, 1973, p. 20) as real growth falls below linear projections. At *d*, cross-pressured between its increasing dependence on alliances with more powerful states for security, and renewed aspirations for a leadership-oriented role for which it may be ill prepared both psychologically and militarily, and disquieted by its continuing real decline in relative power, the government is subject to foreign policy over-reaction and misperception regarding the intent and scope of other governments' actions (Taylor, 1954; Pruitt, 1969). Perhaps these tendencies which contribute to imprudent use of force and the adoption of unyielding foreign policy positions are most severe at points *b* and *d* where the shock of role adjustment is most wrenching.

Each of the four critical transitions is thus damaging to a policy's role stability. For the *risk-acceptant* actor, the first inflection point and the upper turning point are very disturbing, since rivals are threatening the leadership role of the polity in new and unsuspected ways. Beyond the upper turning point, the government is reminded that postponement of an "inevitable" conflict will mean contemplating even greater power disadvantages in the future. Here expansionist arguments may increase the probability of the most serious variety of war, major hegemony. Hitler, for example, warned the Germans in 1939 after several decades of decline that, if they passed up this opportunity for supremacy (Bullock, 1964, p. 503), they would never again have the requisite capability, since the polity faced even more severe relative decline thereafter.

But even comparatively *risk-averse* actors are likely to be much more apt at the critical points to initiate extensive war. At least three of the critical points (*b*, *c*, and *d*) may engender feelings of powerlessness, determinism, and subsequent helplessness in a governing elite anxious about security. A government may respond to such feelings with aggressiveness and violent coercion, despite room for independent action (Soloman, 1970). Paranoid attributes establish the conditions for aggression in such contexts because slippage in relative power position may reinforce mistaken projections of hostility unto rivals.

Interpretation: Refinements and an Hypothesis. The decision to use some level of force in a dispute, no matter how minimal, is a function of a host of internal and external situations and structural factors. For this reason we do not believe that relative power changes at the critical points help explain the frequency of war initiation in general. Instead, the theory of relative capability addresses the impact of the critical points on the extensiveness of war initiation and use of force by the major power; a major power is more likely to become involved in *bigger* wars at these points than at other times. Stated somewhat differently, relative power dynamics may tell us something of the *timing* of the *bigger* wars in which a major power becomes ensnared. At critical points on the relative power curve, expansionist tendencies are greatest and attempts at hegemony are likely to occur. Furthermore, we believe, even normally prudent leaders are more likely to overreact at these points, thus precipitating more massive confrontations than at other times, confrontations that (1) attract a larger number of major combatants, (2) result in more casualties, and/or (3) entrap the participants in a longer period of hostilities. We will use the term "extensive war" in referring to these more massive confrontations, and our research design will incorporate three distinct variables to index the extent of war.

Hence the theory of relative power change has significance not for the frequency of the outbreak of war but for the timing of the more extensive wars which a nation initiates. A major state may initiate wars that do or do not involve other major actors, wars that are long or are short, and wars that are comparatively bloody or benign. To ask whether one might be able to determine *when* a major power is likely to trigger bigger wars and wars involving a number of other major states is thus no trivial question. In asking it, we in no way deny that factors other than the intent or the political vulnerability of the initiator, such as the type of weaponry or the behavior of allies (see below), contribute to the full explanation of the severity, magnitude, and duration of war. Conversely, although war is not a unilateral action, conditions peculiar to a principal belligerent may critically influence the timing and nature of war. Hence, a valid research objective is to determine whether the more extensive wars are more likely at certain times because of the changing power position which the state holds relative to its competitors in the system. This theory was deduced from historical examination of three major power hegemonies prior to 1815, and we now test empirically its predictive power regarding major power experience in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

This study thus seeks to test the following proposition and hypothesis for the group of major powers:

PROPOSITION 1. *Major powers pass through a cycle indexed by relative capability.*

HYPOTHESIS 1. *At critical points during this* *cycle where change is most rapid and disruptive of past trends, namely, at the inflection and turning points, the probability is highest of major power initiation of extensive war (that is, of wars which escalate beyond the level of those initiated at other times).*

Indeed, we may state the hypothesis even more strongly, namely, that the level of extensiveness of such wars varies inversely with the war's temporal distance from the initiator's preceding critical point.

To clarify this hypothesis even further, visualize a time line from 1816 to 1975 with markers indicating the critical points in relative capability for each of the major powers. We plot dots along this line every time a major power initiates a war, color coding dots and markers to distinguish between nations. Our theory suggests that the dots would be more or less randomly distributed for each power; that is, frequency of major power war initiation is not related to proximity to the initiator's critical point. However, if one were to draw three such time lines, one for each measure of war extensiveness, and make the size of each dot proportional to that war's score on the respective extensiveness measure, then, according to our theory, on each line the bigger dots would fall closer to the initiating state's preceding critical point. In fact, according to our more rigorous statement of the hypothesis, the size of the dots will diminish as one moves away from the critical point.

Examining the Cycle of National Power Empirically

Actors and System. Historically the largest amount of political activity, including conflict, has occurred among the nations known as the Great Powers or the major powers (Singer and Small, 1972, Salmore and Hermann, 1969). We have studied the nine members comprising the major power system from 1816 to 1965: Great Britain, France, Russia (USSR), Prussia (W. Germany), Austria-Hungary, Italy, the United States, Japan and China (PRC). We generally follow accepted historical practice in deleting certain states as they drop out of the central system while recognizing the entrance of others (see Table 1). Only Great Britain, France, Russia and Prussia were members for the entire period. While the complete political cycle of each actor is often not encompassed by this interval, the domain is broad enough to include at least one of the critical periods on the curve of each actor's relative power capability.

Table 1. Nations Classified as Major Powers, 1816–1975

Nation	Period of Membership	No. of Years
Great Britain	1816–1975	160
France	1816–1975	160
Prussia/(W.) Germany	1816–1975	160
Russia/USSR	1816–1975	160
Austria-Hungary	1816–1918	103
Italy	1860–1943	84
United States	1898–1975	78
Japan	1894–1975	82
China/PRC	1950–1975	26

Source: Compiled by the authors.

Indicators. Criteria of theoretical relevance and practical availability guide the selection of indicators of national capability. Gross national product is a useful measure of overall economic performance, but problems of exchange rate comparability, the incorporation of qualitative technological change, and the effect of uneven rates of inflation reduce the value of the concept when applied over long periods. Data on GNP and military expenditures, moreover, are either nonexistent or of very poor quality for the nineteenth century. For all of these reasons, we follow Fucks (1965) and use non-monetary units of measure wherever possible.

We drew data from over 40 sources for indicators of *size*: (1) iron and steel production, (2) population, and (3) size of armed forces; and for indicators of *development*: (4) energy use (coal production), and (5) urbanization (the proportion of people living in cities with greater than 100,000 population). Armed forces size is very stochastic, particularly before and after major wars; it also reflects actualized military capability (Knorr, 1973, p. 44) whereas the other indicators reflect primarily latent capability. Urbanization is a somewhat under-used index of social change that has profound effects on the rate of economic development through impact upon labor productivity and constraints on population growth (Lewis, 1978).

The question of the appropriate weight to be applied to each indicator was explored empirically. Ferris (1973) recommends using the squared variances associated with each variable on a single factor extracted by the principal components method because this method maximizes the contribution of each component to the variance in overall power. Since these squared variances did not diverge significantly from unity, however, neither an empirical nor a theoretical argument could be found to give the indicators other than unitary weights. This decision conforms to the observation by Wainer (1976) that weighting components is unlikely to alter the nature of the final index. This is especially true when, as in this study, one is interested not in absolute capability levels but in the pattern of change in relative capability.

Operationalizing Relative Power. For each indicator of power, p_i, the relative capability of State A at time t, P_{Ai} is the percent of the total major actor systemic capability on that indicator held by State A at time t:

$$P_{Ai} = \frac{p_{iA}}{\sum_{k=1}^{N} P_{ik}} \times 100,$$

where N is the number of major actors in the system at time t. State A's total relative power score is the average of its relative power on each of the five power indicators:

$$P_A = 1/5 \sum_{i=1}^{5} P_{Ai}.$$

Relative power scores are obtained for each of the nine actors at intervals of 5 years from 1816 to 1975. This operationalization captures change in the system as well as in the nation-state, yielding a record of the changing relative capacity of the nation-state to sustain its role in the system.

Fitting the Curve of Relative Power. There are several possible choices for a functional form to fit the capabilities data. The curve must be specified in such a manner that highs, lows and inflections are readily determined, allowing for a straightforward test of our hypothesis; maximizing R^2 is of secondary importance. Indeed, a 33-degree polynomial function could be applied to Great Britain with a perfect fit ($R^2 = 1.0$), for instance, but would have far too many local highs and lows to allow coherent hypothesis testing. The curve must also approximate the shape of the cycle of relative capabilities and be theoretically well grounded.

One curve which reflects this general dynamic is a logistic function describing the growth of a population in a limited environment (Heiss, Knorr, and Morgenstern, 1973; Kuznets, 1966). The logistic growth curve was explored by biologist Raymond Pearl (1924) who deduced that human populations grow nearly exponentially until reaching an inflection point and then level off to approach an asymptote. Because the Pearl logistic curve models growth in the context of limited resources (homologous with growth of a major power's share of relative capability in the international system), it provides a theoretically justified, readily applicable method of finding critical points in the growth of a nation's capability.

The following equation applied to relative capability data incorporates this notion:

$$P_t = \frac{k}{1 + m \cdot \exp\,[F(t)]} + d$$

where P_t is a state's relative power score at time t; t is the year minus 1816 (hence $t = 1, \ldots, 160$); the constants $(k+d)$ and d are upper and lower asymptotes, respectively, established by the state's scores; $F(t)$ is a nonlinear time function of the form $b_1t + b_2t^2 + b_3t^3$ and m is a regression parameter whose values will be determined in the run. This equation is linearized algebraically to

$$ln \; \frac{k}{P_t - d} - 1 \; = ln\, m + b_1t + b_2t^2 + b_3t^3$$

and the dependent variable (left-hand side of equation) is regressed on the independent variables t, t^2 and t^3 to produce the beta coefficients, b_1, $b_\circ$ and b_3, and *ln m,* the linearized intercept.[1] We thereby find the parameters for the nation's Pearl function, given the asymptotes, that minimize the sum of the squared deviations. Finally, from the resulting least squares fitted equation for the state, one can determine the critical points by the calculus, observing the value of the first and second derivatives with respect to time at each year 1816–1975. The first derivative with respect to time is

$$\frac{dP_t}{dt} = -\frac{k \cdot m \cdot \exp\,[F(t)] \cdot (b_1 + 2b_2t + 3b_3t^2)}{[1 + m \cdot \exp\,[F(t)]\;]^2}$$

When this derivative is at zero, there is a local or global maximum or minimum. When this derivative is at a maximum (local or global), the second derivative is zero and there is an inflection.

---

[1] To run this on any standard regression routine, one need only set the lower and upper asymptotes (chosen to be slightly outside the smallest and largest data points for the state). For some of the major powers we constrained the linearized equation by setting b_1, b_2 or b_3 equal to zero so that highs or lows calculated to be just outside our 1816–1975 range would fall within that range. Since such a constraint results in one *less* degree of freedom, R^2 goes down, and we thereby reduce the statistical significance of our fit and in no way help us verify our hypothesis.

Findings for the Major Polities. Figure 3 reports for each major actor the regression results for the fitted logistic curve through the actual data on relative power, and the years of the high, low and inflection point(s) of that curve. For each state's graph, values on the vertical axis show its percentage of the total power in the principal actor system at various time points as calculated by the relative power equation.

As reported in Figure 3, regression coefficients for the fitted logistic curve and even the R^2 are quite large (R^2 ranging from .65 to .93) in all cases except China where we have only 6 data points. Since we are not fitting curves through each individual nation's points by trial and error, but have employed theory to define a well-specified equation that is applied to each country in the same fashion, it is not likely that these high R^2s have been obtained by chance and the validity of the generalized relative capability cycle is reinforced. It is strengthened further when one compares the nonlinear results against *linear* regression results. The nonlinear results are better for all cases except China and post-World War II Japan (1945–75). In three cases where only a small portion of the nation's cycle is represented, the nonlinear R^2s are, as anticipated, only slightly better than the linear R^2s. Really significant disparities in R^2, however, occur in the four cases where a large segment of the cycle is encompassed in the interval under study, namely, for the United States (.65 versus .05), Prussia/Germany (.62 versus .00), Italy (.66 versus .23), and Russia/Soviet Union (.68 versus .22). Such substantial margins in favor of the nonlinear analysis support the notion that these governments are subject to a similar cyclical dynamic of relative power.

Theory predicts, and the empirical findings sustain, that at any given time a government falls into one of three categories of the general dynamic of relative power: decline, ascendancy, or maturation. The results in each case also are consistent with the historically observed path. France, Great Britain, and Austria-Hungary provide the best examples of nations in relative political decline. An interval of 160 years is insufficient to encompass more than a segment of the cycle of French participation in the system which must have peaked in the eighteenth century before the Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars (Doran, 1971, p. 127). Great Britain shows the greatest fluctuation in amplitude during this interval, namely, a ninefold decline in relative capability from a peak in 1816 to a trough in 1975. Impressionistic historical surveys of British colonialism (Porter, 1975) appear to be upheld in that the bulk of late nineteenth-century imperial activity took place *after* the nation had already embarked upon a downward political trajectory, not before. Austria-Hungary struggled unsuccessfully to maintain its role as one of the five Great Powers of the nineteenth century; these findings reveal that relative political decline preceded and facilitated territorial partition and that partition was not the primary cause of decline.

Ascendancy is most marked for the two eastern powers, Japan and China. Both were comparative latecomers to the modern system. Both have risen rapidly. Neither shows signs of an ascent that has peaked. Japanese growth reveals the phoenix effect (Organski and Kugler, 1977) of an abrupt, roughly 60 percent reduction in relative capability caused by defeat in World War II, followed by recovery some 20 years later beyond the original level of relative status and influence. Although the nature of Japanese and Chinese capability is quite different than for the "superpowers" in that Japanese strength is essentially commercial and Chinese power is inwardly focused on a single region, both states are upwardly mobile and are significant contenders for greater world leadership.

Political maturation on the cycle of relative capability may be differently characterized for the United States and the Soviet Union. Although Russia has been a member of the main system far longer than the United States, the Soviet share of world power, starting from a large base, has increased only gradually and somewhat irregularly in the twentieth century. While relative U.S. capability grew rapidly between 1900 and 1946, short-term fluctuations in that capability during the post-1946 interval have been even more pronounced than for the Soviet Union. These large fluctuations result from a tendency not to support a high level of actualized military potential during peacetime. The Soviet Union, for example, devotes twice as much of its GNP to military expenditures as the United States does, thus maintaining rough military equivalency, but at far greater cost to society. Although both the Soviet Union and the United States appear to be operating at or near the peak on their relative capability curves, the difference is that the Soviet Union seems to be approaching its peak while the United States may have passed that apex (see next section for qualifications).

Italy and Germany require special comment. Italy is the only actor in the system that experienced a serious dip in power during the first decades of the twentieth century followed by something of a resurgence thereafter. This perturbation probably resulted from Italy's inability to keep up with the rapidly industrializing members of the system at the end of the nineteenth century and from a major effort to mobilize military potential later during the interwar period. Germany, on the other hand, displays perhaps better than any actor one complete cycle of the relative capability curve



Source: Drawn from over 40 sources, the data on our 5 indicators of capability are available from the authors upon request.

Key: L = year of low point
H = year of high point
I = year of inflection point

Figure 3. Relative Power of the Nine Major Powers, 1815–1975: Data Points and Fitted Curves

during this interval. The curve peaks in the last decade of the nineteenth century and follows a rather steady decline thereafter, punctuated only by the effort to mobilize German military strength prior to World War II.

To the extent that relative capability is accurately depicted by these curves, the German *revanche* under Hitler was remarkable not for its proximity to victory but for its recklessness and high probability of defeat (Scott, 1965, p. 31) in the face of overwhelming latent military capability elsewhere in the system.

A last interpretive observation is that despite possible exaggeration of Chinese relative capability because of the size of its population and its armed forces, the emergence of the People's Republic of China in the 1970s as a counterbalance to rising Soviet power is perhaps foretold by the apparent slippage in the relative U.S. position, on the one hand, and by the unavoidable recognition of Chinese prominence on the other (Eckstein, 1977). By 1975 the system in some ways had become far less rigid at the top. China became the new "holder" of the external balance.

U.S., China and Russia: A Reliability Check with Updated Indicators. Each of the empirically determined relative power curves is supported by the historical record from 1816 through 1970. Only during the last decade do some scores appear counter-intuitive: in 1970, for instance, the USSR apparently enjoys 24.9 percent of the system's power, China some 24.7 percent, and the U.S. only 20.0 percent. As already suggested above, the use of population and armed forces size undoubtedly exaggerated China's relative capability score. Furthermore, such indicators rapidly became archaic with the advent of high technology and nuclear capability. To test the reliability of our findings for the most recent period, we constructed a second index over the period 1966–75 (two-year intervals) from recently released data. Defense spending replaced arms forces size and GNP per capita replaced urbanization.

Comparison of the two indices for China, USSR and the U.S. (Figure 4) reveals two important facts about relative power dynamics. (1) More relevant data in the contemporary period do yield intuitively meaningful scores for the magnitude of relative power held by each state. U.S. relative capability increases while Soviet and especially Chinese capability are translated downward. (2) On the other hand, the new data do not change the patterns of relative capability; here U.S. relative capability again trends downward while both Soviet and Chinese relative capability gradually increase. Indeed, a correlation of the slopes across new and old data reveals as r of .98. Hence only the intercepts changed, not the slopes (and it is the slopes of the relative capability curve which are at issue in our war hypothesis). The dynamic of relative capability appears to be quite invariant across a broad mix of power indicators.

War and the Cycle of National Capability: Empirical Findings

In this section we examine empirically our hypothesis that wars initiated by a major power at critical points on its relative capability curve are likely to be more extensive than wars it initiated at other times. Our research design incorporates a dependent variable carefully defined to allow a rigorous test of this hypothesis.

Defining the Dependent Variable. The data set for the dependent variable consists of 77 cases of war initiation by a major power, each coded in terms of magnitude, severity and duration.

We define the war initiator as the actor that (1) has the capacity to use force against an enemy's territory or population and (2) either strikes first with massive force or allies with the government that first uses massive force and thus abets its military action. The *Correlates of War Project* (Singer and Small, 1972) uses a slightly more restrictive definition of "initiator," but neither definition seeks to identify an aggressor. We believe the definition of war initiation should be sufficiently inclusive to allow consideration of (a) wars that the major powers have waged against minor powers, states on the edge of the system, and colonies, and (b) the role played by formal military allies in support of hostilities.

Our dependent variable is drawn in part from the *Correlates of War Project,* in our opinion the highest-quality data collection of its kind available. Using our definition of war initiation for the nine major actors in our sample, we have compiled a list of 77 cases. These include the 25 cases of interstate war initiation in the Singer and Small collection in which a major power is considered to be the initiator. To these we have added 17 cases in which other major powers have been associated as military allies and 6 cases that result either because Japan and the United States were considered to be major powers as of 1895 or because we extended the end point beyond that of the original collection to 1975. In addition, in concurrence with our definition of war initiation, our study includes 29 cases of so-called extra-systemic war involving a major power and a minor power outside the principal system.

We next coded each case of war initiation according to severity, duration, and magnitude in order to obtain measures of the extent of each. In one sense, all of the wars are extensive wars by definition. The minimum threshold for inclusion in the data base from which the bulk of our wars were drawn was deployment of 1000 troops by the major power and a total of more than 1000 battle deaths; these criteria precluded establishment of a minimum duration threshold (Singer and Small, 1972, pp. 35-36). We wish, however, to refine the concept of extensive war so as to distinguish varying degrees of escalation within this set of wars along three indicators. In our research design, we define extensive war as a violent foreign conflict that ranks high on the variables duration, severity and magnitude. Duration is indexed in months. Severity is measured by the number of resulting battlefield deaths. War magnitude is similar to the characterization Blainey uses to describe "general war," namely, the sum of the inverted quintile diplomatic ranks of the participants (1973).[2] A further index of war, frequency, is measured in terms of wars per unit of time and is a fundamentally different type of indicator from duration, severity, and magnitude, which are measured as extent per war. Our hypothesis, it will be recalled, involves the extent and not the frequency of war. Extensive war is therefore a foreign conflict of long duration, great severity, and/or high magnitude.

Research Design and Findings. According to Hypothesis 1, the probability of a major power's initiating a war that becomes extensive is highest at "critical points" on the cycle of relative capability where the rate of relative power growth (or decline) reaches a maximum or where relative power itself peaks or bottoms out, disrupting past trends and the linear or monotonic role aspirations of state leaders and societies. In operational terms, these changes occur, respectively, at the two inflection points, where the second derivative is zero, and at the two turning points, where the first derivative is zero. An outline of the various tests of the basic hypothesis is found in the appendix.

---

[2] For example, a war involving France, Denmark, and an international system nonmember would have a magnitude of 9.5 for France's first quintile, 3 for Denmark's third, and 1 for the system nonmember. Quintile ranks were obtained from Singer and Small (1966, pp. 236-82).



Source: Handbook of Military and Social Indicators, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976.

Figure 4. Relative Power Curves, 1965–76: U.S., USSR, China

Our research design confronts a problem facing all events-data research, a problem inherent in the nature of behavior/perception and actor/observer relationships and not peculiar to this analysis. The problem is to encompass four types of theoretical variation: (1) objective change in relative power, (2) perception, perhaps anticipated or delayed, of objective change by the actor, (3) the behavioral response of the actor, and (4) measurement of the objective change and behavioral response as recorded by the analyst. Since perceptual data are not available, we collapse these types of theoretical variation into categories (1) and (4), yielding for purposes of discussion objective critical points (OCP) and empirically determined critical points (ECP). We recognize, however, that categories (2) and (3) may affect category (4) such that OCP and ECP do not always correspond, and our research design therefore directly addresses how this possible disparity would affect the statistical test of our causal hypothesis.

The research design treats all of the data points as real in theoretical terms; none are to be considered statistical outliers. Although we discuss some actor war experience in its historical context to answer questions of alternative explanations or causal direction, the purpose of the research design is to emphasize the *generality* of the theoretical proposition and hypothesis concerning major power behavior and not to dwell on the idiosyncracies of individual cases. Given the problems of collecting data on the independent variable over such long periods, measurement error, and inability to deal with perceptions directly, only very general findings *on the statistical average* can be reported to support rejection of the null hypothesis. Support for causality includes theory and a series of carefully designed tests explicitly addressing the causal issue. Although the work here is subject to the same qualifications regarding causality experienced throughout the social sciences, alternative hypotheses have been considered, multiple tests using a variety of techniques have been performed, and every precaution of which we are aware has been taken throughout to assure validity of results.

Test A. Comparing the Initiation of Extensive War in Critical Periods and Remaining Intervals

As a first test of our hypothesis, we isolate critical periods around the inflection and turning points of the nation-state curves, and then compare our measures for wars initiated in these periods with corresponding war measures for the remaining interval using a comparison of means test. A critical period is defined as a 16-year interval beginning 3 years prior to any turning or inflection point and extending 12 years beyond. The purpose of the interval was to provide sufficient room for error in identifying the critical point since the analyst has only a sample (collected at 5-year intervals) of rather crude indicators of the changes in relative power spanning some 150 years of history. The problem is one of reliability and not of validity. Regardless of whether the analyst is able to identify its precise location, an objective critical point may exist in historical fact as well as in theory, and state leaders of the period may have far less difficulty in noting its occurrence because of access to more sensitive indicators and because of virtual day-to-day diplomatic "tests" of these fundamental relationships and of their implications for policy.

Hence for reasons of measurement error alone, one might expect that the objective critical point (OCP) may in fact have occurred within 5 years either side of the empirically determined critical point (ECP). In addition, however, perception and response by state leaders to the OCP may in some instances also affect the location of the ECP. For instance, leaders may perceive the OCP at or slightly before its occurrence and respond by initiating a major war. The ensuing mobilization effort, especially a very extensive one, may tend to *increase* relative capability scores. The effect of this rise in relative capability on our determination of the ECP depends on the type of critical point.

Three of the four critical points involve a *decrease* in relative capability level itself (high and second inflection) and/or a *declining* rate in relative capability growth (first inflection and high). Increases in relative capability due to massive war mobilization are counter to the trend at these three critical points and hence *cannot cause them.* Furthermore, because the data on relative capability incorporate this temporary aberration in the trend line during the early years of such wars, *the ECP is likely to fall after the OCP.* In other words, the greatly increasing relative capability scores which occur when massive mobilization follows the OCP may mask the OCP to such a degree that statistical analysis will yield an ECP occurring at a later date. Thus for such cases, the response itself introduces a measurement error which can only be overcome by extending slightly backward the temporal interval around the ECP. The problem occurs not for the actor, we reiterate, but for the subsequent analyst attempting precisely to identify the critical point. The situation is reinforced slightly by the fact that perception of the OCP itself may precede the OCP by a very short interval.

Thus, because of both measurement reliability and the mediating effect of perceptions and behaviors on our events data and analysis, a rigorous test of our hypothesis can and perhaps must incorporate a small region of error *prior* to the empirically determined critical point. Problems of causal direction would arise only if our data include cases of war initiation within this prior interval which are associated with the fourth type of critical point (low point). A review of our data revealed that the three years prior to our ECPs encompass only three war initiations (Germany and Japan in World War II and the United States in the Korean War), each of which is associated with one of the three types of critical points which could not be caused by the war initiation, and each of which involved in the early war years a disproportional mobilization effort by the initiator and disproportionate war losses by the opponents sufficient to push forward the location of that critical point in the statistical analysis. Furthermore, including the fourth year prior to our ECPs adds only two more war initiations, each of which again is associated with one of the appropriate kinds of critical points. We thus can choose 3 or even 4 years prior to the ECP as part of our region of uncertainty without violating the causal direction of our hypothesis.

The region of uncertainty should also include at least 5 years after the ECP, given our sampling interval. But perceptual lags and delayed responses may postpone the *effect* of the critical point another several years. We decided to include 12 years after the ECP as part of our interval to encompass these factors. The number 12 was chosen since it yielded a 16-year critical interval, one-tenth of the total 160-year period.[3]

Although we reduce the problem of identification error by establishing such a critical interval, we increase the likelihood that our results will not be statistically significant because more years of random variation have been encompassed. For the nine major powers there were 23 critical periods from 1816 to 1975 in which 26 wars were initiated. The remaining intervals contained 51 initiations of war. We compare the wars in the two intervals on each of the indexes of war extensiveness.

As reported in Table 2, the means for magnitude, severity, and duration are much higher in the critical periods than in the remaining intervals. The principal conclusion is that *a major power is more prone to initiate a war that becomes extensive (i.e., escalates) during one of the critical periods on the cycle of relative power than at other times.* This is true at an acceptable level of statistical significance for all three measures of war extensiveness; the level of significance is highest when war is measured in terms of magnitude.

Although our data collection for both the dependent and independent variables began with 1816, theoretical and historical observation which suggested the theory covered as well the prior 200 years of the modern state system (Doran, 1971). Major hegemonic wars were initiated at historically recognized critical points in their relative power by the Hapsburgs in the early sixteenth century, by Louis XIV at the turn of the eighteenth century, and by Napoleon at the turn of the nineteenth century. Hence the larger wars in our sample, such as World Wars I and II, are not outliers in the theoretical or the statistical sense. Indeed, that some of the biggest wars of the present century tended to fall in critical intervals for initiator states is in fact strong support for the theory relating critical shifts in relative capability and extensive war of the hegemonic type.

Test B. Extensive War and Temporal Proximity to Critical Points

We here test the more rigorous statement of our hypothesis, namely, that the level of extensiveness of wars initiated by major powers varies inversely with the temporal distance from the critical point. This test is much tougher than Test A not only because it examines a specific inverse relationship between proximity to a critical point and war extensiveness, but also because it does not incorporate a margin of error around the ECP. In particular, the three wars included in Test A by use of an interval beginning 3 years prior to the empirical critical point operate against the hypothesis in this test since they now have negative distance scores.

In discussing the research design, it is helpful to recall our visualization of a time line with markers locating critical points and dots locating war initiations, both color coded to distinguish between nation cases. According to our hypothesis, if the size of each dot is proportional to that war's score on a given measure of war extensiveness, then the size of the dots of a given color will diminish as one moves away from the preceding marker of that color. Since we use three measures of war extensiveness, we would have three such lines. We used linearized least squares to test this hypothesis. The function that describes the inverse variation is $W = 1/T + v$, where W is either magnitude, severity or duration of war; T is the

---

[3] To ensure robustness for this statistical test, we selected a second narrower interval of 10 years (3 years prior and 6 years after the ECP) as a control. If the results are statistically significant for this interval as well, we can have some confidence that the results are not a mere artifact of one artibrarily selected set of temporal limits. The findings were indeed significant at or below the .05 level for the control on all three measures of extensiveness.

Table 2. Extensiveness of Wars Initiated by Major Powers: Comparison of Means Between Critical Intervals and Remaining Intervals

Variable	Group	No. of Wars	Mean	T-Value	One-Tail Probability
Magnitude	Critical Periods	26	28.4	3.07	.003
	Remaining Interval	51	11.1		
Severity	Critical Periods	26	337357	2.02	.027
	Remaining Interval	51	22169		
Duration	Critical Periods	26	28.0	1.36	.092
	Remaining Interval	51	18.6		

Source: For each war initiated by a major power, the authors compiled measures of duration, severity, magnitude and distance from the preceding critical point on the initiator's relative power curve. The initiators of 25 of the wars were coded from J. D. Singer and Melvin Small, *The Wages of War* (New York: Wiley, 1972), pp. 368–69; the other 52 cases were coded by the authors and resulted from differences in the definition of initiation and in the major power subsystem.

distance in time from the critical point to the war; and v is an intercept whose value is determined by the data.

We distinguish three cases to encompass possible perceptual or behavioral mediation and alternative causal explanations. Case 1 is a straightforward test of the hypothesis and assumes that the effect of the critical point on extensive war initiation can begin at the critical point itself; hence it calculates distance of each war from the ECP (markers on the line are not shifted). Case 2 tests whether the effect of the critical point is necessarily postponed due to perceptual lags, delayed responses, or efforts at adjustment; in other words, whether one obtains better results if the ECP markers on the time line are shifted to the right by k years, $k = 1$ to 15. Case 3 addresses counter-causal explanations, namely, the possibility that war initiation (or, given large enough leads, defeat) might cause the critical point. Although examination of the data in the previous section revealed that these explanations are not valid for the 4 years prior to our ECPs, one must determine whether a significant relationship exists for war initiations leading the ECP by 5 or more years (markers shifted to left by $k \geqslant 5$ years). In each of the three cases, the independent variable is the ECP or the shifted ECP, and the dependent variable is war initiation by a major power.

Results of all three cases support our hypothesis. In Case 1, although the correlations were smaller than in Test A as anticipated, all three indexes of extensive war yielded Rs that were positive and statistically significant: magnitude ($R = .541$, $p < .001$), severity ($R = .208$, $p = .036$), and duration ($R = .194$, $p = .045$). For Case 2, correlations in general remained positive but decreased through the tenth year, and only duration at Lag 10 was statistically significant after year 6. All correlations beyond 10 years are numerically as well as statistically insignificant. These results suggest that some of the effect of the critical point may in fact be delayed. But because the results in Case 1 are stronger than those involving lags, and because the highest coefficients for lags occur nearest the no-lag of Case 1 and hence may merely reflect uncertainty in location of the critical point, the impact of the critical point appears to be a rather abrupt one. Finally, even though Case 3 (counter-causal hypothesis) is the only test in this series which gave a positive distance score for the three massive wars of Test A's prior interval, only one out of more than 25 correlations was positive and significant, that for severity at Lead 5 ($R = .20$, $p = .05$); no other correlation was statistically significant and, except for three which were near .10, all the others were near 0 or negative. Since *no* relationship was found for any of the other leads or other measures of war extensiveness, the result for severity at Lead 5 may be interpreted as a consequence of the extremely high severity scores for the two World War II initiations located at $T = 2$ for Lead 5. Recalling that these wars contributed negatively to the correlations in Cases 1 and 2, correlations which were positive and significant and supported the direction of our causal hypothesis, we can conclude that the series of tests made here render our hypothesis valid.

Test C. War Frequency

We have thus demonstrated that the relationship between relative capability and war initiation holds for extensive war initiated by a major power, but does it hold *only* for extensive wars? In other words, is the relationship true for all wars initiated by major powers regardless of size? Since the frequency measure does not discriminate among wars according to size, a relationship between frequency and relative capability would cast doubt on the "extensive war" hypothesis. However, the raw scores clearly indicate that war frequency and relative capability are *not* associated. Little difference exists between the mean number of wars initiated by major powers in the critical intervals and the mean number of nation years comprising the critical periods. Of the 77 instances of war initiation between 1816 and 1975, a total of 26 (34 percent) fall in critical periods. Of the 1017 total nation-years of war in the 1816–1975 interval, some 312 (or 31 percent) occurred during critical periods. These results indicate that about the same frequency of major power war initiation occurred per nation-year for the critical periods as for the interval as a whole; hence frequency appears unrelated to the rate and direction of change in relative capability. But wars initiated by major powers near critical points escalate beyond major power wars further removed.

Test D. At Which Point Is Extensive War Most Likely?

We address one more question about the relationship between relative capability and major war. At which of the four critical points is a nation *most* likely to initiate extensive war? Of the critical periods located around turning points and inflection points, which is the most dangerous? Each of the war indicators (magnitude, severity, duration, and frequency) is summed for wars initiated in each type of critical period (lows, first inflection points, highs, and second inflection points). We divide each sum by the number of each type of period to normalize for varying international system experience (Table 3). The inflections, where $d^2y/dt^2 = 0$ and dy/dt attains its maximum plus or minus value, are clearly most prone to extensive war, ranking first in the four measures of war. Turning points, where $dy/dt = 0$ and y attains its maximum plus or minus value, place second in the same measures.[4] Thus major powers are most likely to initiate war that escalates as the *acceleration* of growth (or decline) in the relative power slows to a halt and changes sign; or expressed in terms of the first-order derivatives, a major power is most likely to initiate extensive war as its *rate* of growth in relative capabilities (dy/dt) reaches a maximum (first inflection) or minimum (second inflection). Likewise, of the four critical points, the second most likely time when the nation will initiate extensive war occurs when the *rate* of change in its relative capability has reached zero, that is, when the relative capability itself (y) has attained its maximum or minimum value (high and low points).

In sum, the key idea of our theory is that major power involvement in extensive war results in large part from over-reaction in the crisis setting imposed by power changes at critical points in a country's history, thus precipitating serious disputes and war that escalates because the government feels seriously threatened and refuses to withdraw. The theory does not deny that a war is extensive in part because a powerful actor is in-

Table 3. Relationship of Four Critical Intervals to Mean Levels of Extensiveness of Wars Initiated by Major Powers

	Low	First Inflection	High	Second Inflection
Wars/Period	$\underline{.86}$	$\boxed{1.00}$	.56	.75
Severity/Period	306,576	217,702	$\underline{383,324}$	$\boxed{607,023}$
Duration/Period	$\underline{31.4}$	29.0	21.4	$\boxed{48.2}$
Magnitude/Period	21.4	$\boxed{50.6}$	39.2	26.2

Source: For each war initiated by a major power, the authors compiled measures of duration, severity, magnitude and distance from the preceding critical point on the initiator's relative power curve. The initiators of 25 of the wars were coded from J. D. Singer and Melvin Small, *The Wages of War* (New York: Wiley, 1972), pp. 368–69; the other 52 cases were coded by the authors and resulted from differences in the definition of initiation and in the major power subsystem.

Key: ☐ – Most Extensive Measure

______ – Next Most Extensive Measure

---

[4] We also compared types of critical periods by using a regression format. Each high, low, or inflection is represented by a dummy variable and then correlated with the measures of war. The results corroborate Table 4, namely, inflections do best, then highs, then lows. In addition, we regressed the types of critical periods as independent (along with T, the distance in time from war to the critical point) on the measures of war; in each case the rise in multiple Rs over the bivariate Rs is virtually nil (ranging from .002 for magnitude to .101 for duration), again substantiating our findings.

volved (e.g., minor actors are unlikely to generate extensive war in isolation), or because of other factors such as type of weaponry used or the behavior of allies. But the theory asks why powerful governments fight some wars that are large and others that are small, because they have in practice done both, and more importantly, *when* they are likely to fight extensive wars. The central issue is not *who* but *when. When* will a major government use sufficient force and resolve to initiate a war that becomes extensive? Without denying that there are other collateral causes of war escalation, our findings show that most extensive wars involving major powers are not initiated at the top of their relative capability curves as is popularly supposed. Nor, despite the fact that war in general is distributed randomly over the 1816–1975 period, are the extensive wars initiated by major powers distributed randomly. Rather, it is at critical points along the national cycle of relative capability that the propensity by major powers to initiate wars that become extensive is highest.

Implications of the New Research Focus for Future Analysis

During critical intervals on a nation's curve of relative capability, secondary forces may catalyze or constrain the actor's propensity to initiate extensive war: (1) structures and attitudes *internal* to government and society; and (2) *external* behavior at work within the international system.

Internal Catalysis and Constraint. Properly modeled and coded, regime type and social class structure may be found to have profound secondary effects on the propensity to get involved in wars that escalate. The pluralism of democracy (Grew, 1978, pp. 31–37), and the liberal, commercial outlook of the middle classes often hinder the unanimity of outlook necessary for the kind of expansionist foreign policy witnessed under a Louis XIV, a Napoleon, a Hitler, or an autocratic Japan. Nineteenth-century Britain, for example, was no less subject to hegemonic pressures than Germany, but the government was less able to exploit these pressures because of parliamentary opposition, an inability to subordinate commercial to power concerns, a critical press, and other internal checks and balances common to democracy. The greater the degree of totalitarian control over foreign policy, and the greater the extent of cultural and class support for the military ascendancy of the state, the more dangerous the critical point in the cycle of relative capability.

Impact of External Systemic Factors. One important external influence on the propensity to initiate extensive wars during the critical period is the nature of alliance association (Singer and Small, 1968; McGowan and Rood, 1975; Silverson and Duncan, 1976; Job, 1976). Opinion is divided regarding whether, in general, alliances increase the probability that a participant will get involved in war (Choucri and North, 1974, p. 220) because other members drag it into extraneous entanglements, or whether alliances decrease the probability of war for the participant because membership helps ward off powerful potential aggressors. Alliances are not likely to discourage the determined initiator of war and hence the kind of war that tends to escalate. Indeed, alliances may spread the effects of such war throughout the system, thereby escalating the conflict further.

Singer and Small (1968) have found that alliance association and war are directly associated in the twentieth century but inversely associated in the nineteenth century. Since the larger wars after 1815 have occurred in the twentieth century whereas wars tended to be smaller in the prior century, the size of wars, suitably measured, may indeed be a function of alliance characteristics. Alliances may hinder small wars (negative association) and catalyse larger wars (positive association). Alliance participation may also reduce the potential of war initiation in non-critical intervals and/or further increase the initiation of war in the critical intervals when the probability of extensive war initiation is higher.

Conclusions

Since the origins of the modern state system, nations have followed a cycle of relative capability marked by political ascendancy, maturation, and decline. Applying a single theoretically justified equation to nine major powers, we have demonstrated that each has traversed at least a segment of this cycle in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Variance explained ranged from 25 to 93 percent and yielded far better results than the linear, null equivalent.

At critical points on the capability cycle, namely, at inflection points and turning points where the linear role perceptions held by the government and society (reflected in the slopes) are abruptly changed, the probability that the state will initiate extensive war was also greatest. This was true whether war extensiveness was defined in terms of severity, duration, or magnitude. It appears that governments and societies find adjustment to new behavioral roles difficult and become vulnerable to hyperinsecurity and aggressiveness at critical points where the direction of the evolutionary outlook changes pervasively.

The theory, suggested to explain three major-power hegemonies in the pre-1816 period, was successful in predicting major-power war behavior for the years 1816–1975. The initiation of extensive war by a major power is not a random event. An understanding of the major power cycle of systemic participation may thereby bring us somewhat closer to an understanding of the causes of some of the most serious wars. Further study of this relationship may provide clues to the prevention of extensive war at the points of its highest probability.

Appendix: Research Design for Testing Hypothesis 1

Test A

Purpose: To compare the propensity of major powers to initiate extensive war in critical and noncritical intervals.

Special Considerations: Delineates a critical interval to reduce error associated with possible incorrect statistical identification of an objective critical point (OCP) due to uncertainty in measurement (5-year data points) and to mediating effect of perceptions and behavioral response of state leaders.

Verifies that the 4 years prior to our ECPs contain only cases which logically cannot support a counter-causal hypothesis.

Establishes critical interval 3 years prior to and 12 years beyond the empirically determined critical point (ECP) rather than equally around it.

Technique: Comparison of means (t-test).

Findings: Initiation of major power extensive war (reflected on each of three indicators) is more likely in the critical intervals than at other times.

Test B

Purpose: To establish the importance of proximity to critical points for the initiation of extensive war by major powers (causation from CP to war).

Special Considerations: No margin of error in ECP incorporated (poorer correlation results likely.)

Case 1. Assumes the effect of CP on extensive war initiation need not be delayed and hence calculates distance of the war from the ECP.

Case 2. Calculates war distance from a point lagged k years ($k=1$ to 15) after ECP, to test whether effect of CP is *necessarily* postponed due to perceptual lags, delayed responses, or efforts at adjustment.

Case 3. Calculates war distance from a point leading ECP by k years ($k \geqslant 5$) to test for counter-causal relationships (war initiation or defeat as cause of CP).

Technique: Linearized least squares.

Findings: Case 1. Positive correlation with statistical significance for all three measures of extensive war.

Case 2. Continued positive correlation (some of effect of CP may be delayed), but no improvement over results of Case 1 (impact of CP is hence comparatively abrupt).

Case 3. No relationship, hence counter-causal arguments rejected.

Test C

Purpose: To determine whether critical points influence the frequency of war initiated by major powers, regardless of extensiveness.

Technique: Least squares regression.

Findings: No relationship.

Test D

Purpose: To determine which of the critical points is most likely to affect major power propensity to initiate wars that become extensive.

Special Considerations: Incorporates critical interval as in Test A.

Technique: Analysis of means.

Findings: First and second inflection points are most critical.

References

Alcock, Norman (1972). *The War Disease.* Oakville, Ontario: Canadian Peace Research Institute Press.

Art, Robert J. (1973). *The Influence of Foreign Policy on Seapower: New Weapons and Weltpolitik in Wilhelmian Germany.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, p. 22.

Berghan, V. R. (1973). *Germany and the Approach of War in 1914.* New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 31.

Blainey, Geoffrey (1973). *The Causes of War.* New York: Free Press.

Bullock, Alan (1964). *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny.* New York: Harper and Row.

Choucri, Nazli, and Robert C. North (1974). *Nations in Conflict: Natural Growth and International Violence.* San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

Denton, Frank H., and Warren Phillips (1968). "Some

Patterns in the History of Violence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 12: 182–95.

Deutsch, K. W., and R. L. Merritt (1965). "Effects of Events on National and International Images." In H. C. Kelman (ed.), *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Anslysis.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Doran, Charles F. (1971). *The Politics of Assimilation: Hegemony and Its Aftermath.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

——— (1980). "Leading Indicators of the June War." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 2: 23–58.

Eckstein, Alexander (1977). *China's Economic Revolution.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ferris, Wayne H. (1973). *The Power Capabilities of Nation-States.* Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.

Fucks, Wilhelm (1965). *Formeln Zur Macht.* Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanfalt.

Galtung, Johan (1966). "International Relations and International Conflicts: A Sociological Approach." *Transactions of the Sixth World Congress of Sociology,* pp. 275-83.

Grew, Raymond, ed. (1978). *Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Heiss, Klaus P., Klaus Knorr and Oskar Morgenstein (1973). *Long Term Projections of Power: Political, Economic and Military Forecasting.* Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger.

Holsti, K. J. (1970). "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14: 233–309.

Jervis, Robert (1976). *Perception and Misperception in International Politics.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Job, Brian (1976). "Membership in International Alliances 1815-1965: Exploration Using Mathematical Modelling." In Dina Zinnes and John V. Gillespie (eds.), *Mathematical Models in International Relations.* New York: Praeger.

Kindelberger, Charles P. (1970). *Power and Money.* New York: Basic Books.

Knorr, Klaus (1973). *Power and Wealth: The Political Economy of International Power.* New York: Basic Books.

Kohn, Hans (1944). *The Idea of Nationalism.* New York: Macmillan.

Kuznets, Simon (1966). *Modern Economic Growth.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lewis, W. Arthur (1978). *The Evolution of the International Economic Order.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Liska, George (1967). *Imperial America: The International Politics of Primacy.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins.

McGowan, P. J., and R. M. Rood (1975). "Alliance Behavior in Balance of Power Systems: Applying a Poisson Model to Nineteenth Century Europe." *American Political Science Review* 69: 859–70.

Modelski, George (1978). "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation State." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20: 214–35.

Organski, A. F. K., and Jacek Kugler (1977). "The Costs of Major Wars: The Phoenix Factor." *American Political Science Review* 71: 1347–66.

Pearl, Raymond (1924). *Studies in Human Biology.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins.

Porter, Bernard (1975). *The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 1850–1970.* London: Longman.

Pruitt, Dean G. (1969). "Stability and Sudden Change in Interpersonal and International Affairs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 13: 18–38.

Rosecrance, Richard N. (1963). *Action and Reaction in World Politics.* Boston: Little, Brown.

Rosenberg, M., and R. Abelson (1960). "An Analysis of Cognitive Balancing" in M. Rosenberg et al., *Attitude Organization and Change.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Rostow, W. W. (1978). *The World Economy: History and Prospect.* Austin: University of Texas Press.

Rummel, R. (1971). "A Status-Field Theory of International Relations." *The Dimensionalities of Nations Project,* Research Report No. 50, Honolulu: University of Hawaii.

Russett, Bruce M. (1968). "Is There a Long-run Trend Toward Concentration in the International System?" *Comparative Political Studies* 1: 37–55.

Salmore, S. A., and C. F. Herman (1969). "The Effects of Size, Development and Accountability on Foreign Policy," *Peace Research Society (International) Papers* 14: 24–47.

Scott, Andres M. (1965). *The Revolution in Statecraft: Informal Penetration.* New York: Random House.

Silverson, R. M., and G. T. Duncan (1976). "Stochastic Models of International Alliance Initiation." In D. A. Zinnes and J. V. Gillespie (eds.), *Mathematical Models in International Relations.* New York: Praeger.

Singer, J. D., Stuart Bremer and John Stuckey (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty and Major Power War 1920–1965." In Bruce Russett (ed.), *Peace, War and Numbers.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

Singer, J. D., and Melvin Small (1966). "The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System 1815–1940." *World Politics* 18: 236–82.

——— (1968). "Alliance Aggregation and the Onset of War." In J. D. Singer et al. (eds.), *Quantitative International Politics.* New York: Free Press.

——— (1972). *The Wages of War 1816–1965: A Statistical Handbook.* New York: John Wiley.

Soloman, George F. (1970). "Psychodynamic Aspects of Aggression, Hostility and Violence." In David N. Daniels, Marshall F. Gilula, and Frank M. Ochberg (eds.), Boston: Little, Brown.

Taylor, A. J. P. (1954). *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1914.* Oxford: Clarendon.

Wainer, Howard (1978). "On the Sensitivity of Regression and Regressors." *Psychological Bulletin* 85: 267–73.

Wallace, Michael (1973). *War and Rank Among Nations.* Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath.

Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics.* Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

Weede, Erich (1973). "Nation-Environment Relations as Determinants of Hostility Among Nations." *Peace Science Society (International) Papers* 20: 67–89.

The Succession Connection: Policy Cycles and Political Change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

VALERIE JANE BUNCE
Northwestern University

This article tests whether economic policy in the Soviet bloc follows a cycle of change in which more mass-oriented policies rise on the agenda after a succession crisis and then fall once the succession is resolved. Changes in investment and budgetary priorities, growth rates of personal income and consumption, and finally, changes in elite rhetoric and policy pronouncements over time all support the existence of a succession cycle in economic priorities. This suggests that the mass publics do influence —albeit indirectly—the policy process in socialist states, and that chief executives change their priorities over the course of their administrations as different clienteles line up at the trough and different constraints develop. There is, then, a structural component to economic decision making in the Soviet bloc, and that component seems to be similar to the one that operates in the West—that is, the desire of politicians to expand their power and remain in office, and their willingness to use economic policy to achieve those ends.

Politics cannot help but determine economics.
This is the ABC of Marxism.

—*V. I. Lenin*

Friends are friends,
but business is business.

—*Nikita Khrushchev*

Much recent work has documented the impact of politics on economic policy in Western Europe and the United States. Douglas Hibbs (1977), Andrew Cowart (1978a, 1978b), David Cameron (1978) and Edward Tufte (1978), for example, have all argued persuasively that political factors, such as ambition for reelection and the ideology of the governing party, affect macro-economic priorities and the scope of the public sector in advanced industrial societies. Thus far, these notions of a politically controlled economy have been applied only to democratic nations. This article assesses the extent to which economic policy follows certain politically based cycles of development in *socialist* states. For example, is there any evidence for the impact of the succession process on economic trends in the Soviet bloc, a connection which parallels that outlined by Edward Tufte (1978)? In other words, do political ambitions (see Schlesinger, 1967) shape economic priorities in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe?

The "Succession Connection"

In previous work on this topic (Bunce, 1976), I have uncovered a certain cycle of policy change in budgetary and investment priorities that is linked to leadership succession in the Soviet bloc. Socialist leaders seem to rearrange priorities in their first year in office; however, once these innovations are introduced, the new priorities tend to freeze—with incremental adjustments—until the next succession. Thus budgetary and investment allocations seem to follow a certain rhythm of innovation and routine. New leaders do introduce new policies, and therefore succession can be seen not as a crisis so much as a mechanism of policy innovation. However, in the absence of succession, leaders—Western, as well as Eastern—seem to get stuck in their ways.

While such cycles can tell us about the role of succession in generating new policies, the timing of innovation, and the pervasiveness of incrementalism, they can say relatively little about the content of those priority shifts and their linkages to political considerations. The question then becomes, are certain priorities more likely at certain times? Second, do leaders follow a *similar* pattern of policy initiatives that reflect certain predictable shifts in the political climate?

In past studies, Soviet specialists have answered these questions by examining either very long-term shifts in policy brought on by modernization (for example, Bergson, 1978), short-term adjustments shaped by shifting coalitions within the Politburo (for example, Hahn, 1972; Conquest, 1967), or, finally, the general policy complexion of a particular administration (Hough, 1976; Breslauer, 1976). One problem with all three of

---

This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Convention in Chicago, April 18-21, 1979. I would like to thank James Seroka for his comments. For further elaboration of these arguments, see Bunce, 1981, forthcoming.

these approaches is that they overlook the possibility of structural limitations on policy change which may set certain similar parameters within each administration on the priorities that will be followed. To argue that Khrushchev is more "liberal" than Brezhnev, that there is an inevitable shift toward more consumer goods production, or that 1965 agricultural policy was different from that of 1964, is to assume that Soviet leaders make decisions solely on the basis of the *Zeitgeist* (the spirit of the times), ideology, personality, and long-term, systemic pressures. However, from what we know of the behavior of, for example, American chief executives, such a model is incomplete. Leaders in the United States tend to be influenced heavily not only by these aforementioned factors, but also by what might be termed "temporal effects" (Hess, 1977). A president or a prime minister assumes different roles and advocates different priorities at different times. A president in his honeymoon is far different from one in midterm or approaching reelection (see Tufte, 1978), and these changes seem too similar from one administration to the next to be merely coincidental.

This notion of executive cycles would seem to be applicable to socialist states as well. First, there is the issue of "controllability." If a political cycle in economic policy is to operate, it must be established at the least that the chief executive can manipulate such policies. In fact, a common critique of cycles research in the United States is that it exaggerates the susceptibility of the economy to presidential fine-tuning. Such assertions, however cannot be made about power in the Kremlin. Norton Long (1962, p. 56), for instance, has explicitly compared political power in Moscow and Washington and concludes that "the program of the President cannot be a Gosplan for the government because the nature of his institutional and group support gives him insufficient power."

While I would not argue that first secretaries always behave as though they have a Gosplan (see, for instance, Bunce and Echols, 1978), the point is that they do have access to considerably more (and more powerful) policy instruments than their counterparts in the West. One can point, for example, to the planning process, the wage bill, and the like, all of which are important economic and political levers. This, in turn, implies that Soviet chief executives *can* respond more easily and quickly to changing political pressures by manipulating policy priorities.

Their *capability* to adjust economic priorities, moreover, would seem to be enhanced by what is an equally strong *ideological* commitment to shifting policies in certain ways at certain times. Political needs, in fact, are supposed to shape economic priorities. As A. I. Rogov observes, "The CPSU . . . is to rely on the basic Leninist principle of the unity of politics and economics, remembering the Leninist principle that successes in the area of economics depend on the political line. . ." (1975, p. 23). It is probable, therefore—even more so than for Western polities—that economic policy in socialist states will be and can be sensitive to changes in the political context.

Finally, there is every reason to believe that what ideology and power facilitate, political realities, in fact, necessitate. Power in the Soviet system, even more than in Western states, is fluid, particularly in the aftermath of a succession struggle. As Myron Rush has explained (1974, p. 13):

> Succession is important in communist regimes because power is highly concentrated and uncontrolled at the top and because their politics are highly variable. . . . Moreover, although the politics of a communist state can change radically without a change in the ruler, their consequences for the country may very much depend on who carries them out.

The conflict brought on by what is a noninstitutionalized succession process is resolved (at least temporarily) and is expressed in terms of shifting policy priorities. As Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington have summarized (1963, p. 191), "Policies are the major weapons in the struggle for power in the [Soviet] system." The fact that the leadership crisis throws power and policy priorities up for grabs, that it often opens up a backlog of policy demands, and that it resists resolution in any regularized sense, all suggest that succession (and its eventual resolution) may very well begin a cycle of policy change in the Soviet Union. Brezhnev building a mandate to continue and justify his rule would seem to be a far different policy maker from Brezhnev firmly in command. (For further discussions of succession and policy cycles, see Rush, 1968, 1974; Bunce, 1976.)

Thus the volatile nature of power at the apex of the Soviet system ("kto-kogo"), the nature of the succession process, and the ideological propensity and the pronounced capacity to link political concerns with policy priorities would all seem to set in motion certain cyclical shifts in public policy priorities in the early rather than the later years of an administration. However, this says little about the actual *form* those patterns might take. On the basis of studies of the American electoral cycle, one would anticipate that Soviet leaders at the beginning of their tenure would try to appeal to the public in order to expand their coalition. As Gary Orren (1979, p. 108) has explained with respect to the United States, the electorate commands prospectively only through "the office holder's anticipation of future election verdicts." In the Soviet case, of course, Brezhnev and Khrushchev were not elected by the mass public. However, this does not mean that either leader felt he could do without their support. In fact, it is reasonable to argue—despite the fact that the Soviet Union is not a polyarchy—that both leaders would have at least tried to win the favor of the masses, particularly in the early part of their tenure.

Such a notion of responsiveness is based on two lines of argument. First, it could be contended that by introducing policies that are more responsive to mass demands than those of his predecessor, the new leader and his colleagues in the Politburo could anticipate and thereby dampen any mass unrest that may break out during the uncertain times of a succession crisis. Of course, socialist leaders are fully aware of such potential unrest, having witnessed a close linkage between succession and protest in Poland, Hungary, Germany and Czechoslovakia in the postwar era (see Mieczkowski, 1978). While the correlation is hardly perfect, it does not have to be to constrain elite behavior; these regimes are, after all, derivative states and, as such, their experiences seem particularly relevant to the Soviet leadership. Moreover, as in the West, the mere possibility of mass revenge and the obviously embarrassing situation of putting down strikes in a workers' state would seem to be sufficient grounds to convince the elite that a preemptive, conciliatory stance toward the masses would be the best short-term strategy in the period immediately following succession. Placating the masses with popular policies, then, would enhance the prospects for political stability and would at the same time build a positive base of support for the new regime (see Trepczynski and Sadowski, 1977, Ch. 4; Miezckowski, 1978). It would be rational for new socialist leaders to assume that successions are, in fact, the "crises" that scholars portray them to be in the West (see Zimmerman, 1977; Rush, 1974) and to adjust their priorities accordingly.

Second, it could be argued that such a strategy of neutralizing potential mass dissatisfaction may in fact be *necessitated* by the cycle of mass and then elite-oriented priorities in previous administrations, a cycle in which mass expectations for a better life were raised by policies introduced in the previous honeymoon period only to be scuttled as the crisis passed, as the leader became settled into office, and as other special interests (i.e., those more traditionally favored by the regime) demanded their fair share. In short, the very process of moving from more responsive policies to "normal" politics and "normal" priorities in the previous regime sets in motion certain frustrations that must be met once again when the next succession gets under way. Each successor, therefore, is in a sense forced to repeat the cycle, as he confronts similar shifts in political pressures.

Thus it is reasonable to expect that, while the pattern of change is different (reflecting the difference between the succession processes),[1] both Soviet and American leaders use certain economic policies to expand their power. Policy shifts, then, reflect shifts in the constituencies they need to please over the course of an administration. It is reasonable to hypothesize, then, that during both the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, there would be sharp increases during the "honeymoon" period in the emphasis placed on mass-oriented economic policies, but that this concern would give way to more traditional interests (such as heavy industry) as administrations consolidated their control.

The question then becomes, how should economic policy be defined and measured? Clearly, one important criterion is that one should look at economic policies which are critical, clearly under the control of Brezhnev, Khrushchev, or any other first secretary, and, finally, easily divisible into "mass" and "non-mass" categories.[2] These stipulations led me (as they did students of Western systems) to examine annual shifts (from approximately 1953 to 1978) in budgetary and investment priorities, changes in wages and income per capita (for evidence on the controllability and the importance of these areas, see Rogov, 1975, p. 23; Voznesenskii, 1971; Tulebaev, 1969, pp. 3–4; Yevdokimov, 1974), and increases in the availability of housing and consumer goods. Increases in wages and incomes, consumer goods, housing stock and increased investments and expenditures on light industry, health, education and welfare are priorities that are favorable to the mass public. By contrast, increasing concern with heavy industry and a reduced growth rate in income, consumer goods and housing production are all priorities that run counter to mass demands.

However, it is also important to look not just at outputs, but also at intentions. There may be failures in implementation, and leaders may use rhetoric rather than deeds to get across their concerns. Thus, in addition to the data noted above, I examined shifts over time in the priorities revealed in party congresses, Central Committee plenum decisions, and major speeches made by Brezhnev and Khrushchev. If words as well as deeds indicate that the cyclical pattern of rising and then falling concerns with "popular" economic policies does indeed occur, then one can conclude that a succession cycle does operate in socialist economic policy making, at least during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras (and, to a lesser extent, throughout Eastern Europe and during the Stalinist period).[3]

---

[1] Because the process of building a mandate occurs after, not before succession in the Soviet Union (in contrast to the United States), the pattern of pumping money into areas favorable to the mass public is the reverse of the Western variant. Thus, while in the U.S., such practices predate the election and then decline in the honeymoon period, in the Soviet case they increase in the honeymoon only to decrease over the course of the administration.

[2] While the main concern of this article will be the Soviet Union in the post-Stalinist period, I will also include some relevant data on the Stalin regime and various administrations in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic.

Goulash Communism

It is no secret that both Brezhnev and Khrushchev have made a great fuss over the importance of "guaranteeing a significant increase in the living standards of the people" (quoted in Rogov, 1975, pp. 321–22; also see *Zabota partii blaga naroda,* 1974, pp. 7–16). For example, during his tenure in office, Khrushchev reiterated time and again that the Soviet Union would overtake capitalist systems in terms of living standards by 1980, a goal which he said was central to the achievement of communism (for example, see Khrushchev, 1961, pp. 65–72). Similarly, Brezhnev has emphasized the key role of "blagosostoianie"—the welfare of the people—in the current agenda of the Soviet regime:

> From the first years of power, the State tried by every means that was possible to improve the position of the working people. But the construction of socialism in our country was difficult. For a long time, we fought in order to establish socialism, to survive. . . . Now we have different conditions; as a result of the heroic labor of millions, we have developed a mature socialist society. . . . This allows for the possibility for which we have always aimed: to place the growth of the welfare of the Soviet people at the center of the practical politics of the Party (Brezhnev, 1970, Vol. 1, pp. 4–5; also see Smirnov, 1971, p. 107; Brezhnev, 1974, pp. 212–22).

Thus Brezhnev has in a sense promised to pay the people back for their hardships, to begin the task of providing at long last the abundance that is supposed to characterize the current epoch of "developed socialism" (see, for instance, Kukushkin, 1975; Meyer, 1974).

Certainly, if one were to look at only the early years of both the Brezhnev and Khrushchev regimes and to tally the impressive results of the assault on poverty, one would assume a positive and stable commitment in that area (see, for instance, Hough, 1975; Wiles, 1974; Brosnan and Krueger, 1971; Smirnov, 1971, pp. 115–16). However, a somewhat different picture emerges if one looks at *annual* changes in various mass-oriented policies over the course of the two administrations.

In Table 1, I have presented data on budgetary priorities and capital investment, expressed as shares of the total outlays. The figures indicate that during the Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, there was a decided tendency to pump up the consumer sector—that is, to spend proportionally more on light industry, housing and welfare—in the early years of the administration than in the later years.[4] For example, in the case of Brezhnev, capital investment in housing reached 17.8 percent of all such outlays in 1968 and gradually fell to 14.7 percent by 1974, a level that has been maintained for the past five years (see *Narkhoz,* 1975, p. 252; 1970, p. 505). To take another example, from 1956–1960 (the early years of the Khrushchev regime), investment in consumer goods averaged 5.2 percent, but from 1961–1965 this figure declined to 4.5 percent. With Brezhnev's rise to power, investment rose to an average of 5.3 percent per year, only to decline to 4.9 percent 1971–1975 (*Narkhoz,* 1967, p. 619; 1975, p. 507).

Even if one examines production of housing units or consumer goods, the same pattern of surge and then decline emerges (see DiMaio, 1974, pp. 20–24; *Narkhoz: Iubeleiyni,* 1977, pp. 437, 481, 326; *Narkhoz,* 1972, pp. 478–79; 1970, pp. 48–484; 1965, pp. 531–32; 1962, p. 434). Thus, the budgetary and investment data indicate that, while there is an overall pattern of greater concern with public consumption since Stalin's death, within this pattern there are fluctuations that seem to be calibrated by the succession cycle.[5] However, no clear tradeoff operates. While

---

[3] I have adopted common scholarly notions of what constitutes succession and non-succession periods—that is, in the former case, 1928–1931, 1954–1957, and 1965–1968; and in the latter, 1931–1940, 1958–1964, and 1968–1978 (see Rush, 1967, 1974). However, given the necessarily tentative character of such dichotomizations, I experimented with other divisions, adding and subtracting one year and defining succession strictly in terms of the first year the new leader exerts policy control (for example, Brezhnev in 1965). These manipulations, however, did not change the results.

[4] It should be noted that the consistency of the pattern, when combined with performance indicators, would challenge the possibility that such shifts are responses to economic factors.

[5] The number of people receiving pension benefits is affected by demographic shifts, but the major changes occurred because of changes in pension laws in 1953–1954 and 1965–1966. While the latter set of programs was really Khrushchev's doing, the fact remains that his successors chose to implement this policy with dramatic results.

Table 1. Capital Investment in Light Industry and Housing and Public Expenditures on Welfare: The Soviet Union, 1929–1977

	Average Light Industry Share of Capital Investment	Average Housing Share of Capital Investment	Average Welfare Share of the Budget
Stalin: Succession Period (1929–1931)	n.a.	.053	.085
Post-Succession Period (1932–1940)	n.a.	.0233	.075
Khrushchev: Succession Period (1954–1957)	.049	.025	.133*
Post-Succession Period (1958–1964)	.040	.019	.131
Brezhnev: Succession Period (1965–1968)	.045	.170	.141
Post-Succession Period (1969–1977)	.041	.152	.144

Sources: Sovet ekonomicheskoi vzaipomoshchi statisticheskii. Fzhegodnik stran chlenov Soveta ekonomicheskoi vzaipomoshchi (Moscow: Statistika, 1976), pp. 130–59; *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR za 60 let: Iubeleiyni statisticheskii ezhegodnik* (Moscow: Statistika, 1977), pp. 272–73, 653–56; R. W. Davies, *The Soviet Financial System* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), pp. 244–48.

*This figure underestimates the impact of the Khrushchev succession since little was done to expand welfare until 1957–when there was a dramatic upward shift.

"mass-oriented" policies show a cycle, heavy industry does not. The burden for expanding public consumption during the "honeymoon" is one that is apparently shared across a variety of policy areas.

The existence of a succession cycle in economic policy is, however, not limited to expenditures in the budget and the plan and production of consumer goods and housing. In Table 2, I have summarized several other important policies—annual changes in national income per capita and average monthly wage (in the aggregate and by class), and changes in the size of the population receiving pension benefits.[6] Once again, a cyclical pattern emerges, wherein new leaders are more responsive to mass interests than leaders who have been in power for a longer time; mass-oriented policies expand immediately after succession and contract

Table 2. Average Annual Growth Rates Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev (Percent)

	National Income (1960–1978)	Real Income per Capita (1965–1978)	Monthly Wage Increases: Workers and Employees (1964–1978)	Monthly Wage Increases: Collective Farmers (1964–1978)	Number of Persons Receiving Pension Benefits (1954–1978)
Succession Periods (1954–1957, 1965–1968)	7.7	6.2	5.2	10.1	9.1
Post-Succession Periods (1958–1964, 1969–1978)	5.6	4.4	3.2	4.6	3.2

Sources: Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR za 60 let: Iubeleinyi statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Moscow: Statistika, 1977), pp. 204–30; *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* Vol. 26, No. 51 (Jan. 15, 1975), p. 12; Vol. 27, No. 48 (Dec. 24, 1976), p. 7; Vol. 28, No. 50 (Jan. 11, 1977), p. 9; Vol. 29, No. 48 (Dec. 27, 1978), p. 12.

---

[6] However, there is one important difference in agricultural policy in the two regimes. Under Khrushchev, investment in agriculture was *closely* tied to performance; whenever output declined, investment went up the following year, but when output improved, investment levels then declined. While a similar linkage occurred in the early years of Brezhnev (which explains why investment declined in 1965— the bountiful harvest of 1964—and increased in 1968—following several bad harvests), it has broken down since 1969 to the point where investment currently increases (though slowly) even after comparatively good years. Thus, the "Catch-22" of the Khrushchev years—that the agricultural sector lost money whenever it performed well—has finally been stopped and agriculture is now assured a steady investment level. (See Volkov, 1975; Simonenko, 1978; and Brezhnev, 1974.)

(but do not, of course, go away completely) once the crisis is resolved. For instance, if one looks at the percentage growth rate of real income, one finds a 19 percent increase from 1960 to 1965 (the last years of Khrushchev) over the previous five-year period; a sharp increase of 33 percent from 1965 to 1970 (Brezhnev's first years in office) over 1960–1965; a more moderate increase of 24 percent from 1970–1975; and an even smaller rate of growth planned for 1975-1981—21 percent (see *Narkhoz,* 1965, p. 593; and *Current Digest,* Nov. 24, 1976, p. 16). Thus, real income seems to follow a cycle of rapid expansion immediately after succession and slower growth thereafter until the next succession period. This seems to characterize *both* the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras (for some relevant evidence on the Khrushchev years, see *Narkhoz,* 1965, p. 593.

A final policy area which seems to have particular relevance to the masses is agriculture. This sector is noted for its serious deficiencies—in the quality of produce, its quantity, and its distribution—and these deficiencies have led to considerable consumer dissatisfaction. Moreover, the quality of life in the rural areas is also affected by the low investment in agriculture, the pressures to produce more, and the overall poverty that has been created by a decades-long favoritism among the Soviet leadership toward urban areas and urban concerns (Bush, 1974). Thus, to expand agricultural investment—broadly defined—is to be more responsive to the cities *and* to the countryside.

In Table 3, I have presented by succession and non-succession periods, the average annual change in share of agricultural investment for the period 1956–1976. It is evident in this table (and in annual graphs) that agriculture is pumped up after succession, only to recede in importance as the administration matures (see in particular, Volkov, 1973).[7] If one examines, moreover, the *timing* of major agricultural plenums in the post-Stalin period—plenums which greatly expanded agricultural investment—two dates stand out—September 1953 and March 1965—both of which were in the honeymoon period of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, respectively (see Volkov, 1973, 1975; Golikov, 1975, pp. 3–4). Finally, there is the issue of income in the agricultural sector, which I noted above (see Table 2). These data support the conclusion drawn by David Bronson and Constance Krueger that

> the most rapid growth in total farm incomes occurred immediately following the accession to power of new regimes. During the two year period, 1954–1955, farm wages increased by 70 percent. The ascendance of Brezhnev and Kosygin in 1964 was followed by a 26 percent rise in wages in 1965-1966 (1971, p. 222: see also Brezhnev, 1975a, 1975b).

Thus Soviet leaders do seem to manipulate agricultural investment in a manner predicted by the hypothesis (also see Tiurina, 1972).

These data, then, do seem to support the argument that both Khrushchev and Brezhnev manipulated economic policy in response to the succession cycle. However, this is not to argue that other factors are not at work: there is an overall trend in expanding mass consumption and agricultural investment both of which are in keeping with the goals of "developed socialism"—(see Simonenko, 1978), and heavy industry at no point assumes the entire burden for the expansion of these areas. However, what does seem to be clear is that the welfare of the people is of more immediate concern in the honeymoon than later in the two regimes. The income data, in particular, document this shift in concerns.

Before I conclude that there is in fact a succession cycle, though, it would be useful to look at priority shifts as expressed by the leaders themselves. If one compares, for example, the amount of space Brezhnev has devoted in his major addresses to the 1966, 1971 and 1976 party congresses to policies having to do with the welfare of the people ("blaga naroda"), one finds a marked decline in avowed interest in this issue over time. In 1966, 16 percent of his main address (16 pages out of 103) was spent on the issues of mass living standards and their economic welfare. By 1971, this percentage declined to less than five percent and by 1976 was even lower. In fact, that year marked the first time since the Stalin era that a special section on improvements in popular welfare was left out of the major congressional address. Instead, references to improvements were periodically interspersed throughout the speech, along with a rather weak call for more investment in consumer goods (see *Materialy XXV s"ezda KPSS,* 1976).

Table 3. Average Annual Percent Change in Share of Capital Investment in Agriculture: The Soviet Union, 1954–1978

	Khrushchev	Brezhnev
Entire Period, 1954–1978	+1.00	+.50
Succession	+1.30	+.90
Post-Succession	+ .56	+.48

Sources: Sovet ekonomicheskoi vzaipomoshchi statisticheskii ezhegodnik stran chlenov soveta ekonomicheskoi vzaipomoshchi (Moscow: Statistika, 1976), pp. 38–44; *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR* (Moscow: Statistika, 1978), pp. 205–06.

This declining emphasis, moreover, seems to have mirrored what was an actual decline of major policy *announcements* in this area. A recent Soviet compendium of social policy initiatives since 1964 reveals that 1964 to 1967 were *the* years of great expansion in the welfare state (see *Zabota partii,* 1974). A tabulation of Central Committee plenums by topic, for example, reveals that, while from 1965 to 1968 there were 12 plenums and resolutions related to welfare, from 1969 to the present there have been only 9 (see *Kommunisticheskaia partiia,* 1973).

Similarly, if one peruses Brezhnev's speeches over the past 15 years, one finds a parallel shift from emphasizing the need to improve the lot of the masses to greater concern with economic productivity, economic incentives, and the necessary linkage between output and social wage. For instance, while in the middle 1960s the theme was reiterated again and again that the masses deserved a comprehensive welfare state (see, for instance, Brezhnev, 1975, Vol. 1, pp. 14–15, 212), by the 1970s the masses were supposed to *earn* these benefits. In line with this shift, Brezhnev said in 1974 that "experience has fully confirmed the effectiveness of economic levers. . . . We must orient ourselves toward an increasingly direct dependence upon the pay of the individual and the end results of their activity" (Brezhnev, 1975b, p. 1; also see Rabkina, 1978, p. 1). In fact, even the priorities revealed in the speeches of Nikita Khrushchev seem to have followed a similar pattern—of beneficience in the early years followed by a more hard-line stance. While in the mid-1950s Khrushchev called for greater economic security for the masses, particularly in the countryside, by the early 1960s he was in a less charitable frame of mind. For example, in 1964 he chided collective farmers with the reminder that "the bad work in a Kolkhoz today is reflected in old age pensions tomorrow" (Khrushchev, 1964, p. 441). He later went on to argue that pensions should be more tied to productivity in order "to induce Kolkhozniks to produce more . . . and thus guarantee a better life in old age." Khrushchev, like Brezhnev, seems to have become more skeptical over time about how much the masses deserved the beneficience of the state.

Thus a cycle of shifting concern with mass demands appears both in elite rhetoric and in concrete policy priorities. Political leaders in the Soviet Union seem to shift their focus, depending upon the nature of the political climate, and tend to manipulate the economy with an eye on the acquisition and maintenance of power.[7] In this sense, American presidents and Soviet first secretaries are very similar—policy priorities are shaped according to political ambitions and the changing nature and demands of their policy constituencies. When succession is at issue, popular policies evolve. However, when succession is *not* at issue, the impact of the masses seems to decline, and other groups and thus demands (whose support the leader needs) surface that out into the mass-oriented programs.[8] The result is that once the new priorities are set, other interests line up at the trough for their fair shares and the emphasis on mass concerns withers away. New leaders, then, East and West, are different when they are on the campaign trail (whether before an election, or, as in socialist states, right after succession) from leaders in midterm. In this sense, the policy process in the White House or the Kremlin seems to be, in part, a cyclical process—at certain times it seems to be more responsive to mass demands.

Some Eastern European Comparisons

Given the support for the hypothesis that a succession cycle exists in Soviet economic policy, it would seem reasonable to suggest that such a cycle may operate in Eastern Europe as well. This argument is based on the obvious congruence—in terms of executive power, ideological concern with economic policy, and succession processes—between the Soviet Union and other bloc states. In fact, one scholar, Bogdan Mieczkowski (1978) has argued persuasively that, in Poland at least, economic policy is closely tied to shifts in political power. The linkage there seems to be quite direct

---

[7] This cycle of shifting concerns can also be seen with respect to changes in party staffing. As T. H. Rigby (1967, pp. 52-53, 316–20) has demonstrated, the party seems to expand right after succession and then falls into a slower growth pattern. More recent data, moreover, confirms this generalization—while from 1961–66 the party increased by 6 percent, from 1966–71 the comparable figure was 3.16 percent which in turn declined from 1971-1976 (Starr, 1978; Rigby, 1976). Similarly, if we look at rates of personnel turnover, we find succession periods to be unusually high—that is, 1956 and 1975—though 1961 was also a time of greata flux (Hodnett and Ogareff, 1973; Daniels, 1971). Finally, succession seems to affect the size of the Supreme Soviet—expanding it dramatically (Vanneman, 1977, pp. 122–40).

[8] It could be argued that I have not uncovered a succession cycle, but rather an economic cycle reflecting an expansion and contraction of economic resources. However, given the consistency of the cycle, the theoretical support for its existence, and the fact that most of the data have to do with the distribution of the pie—whatever its size (i.e., political questions)—the interpretation of a political succession cycle seems reasonable.

Table 4. Growth Rates in Selected Personal Income and Public Consumption In the Soviet Bloc (Percent)

	Succession[a]	Post-Succession[b]
German Democratic Republic		
(Disposable Income Growth, 1971–1976)	5.6	3.8
Poland		
(Average Annual Growth in Real Wages, 1956–1975)	7.4	1.8
Czechoslovakia		
(Personal Consumption in Constant Prices per Capita, 1967–1973)	5.5	4.5
Soviet Union		
(Increases in National Income, 1964–1977)	7.1	4.1

Sources: Vaclav Holesovsky, "Czechoslovak Economy in the 1970s," Michael Keren, "The Return of the Ancient Regime: The GDR in the 1960s," and Zbigniew Fallenbuchl, "The Polish Economy in the 1970s," in Joint Economic Committee (ed.), *East European Economies Post Helsinki* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 98–719, 720–65, 816–64; *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR za 60 let: Iubeleinyi Statisticheskii ezhegodnik* (Moscow: Statistika, 1977), pp. 521, 485; *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 29, No. 48 (Dec. 27, 1978), p. 12.

[a] Succession is defined as 1972–1974 (the German Democratic Republic), 1957–1959 and 1971–1973 (Poland), 1957–1959 and 1968–1970 (Czechoslovakia), and 1965–1967 (Soviet Union).

[b] Post-succession is defined as all other years, except succession periods, depending on data availability.

—the masses riot, the leader falls, public consumption increases for a few years and then tapers off, then the masses riot again and the cycle repeats itself. Thus in Poland it was not a case of "anticipatory reactions" on the part of Gomulka or Gierek; rather, it was a rather straightforward response to mass pressure.

Mieczkowski's argument is in fact relevant to other bloc states as well, and the key factor therefore seems to be succession. In Tables 4–6, I have presented summary data on income, consumption and budgetary and investment priorities in Poland, the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. The data indicate much the same pattern as found in the Soviet case, with the income data again showing the clearest cycle of change. There does seem to be, therefore, some support for the generalization that public consumption in the Soviet bloc as a whole is calibrated in part by what is a succession cycle.[9] Whether mass unrest accompanies succession or not, changes in leaders do lead to a priming of the consumer sector (broadly defined) in the Soviet Union and even more so in Eastern Europe.

Table 5. Average Annual Shares of Total Capital Investment in Light Industry, Housing and Welfare: Eastern Europe (Percent)

	Light Industry	Housing	Welfare
Czechoslovakia:			
Succession Period (1968–1970)	.066	.161	.213
Post-Succession (1965–1967, 1972–1976)	.055	.131	.180
German Democratic Republic:			
Succession Period (1972–1974)	.055	.067	.201
Post-Succession (1965–1971)	.045	.060	.181
Poland:			
Succession Period (1971–1973)	.085	.141	.113
Post-Succession (1959–1970)	.060	.140	.091

Source: Sovet ekonomicheskoi vzaipomoshchi statisticheskii ezhegodnik stran chlenov ekonomicheskoi vzaipomoshchi (Moscow: Statistika, 1976), pp. 136–39.

---

[9] It should be emphasized that the results in no way challenge the notion that a variety of factors, such as ideology, personality, economic cycles, and power struggles, also work to shape economic policy. The point here is that structural factors—relating to succession—are also at work (see Bajt, 1971; Brainard, 1974).

Table 6. Average Annual Growth Rates in Consumption and Consumer Goods: Poland and the Soviet Union (Percent)

	Succession Periods (1956–59 and 1965–68)	Post-Succession Periods (1960–64 and 1969–78)
Soviet Union		
Light Industry Production	7.51	5.72
Light Industry Investment	7.62	3.51
Public Consumption Funds	10.40	6.32
Real Income per Capita	5.81	4.22
	Succession Periods (1956–59 and 1971–73)	**Post-Succession Periods (1960–70 and 1974–77)**
Poland		
Light Industry Production	9.11	6.92
Personal Income	13.70	5.73
Total Consumption Outlays per Capita	6.51	4.92

Sources: Zbigniew Fallenbuchl, "The Polish Economy in the 1970s," in Joint Economic Committee (ed.), *East European Economies Post Helsinki* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 816–64; *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR za 60 let: Iubeleinyi statisticheskii ezhegodnik* (Moscow: Statistika, 1977), pp. 521, 485, 563; *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* Vol. 24, No. 3 (Jan. 24, 1973), p. 9; Vol. 26, No. 51 (Jan. 15, 1975), p. 12; Vol. 29, No. 4 (Jan. 11, 1978), p. 9; *Narodne khoziaistvo SSSR* (Moscow: Statistika), 1965, p. 607; 1967, p. 887; 1970, p. 533; 1974, p. 602; 1975, pp. 563, 604.

Conclusions

The major conclusion of this study is that first secretaries seem to pursue similar economic policy priorities at similar points in their administrations in what seems to be a response to the succession process. These priority shifts involve a tendency to pump up public consumption in the period immediately following succession, and then a tendency to move toward less popular policies, once the succession crisis has been resolved. The pattern of growth in public consumption—whether measured in terms of budgetary and investment priorities, housing starts, production of consumer goods, or national income and wage levels—fluctuates, therefore, in response to a number of factors, one of which seems to be the "newness" of the leadership. In this sense, the tenure of a first secretary can be divided into two terms—an early period which is highly responsive to mass demands, and a later period which registers something of a decline in such concerns. Thus, Khrushchev and Brezhnev (and Gierek, Husak, Gomulka, Ubricht, or Honnecker, for that matter) are rather similar in at least one respect. They were all subject to changing political demands which forced them to move over the course of their terms from more popular to less popular economic priorities.

But why do these shifts occur? In the case of the immediate post-succession period, we can readily agree with the common argument that "the decision-making process in the Soviet Union is inextricably linked to the succession struggle" (Morton, 1967, p. 19). Just as elections seem to affect a great deal of policy making in the West, so also succession in the Soviet Union (and in Eastern Europe, though our evidence here is more scanty) seems to help shape economic priorities. Leaders seem to believe (as one infers from their decisions) that the masses need to be placated in the period immediately following succession. Their logic is straightforward. Succession is, after all, a crisis which might open up a deluge of mass demands (or clearly does, in the case of Poland); there is a backlog of gripes which has built up over the course of the previous regime (indeed, growth rates in consumption do decline in the latter half of each preceding regime); the new leader does have to build a basis of support; and such policies are in keeping with the emphasis on public welfare in the stage of "developed socialism." Finally, the adoption of such a strategy is facilitated by the extent to which various coalitions can agree on such priorities. The critical nature of the period and the pressing need to win over the mass public imply that a decision to inflate public consumption can be a matter of some consensus. After all, it is a temporary shift (as the data indicate) and one which, if not pursued, could have drastic repercussions for all at the apex of the system. To assume such unrest is a more rational approach to decision making during this period than to assume otherwise.

This, indeed, is the irony of an irregular, elitist mode of succession: it makes responsiveness to mass demands perhaps as imperative as it is in a polyarchical system. While their votes are irrelevant to the resolution of the succession, the masses do seem to have clout precisely because the new leader is building a mandate after getting into office. In this sense, the mechanisms of succession-induced responsiveness in the Soviet Union and in the U.S. seem to be similar—politicians respond because, being ambitious, they fear rejection. The anticipation of electoral defeat in the American case, then, has its analogue in the Soviet Union in the fear of mass unrest and in the need to build a coalition of support. Thus, there does seem to be a "succession connection" in the Soviet Union just as there is an "electoral connection" in the United States (Mayhew, 1974). Moreover, it operates in much the same way—as a psychological, anticipatory constraint rather than a post hoc limitation. All that counts is that leaders *believe* they will suffer if they do not respond; whether negative sanctions do in fact occur with any frequency is not terribly relevant. A few electoral upsets of their colleagues or a few riots in Poland can force the ambitions to be responsive each time they face a referendum on their continued tenure. They have too much to lose to believe they are insulated from forced retirement.[10]

The question then becomes, why does this concern fade away once the succession is resolved? There are several answers to this, none of which excludes the others. First, it is possible that members of the elite at the top strike a deal after each succession, wherein it is understood that public consumption will be increased for a short while and then, once the masses are mollified, more traditional concerns (advocated by members of the elite) will be allowed to return to the top of the agenda. Such an explanation, of course, fits in well with the consistent pattern found in the data, a consistency which seems to reflect some unanimity within the ruling circle. Second, it may be a less conscious and more conflictual process, wherein the pumping up of consumption reflects an uneasy, but necessary truce which eventually breaks down as the more traditional interests demand their usual and/or fair share. Third, it could be argued that the drift away from expanding public consumption suggests a rather typical model of organizational change, wherein innovations, once introduced, freeze as leaders realize their costs, as other demands snowball, as power is used up and as the fortuitous combination of power and desire to innovate comes apart once the honeymoon period passes into "midterm doldrums" (see Hess, 1977). Both Brezhnev and Khrushchev could have easily faced more demands as they moved through their terms of office, and could have taken comfort in the fact that, having established a new level of consumption, they could—for reasons of power and expanding commitments—move on to other policy concerns.

However, while one cannot choose easily among these various explanations (nor do we have to do so—they *all* could operate), the point remains that there are good reasons—in terms of power constraints on first secretaries—why increased public consumption should, after a flurry of concern, recede in importance within each administration. The fact that such a pattern seems to exist, of course, says a great deal about succession and economic policy making in socialist states and the impact of the mass public on the policy process. To paraphrase Theodore Lowi (1964, 1972), "Different periods have different politics, different distributions of power, and diffferent policies." In the honeymoon period, power seems to converge on the advisability of responding to mass demands—ambition, fear, a backlog of grievances, and the like, focus power on implementing various popular economic policies. The constraint here comes from the masses, where are paid off, and there is a consensus among the leadership that this is a necessary strategy. The first secretary, of course, has power, but this is severely limited by the rigidity of the agenda during the honeymoon period. Once this period passes, though, and the benefits are distributed, other pressures arise which take the place of the masses. Then the first secretary placates more traditional constituencies and becomes hemmed in by the usual litany of limitations—ideology; constraints on time, information and resources; and institutional and personal conflicts. Policies then become less responsive to the public and more fitting with what has been called "interest-group liberalism" (Lowi, 1969). At this time, everyone gets something, and, as a result, the power of the first secretary declines and public consumption settles into a more incremental pattern of growth. Someone has to pay for politics functioning as interest-group liberalism, and who pays is the mass public—in terms of policy outputs—and the first secretary—in terms of controlling policy priorities.

Thus what I am suggesting is that power and policy in the Soviet Union are at least partially defined by time—a new administration has one model of priorities and constraints, while an

---

[10] In a recent debate in *Soviet Studies*, Philip Hanson (1978) argues that the masses have few ways to register preferences in the Soviet Union and thus influence on public policy is hard to imagine. However, what Hanson ignores is the powerful impact of "anticipation"—a force that moves leaders East and West.

"older" administration has another, and these parameters seem to be set in part by the succession process. Just as there are "seasons" to the presidency (Hess, 1977), so there are seasons to the office of the first secretary—at certain times, certain activities are more likely. This, in turn, implies that many of the more common explanations of the behavior of the first secretary—such as the combined effects of personality and style, career background, ideology, shifting political coalitions, and the issue areas (see Kelley, 1976)—overlook one important factor—temporal variations that occur *within* the particular parameters set by the variables at hand.[11] Khrushchev, for example, may have been a "populist," but he was far less of one at the end of his tenure. Brezhnev may be primarily a cautious reformer, but he was innovative in terms of his responsiveness to mass demands at the beginning of his term. The point is that both leaders changed in similar ways for similar reasons. They are different and these differences—in style, priorities, power, and policy contexts—are important to know. However, they are only part of the story. The other part is that leaders have seemed to alter their rhetoric and their priorities in similar ways in response to shifts in power, demands and clienteles that have occurred over the course of their administrations.

Thus the existence of a succession cycle in economic policy in socialist states tells us something about how decisions are made, about the power of the masses and the first secretary, and about policy priorities. The key factor that emerges from this study is the important role of succession. Edward Tufte's conclusion (1978, p. 137) that "economic life vibrates with the rhythm of politics" seems to help describe the political economy of socialist states as well as capitalist systems. There seems to be a temporal context within which chief executives—East and West—operate.

References

Bajt, Alexander (1971). "Investment Cycles in European Socialist Economies." *Journal of Economic Literature* 9: 53-63.

Bergson, Abram (1978). *Productivity and the Social System: The USSR and the West.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Brainard, Laurence J. (1974). "Policy Cycles in Socialist Economies: Examples from Czechoslovak Agriculture." In Joint Economic Committee (ed.), *Reorientation and Commercial Relations of the Economics of Eastern Europe.* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, pp. 214-28.

Breslauer, George (1976). "Khrushchev Revisited." *Problems of Communism* 25 (Sept.-Oct.): 18-33.

Brezhnev, Leonid (1970, 1973, 1975a). *Leninskim kursom,* 5 vols. Moscow: Politizdat.

______ (1975b). "Iz rechi na torzhestvennom zasedanii v Alma Ata, posviaschennon 20-letiu osvoeniia tselinykh zalezhnikh zemel." *Pravda,* March 15, 1975, p. 1.

______ (1974). *Voprosy agrarnoi politiki KPSS i osvoenie tselinykh zemel' Kazakhstana,* Vol. 1. Moscow: Politizdat.

Bronson, David W., and Constance Krueger (1971). "The Revolution in Soviet Farm Household Income, 1953-1967." In James Millar (ed.), *The Soviet Rural Community: A Symposium.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press, pp. 214-58.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, and Samuel Huntington (1963). *Political Power: USA/USSR.* New York: Viking.

Bunce, Valerie (1981). *Do New Leaders Make a Difference? Executive Succession and Public Policy under Capitalism and Socialism.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, forthcoming.

______ (1976). "Elite Succession, Petrification and Policy Innovation in Communist States: An Empirical Assessment." *Comparative Political Studies* 9 (April): 3-43.

______, and John Echols (1978). "Power and Policy in Communist Systems: The Problem of Incrementalism." *Journal of Politics* 40: 911-32.

Bush, Keith (1974). "Soviet Agriculture: Ten Years Under New Management." *Radio Liberty.* Munich: Radio Liberty Publications.

Cameron, David (1978). "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 72: 1243-61.

Clarke, Roger (1972). *Soviet Economic Facts, 1917-1970.* London: Macmillan.

Conquest, Robert (1967). *Power and Policy in the Soviet Union.* New York: Viking.

Cowart, Andrew (1978a). "The Economic Policies of European Governments, Part I: Monetary Policy." *British Journal of Political Science* 9: 285-312.

______ (1978b). "The Economic Policies of European Governments, Part II: Fiscal Policy." *British Journal of Political Science* 9: 425-40.

Current Digest of the Soviet Press (1975-78). Vol. 26, No. 41 (Jan. 15, 1975), p. 12; Vol. 27, No. 48 (Dec. 24, 1976), p. 7; Vol. 28, No. 4 (Jan. 11, 1977), p. 9; Vol. 29, No. 5 (Jan. 11, 1978), p. 5.

Daniels, Robert V. (1971). "Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev." In John W. Strong (ed.), *The Soviet Union Under Brezhnev and Kosygin.* New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, pp. 16-25.

Davies, R. W. (1958). *The Soviet Financial System.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

DiMaio, Alfred (1974). *Soviet Urban Housing.* New York: Praeger.

Fallenbuchl, Zbigniew (1977). "The Polish Economy in the 1970's." In Joint Economic Committee (ed.), *East European Economics Post Helsinki.* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, pp. 816-64.

Golikov, V. A., ed. (1975). *Kursom Martovskogo*

---

[11] This is not to argue, however, that different leaders are not different (see Bunce, 1976), but rather that they tend to follow similar patterns of activity over time. Personality and style do set certain parameters, but within those parameters, over time economic policy takes on a similar pattern of development.

plenuma. Moscow: Politizdat.

Hanson, Philip (1978). "Mieczkowski on Consumption and Politics: A Comment." *Soviet Studies* 30: 553–56.

Hess, Stephen (1977). "Portrait of a President." *Woodrow Wilson Quarterly* 1: 43–48.

Hibbs, Douglas (1977). "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy." *American Political Science Review* 71: 467–87.

Hodnett, Grey, and Val Ogareff (1977). *Leaders of the Soviet Republics.* Canberra: Australian National University.

Holesovsky, Vaclav (1977). "Czechoslovak Economy in the 1970s." In Joint Economic Committee (ed.), *East European Economics Post Helsinki.* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, pp. 698–719.

Hough, Jerry (1976). "The Brezhnev Era: The Man and the System." *Problems of Communism* 25 (March-April): 1–17.

Kelley, Donald (1974). "Toward a Model of Soviet Decision-Making: A Research Note." *American Political Science Review* 68: 701–06.

Khrushchev, Nikita (1964). *Stroitel'stvo kommunizma v SSSR i razvitie sel'skogo khoziaistva,* Vol. 8. Moscow: Politizdat.

Kommunisticheskaia partiia Sovetskogo Soiuza v resoluitstiakh i resheniakh (1973). Moscow: Statistika.

Kukushkin, M. S. (1975). *Razvitoi sotsializm i proizvostvo material'nykh blag.* Leningrad: Lenizdat.

Lewin, Moshe (1968). *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power.* Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.

Long, Norton (1962). *The Polity.* Chicago: Rand McNally.

Lowi, Theodore (1972). "Four Systems of Policy, Politics and Choice." *Public Administration Review* 32: 298-310.

______ (1969). *The End of Liberalism.* New York: Norton.

______ (1964). "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory." *World Politics* 6: 677–715.

Materialy XXV s"ezda KPSS (1976). Moscow: Politizdat.

Mayhew, David (1974). *Congress: The Electoral Connection.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Meyer, B. (1974). "Rost' narodnogo blagosostoiania v usloviakh razvitogo sotsializma." *Kommunist* 9 (June): 62–75.

Mieczkowski, Bogdan (1978). "The Relationship Between Changes in Consumption and Politics in Poland." *Soviet Studies* 30: 263–69.

Morton, Henry (1967). "The Structure of Decision-Making in the USSR." In Peter Juviler and Henry Morton (eds.), *Soviet Policy-Making.* New York: Praeger, pp. 3-28.

Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR (1965, 1967, 1970, 1974, 1975, 1978). Moscow: Statistika.

Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR za 60 let: Iubeleiyni statisticheskii ezhegodnik (1977). Moscow: Statistika.

Orren, Gary (1979). "Pocketbook Politics." *The Public Interest* 54: 106–12.

Pressman, Jeffrey, and Aaron Wildavsky (1973). *Imprementation.* Berkeley: University of California.

Rabkina, N. (1978). "Distributive Relations and Social Development." *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* Vol. 30 (Dec. 20, 1978), p. 5.

Resheniia partii i pravitel 'stva po sel 'skomu khoziaistva, 1965–1972 (1973). Moscow: Kolos.

Rigby, T. H. (1967). *Communist Party Membership in the USSR.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

______ (1976). "Soviet Communist Party Membership under Brezhnev." *Soviet Studies* 28: 317–37.

Rogov, A. I. (1975). *Rukovodstvo KPSS ekonomicheskoi zrelogo sotsializma.* Moscow: Politizdat.

Rush, Myron (1974). *How Communist States Change Their Rulers.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

______ (1968). *Political Succession in the Soviet Union.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Schlesinger, Joseph (1966). *Ambition and Politics.* Chicago: Rand McNally.

Simonenko, G. S. (1978). "Sblizhenie sotsial 'nogo obespecheniia rabochikh sluzhiashchikh' i kolkhoznikov." *Sovietskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* 4 (April): 52-60.

Smirnov, A. I. (1971). "Rost' blagosostoianiia naroda—vysshaia tsel' ekonomicheskoi politiki partii." In *Voprosy ekonomicheskoi politiki KPSS na sovremennon etape.* Moscow: Politizdat, pp. 107–52.

Spravochnyi tom k vos'momu izdaniyu KPSS v resoliutsiakh i resheniakh s"ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov (1973). Moscow: Politizdat.

Starr, Richard F., ed. (1978). *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs.* Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press.

Tiurina, A. (1972). "Razvitie sel'skogo khoziaistva, 1966–1970." *Istoriia SSRS* 20: 3–25.

Trepczynski, Stanislaw, and Michael Sadowski (1971). *Socialism and National Development.* Warsaw: Interpress.

Tufte, Edward (1978). *Political Control of the Economy.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Tulebaev, T. (1969). *Buidzhetnoe planirovanie v soiuznoi respublike.* Moscow: Finansy.

Vanneman, Peter (1977). *The Supreme Soviet: Politics and the Legislative Process in the Soviet Parliamentary System.* Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

Volkov, I. (1975). "Novy etap v razvitii sel 'skogo khoziaistva SSSR." *Istoriia SSSR* 22 (March-April): 3–21.

Voznesenskii, L. A. (1971). "Ekonomika i politika: iz vzaimodeistvie v sotsialistichkom obshchestve." In *Voprosy ekonomicheskoi politiki KPSS na sovremennon etape.* Moscow: Politizdat.

Wilson, James Q. (1966). "Innovation in Organizations: Notes Toward a Theory." In James Thompson (ed.), *Approaches to Organizational Design.* Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Yevdokimov, V. (1974). *Kontrol' za ispolneniem gosudarstvennogo buidzheta SSSR.* Moscow: Ekonomicheskaia literatura.

Zabota partii i pravitelstva o blage naroda (1974). Moscow: Politizdat.

Zimmerman, William (1977). "The Tito Succession and the Evolution of Yugoslav Politics." *Studies in Comparative Communism* 9 (Spring/Summer): 62–79.

Systemic Power in Community Decision Making: A Restatement of Stratification Theory

CLARENCE N. STONE
University of Maryland

In their continued considerations of political inequality, urban scholars are especially concerned with less visible influences surrounding community decision making, and have employed such concepts as potential power, nondecision making, and anticipated reactions. However, these concepts leave some patterns of influence unexplained. There is also a dimension of power in which durable features of the socioeconomic system confer advantages and disadvantages on groups in ways that predispose public officials to favor some interests at the expense of others. Public officials make their decisions in a context in which strategically important resources are hierarchically arranged. Because this system of stratification leaves public officials situationally dependent on upper-strata interests, it is a factor in all that they do. Consequently, system features lower the opportunity costs of exerting influence for some groups and raise them for others. Thus socioeconomic inequalities put various strata on different political footings.

Students of power have long probed beneath the surface fiction of political equality for the imbalances of influence that are invariably present in the governance of communities. But this search is complicated by the fact that power is often present without being visibly exercised. In trying to understand the less visible influences surrounding public decision making, scholars have variously developed such concepts as nondecisions, anticipated reactions, and indirect influence. Useful as they are, these concepts don't take us far enough. It seems that there is a dimension of power beyond what the accepted concepts suggest—a dimension best termed "systemic."

Consider these circumstances. Contrary to reasonable expectations, electoral strength, whether potential or manifest, appears to be an unreliable indicator of political power. Major business enterprises and other upper-strata interests seem to have an influence on local decisions not warranted by their numbers or their overt participation in political and governmental affairs. For example, while business influence in particular controversies is not very impressive (business interests are often divided or defeated), business influence seems to be important in a way not measured by victories and losses. Conversely, lower-strata groups seem to face fewer handicaps in politics than in other areas of community life (cf. Dahl, 1961, pp. 293–96), but they make little use of political activity to further their position and, when they do, they are often disappointed by the transitory nature of their influence.

Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz (1970) confronted this problem of a less visible face of power, setting forth the notion of nondecision making. By this term, they meant the capacity of elite groups to restrict the scope of community decision making. G. William Domhoff (1978) has added the assertion that there is a national upper class based on corporate wealth which is able to control the agenda of public debate and maintain ideological dominance. However, nondecision making has proved difficult to research; critics charge that it is not possible to study non-events and that what in fact is studied is a special kind of decision making.

Whether the critics have fairly characterized nondecision making is debatable (see Crenson, 1971), but there does seem to be more to the "hidden face" of power than agenda control. Despite efforts to contain them, a variety of issues do surface; during the 1960s, for example, redistributive issues were prominent. The missing element in the community power puzzle seems to be in the predispositions of public officials. Why, when all of their actions are taken into account, do officials over the long haul seem to favor upper-strata interests, disfavor lower-strata interests, and sometimes act in apparent disregard of the contours of electoral power? Can this systemic pattern be

---

This article is a revised version of a paper given at the 1979 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in Washington, D.C. Numerous colleagues have provided helpful comments and words of encouragement. I am particularly indebted to Stephen Elkin for his comments and his willingness to read several drafts. Special thanks are also due Emma Jackson, Kathleen Kemp, Charles Levine, Louis Masotti, Richard Medley, Martin Shefter, Eric Uslaner, and Oran Young for their comments and suggestions. Finally, I wish to express my appreciation to the General Research Board of the University of Maryland for support.

treated in power terms?

In the discussion below, I will argue "yes" to this last question. The core of my argument is that we must take into account contextual forces—the facet of community decision making I label "systemic power." In brief, this argument runs as follows: public officials form their alliances, make their decisions and plan their futures in a context in which strategically important resources are hierarchically arranged—that is, officials operate in a stratified society. The system of stratification is a motivating factor in all that they do; it predisposes them to favor upper- over lower-strata interests. Systemic power therefore has to do with *the impact of the larger socioeconomic system on the predispositions of public officials.*

The class character of community decision making does not result from a conscious calculation. As Norton Long has argued, rationality is "a function of the parts rather than the whole" (1958, p. 251). What I shall elaborate below is the argument that because officials operate within a stratified system, they find themselves rewarded for cooperating with upper-strata interests and unrewarded or even penalized for cooperating with lower-strata interests. In selective ways described later, public officials experience strategic dependencies predisposing them to favor upper- over lower-strata interests. Thus some groups are in a position to receive official cooperation, while others encounter substantial resistance. Put another way, different strata operate from different footings and therefore face different opportunity costs (cf. Harsanyi, 1962). The particular interactions and relationships (the parts) yield an overall pattern of decision making that is unplanned and unforeseen. It does, however, bear a class imprint not predicted by pluralist theories of community power and it comes about in ways requiring no ruling elite.

The overall argument is developed in three steps: (1) a definition and explanation of the concept of systemic power, (2) a highlighting of systemic features underlying specified power imbalances, and (3) an examination of empirical findings bearing on the notion of systemic power used here.

Systemic Power: Toward an Explanation and Definition

Everyone recognizes that system features in some way affect the distribution of power. But how does one relate those system features to the power relationships among determinate actors?

Power is most readily seen in overt and purposive activity among individuals. But students of politics (such as Anton, 1963) have long recognized that power relationships are more complex than what can be observed in that form:

1. Power is not only *interpersonal*; it is also *intergroup* (including relationships between classes and strata). Few would quarrel with this position.
2. Power is not only a matter of *intention*; it is also a matter of context, of the nature of or "logic" of the *situation*. Here there is a need for some clarification.

Most students of power agree that there is a phenomenon called "anticipated reactions." *A* may influence the behavior of *B* because *B* is fearful of the reactions of *A* to a given course of conduct; or *B* may be accommodating to *A* because *B* wants to stay in the good graces of *A* for future advantage. To illustrate, Robert Dahl observes that "elected leaders keep the real or imagined preferences of constituents constantly in mind in deciding what policies to adopt or reject" (1961, p. 164). In this latter instance especially, it is not necessary that the passive "actor" intend that its preferences be taken into account or even be conscious that a power relationship exists. Indeed, Dahl makes much of the indifference and unconcern of the electorate. All that is required for this to be a power relationship is that elected officials take into account preferences of the electorate because the electorate is in a position to give or withhold something of value—in this case, votes. Any actor may, just by possessing a politically useful resource, enjoy a power advantage.

Furthermore, it is not necessary that the superordinate member in a power relationship have gained that position by some intended activity. Inherited wealth is not politically valueless because it was inherited, nor is advantage gained through a fortuitous change in circumstances any less an advantge because the change was fortuitous. Power can therefore be situational in a twofold sense: (a) a participant need not make a conscious effort to get into a power position for that position to be power-relevant, and (b) the participant need not be aware of the particular consequences of the power position (cf. Oppenheim, 1978). This means therefore that, if the *situation* is such that *B* feels a need to be accommodating to *A*, then *A* has power over *B*, whether *A* sought that position or is even aware of it or not. Moreover, the strength of the relationship is not governed by motivation. In an anticipated reaction, the strength of the relationship is determined by the vulnerability of *B* to *A* (cf. Emerson, 1962). Vulnerability hinges on the *structure of the situation,* and that is separate from the motivation or effort that went into creating or even exploiting the situation. This is not to say that motivation, sharply defined intention, or conscious effort to gain an advantage are never important, only that they are not essential to a power relationship.

3. Power relationships are not only *direct*; they may also be *indirect*. Again, there is need for clarification, and there is also a need for keeping in mind the difference between the situational element of power and the indirect element of power.

Power is most often viewed as a conflict relationship. When there is direct conflict, the exercise of power is not in doubt. This is the standard "*A* gets *B* to do what *B* would not otherwise have done." This is a clear case of the "power over" relationship. But suppose there is no overt threat, not even an implicit threat to use sanctions. Rather, participants have an unequal opportunity to further their interests. *A* has a greater capacity to achieve goals than *C* has (excluding *B* from consideration for the time being). We say that *A* is more powerful than *C*—that, for example, Mayor Lee is more powerful than the corner grocer. But is this a power relationship since there is no *direct* conflict between *A* and *C*? This relationship has been treated as a "power to" rather than a "power over" relationship, and therefore not as a conflict relationship. However, the "power to" relationship is a conflict relationship if *A* and *C* are in *indirect* competition to achieve their goals. If *A*, by getting *B* to do *x* makes it unlikely that *C* can get *B* to do *y*, then there is a conflict relationship—but it is indirect because *A* and *C* are not competing directly with one another. This is implied in the nondecision-making argument. *A* excludes *C*'s items from the agenda of decision making, not only because *C*'s items may be threatening in some direct way, but *because the agenda is limited and there is competition for the space available*. An unequal capacity to achieve goals is therefore a conflict relationship to the extent that the actors are in competition for a limited opportunity to further their interests. If *A* uses superior resources to structure a pattern of agenda setting and *C* finds that s/he cannot change the agenda, *A* has exerted power over *C* even in the absence of direct conflict between *A* and *C*.

Defining Systemic Power. For purposes of the present discussion, let us assume that we need be concerned only with durable, not transient, power conditions. Let us also assume that we are concerned only with intergroup power relationships. What we are looking for is a way to treat the durable features of the larger socioeconomic system as an element of the power relationships among groups.

By putting together the different elements of power in their various combinations (and concentrating on durable conditions), one may derive the following classification scheme. Systemic power appears as that type of power *furthest* removed from open competition (*direct* power relationships) and purposive activity (involving a conscious *intention*) among individuals (*interpersonal*). Yet it is made up of elements that are acknowledged to be aspects of power.

Types of Power Relationships

Elements in Relationship	**Type of Relationship**
Intergroup, intentional and direct	Decisional
Intergroup, situational and direct	Anticipated Reaction
Intergroup, intentional and indirect	Nondecision Making
Intergroup, situational and indirect	Systemic

Systemic power can be defined as that dimension of power in which durable features of the socioeconomic system (the *situational* element) confer advantages and disadvantages on groups (the *intergroup* element) in ways predisposing public officials to favor some interests at the expense of others (the *indirect* element).

At the intergroup level, when situational and indirect elements of power are put together in the political context, the combination brings to light the situational dependency of official decision makers on one set of participants that prevents other participants from having an equal chance to further their interests through the political process. Beneficiaries of that situational dependency need not have made a conscious effort to create that dependency for political purposes. All that is necessary for that dependency relationship to qualify as part of a power relationship is that some visible gain be allocated to the beneficiary group and that the gain be, at least indirectly, at the expense of some competing group.

To be sure that the various dimensions of power are differentiated, let us trace the recession from direct and open conflict based on active intention. If a business organization contributes money and mounts a successful campaign to defeat a candidate, it is exercising decisional power. This represents an intentional use of resources under conditions of direct conflict to gain a specific objective.

Anticipated reactions differ from decisional power only in that while conflict is direct, it is not overt, but tacit. It arises from the structure of the situation rather than from an open and intentional mobilization of resources. Consider a hypothetical example. Because only the local chamber of commerce is capable of putting together an effective challenge, an incumbent administration interested in running for reelection courts the good favor of the chamber by being attentive to its interests. The mere presence of mobilizable resources produces results because the responding actor (the mayor) wants to avoid sanctions from the superordinate party (the chamber). Consequently, the chamber exercises power without any active effort.

In contrast to the above examples, nondecision making falls into the category of power relationships involving no direct conflict. The point made so forcefully by Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz (1970) is that contending groups exercise power not only to influence the outcomes of specific issues but also to shape the context of decision making and thereby influence how, and even whether, an issue develops. It is important to remember that the superordinate party in nondecision making is not totally passive. We could, for example, observe a chamber of commerce promoting city manager government, or school administrators reinforcing the view that education is nonpolitical. Bear in mind, however, that what is being observed is not a superordinate party exercising power over a subordinate party (hence the power relationship is not one of direct conflict) but rather the superordinate party using resources to influence the context (institutions, procedures, and norms) of community decision making. Nondecision-making power differs from decisional power in that it is not a matter of winning particular decisional struggles but of determining how conflict will be shaped or opposition prevented (Frey, 1971). It is most telling when it so diffuses the conflict relationship that a direct and even tacit confrontation is avoided.

Systemic power differs from nondecision making on the important dimension of intention and situation. That is, like nondecision making, systemic power does not entail a relationship of direct conflict, but, unlike nondecision making, systemic power is *purely situational.* By this I mean both that members of the power relationship may be unaware of the particular consequences of their power position and that they need have made no active effort to build up or defend their power advantage. Systemic power, *as such,* involves no overt attempt to influence the context of decision making. It lies in the *imperatives of the situation* and requires no elite group engaged in changing or maintaining institutions, procedures, or norms. Because its operation is completely impersonal and deeply embedded in the social structure, this form of power can appropriately be termed "systemic."

How, then, can systemic power be studied? The answer is that its consequences can be observed. Like other elements of community power, systemic features impinge on the behavior of official decision makers, and that impingement can be translated into power terms by means of the concept "opportunity costs." As John Harsanyi (1962) has pointed out, if some actors encounter less resistance than others, they must expend fewer resources to achieve their goals—in short, their opportunity costs are lower. Hence their power position is stronger than the position of those actors who have higher opportunity costs. Now we can link that idea directly to systemic power. Because system features predispose officials to favor some interests and to oppose others, those system features lower the opportunity costs for some groups while raising them for others—thereby having an important impact on the community's overall set of power relationships.

The concept of opportunity costs makes it clear why influence is not proportional to the effort expended on political activities. If, for example, one candidate for public office has to make a great effort to be elected and another sails through with an easy campaign, we don't conclude that the first candidate was more powerful because s/he overcame more resistance. It is often the case that the weak must struggle while the strong have only to ask. And if those with few resources encounter official resistance, they may find that they quickly face political bankruptcy. Edward Banfield recounts how Mayor Richard Daley, on assuming office, wrote to three or four of Chicago's major business leaders, "asking them to list the things they thought most needed doing" (1961, p. 251). The poor of Woodlawn, by contrast, had to engage in protests, voter-registration drives, and other highly visible forms of political action to call attention to their concerns. The truly powerful are often able to achieve their aims with little effort whereas those who are less powerful must make a much greater effort to achieve the same results.

A method of analysis that looks only at conflict or even at amount of energy expended politically is therefore likely to concentrate mainly on the struggles of the less powerful to have some influence on decision makers. It would miss systemic power and overlook the advantages that some groups enjoy in the form of favorable predispositions of public officials. Hence we need a conception of power that encompasses more than direct conflict between two actors. Some power relationships are triadic, and that makes indirect conflict possible. The triad we are considering here has public officials at the focal point. Their tendency to cooperate with some interests and resist others is itself an aspect of community power through its effects on the opportunity costs involved in influencing decisions. Bear in mind that the *indirect* power relationship referred to is not between public officials and favored groups, but between favored and unfavored groups. Note also that if this indirect relationship leads to overt conflict, it is not the favored groups but rather public officials (the intervening presence in the triad) who are likely to be the target of discontent.

Community power relationships thus manifest themselves through the behavior of public officials. That is why recruitment patterns are so important. But systemic power refers to something more fundamental even than recruitment. It refers to the circumstance that officeholders (regardless of personal background, nature of electoral support, network of associations, etc.) are, by virtue of their position, more situationally dependent on some interests than others. Because this dependency is inherent in the situation, officials are inescapably predisposed to favor some interests over others.

The tendency for officials to favor some interests at the expense of others can be the result of many factors—overt pressure, anticipated reactions, or a nondecision process, for example. But the central point here is that one source of that tendency is a set of situational dependencies that grow out of the larger socioeconomic system. Because the impact of these dependencies is indirect and because they are not the product of overt and purposive political activity, they are often overlooked. However, systemic features do affect the power positions of competing groups with a stake in community decision making. By employing the notion of opportunity costs, we can see that systemic power does not mean that power is exercised by the system, but rather that *the system affects power relationships in ways that are situational and indirect.*

Social Stratification and Systemic Power

Up to this point, systemic power has been treated abstractly. Now it is time to turn to the palpable inequalities that are part of the larger socioeconomic system, particularly as they relate to the process of community decision making. To make this matter more manageable, we can look to a well-developed body of writing concerned with social stratification. Most studies of stratification treat hierarchical differentiation as having several dimensions (economic, associational and social) and many layers (one or more middle strata as well as upper and lower strata). The separability of dimensions makes analysis possible on something other than a straight ruling-class/subordinate-class basis. However, because the separate dimensions of differentiation are highly intercorrelated, inequalities are likely to be *cumulative* rather than dispersed.

At the same time, stratification bears on the pluralist argument that numbers can counterbalance wealth. Modern systems of stratification tend to be diamond-shaped: a small top stratum, large (and multiple) middle strata, and a relatively small bottom stratum (Matras, 1975, pp. 130—33). The advantage of numbers thus does not accrue to those at the bottom, but rather to the middle strata. The nature and composition of the middle strata are of special importance. They are often the source of change and conflict, variously challenging the dominance of those higher up and resisting upward movement by those at the bottom of the social hierarchy.

Our concern, however, is with a static tendency of social structure, that is, with the relatively stable impact of inequalities in opportunities and resources. Drawing on the literature on stratification, we can differentiate among three major kinds of inequality, each of which fits the diamond-shaped distribution of opportunities and resources and each of which has special relevance to community decision making. While the three facets of socioeconomic inequality discussed here do not exhaust the elements of stratification impinging on community decision making, they serve to highlight systemic power.

1. *Economic position*: The top stratum possesses great wealth *and* command of major economic enterprises; the middle strata have job skills, job entitlements, moderate amounts of personal wealth and property; the bottom stratum is characterized mainly by economic dependency. This distribution has special significance for public decision makers because, as one moves toward the top of the diamond, economic strata are perceived as more strongly revenue-producing, while as one moves toward the bottom of the diamond, economic strata are perceived as more strongly service-demanding. Officials naturally lean in the direction of favoring revenue producers becuase they are essential to institutional maintenance.[1]

2. *Associational position*: The top stratum possesses hierarchical power, that is, command of the resources of major organizations. Moreover, because these organizations are either essentially self-directing hierarchies or small membership-based associations, they have no collective action problem (Olson, 1965). While middle strata

---

[1] It should be noted that local governments are especially dependent on property taxes and they show a particularly strong concern with revenue production because of their place in the federal system. The strategic dependence of local officials on business is thus partly a matter of a market economy and partly a matter of the federal system. On the former, see Lindblom (1977) and Miliband (1969); on the latter, see Peterson (1978).

possess mass power, they are organized for collective action through employment-related and other voluntary associations. These organzations are relatively stable and, as in the case of unions, sometimes enjoy a legally recognized position. They may have sufficient and continuing funding to have a permanent staff, and in this regard may approximate hierarchical power. However, because they are serving a mass base, they face the "law of oligarchy" problem (a disjunction of goals between officials and rank-and-file members). And because they must sometimes mobilize the membership base to be effective, they cannot escape the collective action problem. The bottom stratum, though a less numerous segment of the population, also has mass power. However, it is either organized into unstable and ad hoc voluntary associations or simply not organized at all. When organized, its associations are without permanent staff; and in all cases the problem of collective action is acute.

Associational position requires some explanation. Insofar as organization represents a capacity to mobilize support for or against a decision, it is an element in anticipated reactions (or, if activated, an element in decisional power). In this sense there is substance to the pluralist argument that a numerous mass can counterbalance an elite group. But even in this realm of anticipated reactions, it is important to keep in mind the diamond-shaped distribution. Mass as a counterbalance to elite resources applies, *as an anticipated reaction*, to middle versus upper strata. It does not readily apply to lower versus upper strata. And, in those not infrequent cases of conflict between middle and lower strata, the lower strata seldom enjoy the advantage of numbers (see Shefter, 1977).

Our main concern here, however, is not with anticipated reactions, but with systemic power. There is a parallel with economic position. In the case of economic position, we focused on revenue production, not on the use of wealth in campaign contributions and the like. Campaign contributions can be limited, and the masses can raise large sums through small donations. In this way, the *immediate advantage* of the wealthy few can be overcome. But their *systemic advantage* as major revenue producers would be unaffected. The masses cannot counterbalance this advantage because, as a mass, they are more visible as service demanders than as producers of revenue.

Associational position has a similar facet which constitutes one element of systemic power. Mass power (that is, numbers without organization) isn't useful for aggregating resources in furthering a policy objective. Suppose, for example, that the objective is to upgrade a neighborhood and improve or eliminate substandard housing. Suppose further that the alternative ways of achieving that goal are (1) through the expansion of a medical complex—a use of hierarchical power, or (2) a rehabilitation effort by a large number of small property owners—a use of mass power thus requiring some kind of collective action. Clearly, the first alternative is easier, and public officials would be more inclined to consult and work with a few key organizational officials than with a mass of property owners. Even aside from the ability-to-pay factor (which could be overcome by a subsidy program), an effort that requires mass action is more difficult (and the greater the mass, the greater the difficulty) than one that requires an organization to act. Having differentiated systemic advantage from non-systemic power, we can now draw a general conclusion. The significance of differences in associational position *as a dimension of systemic power* is that, as one moves toward the top of the diamond, associational strata are perceived as possessing a greater capacity to mobilize and sustain resources for goal attainment, while as one moves toward the bottom of the diamond, associational strata are perceived as being more dependent on unsteady forms of collective action.

3. *Social position and life style*: The top stratum (probably most readily identified by level of education and type of skills required in work role) enjoys high esteem and status. Members of this group are self-assured and widely believed to be cosmopolitan, to be concerned with the future, and to have a high sense of civic responsibility and competence. They are also generally perceived to be achievement-oriented. Members of the middle strata are thought to have these characteristics to a limited degree, and they are only moderately esteemed. Those of the bottom strata are not esteemed and are perceived to possess cultural handicaps. They are not self-assured, their goals are seen as immediate and limited, and they are regarded as likely to engage in psychologically protective or escapist behavior (behavior believed to limit their ability to achieve their full potential as productive members of society). The distribution of social status that accompanies these general beliefs and perceptions has special significance for public decision makers because, as one moves toward the top of the diamond, social strata are regarded as not only more admirable but also more interesting and fruitful to work with (upper-status children, for example, are deemed to be more desirable students to teach), while, as one moves toward the bottom of the diamond, social strata are regarded as less admirable and more frustrating and unrewarding to work with. The point is not that public officials are uncompassionate toward the poor. Often they regard the poor as victims of circumstances, but,

even so, officials see members of the lower strata as unlikely to succeed individually and unlikely to contribute collectively to the well-being of the whole community.

The three dimensions of socioeconomic differentiation discussed here enable us to view systemic power in a clearer light. Given the likelihood that public officials, elected and appointed, will want to enhance their own careers and assure the well-being of the organizational units they are affiliated with (cf. Downs, 1967; Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1978), their behavior will be patterned by the system of stratification. Specifically, systemic power grows out of the fact that as officeholders make decisions, they take into account: (1) economic considerations—especially the government's revenue needs; (2) associational considerations—capacities of various groups to engage in and sustain policy and other goal-oriented actions; and (3) social status and life-style considerations—especially as they bear on professional and career accomplishments.

The overall argument here is that upper-strata interests do "exert" extraordinary influence, but that this influence is not usually overt. It flows more from the position they occupy than from the covert action they take. Upper-strata influence *and lower-strata weakness* are traceable to the predispositions that inevitably accompany public office holding in a society characterized by hierarchical differentiations of wealth, organization position, and esteem. These predispositions facilitate the exercise of influence by upper-strata interests (lower their opportunity costs) and thereby enhance upper-strata power.

These predispositions are not identical with the general cultural biases of the society, nor are they direct products of the general process of opinion formation. Instead, they grow out of the pressures particular to officeholding. Because the predispositions that make up systemic power are different from the prevailing consensus on the economic, political, and social order, their impact is most noticeable as one examines the least visible aspects of decision making. In other words, systemic power has greater impact as decisions are further removed from the external pressures of public sentiment and are therefore more exclusively a matter of the internal pressures of officeholding.

Underlying systemic power are these two points: (1) public officeholders want not only to hold office but also to achieve objectives so that the institutions they direct will thrive and their own individual careers will blossom; and (2) as they are engaged in achieving objectives—that is, governing—officeholders are especially mindful of the resources, both cultural and material, possessed by various segments of society. Systemic power—based, as the name suggests, in the system of social stratification—can be contrasted with other, more visible forms of power. Formal political equality, for example, has mainly to do with the election process—a highly public activity. That activity nudges officeholders in the direction of greater responsiveness to all segments of society, but especially to those of the numerous middle strata. By contrast, as we have seen, systemic power has mainly to do with governing and it tilts the political balance toward the upper strata. Thus, while the total community power configuration is influenced by election outcome, the systemic element of that configuration is not.

Examining the Impact of Systemic Power

If systemic power is indeed systemic and not a matter of an elite group exercising power in some observable form, how can it be studied? The question can be answered in two parts. First, the heart of the above argument is that systemic power manifests itself in the behavior of public officials; therefore we need to look at decisional activity (broadly defined). To the extent that systemic power is present, it should result in (a) decisional outcomes that are consistent with the various strategic dependencies of public officials, and (b) patterns of interaction in which those of the upper and lower strata encounter different degrees of resistance from officials. Second, the argument can be used to derive testable propositions. While at this stage there are no studies of decision making keyed specifically to systemic power, it is possible to illustrate how the argument can account for concrete patterns of behavior. The argument does refer to observable regularities in decision making about which there are relevant findings. Let us then turn to the overall argument as a basis for pertinent generalizations.

We started the discussion with the point that public officials might be expected to base their actions on popular acceptability, thus appealing to the most numerous and most interested segments of their constituencies. We also noted that official behavior doesn't always conform to this seemingly reasonable expectation, and the subsequent discussion indicated why public officials are subject to forces other than those emanating directly from the electoral system. Though they are the least numerous segment of the population, members of the upper strata possess resources strategically important to public officials. Public officials thus operate under *dual pressures*—one set based in electoral accountability and the other based in the hierarchical distribution of economic, organizational, and cultural resources.

From this review of the argument, we can see that systemic power enjoys no monopoly; hence its impact will be selective. Two general propositions seem warranted: (1) upper-strata influence is neither comprehensive nor undifferentiated—it is particular to the way in which public officials derive career and institutional benefit; and (2) upper-strata advantage is greatest where popular constraints are weakest.

Let us turn now from these general propositions to a discussion of how systemic power might be concretely manifested. The application of the general proposition about upper-strata influence being neither comprehensive nor undifferentiated requires first a reminder that the system of stratification involves an economic, an associational, and a social (life-style) dimension. The argument here thus differs from the elitist notion that there is a ruling class exercising general dominance. Instead, the systemic power argument holds that the nature of upper-strata advantage and lower-strata disadvantage varies with the dimension of stratification under consideration. The argument here thus offers a possible explanation for some otherwise puzzling findings in the literature on urban politics. Let us consider each of the three dimensions briefly.

Business Influence and the Economic Dimension. Writers such as Domhoff who argue that there is a ruling class run into difficulty when they find that business influence is more pronounced in some areas than others. Domhoff, for example, is unable to explain why business, through manifestly interested in both areas, has so much less influence in governmental reform than in redevelopment (1978, pp. 168-69).

Business influence is embedded in the imperatives of the situation in which local government operates. And business interests prevail not because a ruling-class network promotes probusiness proposals, but because governments are drawn by the nature of underlying economic and revenue-producing conditions to serve those interests (cf. Lindblom, 1977). It is this set of circumstances that constitutes one facet of systemic power. Business influence is therefore greater in a policy area like urban renewal that is related to revenue production than in an area like governmental reform that is unrelated to revenue production. The notion of systemic power developed here therefore accounts for variations in business influence that Domhoff's ideological-dominance thesis cannot explain.

The Power of the Few and the Associational Dimension. As a dimension of systemic power, associational position helps explain what otherwise is a political paradox. One of the recurring conflicts in urban politics is over expansion of institutions such as hospitals and universities into surrounding residential neighborhoods. The behavior of these institutions is easy to explain, but why do local officials cooperate with and promote their expansionist aims? While hospitals and universities provide employment and sometimes upgrade surrounding property, they also take land off the tax rolls—a problem of considerable consequence for many central cities. If the surrounding neighborhood is a slum, city hall support for institutional expansion might be credited to economic considerations—to the removal of a service-demanding and therefore costly population. But how do we explain city hall support for expansion of an institution when the surrounding neighborhood is composed of the tax-paying and vote-casting middle class? The answer surely must lie with the associational aspect of systemic power. Officials want to see change and activity that they can claim a role in. They want to see the institutions in their jurisdictions grow and prosper, and large institutions have the wherewithal and the organization to assure that major projects are executed and that change occurs. Official decision makers have a natural inclination to work with those best able to accomplish visible successes.

In describing an issue involving strong neighborhood opposition to the construction of a new library by New York University, Douglas Yates assesses Mayor Lindsay's decision to support library construction this way:

> In terms of political costs and benefits the Mayor gained support in the nonprofit sector (but few votes) and lost support in a neighborhood whose votes were thought to be very important for any liberal, reform politician running in the city (1977, p. 123).

If elected officials are guided by a desire for popular support, how does a mayor come to choose an alternative that is not only favored by the least numerous side but also opposed by the group that is at the heart of his own electoral coalition? The problem was not one of miscalculation or lack of information; the opposition was too vocal and too intense for its preference to be misunderstood. Pluralism cannot account for this issue outcome. Systemic power, on the other hand, affords a reasonable explanation for why public officials choose courses of action sought by the few but opposed by the many. The few are better positioned to bring off complex projects and achieve tangible goals.

Agency Autonomy Reinterpreted in Light of the Social Dimension. Most studies of urban administration conclude that public service bureaucracies enjoy a high level of autonomy. In the provision of routine services, bureaucratic decision rules seem to be based mainly on internal considerations—administrative convenience, economizing scarce resources, and professional considerations (Mladenka and Antunes, 1976). Many agency operations appear well insulated from external pressures. Even in areas such as public education where citizens are active, community groups don't seem to have much impact. Civil rights groups and their allies, for example, have a long history of achieving apparent concessions only to be frustrated by failures in implementation (Rogers, 1968). Such experiences have engendered a neopluralist interpretation of urban politics, namely, that administrative fragmentation and unmanaged social conflict have given us an "ungovernable city" (Yates, 1977).

Throughout, but especially in the provision of routine services, researchers find little evidence of a class bias in the allocational decision of administrative agencies. Instead they find "unpatterned inequalities" (Lineberry, 1977). Yet while it is clear that class is by no means the only factor at work in service delivery, there is substantial evidence that the client's social position does indeed have an impact. The systemic-power argument directs us to the phase of service delivery where class is a factor.

A puzzling feature of findings about "unpatterned inequalities" and administrative fragmentation is how to account for the higher level of dissatisfaction with service delivery among lower-income and minority groups. Why does level of satisfaction with and trust in government vary with social status? One possible answer is that lower-status groups have a greater need for government services. But there is a more direct way of explaining lower-status attitudes, and this is that lower-status clients are treated differently interpersonally (Clark, 1965).

Much of the unpatterned inequality in service delivery concerns agency decisions about the location of physical facilities, the allocation of dollars, or the frequency of response to service demands. It does not concern the actual behavior of individual service deliverers interacting with clients. It is at this interpersonal level of decision making that a class bias becomes evident, and differences in social position and life style have an impact. One close student of bureaucratic decision rules concludes:

> Street level bureaucrats develop stereotypes which suggest that lower class citizens are less deserving of a service or that attempts to deliver services to them will be unsuccessful. Consequently, the footsoldiers give low priority to delivering services to lower class clients. The result is that although agency decision rules produce "unpatterned inequalities," individual decision rules create "patterned inequalities" (Greene, 1979, pp. 11-12).

Most students of bureaucracy find that professional norms are an important basis for decision rules. But they don't examine closely the political nature of these norms. However, professional norms apply a value framework to clients, and one aspect of that framework is a definition of who is worthy of being served (Greene, 1979, p. 9). Another aspect is a judgment about how professionals should expend their efforts. Career advancement and professional recognition go to those professionals whose clients show visible improvement from treatment or who are "interesting" in some way (Schon, 1970). Professional norms and mores are biased toward those clients with the greatest "potential," and potential is often perceived to be class-related and intergenerationally transmissible. Upper-class clients—whether public school students, mental health patients, juvenile offenders, or library patrons—generally receive the best service and the most highly trained personnel. And, perhaps most important of all, they are the ones treated with the most positive attitudes (Hollingshead and Redlich, 1958; Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968).

Thus, the aspect of systemic power involving social position and life style does account for a significant inequality in service delivery and may well account for some of the dissatisfaction of poor and minority groups with local government. Even though service-providing professionals are largely autonomous, social inequality can enter service delivery through the norms and mores of various occupational groups. Variations in client treatment thus may not be random occurrences nor determined purely by internal agency considerations. Instead, the treatment of clients may be conditioned by the degree of social esteem they enjoy. If so, further research should support the tentative conclusion drawn here—that class bias is more characteristic of the interpersonal and labor-intensive aspects of service delivery than of other areas.

In light of the numerous defenses available to service bureaucracies, their patterns of client interaction are highly resistant to change, and disadvantaged groups find such matters as teacher attitude very hard to alter. Further, as we shall see in the following section, top-level officials have no incentive to reverse class bias in service delivery.

Class Bias in Program Implementation: The "Ungovernable City" Reconsidered. Turning to the matter of fragmentation and government immobility, we need to remember that while the social dimension is separable from the economic and associational dimensions, the three aspects of systmeic power are in fact highly correlated. Those well-off in one regard tend to be well-off in other regards also. What this means is that community decision makers are operating within a common system of stratification. Even though the mayor, the rezoning board, the redevelopment agency, the school system, the transit authority, the planning commission, and the finance department may all have a certain amount of autonomy and room for independent action, they nevertheless share basic predispositions that—if not identical—are at least highly compatible. Thus they may act in concert on many matters, but balk on others—especially those that hold the risk of altering the city's social composition (cf. Peterson, 1976, pp. 173-78).

Local governments are not uniformly immobilized in all areas of policy. They continue to provide a wide range of services, regulate many activities and do so effectively, build huge public works projects, redevelop vast areas, and institute new transportation systems. Immobility is selective. It is most likely to occur when some group presses a demand that runs counter to ingrained system biases described above. Major efforts to upgrade housing for low-income families, to integrate schools, to institute a comprehensive public health program, and to expand economic opportunities for the poor are likely to encounter serious resistance and be abandoned, subverted, or diverted to some other purpose. But efforts to revitalize business districts, expand prestige institutions, and provide amenities to the affluent middle class do not have a poor record of implementation. Of course, no major project is going to proceed without some resistance, but, if the project involves an accommodation of upper-strata interests, it is likely to garner the kind of priority concern by, and continuing attention from, public officials that leads to breaking impasses and circumventing roadblocks. On the other hand, if the project is suspect as being a "magnet for the poor," official support is likely to be lukewarm or short-lived, and resistance may go unchecked (Stone, 1976). Though the many actors in policy making may be autonomous, they share a tendency to favor upper over lower strata. While policy is usually made by the accretion of many small and apparently autonomous decisions, the cumulative impact often has a class bias. Decision making need not be unpatterned just because it is incremental.

Systemic power provides the key to how this may occur. Even where community groups are active, the opportunity costs of overcoming ingrained system resistance are enormous. In his study of more than 10 years of contention over school desegregation, David Rogers concluded: "Civil rights leaders were so demoralized by this time and so tired after their long series of defeats that many of them temporarily retired from the desegregation struggle" (1968, p. 29).

The disadvantage to those who must overcome official resistance compared to the advantage of those who have only to reinforce official inclinations goes far toward explaining how groups otherwise evenly matched in political resources can fare so differently. The systemic power argument offers a plausible explanation for variations of citizen dissatisfaction, distrust, and alienation along class lines; and that explanation seems to fit the facts better than arguments about administrative fragmentation and unpatterned bias. The neo-pluralist argument fails to account for significant variations in implementation success. While class bias is not omnipresent, the systemic power argument enables us to see where and how it might be at work and what effect it might have in the governance of cities.

The Overt Behavior of Political Actors. Thus far the evidence of systemic power has consisted of broad-stroke patterns. It has been argued that systemic power accounts for decision outcomes unaccounted for by either neo-Marxists/neo-Millsians like Domhoff or latter-day pluralists like Yates. The main thrust of my presentation is that systemic power affects policy outcomes in select ways, depending on the particular nature of the systemic advantage enjoyed by the upper strata. We can now turn from decision outcomes to patterns of overt behavior.

To focus more finely on the behavior of decision makers, let us recall the second general proposition: upper-strata advantage is greatest where popular constraints are weakest. Because systemic forces are different from electoral pressures, public officials can be expected to manifest their inner predispositions to favor upper-strata interests when they are least accountable to the general public. Since not all stages of decision making are equally salient to the public, systemic power should be most evident under conditions of low visibility and least evident under conditions of high visibility.

While most studies of decision making don't focus specifically on visibility, the available evidence does correspond with expectations. A study of redevelopment policy in Atlanta traced urban renewal proposals through three stages and found that pro-business demands enjoyed no advantage over pro-neighborhood demands at the highly visible stage of "official disposition." However, at the preliminary stage of screening demands for further consideration—a low-visibility stage of decision making—business enjoyed a wide advantage, and also enjoyed some advantage at the implementation stage—a relatively low-visibility stage of demand processing (Stone, 1976, pp. 190-92). Similarly, business advantage was most evident when controversy was absent, while neighborhood interests fared better under conditions of conflict (Stone, 1976, pp. 193-94; see also Morlock, 1974, p. 324). Patterns of conflict themselves indicated that officials were predisposed to favor business interests; pro-business demands were most likely to encounter opposition after they were under active consideration by officials, but conflict surrounding pro-neighborhood demands was most likely to take the form of community groups trying to overcome official resistance to giving a proposal sympathetic consideration (Stone, 1976, pp. 194-95). Overall, this study uncovered a pattern of behavior in which public officials clearly preferred to advance pro-business demands and did so except when community opposition was intense. Pro-neighborhood proposals received quite different treatment, being advanced mainly only when external pressures on officials were present. In short, opportunity costs varied greatly from one group to the other.

A related pattern of behavior concerns coalition formation. In a complex urban community, political coalitions can be put together in multiple ways, and different kinds of coalitions are formed for different purposes. Electoral coalitions appear to be quite pluralistic. However, once the highly visible election campaign is over, officials display a marked preference for involving upper-strata interests in planning and formulating policy proposals. For instance, a reanalysis of 32 case studies found that business contacts began earlier and took a more intimate (low-visibility) form than did the contacts of other groups with these same public officials (Davis and Weinbaum, 1969, pp. 70-76). Coalition formation in governing, especially the early and low-visibility phase of consultation and support building, thus tends to have a class character not evident in other phases of politics. In a similar vein, there are indications that mayors *elected* with strong lower-strata support nevertheless feel constrained to form policy alliances with business interests (Stokes, 1973). While the evidence at this stage is impressionistic, officials regardless of electoral base appear to be drawn by the unequal distribution of material, organizational, and cultural resources to favor working closely and intimately with the upper strata.

The Observable Impact of Systemic Power: Summary. Systemic power is elusive but not unobservable. By drawing attention to predispositions and related behavior patterns of public officials, the systemic power argument lends itself to the formulation of propositions and helps account for some important aspects of community decision making. While this review of evidence has necessarily been fragmentary, a number of generalizations have been adduced that can be tested further—if not quantitatively, then at least by means of observed regularities in behavior. First, the systemic power argument enables us to account for reported variations in business influence. Because business influence is tied in closely with the revenue-production needs of local government, business influence declines as policy concerns become more remotely related to revenue production. Second, it enables us to account for paradoxical situations in which elected officials side with the few (e.g., hierarchically directed institutions) against the many (e.g., activated groups of citizens). Third, it enables us to account for class bias in service delivery and to pinpoint that bias as most likely to occur in those places where personal interaction is especially important and where subjectively defined client attributes are most pertinent. In addition, it puts fragmented policy making in a new light, suggesting that implementation success varies according to the class character of program benefits. Finally, systemic power, resting as it does on a foundation that has to do with governing rather than winning elections, leads to the conclusion that public officials favor upper-strata interests more strongly in the least visible phases of decision making and that, regardless of patterns of electoral cleavage, officials come to consult closely and informally with upper-strata interests.

Conclusion

The systemic power argument is at heart an argument about the behavior of public officials. They are the most active element in a triadic relationship in which high-strata interests enjoy a power advantage over lower-strata interests. As officials pursue their own interests, being especially mindful of the particular institutions and processes they are part of, they are guided by a set of strategic dependencies that grow out of a stratified socioeconomic system. This contextual force is what throws off the pluralist prediction that electoral competition and administrative fragmentation will yield shifting coalitions and unpatterned biases. The argument here suggests that, in governing, public officials are strongly drawn to the upper strata and their decisions reflect this attraction. Yet the systemic power argument differs from the ruling-class thesis. Systemic power is not a general form of upper-strata dominance through agenda control.

Because the upper strata are strategically advantaged, their extraordinary influence is not so much exercised as it is selectively manifested in the predispositions and behavior of public officials. The argument here can be summarized briefly:

1. While public officials enjoy significant autonomy in decision making, their autonomy is constrained by the fact that they operate in the broad context of a highly stratified socioeconomic system.
2. This system predisposes officials to favor upper- over lower-strata interests.
3. *These predispositions grow out of public office holding itself*; public officeholders are motivated by a desire for career success. For the institutions they are affiliated with to flourish and for their individual careers to advance, officeholders pursue various policy objectives.
4. As officeholders pursue their objectives, the logic of their situation confers advantages on some groups, disadvantages on others. That is, officeholders are predisposed to accommodate some interests while resisting others. In this way, system features lower the opportunity costs for some groups and raise them for others—thereby having an impact on the overall distribution of power.
5. The system attributes that influence the predispositions of officeholders are of at least three kinds: economic, associational and social; and the impact of systemic power varies accordingly with the nature of the policy problem.
6. Systemic power is not absolutely controlling or always overriding; it is most evident in the least visible phases of policy making.
7. While systemic advantage is only a facet of the total community power picture, it has wide-ranging importance. It affects who has intimate access to decision making, which proposals are considered, and how they are promoted.

Public officeholders are predisposed to interact with and to favor those who can reciprocate benefits (cf. Blau, 1964). Thus they respond to dual pressures. Formal democracy conditions the highly visible actions and campaign strategies of public officials so that they are especially responsive to those of the numerous middle strata of society. Actual governing, however, heightens responsiveness to upper-strata interests, especially when policy activities are technically complex or so diffuse in time and place as to involve no single focused dramatic event—that is, where public oversight is least effective.

It should be acknowledged that there are important limitations of the systemic power argument. It is not intended to explain how the present system of stratification came into being. Rather, it focuses on the results of the system—how system features affect power relationships and the pattern of community decision making. The argument does help explain how the system of stratification is maintained. Advantage perpetuates itself. Public officeholders seldom find it feasible to challenge those who hold strategically important resources. As officeholders, their performance is tied closely to a need to cooperate with those who possess material, organizational, and cultural advantages. It is almost always easier to come to terms with the advantaged than to overthrow them. In their innermost selves, public officials may doubt that the system is just or even the best possible, but in their roles as public officials they nevertheless feel impelled to be "realistic" and accommodate to the existing distribution of strategically important resources.

The fragments of empirical evidence examined here suggest that socioeconomic inequalities do affect the behavior of public officials, and, in this way, leave a class imprint on policy decisions. The system of stratification thus seems to undercut the formal equalities of citizenship and put various groups on different political footings. In that way, socioeconomic inequalities become part of the total community power picture.

References

Anton, Thomas J. (1963). "Power, Pluralism, and Local Politics." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 7: 425–57.

Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S. Baratz (1970). *Power and Poverty.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Banfield, Edward C. (1961). *Political Influence.* New York: Free Press.

Blau, Peter (1964). *Exchange and Power in Social Life.* New York: John Wiley.

Clark, Kenneth B. (1965). *Dark Ghetto.* New York: Harper and Row.

Crenson, Matthew A. (1971). *The Un-Politics of Air Pollution.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

Dahl, Robert A. (1961). *Who Governs?* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Davis, Morris, and Marvin G. Weinbaum (1969). *Metropolitan Decision Processes.* Chicago: Rand McNally.

Domhoff, G. William (1977). *Who Really Rules? New Haven and Community Power Reexamined.* New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books.

Downs, Anthony (1967). *Inside Bureaucracy.* Chicago: Little, Brown.

Emerson, Richard M. (1962). "Power-Dependence Relations." *American Sociological Review* 27: 31–40.

Frey, Frederick W. (1962). "Comment: On Issues and Non-Issues in the Study of Power." *American Political Science Review* 65: 1081–1101.

Frohlich, Norman, and Joe A. Oppenheimer (1978). *Modern Political Economy.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Greene, Kenneth R. (1979). "The Impact of Agency and Individual Decision Rules on the Delivery of Urban Services." Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.

Harsanyi, John C. (1962). "The Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two Person Bargaining Games." *Behavioral Science* 7: 67–75.

Hollingshead, August B., and Frederick C. Redlich (1958). *Social Class and Mental Illness.* New York: John Wiley.

Lindblom, Charles A. (1977). *Politics and Markets.* New York: Basic Books.

Lineberry, Robert L. (1977). *Equality and Urban Policy.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.

Long, Norton (1958). "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games." *American Journal of Sociology* 64: 251–61.

Matras, Judah (1975). *Social Inequality, Stratification, and Mobility.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Miliband, Ralph (1969). *The State in Capitalist Society.* New York: Basic Books.

Morlock, Laura L. (1974). "Business Interests, Countervailing Groups and the Balance of Influence in 91 Cities." In Willis D. Hawley and Frederick M. Wirt (eds.), *The Search for Community Power.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, pp. 309–28.

Olson, Mancur (1965). *The Logic of Collective Action.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Oppenheim, Felix E. (1978). " 'Power' Revisited." *Journal of Politics* 40: 598–608.

Peterson, Paul E. (1976). *School Politics Chicago Style.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

______ (1978). "The Politics of Taxation and Expenditure—A Unitary Approach." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York.

Rogers, David (1968). *110 Livingston Street.* New York: Random House.

Rosenthal, Robert, and Lenore Jacobson (1968). *Pygmalion in the Classroom.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Schon, Donald A. (1970). "The Blindness System." *The Public Interest* 18: 25–38.

Shefter, Martin (1977). "New York City's Fiscal Crisis: The Politics of Inflation and Retrenchment." *The Public Interest* 48: 98–127.

Stokes, Carl B. (1973). *Promises of Power.* New York: Simon and Schuster.

Stone, Clarence N. (1976). *Economic Growth and Neiborhood Discontent.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Yates, Douglas (1977). *The Ungovernable City.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

The Urban Bureaucracy and the Chicago Political Machine: Who Gets What and the Limits to Political Control

KENNETH R. MLADENKA
Texas A&M University

It has long been assumed that urban political machines trade services for votes. However, this study of Chicago found no evidence to suggest that the political machine uses vital public services to reward loyal supporters and to punish enemies. With few exceptions, distribution patterns are a function of past decisions, population shifts, technological changes, and reliance upon technical-rational criteria and professional values. The urban bureaucracy is the major actor in the distributional process. Equity in the distribution of resources is accomplished according to formula and is increasingly a by-product of allegiance to professional standards.

It has long been assumed that urban political machines trade services for votes (Wilson, 1960, p. 53). Machines manipulate "specific, material inducements" to maintain power (Banfield and Wilson, 1963, p. 115). Voters are tied to the machine through the provision of a variety of material rewards (Gosnell, 1937). Machine aldermen are primarily concerned with the level and quality of urban services distributed to their constituents (Meyerson and Banfield, 1955, pp. 66, 258; Rakove, 1975, pp. 117–31). According to this perspective, urban services are political resources that can be manipulated, redistributed, and withdrawn in the scramble for electoral advantage. Loyal wards are rewarded with superior services. Major service decisions are made by the machine, handed down to the bureaucracy, and implemented in accordance with a scheme that seeks to wring maximum political advantage from the distribution of finite service resources.

However, recent research reveals that distributional decisions in large cities are made by professional administrators who rely upon technical-rational rather than political criteria to guide distributional choices (Levy et al., 1974; Lineberry, 1977; Jones et al., 1978; Mladenka, 1978; Mladenka and Hill, 1978). Although the use of bureaucratic decision rules may have distributional consequences, resource allocation is little affected by electoral outcomes, income levels, or the racial composition of neighborhoods. The complexity of municipal government requires the services of career specialists who bring professional values to bear during the resolution of distributional issues. The pattern of service distribution can best be understood in terms of the need of public bureaucracies to simplify reality and avoid conflict.

In order to test these competing hypotheses in Chicago, I gathered data on the distribution of several municipal services, including parks and recreation, fire protection, refuse collection, and education. I used several data collection strategies. First, I collected data on the distribution of resources across the 50 wards in the city for each of the four services analyzed,[1] supplementing these indicators of the variation in resource allocation with an analysis of a variety of written materials including departmental records, city codes and ordinances, budgets, capital improvement plans, and proceedings of the city council. I also observed departmental operations. In addition, I interviewed many agency personnel, and arranged follow-up interviews with key

---

Appreciation is expressed to Steve Brooks who conducted the aldermen interviews. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for this journal for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

[1] Aggregate data on Chicago parks and recreation were obtained from the *Table of Parks and Park Facilities* (1967, 1977), while data on fire protection resources were gathered from *Comprehensive Survey of Fire Department Engine and Ladder Company Distribution* (1964); *Chicago Fire Department Operations Study* (1968); *Fire Department Management and Operations Study* (1971); and *Chicago Fire Department Directory* (1970). Additional data were obtained from unpublished records from the office of the Chicago Fire Department Commissioner. Indicators of educational resources were taken from the Chicago Board of Education's *Selected School Characteristics: 1974-1975*. The measures of refuse collection resources were gathered from unpublished records located in the Office of the General Superintendent, Bureau of Sanitation, Department of Streets and Sanitation. These data were verified by consulting the records maintained by the ward superintendents, Bureau of Sanitation.

bureaucrats. Finally, a research assistant interviewed ward aldermen to explore the role of ward politicians in the service distribution process.

Ward Aldermen

The first approach to analyzing the role of the political machine in resource distribution was to interview 31 of the 48 aldermen in the city (two seats were vacant). Several of these interviews reinforced the image of the urban machine as a small band of professional politicians in tight control of service decisions. One alderman observed that "I produce the votes so when I talk I get results." Another noted, "People vote services. I can deliver the vote because I provide my ward with services." Still another alderman maintained that "if you want something you have to use influence. If I need something from the bureaucracy I just tell them there are six voters in that house; . . . get it fixed." These aldermen are disdainful of the notion that the bureaucracy may control the service distribution process and that professional managers rely upon technical-rational criteria to resolve distributional issues. Instead, they are confident of their ability to manipulate the administrative apparatus to secure superior services. Their power stems from their ability to deliver the vote, and they can count on the vote because they provide their constituents with tangible, material rewards.

This perspective is tempered by the responses of another group of Chicago aldermen who suspect that the exercise of power with regard to service distribution is considerably more complex. These aldermen agree that bureaucrats often rely upon technical-rational criteria for distributing resources. Several mentioned that the library department allocates resources to neighborhood branches on the basis of reader levels, while police officers are assigned on the basis of crime rates and calls for service. One alderman observed that his constituents wanted a higher level of police patrol but he knew that the crime rate in his ward wouldn't justify the assignment of additional personnel.

The interviews produced a mixed set of findings. Some aldermen perceive themselves as ward bosses, supremely confident of their power and secure in the knowledge that their relationship with the machine can be readily translated into tangible rewards for their constituents. Who gets what is simply a question of who has influence. Other aldermen believe that it is the bureaucracy that defines the rules that govern distributional choices. They lack the resources necessary to effectively challenge administrative outcomes. They play little role in shaping and monitoring distributional policy either for their ward or for the city as a whole. Technical-rational rather than political considerations are often employed to justify bureaucratic choices about the division of service resources.

The Distribution of Parks and Recreation

In order to assess the distributional pattern for park and recreational services, I gathered data on all city parks in both 1967 and 1977. In addition to acreage, variables for each of the several hundred parks include number and type of recreational facilities, programs, and activities. Each park was identified by ward, and I explored through correlation analysis the relationships between the income, racial, and electoral characteristics of wards and park acreage and facilities.[2] The "All Facilities" variable was formed by summing the total number of facilities at each park. This indicator assigned the same weight to each facility and was insensitive to the variation in major recreational facilities. I limited the "Selected Facilities" variable to major recreational items—swimming pools, athletic fields, golf courses, day camps, playgrounds, and gymnasiums. In addition, I also examined individual correlations between ward characteristics and key recreational facilities.

The analysis revealed that park acreage was equally distributed in the city in 1967. Black and other low-income wards did not receive less acreage than wealthier wards. A different pattern emerged when the other relationships were examined. Parks located in black wards tended to receive fewer facilities. Although the associations were moderate (correlations of -.30 and -.20 between black and "All Facilities" and "Selected Facilities"), the pattern was consistent. This relationship was even more evident when I examined the associations between the measures of wealth and number of facilities. The correlation between family income of wards and "All Facilities" was .52, the association between income and "Selected Facilities" was .43, and the correlation between income and athletic fields was .42.

To determine if and why the distributional pattern changed from 1967 to 1977, I followed a procedure identical to the one employed in analyzing the 1967 data. An examination of the results again revealed an essentially equal distribution of acreage for the 576 parks in the city. Further examination revealed that while parks located in black wards still tended to receive fewer facilities than parks in white wards, this tendency was considerably less pronounced than it was a decade earlier. In 1967, the correlation between the proportion of the ward population which was black and "All Facilities" was -.30, while the association between percent black and "Selected Facilities" was -.20. By 1977, the correlation between percent black and all park facilities had declined to -.13, while the association of percent black and selected recreational facilities was -.01. A similar pattern is noted for the relationship between ward income and the other indicators of recreational resources. The correlation between ward income and selected ward recreational facilities declined from .43 in 1967 to .18 in 1977.

---

[2] The various analyses for each of the services studied are available from the author upon request.

The data do not support the notion that the political machine rewards electorally loyal wards. In fact, the correlations between the Daley vote for mayor in the 1963 and 1967 elections and the distribution of recreational facilities in 1967 were consistently negative. As support for the political machine increased across wards, resource levels decreased. The correlations between the Daley vote in 1963 and the "All Facilities" and "Selected Facilities" variables for 1967 were -.44 and -.38 while the associations between the Daley vote in 1967 and these same measures of recreational resources were -.38 and -.32. A somewhat different pattern emerged when the distributional results for 1977 were examined. The allocation of total and selected recreational facilities tended to be equally distributed on the basis of electoral support, the distribution of swimming pools and gymnasiums favored loyal wards, and park acreage and golf courses were negatively correlated with the vote for the machine. Although the relationship between electoral support and resource allocation changed during the past decade, there is little evidence to suggest that supportive wards were rewarded with preferential service treatment. The analysis also revealed that the geographical distribution of park sites did not vary on the basis of electoral loyalty to the machine.[3]

What factors are responsible for the pattern of service distribution? The evidence argues that past decisions, population movements, and black demands and protests are important determinants for the allocation of parks in Chicago. Many of the large parks in the system were acquired and developed in the last century. Much of the total parkland in the city is accounted for by a handful of giant sites. Decision made many decades ago about where to locate these huge parks and the subsequent movement of the central city population toward, around, and away from them offer the most convincing explanation of the present distribution of park acreage. In the past, decisions as to the location of parks were influenced by the recreational opportunities afforded by the Chicago lakefront and by the need to serve a central city population that was more geographically concentrated than it is today. Now, because of these decisions, in conjunction with population shifts and the limited supply of land available and suitable for further park development, political and administrative authorities are severely restricted in reallocating recreational sites.

These factors do not, however, account for the apparent shift in resource allocation that took place between 1967 and 1977. Why are recreational facilities more evenly distributed today than they were a decade ago? The interview data strongly suggest that local officials responded to black demands and protests by providing black neighborhoods with a greater share of available resources. Black wards primarily gained swimming pools, athletic fields, and playgrounds, while wealthier wards received fewer of these facilities. Distributional policy was apparently more sensitive to group demands and protests than to patterns of electoral support.

The Distribution of Fire Protection Resources

In order to assess the distributional pattern for fire protection, I examined data on the allocation of fire department resources in both 1965 and 1978. Variables included the number of stations per ward, the number of engine and ladder companies assigned to each station, age and condition of stations, and age of equipment. The analysis did not support the hypothesis that wealthier wards were favored in terms of resource allocation in 1965. The correlation between income and number of stations was -.36, while the association between welfare and number of stations was .30. Examination of scatterplots for the principal pairs of variables revealed a nonlinear relationship between the proportion of the ward population which was black and the number of stations. When wards were categorized on the basis of race, it was found that predominantly black wards (80.1-100 percent black) had a considerably greater number of fire stations in 1965 than predominantly white wards (0-10 percent black). Black wards received 2.8 stations were ward, while white wards were allocated only 2 stations. The mixed wards, however (10.1-40 percent black), emerged as the clear winners, receiving twice as many stations per ward as white wards and an average of one more station than black wards. Similarly, white wards were allocated an average of only 2.8 engine and ladder companies per ward, black wards were assigned 3.6 such companies, and mixed wards received 5.4. The geographical distribution of fire stations also favored black and poor wards.[4]

---

[3] Accessibility to park sites was measured by calculating the average of the linear distance from seven points in each ward to various parks. Separate computations were made for four categories of parks; 1-5 acres, 5.1-25 acres, over 25 acres, and any park of at least one acre. The results for 1977 did not support the hypothesis that electorally supportive wards were favored in terms of accessibility to parks. The correlations between the Daley vote in 1975 and distance to the smallest and largest parks were only .03. These correlations were not significant at the .05 level.

Some significant changes in resource distribution took place between 1965 and 1978, when 41 fire stations in the city were closed and 24 new stations were constructed. The 50 wards were classified on the basis of race and each station in 1978 was assigned to the appropriate category. The results of this exercise revealed that although black wards continued to receive a slightly greater number of stations and trucks than white wards, the differences were considerably less pronounced than they were in 1965. In fact, the evidence suggested a basically equal level of resources in predominantly white and black wards. However, mixed wards again emerged as the winners in the distributional process. These wards received one and a half more stations and two more engine and ladder trucks per ward than white wards.

What factors determined the pattern of resource allocation for fire protection services in 1965 and 1978? I will again reject the electoral explanation of resource allocation and argue that distributional policy within the Chicago Fire Department was largely a function of historical developments, population shifts, a series of unique events, and the triumph of professional values. Although dramatic population shifts occurred after 1930, the fire station network was largely complete by that time. Only 9 percent of the stations in the city in 1965 had been constructed between 1950 and 1965 and only one out of four had been built after 1930. Not only was the early development of the fire protection system heavily influenced by the need to accommodate a geographically concentrated population, but also it was affected by prevailing firefighting technologies. Not until 1923 was horse-drawn equipment completely phased out of the system and replaced by motorized vehicles. Reliance on the horse required that fire stations be located at relatively short distances from each other. As modern equipment replaced animals, these motorized vehicles were housed in stations designed to reflect the limitations of turn-of-the-century technology. The outcome of these developments was a heavy concentration of fire stations in inner-city wards. The two Chicago stockyards fires of 1910 and 1934 also profoundly influenced distributional decision making. These fires and the probability of more left a deep and lasting imprint on the distributional pattern. In 1965 there were still 6 fire stations within a half-mile of the abandoned stockyards, 8 within a mile, and 17 within two miles.

The distributional pattern that existed in 1965 can be attributed in large part to a failure to adapt to technological changes, to only a limited reshaping of the system in response to the geographic dispersal of the inner-city population, and to a preoccupation with the old Chicago stockyards. Although racially mixed wards contained more fire stations in 1965, the evidence does not support the hypothesis that they were rewarded with preferential treatment in return for consistent electoral support. Instead, these wards received higher resource levels because they included within their boundaries both the inner city and the old stockyards.

The distributional changes that occurred between 1965 and 1978 can be largely attributed to the recommendations made by a private management consulting firm. Professional administrators were sensitive to the obsolescence of the system and hired the National Loss Control Service Corporation to document inadequacies and offer specific recommendations. In a series of reports issued in 1964, 1968, and 1971, the firm criticized the excessive protection provided the inner city and the inadequate protection for outlying sections of the city. Using guidelines established by the National Board of Fire Underwriters, the firm conducted several hundred tests in various commercial, industrial, and residential areas of the city to determine an "optimum distribution of resources." The reallocation that occurred in the city between 1965 and 1978 can be attributed to the specific suggestions contained in the management reports. The service distribution process in the Chicago Fire Department during the sixties and seventies was dominated not by machine politicians bent on maximizing electoral advantage but by reliance on technical-rational criteria. The aggregate analysis, examination of written documents, and interviews with both bureaucrats and ward aldermen reinforce the conclusion that redistribution was little affected by the urban machine.

---

[4] The geographical distribution of fire stations was determined by calculating the average of the linear distance from seven points in each ward to the nearest station. Black and poor wards were closer to the nearest fire stations in 1965 than wealthier wards. The correlation between percent welfare and distance was -.44, while the association between income and distance was .56.

The Distribution of Educational Resources

Education is the third major service to be analyzed. I gathered data on each of the 599 public schools in the the city (491 elementary, 40 middle, and 68 high schools) for the year 1974-75. Variables for each school included racial composition of the student body, age of the physical plant, number of teachers, counselors and librarians, staffing costs per pupil, teacher experience, teacher qualifications, number of foreign languages offered, and number of special educational programs. Correlational analysis was employed to examine the relationships between the minority composition of the student body (percent black, Mexican-American, Puerto Rican) and educational resources for elementary and high schools.

The results for elementary schools were mixed. Teacher/pupil ratios were equally distributed, while the associations between percent minority students and both age of school and staffing costs per pupil were weak (correlation of -.10 between percent minority and staffing costs). Minority schools were favored in terms of number of special educational programs, while white schools received both the most experienced and best-educated teachers (correlation of -.54 between percent minority students teachers with the M.A. plus advanced work). The 491 elementary schools in the system were then classified into four categories on the basis of the minority composition of the student body, and the average values for the various indicators of educational resources were determined for each category of schools. Predominantly white schools tended to receive the highest resource levels. Although minority schools (50.1-80 percent minority) ranked first on teacher/pupil ratios, white schools spent most on staffing and were assigned the most experienced and best-educated teachers. White schools spent an average of $703 per student for staffing, as op-posed to $688 in 50.1-80 percent minority schools and $671 in 80.1-100 percent minority schools. In white schools, 74 percent of the teachers had six or more years' experience, and 35 percent had masters' degrees or an M.A. plus advanced work, while the corresponding percentages for teachers' experience and education in heavily minority schools were only 56 percent and 22 percent, respectively.

For high schools, the pattern of resource allocation again favored white students. Although teacher/pupil ratios were slightly lower in minority schools (-.10), minority schools had lower staffing expenditures (-.20), less experienced teachers (correlation of -.80 between minority students and teachers with 13 or more years' experience), and fewer teachers with advanced degrees. White schools spent $48 more per student than black schools, while 54 percent of the teachers in white schools had a masters' degree, as opposed to only 32 percent in black schools.

What factors account for the variations in the distribution of educational resources? Again, I am forced to reject a political explanation of service distribution. Teacher/pupil ratios in the Chicago public school system are determined by bureaucrats who rely upon a complex formula to ensure that these ratios are identical across schools. Variations in the distribution of staffing costs, teacher experience, and teacher training are also a function of bureaucratic rules. Teacher assignment policy is highly decentralized. Transfer requests within the Chicago public school system are granted largely on the basis of seniority. White schools have the most experienced faculty because, when given the choice, teachers prefer to work in white schools. Transfer policy also determines the distribution of staffing costs and teacher qualifications. More experienced teachers also tend to be the best educated and teacher salaries are determined by experience and education.

The Distribution of Refuse Collection Services

The primary measure of the distribution of refuse collection resources was the total number of refuse trucks assigned to each ward on a weekly basis. I gathered these data for each of the 50 wards and explored the relationships between ward characteristics and the number of assigned vehicles through correlation analysis. An examination of the data revealed that black and other low-income wards were assigned fewer trucks than wealthy wards. The correlation between the proportion of the ward population-which was black and the number of vehicles was -.32, while the association between ward income and trucks was .51. Is the relationship between race, income, and number of trucks spurious? The evidence suggests that it is. When the effects of the level of home ownership were held constant, the correlation between percent black and number of trucks declined from -.32 to -.07, while the association between welfare and trucks dropped from -.53 to -.18. When the racial variable was controlled, the correlation between home ownership and trucks remained a strong .84; when the welfare variable was controlled, the association between home ownership and the dependent variable was .79; and when the effects of the income variable were held constant, the correlation between ownership and number of vehicles was .82.

A large number of interviews with administrators at both the bureau and ward level provide strong support for the finding that refuse collection resources are allocated on the basis of the level of home ownership in a ward. In addition, the distributional pattern is affected by the distance to be travelled between pickups and the amount of refuse generated per ward. It should be noted, however, that these policies do not operate to the exclusive advantage of white, wealthy wards. For example, 10 of the 26 predominantly white wards have below the citywide average number of vehicles, while 2 of the 3 wards which are 40.1-80 percent black and 3 of the 12 wards 80.1-100 percent black have above the city average. Similar variation characterizes the pattern of resource distribution when wards are classified on the basis of income. Six of the 14 low-income wards have more than the citywide average number of trucks, while 11 of the 24 middle-income and 3 of the 12 upper-income wards are assigned a below-average number. These differences in the number of assigned vehicles can be largely accounted for by the variation in the ward distribution of home ownership.

Refuse collection resources are distributed on the basis of owner-occupied housing because a city ordinance prohibits collection from multifamily dwellings containing 5 or more apartments. An examination of city codes revealed that the ordinance limiting refuse collection was in operation as early as 1911. That ordinance has survived in basically unaltered form until the present and continues to guide the distribution of refuse collection services. Why was the ordinance adopted? During the nineteenth and part of the twentieth century, coal was the major fuel source. The use of coal enormously complicated refuse collection. Large tenement buildings generated tons of coal cinders. Collection problems were particularly severe during the winter months when huge cinder heaps froze and picks were required to break them apart before loading. It was not until 1940 that motorized vehicles replaced the horse-drawn garbage wagon in Chicago. Rather than increase manpower levels to deal with the problems associated with the use of coal, the city council opted for excluding large multi-family structures from collection. Gas and oil have long since replaced coal as heating fuels. Nonetheless, residents of low-income tenements as well as occupants of apartments, high-rise buildings, townhouses, and condominiums continue to bear the costs of refuse collection themselves.

Whether Chicago citizens are entitled to have garbage picked up by city government is determined not by their loyal support of the political machine but by the type of housing they occupy. Distributional outcomes are the legacy of policies made many decades ago and designed to address conditions that no longer exist.

Conclusion

My analysis of resource distribution in Chicago provides little support for the hypothesis that urban services are used by the political machine to reward loyal supporters and to punish enemies. There is no evidence that the pattern of service distribution in the city is a consequence of rational political calculations about who should win and who should lose in the struggle over finite resources. Instead, distributional outcomes are largely a function of past decisions, population shifts, technological changes, and reliance upon technical-rational criteria and professional values. The allocation of park facilities in 1977 provides the only exception to this pattern. Even in that instance, however, distributional policy was more sensitive to black demands and protests than to the vote. What Levy et al. (1974) discovered for Oakland, what Lineberry (1977) found for San Antonio, what Jones et al. (1978) reported for Detroit, and what Mladenka and Hill (1978) discovered for Houston applies to Chicago as well. Distributional decision making is routinized and largely devoid of explicit political content. Although Nivola (1978) offers a different explanation of the determinants of the distributional pattern in Boston, he also found that bureaucrats control distributional outcomes.

However, it would be misleading to conclude that all urban services are distributed on the basis of organizational routines. Several factors distinguish the service bureaucracies analyzed in this study. First, these urban bureaucracies lack well-defined constituencies and clientele groups. Second, the resource measures considered in this article (parks, fire stations) limit the opportunities for discretionary behavior in distributional decision making. Finally, these bureaucracies differ from the classic street-level organization. The services delivered at the neighborhood level by "street-level bureaucrats" (policemen, welfare workers, housing inspectors) are unlikely to be governed by organizational rules that insure predictable behavior. The severe limitations on the ability of administrators to control the behavior of these bureaucrats has been well documented (Wilson, 1968; Lipsky, 1976). In fact, Nivola analyzed the distribution of services within a street-level organization and concluded that housing inspection outcomes in Boston were a consequence of "technical difficulties, patterns of bureaucratic discretion, and problems of control within the housing inspection department itself" (1978, p. 70).

Although the determinants of distributional outcomes vary across types of bureaucracies, it is significant that distributiuonal patterns in both reformed and machine cities are little affected by voter choices or elected officials. Organizational rules and unanticipated events and developments provide a better explanation of who gets what than any combination of distinctly political and electoral variables.

References

Banfield, Edward C., and James Q. Wilson (1963). *City Politics*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press and the MIT Press.

Chicago Fire Department Directory (1979). City of Chicago.

Chicago Fire Department Operations Study (1968). City of Chicago.

Comprehensive Survey of Fire Department Engine and Ladder Company Distribution (1964). City of Chicago.

Fire Department Management and Operations Study (1971). City of Chicago.

Gosnell, Harold F. (1937). *Machine Politics: Chicago Model*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Jones, Bryan D., Saadia R. Greenberg, Clifford Kaufman, and Joseph Drew (1978). "Service Delivery Rules and the Distribution of Local Government Services: Three Detroit Bureaucracies." *Journal of Politics* 40: 334–68.

Levy, Frank S., Arnold J. Meltsner, and Aaron Wildavsky (1974). *Urban Outcomes*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lineberry, Robert L. (1977). *Equality and Urban Policy*. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Lipsky, Michael (1976). "Toward a Theory of Street

Table 1. Summary of Zero-Order Correlations between Chicago Ward Characteristics and Service Distribution Variables

Demographic and Electoral Variables for Wards	All Park Facilities, 1967	Selected Park Facilities, 1967	All Park Facilities, 1977	Selected Park Facilities, 1977	Distance to Largest Parks, 1977
Percent Black	–.30	–.20	–.13	–.01	–.27
Percent Spanish	–.19	–.18	.12	–.15	–.10
Family Income	.52	.43	.35	.18	.48
Percent Welfare	–.37	–.29	–.18	–.03	–.32
Percent Home Ownership	.54	.52	.50	.41	.61
Daley Vote, 1963	–.44	–.38			
Daley Vote, 1967	–.38	–.32			
Daley Vote, 1971			–.03	.09	0
Daley Vote, 1975			–.01	.14	.03

Demographic and Electoral Variables for Wards	No. of Fire Stations, 1965	Distance to Fire Stations, 1965	No. of Fire Stations, 1978	Distance to Fire Stations, 1978	No. of Refuse Collection Vehicles, 1977
Percent Black	.12	–.23	–.05	–.19	–.32
Percent Spanish	.23	–.23	.30	–.04	.05
Family Income	–.36	.56	–.16	.44	.51
Percent Welfare	.30	–.44	.07	–.39	–.53
Percent Home Ownership	–.23	.71	–.24	.56	.85
Daley Vote, 1963	.31	–.56			
Daley Vote, 1967	.40	–.52			
Daley Vote, 1971			.01	–.10	.29
Daley Vote, 1975			–.01	–.05	.32

Source: Aggregate data on parks and recreation were obtained from the 1967 and 1977 editions of the series entitled *Tables of Parks and Park Facilities* (Chicago Park District), while data on fire protection resources were gathered from the following reports published by the city of Chicago: *Comprehensive Survey of Fire Department Engine and Ladder Company Distribution; Chicago Fire Department Operations Study; Fire Department Management and Operations Study;* and *Chicago Fire Department Directory*. Additional data were obtained from unpublished records located in the Office of the Commissioner, Chicago Fire Department. Indicators of educational resources were taken from *Selected School Characteristics: 1974–1975* (Chicago Board of Education, 1975). The measures of refuse collection resources were gathered from unpublished records located in the Office of the General Superintendent, Bureau of Sanitation, Department of Streets and Sanitation. These data were verified by consulting the records maintained by the ward superintendents, Bureau of Sanitation.

Note: The strength of several of these relationships declines when controls are introduced.

Level Bureaucracy." In Willis D. Hawley and Michael Lipsky (eds.), *Theoretical Perspectives on Urban Politics*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, pp. 196–213.

Meyerson, Martin, and Edward C. Banfield (1955). *Politics, Planning and the Public Interest*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.

Mladenka, Kenneth R. (1978). "Organizational Rules, Service Equality, and Distributional Decisions in Urban Politics." *Social Science Quarterly* 59: 192–201.

______, and Kim Q. Hill (1978). "The Distribution of Urban Police Services." *Journal of Politics* 40: 112–33.

Nivola, Pietro S. (1978). "Distributing a Municipal Service: A Case Study of Housing Inspection." *Journal of Politics* 40: 59–81.

Rakove, Milton L. (1975). *Don't Make No Waves, Don't Back No Losers*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Selected School Characteristics: 1974–1975 (1975). Chicago Board of Education.

Table of Parks and Park Facilities (1967, 1977). Chicago Park District.

Wilson, James Q. (1960). *Negro Politics*. New York: Free Press.

______ (1968). *Varieties of Police Behavior*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Urban Policy: Does Political Structure Matter?

DAVID R. MORGAN
JOHN P. PELISSERO
University of Oklahoma

An interrupted time-series quasi-experiment is employed to test the basic hypothesis that reformed cities (with city manager, at-large elections, and nonpartisan ballots) tax and spend less than unreformed communities. Eleven cities with populations of 25,000 and above which significantly changed their political structure between 1948 and 1973 are compared with 11 matched control cities that made no changes. We found that over an 11-year period, variations in fiscal behavior were virtually unaffected by changes in city government structure.

Among scholars of state and local government, the question is still debated: do politics and governmental structure have any independent influence on policies? Although much state-level research suggests the answer is clearly yes, considerably less agreement exists for the local level. Most research directed toward this issue at the urban level has probed the political effects of reformed institutions. Presumably urban reformers, who sought to replace the political machine with good government devices, sought certain policy goals as well. Just what those goals were and how successful these groups have been in acheiving them remains unsettled. Some argue that one of the consequences of the reform movement's "public-regarding" ethos was to provide greater support for spending on community-wide public improvements. Others disagree. They contend that cities with reform institutions tend to be less responsive to their socioeconomic environments, which presumably causes such municipalities to be less sensitive to the higher spending demands of lower-income and minority interests. The result, according to the latter argument—lower levels of taxing and spending. Thus the issue for local government remains unsettled.

The argument over the political consequences of urban reform has been clouded by several methodological disputes. One of the most important relates to time order. For example, Lineberry AND Fowler (1967, p. 707) insist that one well-known analysis of the reform movement's effect on city government structure (Wolfinger and Field, 1966) is flawed in a causal sense because obvious time order assumptions are violated; independent variables (census data) are used to explain decisions (government structure) made at an earlier period. Yet none of the research on this topic systematically includes a time element; it has all been cross-sectional in design. The research reported here offers a different approach—a time-series analysis—in an effort to shed further light on this basic question.

Public Policy Implications of Municipal Reform

One of the most pervasive themes concerning the effect of municipal reforms derives from the public-regarding thesis first proffered by Banfield and Wilson (1963; p. 46). According to these authors, certain subcultural groups within the city, constituted on ethnic and income lines, sought a more rational, efficient, and honest city government. These groups presumably based their political preferences on some conception of the public interest as a whole in contrast to a more narrow ward or neighborhood orientation. As a principal means of promoting these goals, such public-regarding groups pushed the "good government" agenda of municipal reforms. Such institutional arrangements as council-manager government, nonpartisan ballots, and at-large elections seem entirely consistent with the commitment of these groups to minimizing partisanship and particularism in favor of the universal values of the larger community.

The public-regarding ethos had other political results as well. A concern for the larger whole, according to Banfield and Wilson, might lead to support for various community-wide projects and improvements. Indeed, Wilson and Banfield (1964) show that certain putatively public-regarding groups tended to vote against their self-interest, narrowly conceived, in favor of expenditure proposals that would raise their taxes. Others (Boskoff and Zeigler, 1964, pp. 46-47;

We would like to acknowledge Richard Bingham, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, for suggesting the need for a study of this sort. Robert England deserves special thanks for his valuable assistance in managing and processing the data. Bruce Kennedy helped with the data gathering and coding as well. Finally, we are greatly indebted to Kenneth J. Meier, University of Oklahoma, whose methodological help has been invaluable.

Uyeki, 1966) find a similar association between upper-status groups and support for bond elections for municipal improvements. Thus the causal sequence is complete—an upper-middle class public-regarding ethic should yield two results—municipal reforms *and* greater expenditures for public improvements.

This line of reasoning has not been so obvious to many. In fact, the whole public-regarding ethos has been rather severely challenged. Hennessey (1970) avers that the approach is not a genuine theory and, further, that it was tested with aggregate voting statistics although it was clearly applicable only to individual voting behavior. Others have failed to find evidence to sustain the ethos hypothesis (Wolfinger and Field, 1966; Bowman, Ippolito, and Levin, 1972; Duran, 1972). Miller and Bennett (1974) even insist that a subsequent effort at revisiting the ethos formulation by Wilson and Banfield (1971) contains a serious methodological flaw that disproves the whole concept.

Despite the problems associated with the ethos notion, the most widely referenced study on the effects of reforms on city fiscal behavior begins with that premise. Lineberry and Fowler (1967) argue that reformers were especially hostile to the political machine's attempt to capitalize on community cleavages—class, ethnic, racial, or religious. Reforms were presumably desired as a way of insulating municipal governments from such divisive social forces. One of their basic purposes was to determine if indeed reform governments responded differently from nonreformed governments to their socioeconomic environment. Their analysis of tax and expenditure burdens in cities of 50,000 and over confirms this expectation. Socioeconomic variables were much more closely associated with taxing and spending in unreformed than in reformed cities.[1] But what about tax and expenditure levels? Contrary to the public-regarding view, reform cities had *lower* tax and expenditure burdens. They infer from this finding that reformed institutions indeed do maximize the power of the middle class, but that group apparently wants less, not more, public spending.

This finding that reforms produce lower spending commitments is not inconsistent with another body of thought regarding the goals of municipal reformers. Hays (1964) contends that the municipal reform movement was dominated by the upper class with extensive support from business organizations. Such groups, who had little need for high-priced social programs, were primarily interested in having traditional housekeeping services economically provided. Business-oriented reformers were also eager to create a favorable climate for profit-making in the city, providing another motive for municipal efficiency (Judd, 1979, pp. 111-12). According to this reasoning, reform structures should lead to lower levels of taxing and spending, just as Lineberry and Fowler (1967) and others find (Lyons, 1978).

Finally, some contend that reforms make no real policy differences. Presumably, both structure and policy are the result of the same antecedent influences, either region (Wolfinger and Field, 1966; Cole, 1971) or the socioeconomic characteristics of the community (Hawkins, 1971, Ch. 3).

In sum, despite the provocative public-regarding thesis, most research suggests that municipal reforms should either reduce taxing or spending or have little noticeable effect. As indicated above, all these studies, regardless of their findings, have been cross-sectional in design. Or at least changes in government structure over time have not been examined for their possible effect on policy variations. No attempt has been made to assess policy changes among cities that have altered their government institutions. Surely the debate over the potential policy consequences of the local political system should not be settled solely on the basis of cross-sectional findings. We need to consider what happens to certain municipal policies over a period of time when a city changes its basic political structure.

Research Design

We employ a quasi-experimental time-series design (Campbell and Stanley, 1966; pp. 55-57) to test the policy effects of municipal reform. Two groups of cities are required, one in which a change takes place and a comparable group not undergoing the experimental change from which similar "control" time-series data can be gathered. The design not only controls for virtually all the customarily identified threats to internal validity, but also it readily lends itself to public policy applications (see Meier, forthcoming).

In this analysis, government structure

---

[1] In fact, Wright (1976) has challenged Lineberry and Fowler's conclusion, arguing that their research is flawed because correlation coefficients are used in comparing groups of cities. He insists the proper comparison is between unstandardized regression coefficients. When Wright further tests the Lineberry and Fowler thesis using a multiple regression model in which the slope of each SES variable is allowed to vary within each category of reform, he finds no support for their position. "None of the SES variables becomes systematically less strongly related to policy outputs as reformism increases" (p. 369).

represented by the elements of reform (city manager, at-large representation, nonpartisan elections) serves as the independent variable. Among cities with populations of 25,000 and above, eight cities were found that changed a *completely unreformed* structure to a totally reformed government during a single year between 1948 and 1973. Another three cities were found that began with all of the reform elements and dropped at least two of these in a single year.[2] Apparently only one city, since 1950, has dropped all three reform elements in a single year. A second group of eleven cities, which began with the same form of government and maintained this structure, were matched to specific cities in the first group. Cities that experienced a change in government structure constitute the "experimental" group and those cities that did not become the "control" or "match" group. Table 1 includes both groups of cities, the year of structural change for the experimental cities, and the structural components.

A brief comment should be made regarding the matching procedure. The following criteria were employed to select the matching cities: (1) a comparable form of government with the experimental city before the change; (2) similar economic base; (3) a similarity in one of the dependent variables, per capita general revenue. Matching by both economic base and per capita general revenue should minimize the possibility that observed changes in fiscal behavior over time might result from differing socioeconomic characteristics between the pairs of cities. One additional important characteristic of our cities should be noted—functional responsibility. Differences in spending assignments among cities must be considered when expenditures are analyzed. This is particularly true for schools and welfare, since these two very expensive activities can account for about half the variation in *total* general municipal expenditures (Liebert, 1974, pp. 771-72). Our experimental and control cities are perfectly congruent on school and welfare responsibilities.

The time-series analysis includes an examination of 7 revenue and expenditure variables over an 11-year period—the year of change and 5 years before and after that intervention. The dependent variables consist of per capita measures of (1) general revenue, (2) general expenditures, (3) police expenditures, (4) fire expenditures, (5) highway expenditures, (6) sanitation expenditures, and (7) parks and recreation expenditures.[3] We would prefer to have additional measures that could be used to assess differences in spending for social programs, but our fiscal measures represent all such data of any consequence consistently available from the Census Bureau over the past several decades.

Findings

Although results of an interrupted time-series design are often displayed graphically, visual examination may be inconslusive. Thus it is necessary to test for the effects of the intervention statistically. McCain and McCleary (1979) offer a method for performing an ordinary regression that estimates the parameters for the initial level of spending, the slope (spending trend over time), change in level, and change in slope (both potentially resulting from the intervention). These potential effects can be represented with the following regression equation:

$$\hat{Y}_t = a_1 + b_1 X_{1t} + b_2 X_{2t} + b_3 X_{3t} + e_t.$$

In this equation the independent variable X_{1t} is a linear measure of time such that X_{1t} equals 1, 2, 3, . . . , N. The parameter b_1 is the *slope* of the series. X_{2t} is a dummy variable where $X_{2t} = 0$ before the reform change and $X_{2t} = 1$ after the intervention. The parameter b_2 thus represents the *alteration* in *level* (intercept) following reform change. Variable X_{3t} *is also a dummy "counter*-variable" where $X_{3t} = 0$ before the intervention and $X_{3t} = X_{1t}$ after the intervention (i.e., 1, 2, 3 . . .). The parameter b_3 represents the post-intervention *change* in *slope*. If the parameters b_2 and b_3 are not statistically significant,[4] we may accept the null hypothesis that reform interventions produced no effect. In the opposite case, if these two parameters are significant, we must then look for autocorrelation before we may assume that reforms made a difference. Note that the formula to be used consists of only the three time-related variables; no measures of the social and economic characteristics of the cities are included. Omission of the usual socioeconomic variables appears justified for three reasons. Assuming the match is well done, the pairs of cities should be similar in certain fundamental ways. Second, as the subsequent analysis will reveal, the level of explained variance for almost all the equations is so high that any additional independent variables would add virtually no explanation. Finally, with an *N*

---

[2] Although the decision to treat municipal reforms as additive is debatable (see Lyons, 1977), Bryant (1976) has shown that the three customarily used items (with commission form considered as a reform structure) do meet the .90 criterion for a Guttman scale using all cities having populations of 25,000 and over.

[3] Data sources for these variables include U.S. Bureau of the Census, *City Government Finances* (1945-1978); International City Management Association, *Municipal Year Book* (1945-1978); and the Rand McNally *Commercial Atlas and Marketing Guide* (1945-1978), which provided estimates of city populations for use in calculating the per capita measures for non-census periods. Capital outlays have been removed from all expenditures where the data permit, i.e., general expenditures and highways (capital expenditures could not be excluded, however, for any of the 1940s data). Where the breakdown was available (since 1960), sanitation expenditures do not include sewerage.

[4] Although tests of statistical significance are not strictly applicable to data representing a total population, such tests are commonly employed as a way of depicting "sizable" relationships. Because of the small number of time points in the analysis and the need to emphasize changes that are more than minimal, only those changes in the intercept and slope that reach the .01 level of significance are reported.

Table 1. Experimental and Control Cities, Government Structure and Economic Base ($N = 22$)

A. Experimental	Year of Change[a]	Economic Base[b]	Government Structure[c] *Before* Change	Government Structure[c] *After* Change	Net Change[d]
1. Council Bluffs, Iowa	1951	T	MC–M–P	CM–A–NP	+3
2. Peoria, Illinois	1954	Mr	MC–W–P	CM–A–NP	+3
3. Rock Island, Illinois	1954	Mm	MC–W–P	CM–A–NP	+3
4. Brockton, Massachusetts	1958	Mm	MC–M–P	CM–A–NP	+3
5. Huntington, West Virginia	1958	Mr	MC–M–P	CM–A–NP	+3
6. Little Rock, Arkansas	1958	Rm	MC–W–P	CM–A–NP	+3
7. Independence, Missouri	1962	Rm	MC–W–P	CM–M–NP	+3
8. Great Falls, Montana	1973	Rr	MC–W–P	CM–A–NP	+3
9. Worcester, Massachusetts	1950	Mm	CM–A–NP	MC–W–P	–3
10. Kenosha, Wisconsin	1958	Mm	CM–A–NP	MC–W–NP	–2
11. Brockton, Massachusetts	1962	Mm	CM–A–NP	MC–M–NP	–2

B. Control	Economic Base[b]	Government Structure[e]
1. Davenport, Iowa	Rm	MC–M–P
2. Terre Haute, Indiana	Mr	MC–M–P
3. Muncie, Indiana	Mm	MC–M–P
4. Cranston, Rhode Island	Mm	MC–W–P
5. Hammond, Indiana	M	MC–M–P
6. Charleston, West Virginia	Rr	MC–M–P
7. Berwyn, Illinois	Rr	MC–W–P
8. Billings, Montana	Rr	MC–W–P
9. Hartford, Connecticut	M	CM–A–NP
10. Clifton, New Jersey	Mm	CM–A–NP
11. Lowell, Massachusetts	Mm	CM–A–NP

Source: International City Management Association, *Municipal Year Book* (1945–1978), Washington, D.C.

[a] First year city altered government structure.

[b] Cities classified according to employment patterns, as follows:

T =Transportation center (25 percent or more reported transportation as occupation)
Mm =Manufacturing city (50 percent employed in manufacturing)
Mr =Diversified city (employment in manufacturing dominant but less than 50 percent)
Rr =Retail trade city (retail employment is greater than that in wholesale trade, service, or manufacturing)
Rm =Diversified city (retail employment dominant, manufacturing employment at least 20 percent)

[c] Form of government, representation, and ballot type, as follows:

CM =City manager form
MC =Mayor-council form
A =At-large representation
W =Representation by ward or district
NP =Nonpartisan ballot
P =Partisan ballot

[d] Number of *reform* elements present after change.

[e] Constant structural arrangements during the period analyzed.

of 11 (time points), adding more explanatory variables runs the risk of overdetermining the equation and exhausting the needed degrees of freedom.

Here we should note that the dependent variables in the analysis to follow are mean figures for cities grouped into four categories—more reformed experimental cities ($N = 8$), less reformed experimental cities ($N = 3$), and the two groups of control cities. This averaging process permits us to report far fewer equations and has the additional advantage of smoothing out any potential abrupt changes in spending peculiar to a given municipality.[5] Nonetheless, as an additional precaution, a separate time-series analysis was undertaken for each individual city, the results of which are summarized below.

The results of the initial analysis are found in Table 2. The regression coefficients are shown for each variable along with the degree of statistical significance for each and the level of explained variance (R^2) for the equation. Our first concern is to determine how many statistically significant relationships exist for variables 2 (intercept) and 3 (slope). In fact, few significant differences are found for the two variables. For the total of 28 equations only 9 reflect statistical significance at the .01 level for either variable 2 or 3. More than this only 4 of these 9 equations show statistical significance for those cities undergoing structural change. Otherwise all significant changes are for control cities. As with any time series, our results must also be tested for autocorrelation. If serial correlation is present, the differences between the pre-intervention and post-intervention period is likely to be overstated (Ostrom, 1978, p. 29). We might thus conclude in our case that reforms made a difference when in fact they did not. Our test is made using a procedure developed by Pack (1977), which is actually the first step in the Box-Jenkins (1970) method for identifying autocorrelation. If the Q statistic produced by the test, shown in Table 2, is not significant (using a chi-square distribution), no autocorrelation exists.[6] Using the less demanding .05 level, only one of the nine significant intercepts and slopes reflects autocorrelation. Since the autocorrelation is for a control group, we may safely ignore it; it will not affect our basic hypothesis concerning the impact of reform structures.

One more basic issue must be addressed at this point. Four equations involving experimental cities did contain significant changes apparently resulting from the intervention. But what about the direction of change? If the change in spending is not in the right direction, reform does not produce the expected impact. The results of these four equations showing the direction of change for the intercept or slope is as follows (positive direction means spending increased; negative direction, the opposite): (1) general expenditures for *less* reformed cities have a *positive* slope change; (2) police spending in *more* reformed cities shows a *positive* intercept change; (3) sanitation spending for *more* reformed communities manifests a *positive* intercept change; and (4) highway expenditures in *less* reformed municipalities reflect a *positive* slope change.

All the changes are positive, indicating more than expected increases in spending following structural change. But note that two of the equations—police and sanitation spending—are for groups of cities that became more reformed. Those cities, in line with the presumed effect of reforms, should have spent less after the structural change took place. So, in all, for 28 tests of the effects of reform, only two structural changes (7 percent) produce the expected modifications in revenue and spending levels. Moreover, just as many significant effects of structural change among experimental cities are in the wrong direction. These findings clearly do not bode well for the theoretical assumptions growing out of the reform literature.

The relationship between municipal reforms and policy changes were tested in three other ways. First, a time-series analysis was performed for each city separately (without averaging). Of the 39 significant changes (in intercept or slope) of a total 156 possible, 16 occurred among experimental cities. But exactly half of these changes were in the wrong direction. Second, each experimental city was compared directly with its control counterpart for each of the 7 policies. Of the 11 cases where an experimental city reflected a change that was not found in its control, 6 were in the wrong direction. Finally, changes in spending patterns among the functional areas were examined by calculating the percentage of general expenditures devoted to each of four spending categories. These data were then employed as dependent variables in a similar time-series analysis. In only two equations did statistically significant var-

[5] With a small number of cases, especially with the possibility of considerable variation on certain variables, one might consider standardizing the variables before averaging. For each city, the per capita measure for every year was converted to a Z-score for each of the 7 functional categories. These standardized values were then used in the time-series analysis described in the text. Only a few changes resulted, which appeared to be so minor that we felt justified in omitting the standardization procedure and have reported the data on a per capita basis to make interpretation easier.

[6] We are greatly indebted to Ken Meier for making available the computer program necessary to generate the Q statistic.

Table 2. Regression Coefficients for OLS Equation for All Sets of Cities to Test for Significance of Change in Reform Structure (Betas in Parentheses)

	Independent Variables							
Dependent Variable (per capita)	Time	*F*-Value	Intervention Intercept	*F*-Value	Intervention Slope	*F*-Value	R^2	Pack's Q*
General Revenue								
More Reform (N = 8)	4.09	<.01	4.28	ns	.00	ns	.98	
	(.86)		(.14)		(.00)			
Control (N = 8)	3.95	<.01	5.32	<.01	−1.60	ns	.99	4.34
	(1.00)		(.21)		(−.23)			
Less Reform (N = 3)	6.37	<.01	−1.40	ns	−.84	ns	.98	
	(1.09)		(−.04)		(−.08)			
Control (N = 3)	8.85	<.01	−8.37	ns	−2.07	ns	.98	
	(1.30)		(−.19)		(−.17)			
General Expenditures								
More Reform	4.00	<.01	6.46	ns	−.22	ns	.97	
	(.82)		(.21)		(−.03)			
Control	3.54	<.01	10.20	<.01	−1.48	ns	.99	8.84**
	(.82)		(.37)		(−.19)			
Less Reform	6.10	<.01	−9.37	ns	6.08	<.01	.99	4.51
	(.76)		(−.18)		(.42)			
Control	10.41	<.01	1.86	ns	−1.76	ns	.98	
	(1.05)		(.03)		(−.10)			
Police Expenditures								
More Reform	.41	<.01	1.10	<.01	.13	ns	.99	2.58
	(.64)		(.27)		(.12)			
Control	.50	<.01	.53	<.01	.01	ns	.99	3.48
	(.86)		(.14)		(.01)			
Less Reform	.36	<.01	−.58	ns	.32	ns	.97	
	(.79)		(−.20)		(.39)			
Control	.79	<.01	−.87	ns	.24	ns	.98	
	(.98)		(−.17)		(.17)			
Fire Expenditures								
More Reform	.62	<.01	−.11	ns	−.35	ns	.91	
	(1.34)		(−.04)		(−.42)			
Control	.48	<.01	2.01	<.01	−.27	ns	.98	4.81
	(.75)		(.49)		(−.24)			
Less Reform	.36	ns	−.43	ns	.22	ns	.88	
	(.81)		(−.15)		(.28)			
Control	.90	<.01	1.17	ns	−.63	<.01	.97	1.63
	(1.12)		(.24)		(−.46)			
Sanitation Expenditures								
More Reform	.38	ns	7.02	<.01	−.84	ns	.84	3.37
	(.33)		(.95)		(−.40)			
Control	.72	ns	−3.53	ns	1.82	ns	.81	
	(.53)		(−.41)		(.75)			
Less Reform	.41	ns	.21	ns	.25	ns	.55	
	(.54)		(.04)		(.18)			
Control	1.00	<.01	−1.89	ns	−.36	ns	.74	
Parks Expenditures	(1.44)		(−.43)		(−.30)			
More Reform	.06	ns	.29	ns	.49	ns	.88	
	(.16)		(.11)		(.69)			
Control	.43	<.01	.74	ns	−.57	ns	.79	
	(1.36)		(.37)		(−1.02)			
Less Reform	.22	ns	−.05	ns	.05	ns	.83	
	(.84)		(−.03)		(.11)			
Control	.32	<.01	−.35	ns	−.08	ns	.83	
	(1.23)		(−.21)		(−.17)			

continued

Table 2. *(continued)*

Dependent Variable (per capita)	Independent Variables							
	Time	*F*-Value	Intervention Intercept	*F*-Value	Intervention Slope	*F*-Value	R^2	Pack's Q*
Highway Expenditures								
More Reform	.64	<.01	1.80	ns	–.58	ns	.92	
	(.98)		(.44)		(–.50)			
Control	.32	<.01	.60	ns	–.18	ns	.92	
	(.97)		(.29)		(–.31)			
Less Reform	–.36	<.01	.92	ns	.64	<.01	.74	3.37
	(–1.41)		(.58)		(1.42)			
Control	.37	ns	2.29	ns	–.48	ns	.83	
	(.70)		(.69)		(–.52)			

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *City Government Finances* (1945–1978); International City Management Association, *Municipal Year Book* (1945–1978) (Washington, D.C.); *Commercial Atlas and Marketing Guide* (1945–1978) (Chicago: Rand McNally).

*The Q statistic may be compared with a χ^2 distribution, where a value of 7.815 is necessary for statistical significance at the .05 level (**). Unless the Q is significant, no autocorrelation is deemed to exist.

iations in slope or intercept appear for experimental cities, and one of these was in the wrong direction. Changing structure does not seem to matter much in allocating funds across different functional areas.

Conclusion

Disagreement persists over the potential policy consequences of urban political structures. Most of the prior attempts to investigate this linkage have dealt with the question of whether municipal reforms should induce cities to tax and spend more or less than unreformed cities. Despite Banfield and Wilson's widely known thesis suggesting that cities dominated by a middle-class public-regarding ethos may support greater public expenditures, a larger body of research tends to support the view that reformers wanted efficient, business-like government with lower levels of spending. To complicate matters further, others have shown that reform characteristics have little or no impact on municipal spending levels. The research reported here, employing an interrupted time-series design for 22 cities over an 11-year period, generally confirms that changes in city government structure have almost no impact on changes in taxing and spending levels. We also discovered no consistent reallocation of expenditures among functional categories following changes in municipal structure.

This research represents the first attempt to analyze the effects of local government structure on policy using a genuine longitudinal design. If we accept the argument of Gray (1976) and others that theoretically policy making should be viewed as a process occurring over time, we believe our dynamic model is preferable to a cross-sectional analysis. Admittedly, this research is not likely to settle this dispute permanently—our findings are confined to fiscal variables, the time span is somewhat limited, and a relatively small number of cities are involved. Clearly something comparable to this analysis should be undertaken, where appropriate longitudinal data can be located, for other policy measures. Given these constraints, none of which we believe seriously limits what we have done, the findings are nonetheless unambiguous—urban reforms have few policy consequences.

What might we conclude about the efficacy of the reform movement based on these findings? There is a widely shared view that this group was largely successful in its effort to rid the cities of pernicious machine influences; presumably today's municipalities are more honestly governed, more efficient, and better managed than was true in the past. But the evidence offered here suggests these changes had little long-range effect on basic fiscal decisions. If the reformers wanted to keep the lid on city spending (which in itself is still arguable), they were not successful. No attempt is made here to minimize the overall import of the reform movement. Indeed, a number of community battles have been waged over the adoption of reform structures. Yet in the long run, government structure may matter very little—at least when it comes to city taxing and spending policies.

References

Banfield, Edward, and James Q. Wilson (1963). *City Politics*. New York: Vintage.

Boskoff, Alvin, and Harmon Zeigler (1964). *Voting Patterns in a Local Election*. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott.

Bowman, Lewis, Dennis S. Ippolito, and Martin L. Levin (1972). "Self-Interest and Referendum Support: The Case of a Rapid Transit Vote in Atlanta." In Harlan Hahn (ed.), *People and Politics in Urban Society*. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Box, George, and G. M. Jenkins (1970). *Time Series Analysis, Forecasting and Control*. San Francisco: Holden-Day.

Bryant, Stephen (1976). "The Dimensions of Reformism in Urban Policy Analysis." *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 12: 117–24.

Campbell, Donald T., and Julian C. Stanley (1966). *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Resarch*. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Cole, Richard L. (1971). "The Urban Policy Process: A Note on Structural and Regional Influences." *Social Science Quarterly* 52: 646–55.

Commercial Atlas and Marketing Guide (1945–1978). Chicago: Rand McNally.

Durand, Roger (1972). "Ethnicity, 'Public-Regardingness,' and Referenda Voting." *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 16: 259–68.

Gray, Virginia (1976). "Models of Comparative State Politics: A Comparison of Cross-Sectional and Time Series Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 20: 235–56.

Hawkins, Brett (1971). *Politics and Urban Policies*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

Hays, Samuel P. (1964). "The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era." *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 55: 157–69.

Hennessey, Timothy M. (1970). "Theory and Concept Formation in Comparative Urban Research." *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 14: 537–64.

International City Management Association (1945-1978). *Municipal Year Book*. Washington, D.C.

Judd, Dennis R. (1979). *The Politics of American Cities*. Boston: Little, Brown.

Leibert, Roland J. (1974). "Municipal Functions, Structures, and Expenditures: A Reanalysis of Recent Research." *Social Science Quarterly* 54: 765–83.

Lineberry, Robert L., and Edmund P. Fowler (1967). "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities." *American Political Science Review* 61: 701–16.

Lyons, William (1977). "Urban Structures and Policy: Reassessing Additive Assumptions of Reform." *Political Methodology* 4: 213–26.

______ (1978). "Reform and Response in American Cities: Structure and Policy Reconsidered." *Social Science Quarterly* 59: 118–32.

McCain, Leslie, and Richard McCleary (1979). "The Statistical Analysis of Interrupted Time-Series Quasi Experiments." In Thomas D. Cook and Donald T. Campbell (eds.), *Quasi-Experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues for Field Settings*. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Meier, Kenneth J. (1980). "Executive Reorganization of Government: Impact on Employment and Expenditures." *American Journal of Political Science*, 24: 396-412.

Miller, Abraham, and Stephen Bennett (1974). "Communication." *American Political Science Review* 68: 1265–71.

Ostrom, Charles W., Jr. (1978). *Time Series Analysis: Regression Techniques*. Beverly Hills: Sage Paper on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences.

Pack, David J. (1977). "Revealing Time Series Interrelationships." *Decision Sciences* 8: 377–402.

U.S. Bureau of the Census (1945–1978). *City Government Finances*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Reason and Authority in Habermas:
A Critique of the Critics

STEPHEN K. WHITE
University of Hartford

Some critics of Jürgen Habermas have charged that his ideas have an affinity with authoritarianism. This criticism rests on a fundamental misinterpretation of Habermas' project for a communicative ethics. Political authoritarianism is deeply incompatible with his conceptions of practical rationality and normative legitimacy. After demonstrating this incompatibility, I propose an explanation for the persistence of misunderstanding on this question. In conclusion, some suggestions are offered as to the sort of political orientation one can justifiably derive from Habermas' philosophical foundations.

In the last decade, Jürgen Habermas has laid out the foundations for what he calls a "communicative ethics." His contention is that we can critically evaluate political life from the perspective of a rational consensus; that is, one attained in a "domination-free" (*herrschaftsfrei*) "practical discourse" (Habermas, 1971a, p. 284; 1973b, pp. 250–60, 265 n. 46; 1975, pp. 89, 107–08, 120). Some critics of Habermas have charged that his approach contains the philosophical seeds of unbridled leftist authoritarianism. Robert Spaemann has contended that Habermas' grounding of democratic legitimacy in *herrschaftsfrei* discourse constitutes a utopian formula for "despotism" (1977, pp. 121–25). Hermann Lübbe sees theories like Habermas' as preparing the "groundwork of totalitarian authority" (1978, p. 139). Similarly, Reinhart Maurer finds in Habermas the source of "a new fanaticism" and "a totalitarian social technology" (1977, pp. 53, 63).

While these critiques differ somewhat on particulars, they all appear to attribute to Habermas something like a doctrine of the "real will." The use of such a formulation in one's political thought is often considered to be a litmus test for separating liberal thinkers who value individual freedom and tolerance from those who do not, whether they be of the right or left (Berlin, 1969, pp. 127–28, 132–34). Two classic types of the real will doctrine derive from Rousseau and the orthodox Marxist-Leninist tradition. Spaemann sees Habermas as embracing an updated version of the first, while Maurer and Lübbe find him following the second.

Habermas does not, I will argue, advocate a real will, at least in the pernicious form attributed to him by his critics. One way of showing this is, of course, to examine how Habermas has dissociated himself from this sort of doctrine in either its Rousseauean or Marxist-Leninist versions. Such clarification, however, might not be thoroughly convincing, since the critics suggest that even if Habermas does not *intend* an authoritarian result, his theoretical approach *necessarily implies* one. Spaemann, for example, notes that his critique aims not so much at Habermas' intentions as at "the inherent consequences of a type of thought" (1977, p. 125; cf. Maurer, 1977, pp. 17, 33–35; Lübbe, 1978, p. 137). This kind of suspicion echoes Isaiah Berlin's well-known argument that theories which begin with concepts of positive freedom and a real will tend to develop an almost inherent "momentum" toward the justification of authoritarianism (1969, pp. 118, 132, 152; cf. pp. xliv–xlvii). Whatever the merit of this argument generally, I will maintain that it does not apply to Habermas. Although he speaks sometimes of a real will and his idea of freedom is partially a positive one, his conception of practical truth or normative validity is such that his theory as a whole, far from necessarily implying authoritarianism, is actually deeply incompatible with it. I will conclude this line of argument with a suggestion as to why Habermas is particularly susceptible to misunderstanding on this point. Finally, after having shown that Habermas' thought does not warrant an authoritarian orientation in politics, I will take up the question of what sort of political orientation, if any, it does provide one with.

I would like to thank the Fulbright Commission for support in 1978–79 while this article was written, and Albrecht Wellmer and the Universität Konstanz for providing me with ideal working conditions. Helpful comments on an earlier version of this article were made by Peter Bachrach, Martin Fleisher, and Melvin Richter, as well as the anonymous *Review* referees.

Communicative Ethics and *Herrschaftsfrei* Discourse

Before proceeding to the real will question, I should briefly elucidate what Habermas means by a communicative ethics, although I cannot discuss it in detail here (for a fuller treatment, see McCarthy, 1978; White, 1979). Habermas has not written a systematic work on this topic; he has only outlined the project. This article will make it clear that there are major questions left open and many potential avenues for criticism. Rather than pursuing any of these avenues, however, I intend to show simply that the ones chosen by Spaemann, Lübbe, and Maurer are dead ends.

Habermas' notion of a communicative ethics gets its orientation from his recent efforts to formulate a theory of communicative competence (1970, 1971b). The object of the latter is to explain the necessary presuppositions of understanding in ordinary language communication; and it is the nature of the presuppositions he discovers which gives his ethics its particular cast.

Habermas' project has led him to develop a new theory of action and critical reflection. While he has borrowed from various schools of philosophy and social thought, he draws most heavily perhaps from speech act theory. His central contention is that the ongoing understanding we achieve in non-strategic interaction or "communicative action" rests on a "background consensus" on the validity of four universal claims we raise in the performance of speech acts. The four validity claims are: (1) the linguistic comprehensibility of the utterance; (2) the veracity of the speaker; (3) the truth of the utterance's propositional component; and (4) the correctness or normative validity of the performative component. Comprehensibility is the claim that we have produced a well-formed sentence; it corresponds to the Chomskyian idea of a speaker's mastery of a set of linguistic rules or "linguistic competence." Habermas is primarily interested in the other three claims, though, since they express our communicative competence. He distinguishes between linguistics which thematizes the basic units of language—sentences—and universal or formal pragmatics, which thematizes the basic units of speech—utterances; the former study investigates the conditions of grammatical sentences, and the latter the conditions of successful utterances. To be successful, an utterance must satisfy not only the comprehensibility claim, but also the other three (1970, pp. 366–67; 1979b, pp. 2–3, 8, 25–34, 50–61).[1]

The background consensus which exists in communicative action depends on an acceptance of these claims. This means that the hearer accepts the speaker's claims that his/her utterance asserts something true, expresses his/her intentions truthfully, and counts as legitimate in relation to socially recognized expectations (Habermas, 1979b, pp. 6, 26–29). In communicative action, the acceptance of these claims is uncritical, although it does rely on an underlying supposition of accountability which each subject makes about the other. Each necessarily supposes that the other understands his/her own actions, takes them intentionally, and could justify them if called upon to do so (1971b, pp. 114–20).

Thus, the idea of meaningful speech in communicative action inherently refers us to the critical justification or redemption of the validity claims (1971b, pp. 122, 135–36). Each type of claim, when challenged, has a corresponding mode of redemption. The claim of veracity or authenticity can only be tested in the course of subsequent interaction, where a speaker's announced motives or intentions will be shown to have been either sincerely or deceptively expressed. Truth and normative validity, however, are tested in "discourse"; truth in "theoretical discourses" and normative validity in "practical discourses." I will focus only on the latter. In practical discourse we exchange arguments aimed at providing grounds for problematized normative claims.[2] A successful discourse might repair the old consensus by reaffirming the validity of the original claim or, alternatively, show its invalidity and mark out grounds for a claim which could induce a new consensus. To undertake a discourse requires that we adopt a hypothetical attitude toward the claim and that we suspend the constraints of interaction, so that the only operative motive is the cooperative search for truth or legitimacy (1973a, pp. 17–18, 1973b, pp. 214, 219–20).

Our capacity to engage in discourse and reach an understanding depends ultimately on the intuitive sense, which all competent speakers credit themselves with, of being able in principle to distinguish a true or rational consensus from a deceptive one (Habermas, 1971b, p. 123; cf. 1973b, pp. 240–57). Habermas has tried to explicate this sense of a true or rational consensus by sketching the conditions of "an ideal speech situation" (ISS) in which there would be no deception or domination, and the only force exercised would be the "forceless force of better argument" (*zwangloser Zwang des bessern Argumentes*) leading to a rationally motivated consensus (1970, pp. 369–74; 1971b, p. 137; 1973b, p. 240; 1975, pp. 95–110). The notion of the ISS allows Habermas to distinguish between a rational consensus and a merely empirical one. When we engage in an actual discourse, its justificatory quality will depend upon how well it measures up to the standards of the ISS, that is, the ideal of *herrschaftsfrei* discourse.

---

[1] Our communicative competence to raise the universal validity claims allows us to fulfill the "telos of communication" which requires embedding sentences in three "relations to reality":

> (1) the external reality of what is supposed to be an existing state of affairs, (2) the internal reality of what a speaker would like to express before a public as his intentions, and finally, (3) the normative reality of what is intersubjectively recognized as a legitimate interpersonal relationship (Habermas, 1979b, pp. 27-28).

[2] When a claim is challenged, discourse is not the only alternative; one could break off communication completely or begin strategic interaction (Habermas, 1979b, pp. 3-4).

A rational consensus can be guaranteed only if discourse is freed from formal constraints on the process of argumentation itself, as well as constraints which are brought into that process from the surrounding context of interaction. The conditions of the ISS thus take the form of rules prohibiting such constraints. First, with regard to the process of argumentation, Habermas requires "for all possible participants a symmetrical distribution [*symmetrische Verteilung*] of chances to choose and carry out speech acts" (1971b, p. 137; 1973b, pp. 255–56). This assumption of symmetry means that, within discourse, each has an equal opportunity to initiate and continue communication; each also has an opportunity to make assertions and propose explanations (raise truth claims in "constative" speech acts), as well as recommend norms (raise normative validity claims in "regulative" speech acts). In addition, there must be an equal chance to dispute these claims, to insure that no subject matter can have a privileged status with regard to examination and critique (1970, pp. 371–72; 1971b, pp. 109–14; 1979b, pp. 50–59).

While these conditions make certain that discourse is formally unrestricted, they fail to guarantee that participants have not initiated the discourse in a distorted manner. They must be prohibited from perpetuating patterns of distorted or ideological communication existing in the context of interaction, and from taking up discourses with a strategic attitude, meaning that the intentions and motives of some participants are concealed. If these distortions are not prevented, participants could believe a valid consensus had been attained when, in fact, it was reached under the influence of some constraint. Hence, the symmetry assumption must be extended to interaction; in other words, the ISS admits only actors who have satisfied this assumption. This means that the conditions of unconstrained discourse cannot be conceived apart from what Habermas calls "pure communicative action." This model of action exhibits a symmetry of speech acts in two ways. First, there is a reciprocal openness of participants in relation to their true intentions, motives, needs, and an equal chance of expressing these in "representative" speech acts. Second, there is an equal chance to employ "regulative" speech acts so that there are no one-sidedly binding norms; that is, an equal distribution of opportunities "to order and resist orders, to permit and forbid, to make and extract promises, and to be responsible for one's conduct and demand that others are as well" (Habermas, 1973b, p. 256; 1971b, pp. 136–39.

The satisfaction of the various symmetry rules is the core of what Habermas means by a *herrschaftsfrei* discourse. And it is in terms of this model that he interprets such concepts as justice, freedom, and the common interest. The justice or legitimacy of a basic norm is assessed by its capacity to withstand discursive testing. The autonomy of the individual is expressed in binding oneself to norms which satisfy such a test. The process of discourse can also separate "particular" from "generalizable" interests, ones which are based on needs that can be "communicatively shared" by all. (For "generalizable interest," see Habermas, 1975, pp. 23, 89, 107–08. For autonomy, see 1975, p. 89; McCarthy, 1978, pp. 325–31. For justice, see Habermas, 1970, p. 372; 1971b, p. 139; 1973b, p. 265 n. 45). Each of these concepts will be explained more fully after I examine the critics' arguments. What is important to see now is simply the general direction of Habermas' work from the point of view of political philosophy. He is offering a theory of the nature of action and understanding which provides a new conceptualization of practical rationality and thus a distinct perspective on basic political concepts.

The Critics

Robert Spaemann interprets the notion of *herrschaftsfrei* discourse as a utopian social goal, the attainment of which becomes, for Habermas, the sole legitimating criterion of political action (1977, pp. 115–16, 124). When one uses force in the name of realizing this goal, that force loses its ordinary coercive character; it does so because it is exercised for the purpose of expanding the realm of freedom for those individuals who do not yet understand that the goal of *Herrschaftsfreiheit* is in the real interest of all autonomous beings. This dangerous mode of thinking can be employed, Spaemann argues, to legitimate the uncontrolled power of either a minority or a majority. The former possibility is implied in Habermas' idea that critical theory is analogous to psychoanalysis in that both aim at liberating people from unconscious forces; and in the case of critical theory, this means liberation from ideology (Habermas, 1971a, Chs. 10–12, esp. pp. 189, 274–90). This sort of doctor-patient model, says Spaemann, provides the groundwork for a doctrine of rule by an intellectual elite who are justified in forcing the "patients" to become free of their ideological bonds (1977, pp. 120–21).

Spaemann directs most of his attention, however, to unearthing the Habermasian seeds of majority despotism. (In this section, I will answer this argument only; the difficulties involved with the doctor-patient model will be taken up below.) In this vein, Spaemann argues (1977, p. 123) that adopting the basic political goal of consensus in unrestricted discussion betrays a serious misunderstanding of the nature of politics. While such a goal may be appropriate in the educational system, it has dangerous consequences in the political; there discussion must always take place under the pressure to take action, and this invariably means limiting discussion, cutting off debate. Since discussion is always carried on under action constraints, it means that the sort of consensus attainable in politics will not be one to which all can agree, but rather one to which, at best, a majority can agree. Thus Habermas' goal of a *herrschaftsfrei* consensus of all can never be realized. The only possible use it can have is that of lending a bogus philosophical legitimacy to a majority's suppression of a minority. "This precisely," says Spaemann, "is despotism" (1977, p. 123).

The ideal of *Herrschaftsfreiheit* thus suffers a fate similar to Rousseau's ideas of freedom and the general will. Both he and Habermas aim at a politics where freedom and authority are reconciled, so that the coercive side of authority is exercised; but "the utopian goal of the abolition of authority legitimates on the contrary uncontrolled authority. . ." (Spaemann, 1977, pp. 115–16, 124).[3]

In a reply to this charge, Habermas has argued (1974, pp. 382–86) that Spaemann's critique fails to take account of an essential categorical distinction in his work: that between the *philosophical* problems underlying democratic legitimacy and *organizational* problems of democratic institutions. Habermas has concentrated so far on the former question, which he has addressed with his concept of a rational consensus attained under the conditions of the ISS. This concept is intended not as a blueprint for a direct democracy, as Spaemann's Rousseauean interpretation implies, but rather as a critical principle for democratic legitimacy.

Understood as a principle of legitimacy and not as an institutional proposal, Habermas' model of discourse seems in no way to conflict with the common-sense observation that actual political discussion and decisions must take place under all sorts of constraints. The significance of Habermas' principle in relation to this observation is that it gives a possible criterion for deciding *which* constraints are legitimate and which are not. For example, it is certainly clear that during the Vietnam War political and military leaders in the U.S. often suppressed intelligence reports which were pessimistic about the success of the war effort. This certainly constituted a constraining of possible public debate on the war issue; and it was done in the name of what those leaders considered as their appropriate freedom to act in the best interests of the American people. The question is, would one want to lump together conceptually this kind of constraint with, say, time constraints in relation to democratic legitimacy?

Spaemann is clearly correct in pointing out the danger of a political theory confusing its principle of legitimacy with a particular institutional arrangement designed to implement that principle in concrete historical circumstances. He is wrong, however, to find this danger in Habermas' theory.[4]

Like Spaemann, Maurer and Lübbe see Habermas' notion of *Herrschaftsfreiheit* as having authoritarian consequences. Unlike Spaemann, they do not look to Rousseau for the source of the problem, but rather find it in Habermas' having forgotten both Hegel's critique of Jacobin terror and the potentially totalitarian implications of the orthodox Marxist-Leninist idea of revolutionary action to further the objective course of history (Maurer, 1977, pp. 35, 49–65; Lübbe, 1978, pp. 126–31, 138–39). These implications take the form of a real will formulation in which one can be forced to be free not in the name of the general will, but in the name of historical necessity, interpreted by a revolutionary elite.

---

[3] It would go beyond my present purposes to enter the debate over whether Rousseau's thought is really authoritarian or liberal. The former view is at least a defensible interpretation.

[4] In a rejoinder to Habermas' reply, Spaemann contends that Habermas does not always keep this distinction between institutional arrangements and the principle of legitimacy clear in his own writings (1977, pp. 140-41). There is some validity in this complaint. For example, in one place Habermas asks parenthetically whether the ISS could be a possible "Lebensform" (1973b, pp. 258-59; cf. 1971a, p. 314). Although confusing, occasional remarks like this must, however, be taken in the context of Habermas' work as a whole. When this is done, one finds that the thrust of his ideas is counter to what Spaemann takes it to be.

Maurer's and Lübbe's positions are for my purposes quite similar. Since this is the case, and since Maurer's arguments are more extensively developed, I will focus on them.[5] Maurer contends that Habermas' ideal of discourse offers only a formal standard for judging political life and an empty notion of freedom. At bottom, the talk of discourse is nothing more than "political lyric poetry" (1977, pp. 35–39). While the discursive ideal is thus, on its own, rather harmless, it takes a Jacobin-like turn, argues Maurer, when it is joined with the conception of social evolution and moral development which Habermas has outlined under the title of "a reconstruction of historical materialism" (1977, p. 49; for Habermas' work on this topic, see 1979a, 1979b, 1976). Here we find, just as in Marx, an objectivist conception of historical progress; consequently, Habermas' thought "has the same structure" as Marx's and thus "arouses a definite 'leftist' . . . will for power [*Machtwillen*]. And this "will for power" can cloak itself in a real will formulation. The emptiness of discourse is filled with the substantive interest in historical progress, the precise direction of which can be determined by a political elite. "The emancipators," Maurer asserts, "are . . . objectively right, since they—as Marx already formulated—stand in the service of history"; and this asserted objectivity is doubtless likely to promote "a new hybris and a new fanaticism" (1977, pp. 35, 54).

Thus, Habermas has attempted to construct a "halfway" house between liberalism and Marxism; but the structure will not stand. The liberal features are theoretically subordinated to the Marxist-Leninist ones which lead toward a totalitarian practice (Maurer, 1977, pp. 7, 35, 63, 67).

Maurer's critique, like Spaemann's, fails to give much credence to Habermas' claim that he has drawn a distinction between a principle of democratic legitimacy and its validity, on the one hand, and the institutional realization of that principle, on the other (Maurer, 1977, p. 39). The discourse principle is taken to be a proposal for a radical form of organization which roots out all traditions and tears down all institutions; and when this has been accomplished, the remaining void is filled by "emancipators" who proceed in a totalitarian manner to execute the real will of historically progressive humanity. Maurer's extrapolation of this totalitarian danger from the "reconstruction of historical materialism" also ignores Habermas' rather clear remark that his theory postulates "neither the unilinearity, nor the necessity, nor the continuity, nor the irreversibility of history" (1979b, pp. 139–40). Neither the fanatic nor the totalitarian social engineer, it seems to me, would find much encouragement in such a statement. Nor would these individuals be encouraged by Habermas' clear rejection of the Leninist conception of the party, in the context of which he writes: "There is no privileged access to truth" and "no theory which at the outset can assure a world-historical mission in return for the potential sacrifices" (1973a, pp. 33–40).[6]

Inherent Authoritarianism?

Although Spaemann's and Maurer's critiques thus miss their mark, there remains a sense in which Habermas does employ a type of real will formulation. I will show, first, that Habermas clearly intends this to be a limited formulation, in the sense of not being liable to authoritarian perversion. This investigation will put us in a position to consider the final question of whether, regardless of Habermas' intentions, his theory necessarily has despotic or totalitarian implications.

The place to begin the investigation of Habermas' idea of a real will is with his discursive conception of practical rationality. His distance from the mainstream of liberal thought is evident in his assertion that one's claim to rationality ultimately requires an inquiry into the justifiability of one's needs and interests. Communicative ethics, Habermas asserts, requires abandoning the self-deception of thinking that we, as "isolated individuals," are always the sufficient judges of the justifiability of our own interests (1976, pp. 344–45.). Following the logic of discursive testing requires us to question our traditional interpretations of needs and interests, to look at them as part of our socially constructed reality which could be otherwise than it is. This process, Habermas hopes, could open the possibility of participants developing nonideological interpretations in which they "can make their inner natures transparent." What the individual then decides are his or her authentic needs must, however, be capable of a discursive consensus, if they are to be the basis of a common norm. The application of the symmetry rules tests for this capability; it separates what the individual wants from what he or she "should want" (*sollen wollen*) (Habermas, 1973b, p. 252).

---

[5] Lübbe in fact never cites Habermas explicitly, but the specific formulations he criticizes leave little doubt that Habermas is one of his primary targets (1978, esp. pp. 130-31).

[6] Maurer in fact acknowledges some of Habermas' remarks about authoritarianism; his suspicions, however, are not allayed. He remains convinced that the activist reader of Habermas, "especially when he is young," is bound to derive theoretical vindication for his "will for power" (1977, pp. 17, 33-35). Against a suspicion this extreme, it is unclear as to whether any counterargument could be persuasive.

Unfortunately, Habermas' remarks on this important topic are brief. For present purposes, though, only one question need be pressed: once some individuals or groups have made their "inner natures transparent" and can see what they and others "should want," what will be their stance toward those others who have not been so reflectively successful? Habermas' response to this question is quite clear. The claim of having freed oneself from ideological deception does not constitute a sufficient justification for the use of force. The attempt to prove this claim cannot be conjoined with force, but rather must take place in what Habermas calls "processes of enlightenment," where the task is one of trying to show how something is in someone's real interest, i.e., is something he "should want."[7] Habermas refers to such processes as "therapeutic 'discourses,' " the single quotation marks indicating that these are not discourses in the full sense, since the relation between the participants is unequal at the beginning, as in a psychoanalytic dialogue (1973a, p. 32).

The drawing of an analogy between the goals of critical social theory and those of psychoanalysis has been criticized on several grounds (Habermas discusses some of these criticisms in 1973a, pp. 15–16, 25 f.; cf. Maurer, 1977, pp. 33-34; Gadamer, 1971, pp. 292–317). Only one of these is important for present concerns and that is Spaemann's. As mentioned earlier, he argues that the appeal to a psychoanalytic model justifies rule by an intellectual elite. This critique misses its mark, though, because, as said, Habermas reserves the model only for processes where force is not involved. Those who take up the task of enlightenment, Habermas warns, must, "if they are to avoid exploitation and deception, . . . commit themselves wholly to the proper precautions. . . ." This means that when an interpretation of a particular group's real interest is proffered—on the basis of the reconstruction of historical materialism—that interpretation can only be validated when freely accepted by those to whom it is proffered. Only to this degree "do the analytically proposed interpretations actually become conscious, and does the objectively attributed situation of interests actually become the *real interest* of a group capable of action" (1973a, pp. 32–34; 1974, p. 387).

Habermas thus appears to retain something like a notion of the real will. Such a formulation is necessary, he thinks, if we are going to speak of the rationality of norms and the generalizability of interests in a sense which is not reducible to the individual's strategic calculations, where interests are uncriticizable and the rationality of norms is measured by the degree to which they maximize those interests. While the discursive standard of reason by which Habermas defines "a *rational* human will" certainly has affinities with traditional real will formulations, the vehicle for the realization of this will can only be argumentation, not force. "Enlightenment which does not terminate in insight, that is, in freely accepted interpretations, is no enlightenment at all" (Habermas, 1974, p. 387).

Having tried to clarify Habermas' thought so as to show that his intentions are not authoritarian, I will now turn to the question of whether, regardless of intentions, his ideas of positive freedom and a rational will necessarily imply despotism or totalitarianism. Berlin's "Two Concepts of Liberty" is the *locus classicus* of this kind of argument. While Berlin adduces several reasons for the susceptibility of theories such as Habermas' to authoritarian perversion, the most important one is that they promise a "single true solution" to moral and political problems, in which all human ends are brought into harmony. This belief is responsible for that "dogmatic certainty" in politics which justifies despotic or totalitarian measures in the name of bringing about the desired solution (Berlin, 1969, pp. 152, 167–68).

I would like to argue that although Habermas has a conception of the good society which is probably more harmonious than Berlin would find acceptable, his conception of the nature of practical truth allows for no dogmatic certainty as to how such a society is to be brought into being. This contrasts with Rousseau and the Marxist-Leninist traditions which do indeed offer this kind of certainty; the latter in the pseudo-scientific determinism of historical materialism, and the former in his faith that a radically different society could eradicate those influences which corrupt human nature and by this eradication insure the discovery of the general will. Communicative ethics, on the other hand, directs us not toward dogmatism and an authoritarian real will, but rather toward fallibilism and tolerance (cf. Alexy, 1978, p. 54; Wellmer, 1979, p. 36). This point can be demonstrated by examining how Habermas' ideas of freedom and the legitimacy of norms are structured by his view that a discursive consensus is the standard of practical truth.

---

[7] Habermas has not spelled out what particular modes of action fall under the concept "processes of enlightenment." His exclusion of modes which involve the strategic use of force, however, allow certain general demarcations. For example, the majority of mass demonstrations against the Vietnam War would appear to qualify as attempts at political enlightenment, in the sense that one of their main purposes was communicative: raising the antiwar issue to the American public and political leaders. The same cannot be said, though, in cases where the overriding purpose of the demonstrators was simply to provoke police violence as part of a general strategy of revolution, the argument being that by intensifying fascist tendencies in Western industrial nations, the task of generating a revolutionary opposition could be made easier.

Habermas' interpretation of freedom is grounded in the idea of the ISS. Freedom is expressed in the willingness to submit one's claims to critical reflection, which means openness to the movement from action to discourse and, within discourse, to reflection which increasingly questions the foundations of one's interpretations of self and society. When this reciprocal openness in relation to needs and interests is joined with the symmetry rules, Habermas thinks we have the procedural basis for determining generalizable interests that could be embodied in legitimate norms. To bind oneself to such a norm would mean making good on one's claim to practical rationality and one's potential as a free being.

Habermas' ideas here are in the Rousseau-Kant tradition of positive freedom, where autonomy is fully expressed in binding one's will to a self-given law. The most important difference from Kant is that Habermas' ethics does not isolate itself from needs and interests, but rather requires them to be drawn into the collective process of discursive justification. Hence there is no sharp Kantian distinction between morals and politics. This fact would seem to locate Habermas closer to Rousseau. That is true, however, only in a restricted sense. Habermas acknowledges Rousseau's importance as a forefather of the discursive principle of legitimacy; he was the first political philosopher to develop clearly a procedural conception of democratic legitimacy, to argue that the basic principle is not derived from nature or God, but purely from the idea of a voluntary agreement of equals. As Habermas points out, though, Rousseau tended to confuse the introduction of this new principle with proposals for its institutionalization (1979b, pp. 184–87). Given Rousseau's conviction that his new principle could be adequately realized under the conditions set out in the *Social Contract,* the legitimacy claim is threatened with absorption into the actual decisions of an institution which can, as a consequence, confront the individual with absolute authority and the right to force him to be free.

There is no comparable source for such a conviction in communicative ethics. Habermas emphasizes repeatedly that while we may try to organize a given discussion in a manner which satisfies the conditions of the ISS, we can never be sure that we have achieved this goal; and thus the decisions we reach and the norms we endorse will have no stamp of philosophical infallibility (1973b, pp. 257–58; 1974, p. 381). The idea of a rational consensus *always* remains available as a critical standard for the reassessment of any empirical decision.

One might want to object that Habermas' appeal here to an intuitive sense of a rational consensus, which we all acquire as we develop communicative competence, is too vague or indeterminate to be of much use in political theory. Although I will try to meet this objection in my concluding remarks, it represents at least a legitimately arguable position. It is quite a different matter, however, to argue that Habermas' fallibilistic approach to practical truth necessarily implies an authoritarian real will. The implications seem to me to point rather in the opposite direction. Although the positive notion of freedom in relation to a discursive consensus remains the final standard, the unavoidable fallibility of institutional interpretations of legitimacy provides a strong justification for negative freedoms of expression and minority rights. For communicative ethics, allowance of these freedoms is at least a minimum condition for the validity of our claim that politics is being organized in a manner which seeks to measure itself according to the standards of practical discourse.

The non-authoritarian nature of communicative ethics can also be seen if we consider how Habermas characterizes the claim that a particular norm embodies a generalizable interest. To make such a claim means that the norm could be agreed to under the conditions of the ISS, that is, under conditions where the force of better argument could "rationally motivate" (*rational motivieren*) our acceptance of it (Habermas, 1971b, p. 137; 1973b, pp. 240–52). Here again one might want to question the adequacy of Habermas' ideas, but it is quite another thing to argue that they are somehow necessarily linked with a notion like forcing someone to be free in the name of a generalizable interest. It simply does not make sense to speak of obtaining a rational motivation by *forcing* someone *to recognize the validity* of a normative claim. Force can, of course, bring behavioral conformity with the decision of an institutionalized authority, but to think we could get something more is like expecting, as Hannah Pitkin says, that we could increase the validity of an argument by threatening to shoot anyone who disagrees with it (1972, p. 284).

Misunderstanding Habermas

So far I have tried to show how the authoritarianism usually connected with doctrines of the real will is both explicitly renounced by Habermas and philosophically incompatible with communicative ethics. Now I want to suggest why this suspicion of authoritarianism has continually resurfaced.

There are two broad currents running through Habermas' work. The one has its source in the work of the Frankfurt School and is most evident in Habermas' thought before 1970. Both he and the older generation of that school—Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse—appeal to the idea of a "liberated" or "rational" society composed of "emancipated" individuals who no longer have false needs or consciousnesses. Habermas in particular spoke of an "emancipatory interest" guiding us in the direction of a rational society (1971a).[8] The image of that society, however, always remained vague, its content only being hinted at through critiques of bourgeois society (see, for example, Horkheimer, 1972, pp. 213, 233; Adorno, 1976, p. 248). This vagueness is partially a result of a reluctance to engage in utopian speculation (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 269; Marcuse, 1969, p. 3 f., has been the least inhibited in this regard). Critical theorists share this reluctance with Marxx, but like the latter, their appeal to an ideal of the good or rational society has an undeniable utopian quality. When Marcuse holds out the image of a society where Eros has replaced Thanatos as the dominant force in social relations, he is following in the tradition of Marx's vision of the good society of free producers.

Joining this first current is a second one which gains increasing significance from about 1970; this is the "linguistic turn," in the context of which Habermas develops the consensus theory of truth and the idea of communicative ethics (cf. Wellmer, 1976). Here the focus is not on anticipating the shape of the good society, but rather on a procedural foundation for a legitimate or fair mode of articulating and adjudicating competing notions of the good society.

Habermas' critics tend to assume that the first strand has systematic priority over the second; that is, that the idea of practical discourse is simply a sketch of the sort of conditions under which Habermas' own idea of a good society would necessarily emerge as the choice of all. Interpreted this way, the theory as a whole may seem to point toward authoritarian measures as appropriate for pushing society toward emancipation, toward a greater realization of the ideal conditions of practical discourse. The fallacy in this interpretation, however, is that it attributes a claim of *infallible* truth to Habermas' conception of the good society which is clearly incompatible with his consensus theory of practical truth. Such an interpretation renders his theory as a whole self-contradictory. Its incorrect reversal of priorities is clearly reflected in a published conversation between Habermas and Marcuse, where the former begins by stressing their agreement (on the general shape of a good society, i.e., the first current) but ends with a sharp critique of the other's willingness to accept the idea of an authoritarian real will and educational dictatorship (cf. MacIntyre, 1970, pp. 99–105). This is not an *ad hoc* criticism; for Habermas, the practical truth claim underlying such ideas is simply insupportable; thus he reproaches Marcuse, asserting, "You're speaking like the old philosopher," who claims substantive knowledge of the good or of historical necessity (Marcuse, Habermas et al., 1978–79, p. 137 f.).[9] The implication of this exchange is clear; it is the second current in Habermas' work that has theoretical priority and not vice-versa.

Communicative Ethics and Politics

I have tried to show in this article that Habermas' work does not justify an authoritarian orientation in politics. What sort of orientation, then, does it justify? The Marxist heritage of critical theory requires that this problem be addressed. And Habermas has certainly been acutely aware of this demand. He has, however, considered his primary task to be one of deepening the theoretical foundations of critical theory rather than directly tackling the theory-practice problem (McCarthy, 1978, p. 270). This choice of emphasis has been met with skepticism from many close to the tradition of critical theory. In contrast to the critics considered earlier, these individuals worry about Habermas' work having become apolitical (Howard, 1974, p. 300; O'Neill, 1976, p. 3; Lehnhart, 1976, p. 34). One can admit that he has clarified some significant questions about reason and ethics, and that he has linked these ideas, in *Legitimation Crisis,* with an analysis of crisis tendencies in advanced capitalism; what does not, however, seem to emerge from all this, say these critics, is any clear political direction. He identifies no historical subject in the Marxist sense, nor any specific institutional forms which could claim greater legitimacy (McCarthy, 1978, p. 385; Bernstein, 1976, pp. 223–25).

---

[8] Charges of affinity with authoritarianism were raised against this aspect of Habermas' early work. For a useful summary of these critiques and a thoughtful response to the effect that, even then, these charges were unwarranted, see Fred Dallmayr (1972, pp. 86-106).

[9] A failure to perceive this difference between Habermas and Marcuse is evident in Heather and Stolz (1979, pp. 3-5, 18-20). Kai Nielsen also neglects the second current; he sees Habermas as presenting a "substantive account of reason"; as "cash[ing] out rationality in terms of emancipation." Hence knowledge of what is rational comes only after we know the nature of the good society and the emancipated individual (Nielsen, 1977, pp. 282, 301, 303).

Does Habermas leave us then, as some have argued, with no political orientation? While a full answer to this question would require an extended discussion, a partial one can be set out fairly briefly. As just mentioned, the suspicion that we get no political direction from Habermas seems to be grounded in his not telling us what particular goals should be adopted and who should adopt them. The fact that he does not tell us these things should not, however, be taken as definitive proof that he tells us nothing about political practice. One can think of more modest ways to speak of political orientation. For example, it has been argued that the practical character of Hannah Arendt's political philosophy is demonstrated by the defense it gives to civil liberties, this defense deriving from the central question of her work: Does a given political practice "serve totalitarian domination or not?" (Quoted in Heather and Stolz, 1979, p. 16). Habermas, I think, offers us at least this sort of general orientation.

Although his work gives no justification to substantive political principles with a universal validity, it does perhaps allow one to speak of two procedural principles which are valid in advanced industrial societies, both capitalist and state socialist.[10] These principles themselves are hardly novel; what is different, however, is the discursive basis of their validity. First, there is the freedom to participate in public decisions important to one's basic concerns; and, second, freedom of expression and tolerance. These procedural political principles state minimal conditions for a politics which claims democratic legitimacy.

Two sorts of questions appear to be in order here. First, how are these principles derived from the idea of discourse? Second, does simply stating such general principles really give any concrete political orientation? As for the first question, I have already shown how the ideas of tolerance and freedom of expression can be understood to link up with a discursive foundation. Nothing, though, has been said about participation. A reader of *Legitimation Crisis* will come away with a strong sense that Habermas considers greater participation important, but may wonder what exactly there is in the discursive standard for redeeming claims about legitimacy which necessarily refers us to the value of participation. Perhaps the simplest way to show this is to contrast communicative ethics with Kantian ethics. In the latter, the standard of right—the categorical imperative—is applied monologically to a given situation; that is, the moral agent simply asks himself about the rightness of a particular maxim of action. One of the problems often noted about such a construction is that it might justify, say, a somewhat old-fashioned father forbidding his adolescent daughter from studying to become a doctor on the grounds that it is not proper for women to enter professions. He could, in good conscience, will this to be a universal law. In communicative ethics, on the other hand, the standard of right is derived from the intersubjective structure of discursive communication in which each who is affected by a proposed norm has the opportunity to participate; to exclude someone thus affected (e.g., the daughter) is to render one's normative validity claim immediately suspect. Participation is thus inherent in Habermas' conception of what it means to redeem a normative validity claim. It should be stressed that participation does not become justifiable simply because each individual arrives at the social bargaining table with an interest he wants to defend and knows best how to defend. Right does not derive simply from agreements between interest-bearing individuals; rather, it derives from the relation of intersubjectivity. Hence the significance of participation in communicative ethics follows from the recognition each subject is due when validity claims are addressed to him.

The problem now is to see if we can derive any concrete implications for politics from this philosophical groundwork. As I said, Habermas stresses the need for greater participation in all areas of life where important public decisions are made; but, as critics have rightly pointed out, he gives us little indication as to what sorts of institutional forms are appropriate for this purpose. In trying to understand what sense can be made of this posture, we should not make Spaemann's mistake and assume that Habermas is simply proposing direct democratic control of all major institutions. But if we do not assume this, how then should we take his remarks on participation? The proper way, I believe, is to think of the principle of participation, as well as that of tolerance and free expression, on analogy with the way the First Amendment has—at least sometimes—been understood in American constitutional law. It has been considered a "preferred freedom" and attacks upon it or failures to protect it are consequently seen in a special light; the party which has threatened it bears a heavier-than-normal burden of proof in its argument that such infringement is justified. We might think of the two discursive principles in a similar way. With regard to participation, this would mean that the burden of proof would be on the institution—be it political, administrative or corporate—to demonstrate why there could not be greater participation in decisions which affect people's lives in important ways.

---

[10] These principles are qualified in their validity insofar as it is dependent upon the achievement of a stage in the historical evolution of "normative structures" ("world views" and other "collectively distributed structures of consciousness" which bear upon what at a given time will be considered legitimate in social relations) as well as in the evolution of forces of production. Habermas' reconstruction of historical materialism aims at explaining both modes of evolution and their interconnection. (1979a, pp. 28-32; 1975, pp. 8-11; 1979b, pp. 97-98, 142-48).

Thinking of free expression as having a preferred status is hardly a radical proposal. This is not the case, however, with participation. Strong participationist arguments are often met with the reply that they are "unrealistic" and advocate something which would be disastrous for economic efficiency. Thinking about participation on analogy with free expression, though, can give one an interesting perspective on this familiar response. Consider some of the kinds of arguments that are or could be made against freedom of expression. Do not opponents of this freedom in countries where it is suppressed often claim that its exercise would undermine something like political efficiency, in the sense of unity on the direction of public policy? Or consider the following thought experiment. Say one were to erase suddenly the constitutional tradition of free expression in a country like the United States. Now imagine how the debate over the possible introduction of this freedom into that society's set of core values might proceed. Could not an opponent of this potential freedom argue persuasively against it, on the grounds that it is an unrealistic ideal? After all, public opinion surveys consistently show that, in concrete situations, a large percentage of people manifest little understanding of or support for free expression. (See the literature cited in Paterson, 1979, pp. 7–8). Reflection along these lines may lead us at least to question the near-automatic negative response which participationist arguments tend to encounter and entertain the possibility that this response may have a substantial ideological component. If Habermas is right about the legitimacy of participation, perhaps we should begin to weigh arguments against it with some of the skepticism we exhibit when similar arguments are directed against free expression.

The view offered here of discursive principles constitutes, of course, only a small step in orienting political action. And the direction it does give us provides no guarantees about our destination. It certainly does not insure that we will arrive at something like Habermas' own notion of the good society; for example, one could imagine a highly egalitarian, participatory society where people's all-consuming concern was with ever-greater numbers and types of consumer goods—a sort of black mass version of the goals of the American public-interest movement. But this sort of indeterminancy is simply unavoidable in communicative ethics. Nevertheless, the small step such an ethics does take is significant because it both directs democratic theory away from its contemporary "elitist" turn and does so on the basis of a systematic philosophical foundation.

References

Adorno, Theodore (1976). "Sociology and Empirical Research." In Paul Connerton (ed.), *Critical Sociology*. New York: Penguin.

Alexy, Robert (1978). "Eine Theorie des praktischen Diskurses." In Willi Oelmüller (ed.), *Normenbegrundung und Normendurchsetzung*. Paderborn: Schöningh.

Berlin, Isaiah (1969). *Four Essays on Liberty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bernstein, Richard J. (1976). *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory*. New York: Harcourt Brace.

Dallmayr, Fred R. (1972). "Reason and Emancipation: Notes on Habermas." *Man and World* 5: 79–109.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1971). "Replik." In *Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Habermas, Jürgen (1970). "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence." *Inquiry* 13: 360–75.

______ (1971a; first published 1968). *Knowledge and Human Interests*. Translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro. Boston: Beacon.

______ (1971b). "Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der kommunikativen Kompetenz." In Habermas and Niklas Luhmann, *Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

______ (1973a). *Theory and Practice*. Translated by John Viertel. Boston: Beacon.

______ (1973b). "Wahrheitstheorien." In *Wirklichkeit und Reflexion*. Pfullingen: Neske.

______ (1974). "Die Utopie des guten Herrschers (Eine Antwort an Robert Spaemann)." *Kultur and Kritik*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

______ (1975). *Legitimation Crisis*. Translated with an introduction by Thomas A. McCarthy. Boston: Beacon.

______ (1976). *Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

______ (1979a). "History and Evolution." Translated by David J. Parent. *Telos* 39: 5–44.

______ (1979b; first published 1976). *Communication and the Evolution of Society*. Translated with an introduction by Thomas A. McCarthy. Boston: Beacon.

Heather, Gerard P., and Matthew Stolz (1979). "Hannah Arendt and the Problem of Critical Theory." *Journal of Politics* 1: 2–22.

Horkheimer, Max (1972). *Critical Theory.* New York: Seabury.

Howard, Dick (1974). "A Politics in Search of the Political." *Theory and Society* 1: 271–306.

Lehnhart, Christian (1976). "The Wanderings of Enlightenment." In John O'Neill (ed.), *On Critical Theory.* New York: Seabury.

Lübbe, Hermann (1978). "Freiheit und Terror." In Willi Oelmüller (ed.), *Normenbegrundung und Normendurchsetzung.* Paderborn: Schöningh.

MacIntyre, Alasdair (1970). *Herbert Marcuse.* New York: Viking.

Marcuse, Herbert (1969). *An Essay on Liberation.* Boston: Beacon.

______, Jürgen Habermas et al. (1978–79). "Theory and Politics: A Discussion with Herbert Marcuse, Jürgen Habermas, Heinz Lubasz, and Telman Spengler." *Telos* 39: 124–53.

Maurer, Reinhart K. (1977). *Jürgen Habermas' Aufhebung der Philosophie.* Sonderheft, *Philosophische Rundschau,* Beiheft 8. Tübingen: JCB Mohr.

McCarthy, Thomas A. (1978). *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Nielsen, Kai (1977). "Rationality, Needs and Politics." *Cultural Hermeneutics* 4: 281–308.

O'Neill, John (1976). "Critique and Remembrance." In O'Neill (ed.), *On Critical Theory.* New York: Seabury.

Paterson, John (1979). "Moral Development and Political Thinking." *Western Political Quarterly* 1: 7–20.

Pitkin, Hannah (1972). *Wittgenstein and Justice.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Spaemann, Robert (1977; first published 1972). "Die Utopie der Herrschaftsfreiheit." *Zur Kritik der politischen Utopie.* Stuttgart: Ernst Klett.

Wellmer, Albrecht (1976). "Communication and Emancipation: Reflections on the 'Linguistic Turn' in Critical Theory." In John O'Neill (ed.), *On Critical Theory.* New York: Seabury.

______ (1979). *Praktische Philosophie und Theorie der Gesellschaft.* Konstanz: Universitätsverlag.

White, Stephen K. (1979). "Rationality and the Foundations of Political Philosophy: An Introduction to the Recent Work of Jürgen Habermas." *Journal of Politics* 4: 1156–71.

Rousseau and the Problem of Bourgeois Society

ARTHUR M. MELZER
Michigan State University

The heart of Rousseau's thought, as he himself declared, is the claim that society (especially bourgeois society), while necessary now to man's preservation, corrupts the life it fosters. What, then, is this corruption? What, in Rousseau's view, is the problem of bourgeois society? The corruption, I argue, is disunity of soul, through which men lose the fullness of existence they seek by nature. Unity of soul, which is natural, is lost in society through the contradiction of personal dependence: using others entails serving them. Thus modern or bourgeois society, which builds on this contradiction by deriving men's sociability from their selfishness, necessarily divides their souls. There can be no psychic unity in society without true social unity. (Hence Rousseau's analysis of unity is also his defense of justice.) Psychic and social unity are more or less attainable in the just state through patriotism and virtue ("morality"), but perfect psychic unity is possible only beyond society and morality.

Rousseau is the prototype of the modern *homme revolté* (Shklar, 1969, pp. 1-12; Stelling-Michaud, 1962). In tones of anger and bitter contempt, he gave a radical and profound critique of modern political culture, a critique that defined the problem which Rousseau and most later thinkers attempted to solve. The need for a precise statement of that critique is obvious—but the task has proven extremely difficult; for on examination, Rousseau's writings seem to present not a unified critique, but a disparate array of accusations. Men are actors and hypocrites. Men are troubled by ceaseless desires and labors. They are effeminate, enervated and lacking in "force and vigor of the soul." They are unjust and exploitative. They are overly concerned with their image in the eyes of others. While there is surely some truth to each of these accusations, it is difficult to see what links them, or what in them is so terrible as to justify the vehemence of Rousseau's protest and the extremism of his proposed solutions.

Among Rousseau scholars, there have been two basic interpretations of his critique. The first, fixing on Rousseau's frequent discussions of happiness, views him as a eudemonist whose central concern is some notion of "alienation." The second views him as a moralist in the strict sense, a proto-Kantian, whose concern is with justice for its own sake.[1] The account I will give is of the former sort. I will argue that the heart of Rousseau's critique is the issue of psychic integration or unity of soul. While few scholars have failed to mention unity as one of Rousseau's concerns, still fewer have made it the key to understanding him (Burgelin, 1952, and Bloom, 1979 being perhaps the most useful).

What underlies the variety of Rousseau's accusations, and constitutes the evil in each of them, is disunity of soul:

> The cause of *human misery* is the *contradiction* that exists between our state and our desires, between our duties and our penchants, between nature and social institutions, between man and citizen; *render man one* and you will make him as happy as he is capable of being. Give him over entirely to the state or leave him entirely to himself, but if you *divide* his heart you will tear it (*Works*, Vol. 3, p. 510).[2]

Rousseau's critique comprises two general points. First, disunity of soul (or psyche) is the cause of man's misery in society, and unity the key to his health and happiness. Second, loss of unity results from a contradiction between human nature and our particular social institutions. Thus I will first describe what unity of soul is and why it is good. Then I will isolate the social cause of disunity and show it to be the heart of the "problem of bourgeois society."[3] In the course of these arguments, I will also incorporate the second line of Rousseau interpretation by showing how the issue of unity of soul includes that of justice.

---

[1] Recent eudemonistic interpretations include Starobinski (1971), Shklar (1969), Burgelin (1952), Bloom (1979), Manuel (1978), Berman (1970) and Ellenburg (1976). For the moralistic or Kantian interpretation, see Gurvitch (1932, pp. 260–79), Cassirer (1954 and 1963), and Levine (1976). See also Hendel (1962), Green (1941), Derathe (1948) and Galston (1975, pp. 103–31).

[2] Translations of *Works, Confessions, Rousseau Juge de Jean-Jacques, Narcisse, Héeloïse,* and *Reveries* are my own. Emphasis added.

[3] For reasons that will become clear, the divided modern man is characteristically a "bourgeois," not in the narrow sense of "middle-class," but in the broader one originated by Rousseau: an urban non-citizen, any selfish man who is very dependent on society (unlike the peasant or the savage) but who does not live (and die) for it (as does the citizen). See *Social Contract,* pp. 54 n., 114; *Emile,* p. 40.

Justice and Unity

Before turning to the account of unity, it is necessary to defend the claim that it is Rousseau's primary concern by considering briefly the alternative, "moralistic" interpretation of his critique. Ernst Cassirer, its most forceful proponent, argues that Rousseau's deepest concern was not to "inquire into happiness or utility; he was concerned with the dignity of man." Rousseau's vehement protest against society stems from his belief that "there is no value to human existence on this earth if justice is not brought to triumph" (Cassirer, 1954, pp. 70–71; see also 1963, p. 56).

It is certainly true that Rousseau attacks men and society for their injustice, for the "violence of powerful men and the oppression of the weak" (*Second Discourse*, p. 97). Indeed, this is the aspect of Rousseau's critique most readily intelligible to us. He protests the obvious injustice of "a handful of men glutted with superfluities while the starving multitude lacks necessities" (*Second Discourse*, p. 181). Where these extremes are absent, he sees that injustice and exploitation have only become more secret and more general. The whole apparatus of the state and all the fine trappings of "civilization" are only tools that the strong have invented for extending and strengthening their powers of exploitation. "All these grand words of society, of justice, of law, of mutual defense, of help for the weak, of philosophy and of the progress of reason are only lures invented by clever politicians or by base flatterers to impose themselves on the simple" (*Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 475, 478, 54, 73, 98; *Emile*, p. 473; *Second Discourse*, p. 159).

In charging society with injustice, however, Rousseau is less concerned with the triumph of justice for its own sake, as Cassirer claims, than with the *consequences* of injustice. He is not complaining merely that the distribution of goods in society does not conform to some abstract principle of justice or fairness. He is concerned with the *bodily harm* and especially with the *corruption of soul* men suffer due to their subjection to others. Unjust relations between men "engender all the vices, and by them, master and slave are mutually corrupted" (*Emile*, p. 85; *Héloïse*, p. 568; *Second Discourse*, pp. 193-203, 181, 173-77, 156-57, 97).

Similarly, any positive value justice has derives from its good effects. Rousseau clearly states that justice should be demanded of men only if good for them:

> If moral goodness is in conformity with our nature, man could be *healthy of spirit* or *well-constituted* only to the extent that he is good. If it is not and man is naturally wicked, he cannot cease to be so without being corrupted, and goodness in him is only a vice contrary to nature. If he were made to do harm to his kind as a wolf is made to slaughter his prey, a humane man would be an animal as depraved as a pitying wolf, and only virtue would leave us with remorse (*Emile*, p. 287).[4]

Unlike Kant, Rousseau acknowledges the priority of the good to the just. He praises justice or blames its opposite for the good or harm they do—to the actor as well as the beneficiary.

Thus, Rousseau's demand for justice is (and must be) based on a prior belief in the goodness of justice. To hold such a belief, Rousseau must defend justice against the moral skeptics—such as Thrasymachus in Plato's *Republic*, and his own "violent reasoner" (*Geneva Manuscript*, pp. 157-63)—who argue that the demands of justice are not good for those upon whom they are made, so not compelling or real.

Thrasymachus, for example, quite agrees with Rousseau that most men in existing societies seek to get the better of others, that the most successful among these become the rulers, and that they use the state to exploit the weak. Yet Thrasymachus, scarcely an *homme revolté*, makes this observation not to demand justice but attack it. What does the observation prove if not that men are wolves whose true natural good consists in preying upon others? Were the wolves "just" to their prey, they would severely harm themselves. Justice is not good for them; hence it is not binding—indeed, it is not justice. What is good for the wolves is bad for their prey, and conversely. Justice, the good of all, does not exist. One is forced, then, to take sides. And since the wolves are the healthy and happy ones who have succeeded in doing only what their prey would do if they could, it makes sense to be their partisan. To take the side of the weak, the "party of humanity," and self-righteously demand they not be oppressed could only be an act of self-interest or *ressentiment*. It is not an act of "justice."[5]

Against such arguments, Rousseau defends the goodness, hence the reality, of justice through a critique of mastery. It is *better* for a man to be just than to exploit others. This crucial assertion appears at the beginning of the *Social Contract* (p. 46): "Man was born free, and everywhere he is in chains. One who believes himself the *master* of others is nonetheless *a greater slave than they.*"[6] And, in *Emile* (p. 85): "Dependence on men, since it is without order, engenders *all the vices,* and by it, master and slave are *mutually corrupted.*" Corruption of soul, which we saw to be the major harm done the victim of injustice, afflicts the oppressor as well as the oppressed. Since mastery leads to corruption and unhappiness, justice is good and its demands are binding or compelling.

---

[4] The Savoyard Vicar is speaking. For the same view in Rousseau's own name see *Geneva Manuscript*, pp. 157–63; *Emile*, pp. 235, 235n., 314–15, 314n. See Masters (1968, pp. 261–76) for a good analysis.

[5] Plato, *Republic* 336b-354c, *Gorgias* 481c–486e. See Nietzsche, *Geneology of Morals* I-13. One might, of course, prefer the "prey" on the basis of a utilitarian notion of collective happiness, constructed by summing the private happiness of all individuals. Rousseau did not take this view. Where there is no common good, such a construct corresponds to nothing real; therefore, there is no reason for the individual to prefer it to his private good.

Corruption of soul, therefore, is the more fundamental evil which serves as the basis for the evil of injustice. This conclusion is confirmed by the striking fact that, in the rare cases where injustice and oppression do not cause corruption, but rather prevent it, Rousseau does not condemn them. In a manner more reminiscent of Nietzsche than Kant, Rousseau praises Rome as the "model of all free peoples" and Sparta as a "republic of demi-gods rather than men" (*Second Discourse,* p. 80; *First Discourse,* p. 43). To be sure, Rousseau regarded the constant imperialism of Rome and especially the slavery of Sparta as unjust, but in the end what counted more for him was the magnificent freedom and health of the men they produced.[7]

Rousseau's vital concern with the problem of injustice stems from the eudemonistic and non-Kantian consideration that injustice is harmful and corrupting to the unjust and their victims. If we now ask what this corruption is, we are led back to the issue of disunity of soul. Hence, in analyzing Rousseau's notion of unity and, after that, the sources of disunity, we will at the same time be examining the basis for the value of justice.[8]

The Negative Interpretation of Unity

What unity of soul is and why it is good emerge most clearly at the beginning of *Emile* (p. 40) where Rousseau describes modern or bourgeois man:

> He who in the civil order wants to preserve the primacy of the sentiments of nature does not know what he wants. Always in contradiction with himself, always floating between his inclinations and his duties, he will never be either man or citizen. He will be good neither for himself nor for others. He will be one of these men of our days: A Frenchman, an Englishman, a bourgeois. He will be nothing.
>
> To be something, to be oneself and always one, a man must act as he speaks; he must always be decisive in making his choice, make it in a lofty style and always stick to it.

One might interpret this passage as follows: Disunity of soul—the bourgeois' affliction—is the internal opposition of the inclinations, so that he is at war with himself or pulled in opposite directions. Unity, then, would appear to be merely a *negative* good: the lack of disunity and of the torment it brings. The bourgeois needs unity to relieve him of the pain of inner conflict. For illustration, one might think of the torments endured by Julie in *La Nouvelle Héloïse* due to the conflict between her love for St.-Preux and her respect for her parents.

This negative interpretation of unity, however, does not square well with Rousseau's descriptions of modern men in the *First* and *Second Discourses.* It is not said in the above passage, nor in the *Discourses,* that the bourgeois' problem is that he is tormented. All of the exertions of Rousseau's rhetoric are necessary precisely because modern men are "happy slaves," strangely indifferent to their own unhealthiness (*First Discourse,* p. 36; *Second Discourse,* p. 179; *Geneva Manuscript,* p. 184). Moreover, the strength of passion necessary for torments like Julie's arises only in simple and isolated environments, and not amid the complexity and urbanity of the towns. The bourgeois is accused of having extensive, restless and impatient desires, but not deep, strong or tormenting ones (*Works,* Vol. 3, pp. 15–16; *R. Juge de J.-J.,* p. 818). The passage above suggests that modern man, though divided, is *not* tormented, because he is *"floating"* between his two ends. As Rousseau goes on to say, he is "not precisely double, but composite," having compromised his conflicting ends to attain a measure of internal peace.

Furthermore, the negative interpretation of unity cannot explain the important fact that Rousseau regards the just or virtuous citizen as one of the possible forms of unity; for Rousseau emphasizes repeatedly that such virtue requires inner struggle and is painful (*Emile,* pp. 441, 291).[9]

---

[6] These two famous and crucial assertions are assumed and never proved in the *Social Contract.* This work presupposes the critique of mastery given in the *Second Discourse* and in *Emile,* and "should be considered as a kind of appendix to [*Emile*]" (letter to Duchesne, May 23, 1762). If one reads it as if meant to be complete and self-contained, one will be misled in the direction of a Kantian interpretation.

[7] For Rousseau's defense of slavery, see n. 15.

[8] Cassirer, of course, does not deny there are eudemonistic *elements* in Rousseau. He claims Rousseau's radical demand for Law and Freedom can only be understood in terms of an underlying Kantianism (Cassirer, 1954, pp. 55–58, 62, 69–71, 126–27; 1963, p. 57). I will show Rousseau a *consistent* eudemonist by explaining his emphasis on law and freedom in terms of unity of soul.

Unity, and the benefit of unity, must be something more than the mere absence of conflict and pain. It must be something positive. Rousseau says in the passage from *Emile* that to be divided like the bourgeois is to "be nothing," and to be unified is to "be something." The further significance of unity will emerge from a consideration of Rousseau's psychological first principles.

The Positive Meaning of Unity: Existence

According to Rousseau, self-love (*amour de soi-même*) is the "source of our passions, the origin and the principle of all the others" (*Emile,* pp. 212–13). It is "a natural sentiment which inclines every animal to watch over its own preservation" (*Second Discourse,* p. 222). The familiar notion of self-preservation contains more complexities than at first appears. That our fundamental desire is for preservation means, first of all, that it is not for pleasure. We do not desire life for the sake of pleasure (as Hedonism maintains), but rather pleasant things for the sake of life (see Cicero, *De Finibus,* Bk. 3, Secs. 4–5; Bk. 5, Secs. 7–10, 13). Furthermore, for Rousseau, the desire for self-preservation is not a bundle of instincts and reflexes that lead us blindly to the things we need. It is a conscious desire. And it is not a conscious fleeing of harm and death, as it is for Hobbes (*De Cive* I, 7), but a *positive desire for life.* Self-love is "the *desire to exist.* All that seems to extend or strengthen our *existence* flatters us, all that seems to destroy or compress it distresses us. That is the primitive source of all our passions" (*Works,* Vol. 2, pp. 1324–25). The positive goal of life is to live. Such a view may seem strange, but the more familiar notions of "alienation" and "self-realization" also presuppose that the ultimate good is being or existing (Burgelin, 1952, pp. 115–48).

What, then, do we desire in desiring to exist? Is life or existence an object that can be desired directly? Rousseau claims our existence is a constant, positive object of our awareness. We have a "sentiment of existence": an awareness of the conscious self and of the brute fact that one *is.* Self-love, the desire to exist, takes the form of a joy and pleasure in this awareness. The whole end of life is to exist and to love existence.

Yet in what sense is existence an object of *desire,* since in order to desire one must already exist? Rousseau argues that we desire a greater or more complete existence than we already have. All men are not equally alive. We desire to be more real, more awake, more intensely *there.* Self-love is a hunger for life that seeks a *fullness* of existence.

The view that men seek self-realization or a fullness of existence might seem to require a doctrine of being, and of a hierarchy of being, to give sense to the notion of degrees of reality or existence. But Rousseau did not develop such a doctrine—either because he considered metaphysics impossible if not unnecessary; or because, as Burgelin suggests (1952, p. 32), he found traditional metaphysics inadequate to the phenomenon of human existence without being able to replace it with a "philosophy of existence"; or because, on the contrary, he adhered to modern natural science and therefore thought the experience of one's existence as a unique, independent being could not be metaphysically valid in the homogeneous world of matter in motion. Whatever the case, Rousseau confined himself to the apparently psychological view that the degree of existence is "in the sentiment which appreciates it." To exist more is only to be more aware of our existence, to have a heightened sentiment of our existence. "The man who has lived most is . . . he who has most *felt* life" (*Emile,* p. 42). Some ambiguity remains, however, since Rousseau tends to equate the sentiment of our existence with our existence itself (*Works,* Vol. 2, pp. 1324–25; *R. Juge de J.-J.,* p. 805).

Whether the increase in existence is to be understood in metaphysical or psychological terms, the causes of it are fairly clear, and that is what concerns us here. According to Rousseau, we increase our existence in two ways: through "expansion" and through unity.[10]

Briefly, we "expand" our existence by actualizing the capacities within us. "To live is not to breathe; it is to act; it is to make use of our organs, our senses, our faculties, of all the parts of ourselves which give us the sentiment of our existence" (*Emile,* p. 42). We further expand our existence by attaching ourselves to or identifying with beings beyond ourselves.

---

[9] The citizen, who is "given over entirely to the state," is unified (see the passage quoted at the beginning). But unity must not be confused with "wholeness." The citizen is far from self-sufficient or whole. He is unified internally precisely by being completely a part in relation to the larger whole of the state (*Emile,* pp. 39–40).

[10] Regarding "unity" and "extent" as the two determinants of existence or reality, see F. H. Bradley (1968, pp. 364, 214–17). See also St. Augustine for whom the *summum bonum* is "peace in eternal life or eternal life in peace" (*City of God* XIX, 10–13). Gilson shows that the importance of peace follows from Augustine's metaphysical view that "to exist is to be one" (1960, pp. 210–12, n. 9). See also Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1001a, 1053b 10–35.

> It is very natural that he who loves himself seeks to extend his being and his enjoyments, and to appropriate to himself by attachment that which he senses must be a good for him (*R. Juge de J.-J.,* pp. 805–06).

Self-extension is accomplished through the identification with others involved in friendship and pity, as well as through the identification with nature. Through it, one seeks both to expand the self so as to include within it everything the self needs for preservation, and to project the self onto the world so as to be more fully present to oneself (*R. Juge de J.-J.,* p. 845; *Reveries,* pp. 1065–66, 1056; *Emile,* pp. 67, 80, 98, 159, 168, 192, 213).

The second and more basic factor determining the degree of existence is unity of soul. Before we can expand our self, we must first have a self to expand. But to have a self necessarily means to have a single self. *To be, we must be one.* We cannot be two things at once, nor can we be a different thing at every instant: we need *unity of will or inclination* and also *unity over time.*

The importance of unity for existence is perhaps clearer in the second respect: unity over time. To live in the extensionless point of the present, immersed in the flux of time and sensations, is to perish every instant. To truly exist, to have some being, to have a self, one must have duration. The self cannot exist in the instant; it *is* an identity or self-sameness over time. To be oneself is precisely to be what one was. Therefore, "the life of the individual begins," and he becomes "capable of happiness or unhappiness" only when "memory extends the sentiment of identity to all the moments of his existence, and he becomes truly one" (*Emile,* p. 78).

Yet this elementary unity over time is not complete, hence not sufficient for full existence. Part of us is still caught in the flux. We identify with our loves and attachments; we *are* what we love and live for—our goals, loved ones, reputation, possessions. But these things—and our love for them—are in flux. "Everything around us changes. We ourselves change, and no one can assure himself that he will love tomorrow what he loves today" (*Reveries,* p. 1085). As a result, our identity has an uncertainty and inconstancy that led Rousseau to complain of his "weekly souls" (*Works,* Vol. 1, p. 1110).

Another difficulty with the simple unity forged by memory is that the self is given such stability as it has by being spread over past and future. This creates the possibility of losing part of oneself to the past, through nostalgic longing, and especially to the future through desire and hope. We are always ahead of or behind ourselves—never wholly *with* ourselves.

The bourgeois is the classic example. One of Rousseau's principal "accusations" against him is that his vanity has extended his desires so far beyond his powers that his life is filled with ceaseless desires, labors and anxieties. Unlike the idle savage who "breathes only repose and freedom," the bourgeois is "always active, sweats, agitates himself" (*Second Discourse,* p. 178). The evil of this condition is not, or not simply, the frustration or pain that results from it, but the loss of unity over time, the loss of "repose" or "peace" and of the plenitude of existence found in them. Think of his life. His constant desires and labors thrust him into the future and away from his present self. They make him say: tomorrow I will *live,* today I will *prepare* to live. In this way, the bourgeois continually postpones his existence. Spending his life "on the way," he is never "there" and at rest. He never knows a moment when he possesses all that he wants and thus possesses himself; never a moment when, complete and at end, he can say to himself: let this moment last forever. He dies without ever having begun to live (*Second Discourse,* pp. 179, 193, 195; *Emile,* pp. 82–83, 411; *Works,* Vol. 2, p. 1326).

The fullness of existence our self-love seeks requires the perfect unity over time Rousseau calls having a "state." In this condition the two difficulties just discussed are overcome. The awareness of one's self and existence is freed of any alteration by the passage of time. And the self is no longer scattered between past and future, but is complete and wholly present in every moment. In the *Reveries* (p. 1046), Rousseau described the condition as

> a simple and permanent *state* . . . where the soul finds a place sufficiently solid on which to *rest entirely* and to *gather there all its being,* without the need to recall the past or climb onto the future; where time counts for nothing, where the present lasts forever without in any way marking its duration and without any trace of succession, without any sentiment of privation or of enjoyment, of pleasure or of pain, of desire or fear except this alone of *our existence,* which sentiment *fills the soul* entirely.

The perfect unity over time—and resulting fullness of existence—described here is that of Rousseau the solitary dreamer. It is not a condition accessible to ordinary human beings, who are not capable of ridding themselves of all worldly passions and attachments. Neither is it compatible with life in civil society. Unity, however, is capable of degrees and there are lesser forms of it closer to ordinary life. Indeed, all the many human types Rousseau praises in his works—the peasant, the savage, the citizen, the lover, the family man—approximate in different ways and different degrees this perfect unity over time.

Consider, for example, the life of rustic and domestic simplicity led by Julie at Clarens or by the peasants of the Haut Valais (*D'Alembert,* pp. 60–63; *Héloïse,* pp. 527–57). It is a quiet, simple and uniform life of daily routines and seasonal festivities. There is nothing in it exciting, impressive or intensely pleasant. Yet there is a great charm to the picture of the life as a whole. And the charm is precisely that: the life is a *whole.* It is not a mere sequence of disconnected activities and experiences, but a "life," a unified manner of being, a kind of "state." There is an order and necessity to all one's actions. Each of the day's various tasks contributes in a different way to the preservation and expression of the same way of life. Each activity is like a different note in a single melody. In such a life one has a "state" because the self is neither changing in time nor scattered over it. In all the different times and aspects of one's life one is always living the same life, always being the same person. And each moment of one's life is lived in its contribution to one's life as a whole.

Through such temporal unity, one "feels life" more—not because one has filled it with extraneous pleasures and excitement, but because life's own native power has been gathered up and unified. The full reality of one's existence is allowed to shine through unscattered and undiminished.[11]

As mentioned above, the unity necessary for full existence is not only unity over time but also unity at each time. One cannot be two things at once; to be is to be some one single thing. And since, on one level, we *are* what we love and live for, if we are to be one single thing our basic desires must be harmonious and noncontradictory. We need *unity of inclination.* We must have the same goal—and be the same person—in every part of our self, or else we cannot be at all. If the soul is not one, either due to natural causes (as Plato, for instance, maintains) or to historical ones (as, for instance, in Freud); if instead, it is some monstrous combination of heterogeneous parts, each with its own nature and tendency, each warring with the others to rule the soul and direct our lives; and if one fails to impose order on this inner flux and chaos, then one can, quite literally, have no *existence* at all. It is the total disintegration of the self—madness.

For one to exist, one's soul must cohere, with all parts loving and hating the same things. The fullness of existence our self-love desires requires total oneness with oneself. All the desires and inclinations must form a coherent whole around a comprehensive end, so that one has a single focus and center of being. One should be single-minded, wholehearted and simple, so as to "be oneself" without exception or contradiction.[12] For he *is* most who is most fully what he is.

The bourgeois, in Rousseau's description, lacks unity of will or inclination, just as he lacks unity over time. The latter is caused by the extent and inconstancy of his desires, the former—which will concern us more in what follows—by the opposition among his desires. As stated in the passage from *Emile,* the bourgeois floats between his inclinations and his duties, or his selfish and unselfish desires. He has not wholly "fallen to pieces," but the fragmentation of his self severely attenuates his existence. He "feels life" less, because he lives two lives.

This decrease in life shows itself in the bourgeois' enervation, "spiritual pettiness" and lack of "force and vigor of the soul"—another of Rousseau's accusations (*First Discourse,* pp. 36–37, 54–56; *Second Discourse,* p. 164). In unified souls, the total energy of their self-love is harnessed in a single direction. They are

> healthy souls, whose force, without perhaps exceeding that of common souls, produces much more effect, because it acts *wholly along the same line,* it loses none of its effect in oblique directions, and it always strikes *all at the same point* (*R. Juge de J.-J.,* p. 669, variant c).

The bourgeois lacks a single focus of care and energy. The force of his soul is both scattered and turned against itself.

In sum, self-love, the root of all desire, seeks a plenitude of existence, a heightened sense of reality, a perfect immediacy and presence, which comes from being *all there,* from gathering together one's whole being. To do so one needs unity over time and unity of inclination: one must be wholly where one is and wholly what one is, one must live in the present and be one with oneself. Fullness of existence, therefore, is the positive good of unity, lacking which the bourgeois is a "nothing." He is not tormented, but suffers from a failure to live.

---

[11] For somewhat different treatments of the theme of time in Rousseau, see Poulet (1956, pp. 158–84), Van Laere (1968) and Temmer (1958).

[12] Describing Socrates and Cato, the twin peaks of human excellence, Rousseau speaks of the "*simplicity* which was the soul of their characters and which they put into all of the actions of their lives" (*Works,* Vol. 3, p. 1896). See also the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1094a1–1095a30) where Aristotle argues for the necessity of ordering all our goods in a single hierarchy. In scholastic terms, we need a "*summum bonum.*"

The Cause of Disunity: Society, and Not Nature

All the novelty of Rousseau's thought, as he himself proclaimed, stems from his principle that man is by nature good and that society makes him miserable and wicked (*Second Discourse,* p. 193; *R. Juge de J.-J.,* pp. 933–34; *Confessions,* pp. 388–89; *Works,* Vol. 1, pp. 1135–36; Vol. 4, pp. 935–36, 966). This means, in part, that the cause of disunity of soul—the source of man's misery—is in society rather than nature. Man is one by nature because all his inclinations serve the unitary end of self-love.

The significance of such a position is best seen in light of the traditional view Rousseau is implicitly contradicting, to wit, that the causes of disunity are natural. Rousseau himself states this view in the "Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar":

> In meditating on the nature of man I believed I discovered in it *two distinct principles*; one of which raised him to the study of eternal truths, to the love of justice and moral beauty, to the regions of the intellectual world whose contemplation is the wise man's delight; while the other took him basely into himself, subjected him to the empire of the senses and to the passions which are their ministers, and by means of these hindered all that the sentiment of the former inspired in him. In sensing myself carried away and caught up in the combat of these *two contrary motions,* I said to myself, "No, *man is not one*. . . ." If to prefer oneself to everything is an inclination natural to man, and if nevertheless the first sentiment of justice is innate in the human heart, let him who regards man as a *simple being* overcome these contradictions, and I shall no longer acknowledge more than one substance (*Emile,* pp. 278–79; cf. *Works,* Vol. 4, p. 936).

Here (and also in the *Letter to Beaumont*) Rousseau makes a fairly traditional statement of the dualistic view of human nature. Man is not naturally one or unified, but composed of the disparate and antipathetic elements of body and soul. This dualism causes a division within the soul between passion and reason. The soul is known to have two parts because man desires opposite things simultaneously, and by the principle of noncontradiction, the same thing cannot do contrary things at the same time.[13]

But these arguments for the natural duality of the soul, which Rousseau makes only in religious and apologetic contexts, are contradicted in the body of *Emile,* where man is not said to have "two distinct principles." Self-love, which is said to aim simply at self-preservation, is the "source of our passions, the origin and the principle of *all* the others" (*Emile,* p. 213). Rousseau does speak a great deal about conscience, but describes it as deriving from bodily self-love in the form of pity and not from an independent principle (*Emile,* pp. 235, 235n).[14]

To the traditional view, that the passions are bad as judged by a second principle in our nature, Rousseau responds as follows in *Emile* (p. 213):

> Our passions are the principal instruments of our preservation. It is, therefore, an enterprise as vain as it is ridiculous to want to destroy them. It is to control nature, it is to reform the work of God. If God were to tell man to annihilate the passions which He gives him, God would will and not will; He would contradict Himself. Never did He give this senseless order. Nothing of the kind is written in the human heart. . . . The love of oneself is always good and always in conformity with order.

---

[13] See Plato, *Republic* 436a–442a; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* I qu. 8a2, II–I qu. 23a1.

[14] Since I assume, as many scholars do not, a distinction between Rousseau's thought and that of the Savoyard Vicar, I am forced to say a few words about this question.

With thinkers such as Rousseau who insist so strongly that religion is absolutely necessary to the happiness and decency of ordinary men (the case of extraordinary men, like Wolmar, is different), one must suspect that even if they did not believe, they might say they did. This is especially the case with Rousseau who so openly talks about the necessity for just such lies and myths in his discussions of the Legislator and the Civil Religion in the *Social Contract.* Furthermore, Rousseau, who extended the Enlightenment critique of dogmatism to dogmatic atheism, clearly thought it an important lesson for the world to see that an intelligent man could be a believer, and a believer gentle and tolerant. So we must wonder whether "Rousseau the believer" is not a posture in the manner of "J. J. Rousseau *citoyen de Genève,*" or whether the Profession of Faith is not a civil religion for bourgeois society (*Emile,* pp. 312 n., 314–15; *Geneva Manuscript,* p. 195; *Social Contract,* pp. 67–70, 124–32; *Héloïse,* p. 588; *Works,* Vol. 3, pp. 700–06; Vol. 4, pp. 1142–43; *Confessions,* pp. 435–36.

Whatever the case, one must at least make the following distinction. In the Profession of Faith, Rousseau makes appeal, in his reasonings, not to revelation, but to an "inner sentiment," prior to reason (*Emile,* pp. 269–70). In his other works, he relies upon unaided human reason, and makes no such use of the inner sentiment. Following from the use of this "sentiment," the doctrine of the Profession of Faith departs from that of the other works in the ways indicated and in others as well. Even P. M. Masson acknowledges these differences exist and that he cannot explain them (1914, pp. 167 n. 1, 169 n. 2). At the very least, then, one must distinguish between Rousseau's philosophical thought based on reason alone, and his religious thought based on the inner sentiment. The position described in the text belongs to the former.

Here Rousseau applies the principle of noncontradiction to man's Creator to prove that man's nature is one or unified. If man as we know him suffers from disunity of soul, it is because self-love, the single principle of all desire, undergoes certain modifications in society which have

> *alien causes* without which they would never have come to pass; and these same modifications, far from being advantageous for us, are harmful. They change the first object [of self-love] and go against their principle. It is *then* that man finds himself *outside of nature* and sets himself in *contradiction with himself* (*Emile*, p. 213).

"Alien causes," and not nature, are the source of disunity.

Rousseau's belief in the natural unity of the soul is based on the denial of the existence of the second and higher element of the soul asserted by the traditional view. Man is asocial and unmetaphysical: he has no natural love of order, justice or "eternal truths." Sharing the cynicism of most other modern thinkers, Rousseau considered these supposedly higher inclinations to be modifications of *amour-propre* (vanity), itself a modification of self-love (*Emile*, p. 213; *First Discourse*, p. 63; *Second Discourse*, p. 175; *Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 503, 937).

Furthermore, Rousseau denied man had any *need* for higher inclinations or attachments. This point follows from certain important and difficult arguments in Rousseau, which cannot be developed here. They culminate in the claim that through moderation and resignation to necessity, men can remain fully loyal to themselves and their particular attachments. There is no need, from fear of loss and death, to overcome the desires that attach us to ourselves and our fragile possessions. Since nature has made man happy and good by making him love himself, there is no reason to suppose it has also made him love order or virtue.

If man is by nature a single, unified thing, as Rousseau claims, how does disunity arise? What are the "alien causes" that give rise to contradiction in the soul? We have already heard a general answer: men acquire a second, contradictory inclination through the demands of society. The precise workings of this process remain to be explained.

The Social Cause of Disunity: Personal Dependence or Using Other Men

As we have seen, for Rousseau, human nature has only one end: self-preservation; that is, maintaining and heightening one's existence. The oneness of this end is the basis for the natural harmony of man's desires, which constitute the natural unity of his soul. Having received unity from nature, men lose it, according to Rousseau, through their own actions, through their efforts to use other men as means. The fall from unity involves two stages: the loss of self-sufficiency due to the rise of unnatural desires; then the loss of unity through the pursuit of social means.

In man's primitive, natural state his desires—limited to those for food, sleep and sex—were well within the reach of his powers. Consequently, man was free, self-sufficient or whole. The invention of huts, the "first revolution," gave rise to love, the family and other primitive social relations, as well as to the first developments of reason. These changes, especially the first and last, led in turn to a revolution within man's soul: the rise of *amour-propre* (vanity or pride). Man came to desire honor and preference for their own sake. *Amour-propre,* when combined with the right economic conditions, so extended the desires as to destroy men's primitive self-sufficiency (*Second Discourse,* pp. 146–52).

It might seem, as many have maintained, that *amour-propre* is also the direct cause of disunity. *Amour-propre* gives rise to the "relative self"—one's position in comparison with others or one's place in their eyes—which can stand in opposition to the absolute, natural self. It might seem the division within the bourgeois is one between natural inclination and vanity, between self-preservation and honor. This view is seriously mistaken, however.

By giving men the new goal of honor, *amour-propre* does tend to destroy their original, natural unity. If one is trying to maintain such perfect unity—as Rousseau is in *Rousseau Juge de Jean-Jacques,* the *Reveries* and the first half of *Emile*—then *amour-propre* is indeed the enemy. Nevertheless, the demands of nature and of pride can be placed in reasonable harmony so that the tribal savage and Emile, for instance, attain a high degree of unity despite their *amour-propre.* In the patriotic citizen, a somewhat different case, it is even an aid to unity. *Amour-propre* alone cannot suffice to explain the bourgeois' disunity.

While *amour-propre* extends men's desires beyond their natural powers, severe disunity of soul arises only when men seek to restore the balance by using other men as means. Using other men—what Rousseau calls "personal dependence"—is self-contradictory and enslaving, according to Rousseau. And disunity arises from the internalization of this contradiction or enslavement.

The use of social means or power is self-contradictory because the power needed to acquire, maintain and use such means is most often greater than, or different from, the power one acquires *from* them, so that the acquisition of power *increases* one's need for power. For instance, in seeking power one acquires things; in acquiring things one extends oneself; in extending oneself one increases one's insecurity, hence one's need for power. A man thus comes to seek not power, but power after power because, in Hobbes' more succinct formulation, "He cannot assure the power and means . . . which he hath present, without the acquisition of more" (*Leviathan,* Ch. 11). Thus the first consequence of using others to satisfy one's needs is the indefinite extension of one's needs, desires and dependence on others.

The same contradiction of personal dependence eventually enslaves men to others or to society. Being weak, men seek to use others; but being weak, they cannot easily do so. Only by an *all-consuming attention to others* can one succeed in getting them to serve oneself. Power is a kind of selfish selflessness. This contradiction takes several forms. Most generally, men render lifelong *obedience to society* and are "anxious to oblige one another from dawn to dark"—all from the *selfish* desire to win the acceptance and services of others (*First Discourse*, p. 39). Moreover, men acquire what power they have over some, only by submitting to the power of others: "Domination becomes dearer to them than independence, and they consent to wear chains in order to give them to others in turn" (*Second Discourse,* p. 173). "A little parvenu gives himself a hundred masters to acquire ten valets" (*Works*, Vol.3, p. 842 n.).

Even those, like kings, whose power seems to require of them no such obedience, do in fact obey. "The strongest is never strong enough to be the master forever unless he transforms his force into right and obedience into duty" (*Social Contract*, p. 48). All political power is dependent on publicly accepted, legitimating opinions. And "[public] opinion, queen of the world, is not subject to the power of kings; they are themselves her first slaves" (*D'Alembert*, pp. 73–74). For an illustration, one should consider Rousseau's claim that, since the rise of Christianity, the monarchies of the West have been ruined by the power of the priests (*Social Contract*, p. 126). Tyrants too are slaves of their power, spending all their days trying to protect it. The tyrant *appears* to have power since he frequently makes others do what they do not want; in fact, he is enslaved because, to keep and use this "power," he must continually do what *he* does not want.

Rousseau summarized this critique of mastery as follows, in *Emile*:

> Your freedom and your power, extend only as far as your natural strength and not beyond. All the rest is only slavery, illusion and deception. Even *domination is servile* when it is connected with opinion, for you depend on the prejudices of those you govern by prejudices. To lead them *as you please* you must conduct yourself *as they please*. . . . You will always say *"we want,"* and you will always do *what the others want.* The only one who does his will is he who, in order to do it, has no need to put *another's arms* at the end of his own; from which it follows that the first of all goods is not authority but freedom. The truly free man wants only what he can do and does what he pleases. That is my *fundamental maxim* (pp. 83–84; cf. *Works,* Vol. 3, pp. 841–42).

Mastery is slavery, for to command one must obey. All need to use other men, all personal dependence is contradictory and enslaving. That is Rousseau's fundamental maxim.[15]

It follows that all men in bourgeois society—which is rife with personal dependence—are slaves. Yet this famous accusation seems to bring to a head the questionableness of Rousseau's argument. One is inclined to say that whatever discomfort Rousseau himself may have felt in the drawing-rooms of eighteenth-century Paris, the average bourgeois does not feel enslaved. And why should he? Perhaps the task of controlling and using others is at times difficult; it is not so demanding as to be enslaving. On the contrary, the task is often quite enjoyable, especially for those skilled at it, those combining the courage and cleverness extolled by Thrasymachus. Moreover, if the pursuit of power were as futile and enslaving as Rousseau claims, men long ago would have seen this and given it up.

Rousseau knows quite well, however, that modern men are "happy slaves" who do not see the point of his accusations (*First Discourse,* p. 36; *Second Discourse,* p. 104). The bourgeois does not feel his enslavement, Rousseau's argument continues, because he has *internalized* it. From infancy he has felt the necessity of serving and manipulating others to satisfy his own selfish desires. Long before he could understand what was happening to him, he became "socialized." While he remains fundamentally selfish, the constant and pressing demands of society have molded his habits so that he instinctively acts as society requires. He does not genuinely love and live for society as does the patriotic citizen. Society remains for him a *means*—but a means so necessary and general as to be more important to him than any momentary and particular selfish end. Thus his very selfishness has trained him to serve society eagerly and habitually, though ultimately insincerely.

---

[15] Rousseau's argument applies only to the power of individuals and not to that of states. A state, through numbers and unity, can be genuinely stronger than those it enslaves; thus it can genuinely enslave them and thereby truly increase its freedom. "There are some unfortunate situations when one cannot preserve one's freedom except at the expense of others, and when the citizen can only be perfectly free if the slave is completely enslaved. Such was Sparta's situation. As for you, modern peoples, you *have* no slaves, but you *are* slaves. You pay for their freedom with your own. You boast of that preference in vain; I find it more cowardly than humane" (*Social Contract,* p. 103).

Desiring to serve, the bourgeois no longer feels enslaved by society's demands. Only men of unbroken unity of soul, like the savage and like Rousseau, recognize, suffer under and flee the enslavement of society and power. "What a sight the difficult and envied labors of a European minister are for a Carib! How many cruel deaths would that indolent savage not prefer to the horror of such a life. . ." (*Second Discourse,* p. 179). But the bourgeois, broken and tamed, does not see the horror. Having long since fallen from the plenitude of uncompromised unity and selfhood, he no longer remembers or regrets what he has lost in submitting to the yoke of his social position and power.

Thus the bourgeois is enslaved by his effort to use other men, though he does not know it. The internalization of his enslavement—which conceals it from him—splits his soul. Here, then, is the source of disunity. The bourgeois is divided between the inclinations of his selfishness and the internalized need to serve others that very selfishness produces. He spends his life concerned with others—to control them—though he loves only himself. As Rousseau says, he floats between being good for himself and good for others. Having internalized the self-contradiction of using other men, he is divided by selfish selflessness.

The nature of disunity can be clarified further by examining more closely the selfishly motivated service to others the bourgeois performs. He must not only perform certain actions, but also adopt certain attitudes and postures. Men seeking to supply their weakness by using others cannot do so through force alone; they must use fraud. Man's capacity to lie and pretend is the primary source of his power to exploit; hence, in accordance with Rousseau's accusation, the bourgeois is an actor and a hypocrite. He must constantly hide his selfishness and affect that disinterested concern for others known as politeness: "Incessantly politeness requires, propriety demands; incessantly usage is followed, never one's own inclinations. One no longer dares to appear as he is" (*First Discourse,* p. 38). Further, he must find out what morals and talents attract consideration: "It is necessary to have them or affect them; for one's own advantage it was necessary to appear to be other than what one in fact was, to be and to seem became two altogether different things" (*Second Discourse,* p. 155).

The split between seeming and being, inner and outer, takes root deep within men and destroys the unity and sincerity of their selfhood. For the dissimulation involved is not an occasional lie, nor the sort of deceit that can be undertaken in a calculated, detached and self-possessed manner. It is the full-time "act" or "role" men unconsciously adopt through socialization (*Works,* Vol. 4, p. 56 variant b); it is the ingrained pretense to concern for others and to "bourgeois respectability" that makes one an accepted member of society, entitled to its benefits and good opinion. The bourgeois—needing security, desiring honor and caught up in the self-augmenting pursuit of power—is utterly dependent on society. He feels this dependence so deeply and constantly as to be barely conscious of it. His dissimulation is correspondingly deep, requiring him to falsify his inner inclinations and beliefs to the point where he scarcely has desires and beliefs of his own. He is left with the negative and formal selfishness of the pursuit of power. The positive, concrete notion of who he is and what he wants has been yielded up for use as a means for the manipulation of others.

Due to his role-playing, the bourgeois has lost his natural self, but he *is* not his role. He is neither himself nor what he pretends to be; therefore, he is nothing. This means he spends his life claiming to others, and to himself, that he cares about what he does not care about, that he feels what he does not feel, and that he believes what he does not believe. He somehow knows, all the while, the falseness of his inner life—because he feels within himself the readiness to change in the face of changed social circumstances—but he no longer knows how to find his true cares, feelings and beliefs. He has nothing inside: he is empty and hollow. When alone, he is lost: "The man of the world is entirely in his mask. Almost never being in himself, he is always alien and ill at ease when forced to go back there. What he is is nothing; what he appears to be is everything for him" (*Emile,* p. 230). Thus, the only mode of caring, feeling and believing that the bourgeois knows is based on *pretending*:

> Everything being reduced to appearances, everything becomes factitious and deceptive: honor, friendship, virtue, and often even vices, about which men finally discover the secret of boasting; in a word, always asking others what we are and never daring to question ourselves on this subject, in the midst of so much philosophy, humanity, politeness, and sublime maxims, we have only a deceitful and frivolous exterior (*Second Discourse,* p. 180).

Everything the bourgeois claims to live for and care about is ultimately only a pretense. He does not live; he only pretends to live.

The importance of lying and dissimulation is indicated by the brief description of the unified man in the passage from *Emile*: "To be something, to be oneself and always one, a man must *act as he speaks*" (cf. *Works,* Vol. 4, p. 59).

Disunity arises, then, from personal dependence and not—to elaborate an earlier point—from *amour-propre* as such. Where men do not use one another, *amour-propre* is not divisive. Compare, for example, the bourgeois with the patriotic citizen. They are alike in the strength of their *amour-propre* or their concern for other men's opinions of them. The citizen, however, loves his fellow-citizens and does not try to use them. He is sincere and unified because his desire to serve others in order to win honor coincides with—and becomes a part of—his love of them. But the bourgeois' "devotion" to others—his politeness, solicitude, conformity and moralism—is merely the contradictory, hence hypocritical and divisive, product of his selfishness. He is divided, not between self-love and *amour-propre,* but between his selfish ends of security, honor and power (which stem from *both* self-love *and amour-propre*) and the all-consuming "services" to others, the phony "social self" required by his use of men as means.[16]

The Problem of Bourgeois Society

Having analyzed the nature and cause of disunity of soul, we are now in a position to state what "bourgeois society" is, according to Rousseau, and what are its defects.

Rousseau's conception of bourgeois or modern society is based on a distinction implicit in much of the preceding discussion. There are two reasons why one man might care about another. The first is caring for the other as an end in himself; the second, needing the other as a *means* to some selfish interest of one's own (personal dependence). Rousseau did not regard this distinction as theoretically fundamental. He thought the two motives stemmed from the common source of self-love—the former resulting when the self is extended over other men through identification or affection. But Rousseau did regard the distinction as of fundamental practical importance: the two motives are mutually exclusive to a high degree; and they have dramatically opposite effects, as we shall see.

The former point may be explained as follows. Men's selfish interests never completely coincide (their bodies being separate), so the more one man needs and depends on the services of another, the more he must be driven to wish (if only secretly) that the other serve him without reciprocity, in short, that the other be his slave. A man's selfish need of others may begin moderately enough, but as we have seen, it tends to "snowball" due to the self-contradictoriness of power. Hence, Rousseau claims "the moral picture, if not of human life, at least of the secret pretensions of the heart of every civilized man" is to be "the sole master of the universe" (*Second Discourse,* p. 195). The necessary, if secret, desire to enslave others destroys all genuine respect and affection for them. For example, excessive sexual desire leads one to treat as objects those one seeks to love; and more generally, a high degree of self-sufficiency is necessary for genuine friendship. The second motive (needing to use others) excludes the first (loving others). Conversely, the more one truly loves and lives for others, the less one needs to use them, because the larger whole for which one lives is more self-sufficient than one's individual self.

Based on these two opposite motives for caring about others, Rousseau distinguishes two kinds of social bonds, and thus two kinds of society. One is based on "mutual esteem and benevolence" or the "love of society"; the other on enlightened selfishness, "mutual dependence" or "personal interest." These bonds are also opposites: "One cannot tighten one of these bonds without the other relaxing as much" (*Narcisse,* p. 968n.). The first kind of social bond is found, according to Rousseau, in two historical conditions. It exists in the most primitive, savage societies, where mutual affection has not yet been destroyed by the development of property, the advancement of reason, the invention of dissimulation and the increase in men's selfish desires. It can also be found in civilized times in those rare cases where the perfection of the art of legislation has led to the creation of a genuine city united by virtue and patriotism (*Narcisse,* p. 969n.; *Works,* Vol. 4, pp. 936–37; *Second Discourse,* pp. 148–51; *Social Contract,* p. 68; *Political Economy,* pp. 217–24). The second, selfish kind of social bond is found wherever primitive societies have decayed—as they inevitably must—and imperfect states have been established. It is found, then, more or less *everywhere* in civilized times. Indeed, when Rousseau speaks in general about "society," he usually means this second kind of society.

---

[16] The primacy of the problem of personal dependence explains the importance of economics in Rousseau's analysis of society and culture. In the *Second Discourse,* for example (pp. 150–51), Rousseau claims the tribal stage was the "happiest and most durable epoch" and that tribal man—who had already developed *amour-propre*—still "lived free, healthy, good and happy." Slavery and disunity did not arise until "the moment when one man *needed the help* of another," a moment which came with the invention of the division of labor and private property.

But Rousseau also distinguishes "modern" or "bourgeois" societies from such societies in general. The defining characteristic of modern societies is that the selfish kind of social bond is especially and even unnaturally predominant. "Ancient politicians incessantly talked about morals and virtue, those of our time talk only of business and money" (*First Discourse,* p. 51). In Rousseau's view the exaggerated reliance on the bond of mutual dependence has been produced by the conscious efforts of modern philosophers and statesmen (beginning with Hobbes). To analyze its effects is the primary purpose of Rousseau's critical works.

Rousseau understood very well the attractions of the modern view. He agreed one could more or less hold men together in society through bonds of personal dependence and self-interest. And he appreciated the ingenuity of a social system which, by building on the low but solid motives of vanity and greed, could avoid the difficulties attending reliance upon "morals and virtue." He saw, for instance, the usefulness of this system for ridding politics of intolerance, fanaticism and the other evils of a priestly and otherworldly religion. Furthermore, free of the need to maintain morals and virtue, such a system could allow intellectual as well as economic free enterprise: the free flowering of arts and sciences, the enlightenment and "high culture" that make bourgeois society so pleasant to people of taste and intellect, so congenial to those of genius (*First Discourse,* pp. 35–36; *Narcisse,* pp. 971–72; *Social Contract,* pp. 126–30; *Works,* Vol. 3, pp. 224–25, 227).

In spite of these advantages and his century's enthusiasm for them, Rousseau opposed and sought to reverse this basic tendency of modern thought and statecraft.

> Of all the truths that I have proposed for the consideration of the wise, here is the most astonishing and the most cruel. Our writers all regard as the masterpiece of the statecraft of our century the sciences, arts, luxury, commerce, laws and other bonds which, by tightening among men those knots of society based on *personal interest,* place them all in a *mutual dependence,* give them *reciprocal needs* and common *interests,* and oblige each of them to contribute to the happiness of others in order to secure his own. These ideas are fine, no doubt, and are set forth in a favorable light. But, in examining them with attention and without partiality, one finds much to counteract the advantages which they seem at first to present.
>
> It is indeed a very wonderful thing to have placed mankind under the impossibility of living together without hindering, supplanting, deceiving, betraying and destroying each other! It is now necessary for us to keep ourselves from ever being *seen such as we are*: as, for two men whose interests may coincide, a hundred thousand, perhaps, have interests opposed to them, and there is no other means of succeeding except by *deceiving and ruining* all these men. Such is the deadly source of violences, treasons, villainies and of all the horrors which are necessitated by a state of things where each man, *pretending* to work for the fortune or reputation of others, seeks only to raise his own above that of the others and at their expense (*Narcisse,* pp. 968–69; cf. *First Discourse,* p. 51; *Second Discourse,* pp. 156, 172–75; *Works,* Vol. 4, p. 936; *Political Economy,* pp. 216–17).[17]

Modern bourgeois society, based on personal interest and mutual dependence makes men unjust. There may well be a reasonably stable social order; there may be toleration, fine manners, sophisticated works of art, and high-minded discourses. It will all be bourgeois hypocrisy. Beneath this social order and the high culture that adorns it, men will manipulate, exploit, oppress and devour one another. Mutual enmity and injustice are inevitable, not because man is by nature wicked, but because this system, by building on and encouraging personal dependence, has so arranged things that each man can make himself happy only by harming others.

Furthermore, the injustice of modern society is *condemnable* because it is as bad for the wolves as for their prey, for masters as for slaves: in both it is accompanied by disunity of soul. For the cause of men's injustice is the same as of disunity: personal dependence or the need to use other men as means.

Rousseau's overall critique of bourgeois society may be formulated as follows. The essence and genius of modern politics was to build society on the contradiction of personal dependence: to derive men's selflessness and sociability from their very selfishness. This social bond has indeed succeeded in holding men together, but because it is a contradiction it has resulted in both injustice among society's members and disunity within them; it has destroyed social and psychic unity. In modern society "our needs bring us together in proportion as our passions divide us, and the more we become enemies of our fellow men, the less we can do without them" (*Geneva Manuscript,* p. 158). This simple but oddly elusive statement summarizes the whole of Rousseau's social analysis.

Modern society rests upon men's selfish interests, and infinitely increases them. Now the greater our selfishness, the less we love others, but the more we need them. Needing to use others, wishing secretly to enslave them if we could, and also being in competition with them, we become their enemies. Yet though we are enemies, we cannot separate, for our *need of* each other is precisely what makes us enemies. Thus the more we are enemies, the closer we are bound to each other. We are brought and held together by our need to harm each other. As a result, society becomes nothing but a system for secret exploitation. Modern society pushes us simultaneously toward and away from others; it binds us together by making us opposed; it thus organizes us for mutual crime and injustice.

---

[17] For a discussion of this passage and related ideas, see Keohane (1978). See also Lovejoy (1961, pp. 153–215).

Looked at from the other side of the contradiction, modern society pushes us simultaneously toward and away from ourselves. It makes us selfish, hence it makes us need to use others. And lacking the force to enslave others or to be unjust all the time, we must become "sociable," we must serve, court and flatter others. Politeness is Rousseau's image for this aspect of society: doing everything to please others, but all for our own interest. One is never "polite" with those one truly cares for (*Works,* Vol. 3, p. 74). Politeness—and all the other forms of "socialization" and conformism—is selfish selflessness; and that is the contradiction within the bourgeois. He spends his life serving others, precisely because he cares only about himself.

The problem of bourgeois society is the contradiction that lies at its base: the contradiction of personal dependence or of sociability produced from selfishness. Due to the contradiction, men are good neither for themselves nor for others. Because they are sociable as well as selfish, they lack unity; because they are selfish as well as sociable, they lack justice. Injustice and disunity are two sides of the same coin, and bourgeois society—based, as it is, on personal dependence—is the cause of both.[18]

The Political Solution

The character of Rousseau's various solutions to the problem of unity and justice follows directly from the above analysis. The contradiction of society can be resolved in the direction of either of its terms: complete selfishness or complete sociability. This fact leads to the well-known bifurcation of Rousseau's thought into the alternatives of the good, solitary, natural man (the pre-tribal savage or "*pauvre* Jean-Jacques" the romantic dreamer and lover of nature), and the denatured, virtuous and patriotic citizen (J. J. Rousseau *citoyen de Genève,* last of the Romans or first of the Kantians).

I will conclude by briefly showing how the preceding analysis of the problem can be used to explain the major features—and ultimate limitations—of Rousseau's political solution. We have seen that social men are disunified (and unjust) because they have a selfish need for social means. To restore them to unity of soul in the context of society, one must uproot the selfish "pole" of the contradiction and transform their concern with social means into an end in itself. Hence the primary task of politics and legislation is to transform men into citizens by eliminating all need to use other men, while promoting the love of other men (*Emile,* p. 85; *Social Contract,* p. 77).

The major features of Rousseau's politics follow from this task. To eliminate personal dependence on the economic level, a relative *equality of fortunes* must be maintained, and sumptuary laws should be used to prevent the immoderation, selfishness and mutual dependence caused by luxury, "the worst of all evils in any state whatever" (*Second Discourse,* p. 199). On the political level, personal dependence can be eliminated by the comprehensive and absolute *rule of law,* popularly enacted. Law must be comprehensive so that men's mutual relations will be guided, as much as possible, by impersonal principle and not by selfish or personal interests. Law should be popularly enacted so as not to become a means by which the strong use the weak. And it must be absolute—the General Will must be sovereign in the strict sense—so that no clever politician, sophist or priest can evade it through appeal to his "natural rights" or to his "superior wisdom" regarding the Natural Law or the Will of God (*Second Discourse,* pp. 79–80, 171–76; *First Discourse,* pp. 48–52; *Social Contract,* pp. 55, 77; *Works,* Vol. 3, pp. 510–11; *Confessions,* pp. 404–05).

These same institutions will also promote love of one's fellow-citizens or patriotism. The citizens possess the sovereign power, enjoy the dignity and safety coming from the equal protection of the laws, and are not economically enslaved to anyone; therefore, they will love the city as their own and as the source of all good things. To be lovable, the city should also be *small,* so that the "sweet habit of seeing and knowing one another turn[s] love of the fatherland into love of the citizens" (*Second Discourse,* p. 79); and it must be *unified,* so there is a single city to love, and not a pluralistic collection of competing parties and rival interest groups. Patriotism should also be fostered by *public education* which, from an early age, attaches men's hearts and ambitions to the city. Finally, these morals, inherently fragile because contrary to nature, need to be supported by a *civil religion* and protected through *censorship* of the arts and sciences (*Political Economy,* pp. 217–24; *Works,* Vol. 3, pp. 966–70; *Social Contract,* pp. 124–32; *First Discourse,* pp. 36–37, 62–64).

---

[18] I have not stopped to show, at each point, how the various elements of Rousseau's description of the bourgeois have been developed by later social critics. One may form a good idea of the influence of Rousseau's description, or at least of the importance of the phenomena he described, by considering the terms of analysis made current by later thinkers; terms such as: "Divided self," "hollow men," "alienation," "identity crisis," "loss of simplicity," "inauthenticity," "other-directedness," and so forth.

Such institutions, and the patriotism they foster, produce a unified city. Each man works together with the others for a common end: the preservation, freedom and union of the city. Each lives for the others, or rather for the communal self which, together, they compose and share. Their love of the city will find its greatest consummation in *public festivals* and celebrations, where "each sees and loves himself in the others" and where the city, gathering all its being in one place, gives itself over to the sentiment of its collective existence (*D'Alembert,* pp. 126–37).

The patriotic unity of the city will produce, in turn, unity of soul in its members. Since each citizen lives for the whole, each is unselfish and thus in little (selfish) need of other men. And since all live for the whole, each can trust it—working through impersonal laws—to provide him with what little he does need. Therefore, men have no need to use others, no self-augmenting pursuit of power, no selfish need to serve others—hence no disunity of soul. Each lives for the single and unified end of the city's good. In other words, disunity is the internalization of our enslavement to what is outside and opposed to us, following from our loss of our primitive self-sufficiency. It is overcome by extending the self to that larger, ordered and self-sufficient whole which includes within it the individual self and all that it depends on. Unity with other men leads to unity within the soul (*Works,* Vol. 3, pp. 510–11; *Social Contract,* p. 55; *Emile,* pp. 39–40).

This condition of perfect unity and justice, however, would be possible only if one could truly denature men, truly uproot their selfishness. But, as Rousseau explains,

> Art, which can disguise, bend and even stifle nature, cannot change it altogether. It extends the germ of our passions rather than giving it a contrary direction as would be necessary to make us truly civil, that is to give us that civility of heart which would make us prefer others to ourselves (*Works,* Vol. 4, p. 56).

Invincible nature sets a limit to men's capacity to transform the natural self into the communal self. Men are separate individuals; and the city is not a natural organism or genuine whole with "a kind of central nervous system" which could truly unite the good and bad, pleasure and pain, life and death of its parts (*Geneva Manuscript,* pp. 158–60). Even in the best city the citizens must be divided, in their inclinations, between the city's good and their own. It would seem Rousseau has only succeeded in replacing one form of disunity with another. The citizen may not have the full-blown "needy selfishness" that splits the bourgeois, but he will be torn in his desires between his genuine love for the city and his ineradicable love of himself.

Unity of soul (and of the city) *can,* however, be achieved according to Rousseau; but only in a fundamentally new way. It must be based on *force* rather than inclination or desire. Patriotism, love of the city, can never be complete; men must be forced to be free and unified—in the city, by the government, in the soul, by "will." Through will, men can forcibly *repress* their inevitable selfish desires in the name of duty or moral obligation. Such moral self-conquest through force of will Rousseau calls "virtue" or "moral freedom" (*Emile,* p. 444; *Social Contract,* p. 56; *Works,* Vol. 4, pp. 1142–43).

Force or virtue, in this sense, unifies men's souls in two ways. First, reinforcing their spontaneous love of the city with a moral commitment to the city, it prevents citizens from reverting to the injustice and exploitation that splits the bourgeois. However, in doing so through force, through repressing and not uprooting men's selfish desires, virtue still leaves men divided in their inclinations.

The second and more significant contribution of virtue to unity is to make unity possible in spite of the division among the inclinations. As we have just seen, virtue consists in forcibly resisting one's desires. Such resistance is possible because men are, as Rousseau (sometimes) says, "free agents." While animals are wholly determined by their inclinations, men seem to have something in their souls in addition to inclination—will—which enables them to determine themselves; that is, to act and also to *define themselves* independently of their desires. They can, as it were, create or assert a new self and then choose or reject their inclinations in accordance with it. They can act "on principle" (*Second Discourse,* p. 114; *Social Contract,* pp. 55–56; *Emile,* pp. 444, 280–81). The new self or unity thus produced is a new kind of self. It is no longer a "sensuous" or "natural" self based on what one desires and is, but a "moral" and "ideal" self based on what one wills and respects.

Hence the moral man can fix his identity above the flux and conflict of his desires. He attains unity of will in place of unity of inclination by adhering to a moral principle or law. Furthermore, over time, the "man of principle" is always doing and being the same thing because his various choices and actions are adopted as so many particular applications of the same universal principle. Through virtue, then, the citizen attains a forced and self-imposed unity that replaces the spontaneous harmony of inclination he has irretrievably lost.

This view, that virtue—based as it is on self-conquest—gives men unity of soul, would be unintelligible on the negative interpretation of unity, which understands it as the absence of the pain of inner conflict. It is intelligible only in terms of the positive meaning of unity: existence.

Virtue may require a painful self-conquest, but it makes one more real and alive. Through "integrity" the virtuous man overcomes the bourgeois' disintegration. In contrast to the phoniness, vacillation, emptiness and enervation of the bourgeois, the virtuous man knows who he is and what he stands for. He has the characteristics of unity described in the passage from *Emile*: "A man must act as he speaks; he must always be decisive in making his choice, make it in a lofty style and always stick to it." The unity and selfhood coming from virtue is strict and forceful because morality allows no compromise with rival inclinations. One cannot be "half-moral." Moreover, the desires and feelings may change over time, but the moral self is forever what it does today. In short, moral obligation is "unitary": the whole of it is at stake in each of one's momentary duties. Hence, the virtuous man necessarily gathers up and acts for his whole self in every moral action. He is unified, concentrated and intensely *there*.

Thus Rousseau's political solution to the problem of bourgeois society requires virtue as well as patriotism. Though virtue or justice requires pain, self-overcoming and the neglect of one's interest in the narrow sense, it gives to social men the greatest unity, hence the fullest existence, of which they are capable. The just man, then, is happy, and justice is good. Consequently, justice is binding on social men.[19]

Ultimately, however, Rousseau found the unity attainable through virtue to be imperfect. So long as men are in pain, their souls can never truly come to rest. And since men can never really detach themselves from their desires, virtue is too repressive of the self. The virtuous man asserts that he is his will and not his desires; that he has created or re-created his own self through will and commitment. But Rousseau was too materialistic and sensual a thinker to believe him (*Confessions,* pp. 408–09).[20] Virtue, like love, is an illusion, if a useful and noble one. Man cannot cease to care about the things he desires, nor abandon his individual, sensuous self and wholly relocate his existence. In Rousseau's view nature is malleable in that one can easily fail to be oneself, but invincible in that one can never *truly* be anything other than oneself (*Héloïse,* pp. 563–64; *Works,* Vol. 4, pp. 56–57; *Emile,* pp. 38–39). The ultimate invincibility of nature and of the natural self, which led Rousseau from patriotism to virtue, finally leads him to abandon the moral-political realm altogether and to turn to the perfect natural unity of the solitary dreamer (*Works,* Vol. 3, p. 1894; *R. Juge de J.-J.,* pp. 667–72, 810–25; *Reveries,* pp. 1042–49, 1052–53).[21]

References

Bergson, Henri (1935, first published 1932). *Two Sources of Morality and Religion.* Translated by R. A. Audra and C. Brereton. Garden City: Anchor.

Berman, Marshall (1970). *The Politics of Authenticity.* New York: Atheneum.

Bloom, Allan, trans. (1979). *Emile or On Education.* New York: Basic Books.

Bradley, F. H. (1968, first published 1893). *Appearance and Reality.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Burgelin, Pierre (1952). *La Philosophie de l'Existence de J.-J. Rousseau.* Paris: Presses Universitaire de France.

Cassirer, Ernst (1954). *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.* Translated by Peter Gay. New York: Columbia University Press.

______ (1963). *Rousseau, Kant and Goethe.* Translated

---

[19] The argument that morality is good because it unifies the soul is similar to that of Plato's *Republic* (see 350d–352b, 441d–444a). See also Bergson (1935, p. 15): "Obligation, which we look upon as a bond between men, first *binds us to ourselves.*"

[20] Rousseau never unambiguously asserts, let alone proves, the existence of free will (except, of course, in the Profession of Faith where Rousseau's argument relies upon the "inner sentiment"). In a "fragment on liberty" (*Works,* Vol. 3, pp. 1894–95, only in the post-1975 editions) he claims that "whether the acts of my will are in my own power or whether they follow a foreign impulse I do not know and I care very little to know." Furthermore, in several places, Rousseau admits virtue is based on passion or inclination (*Héloïse,* p. 493; *Emile,* pp. 397, 445; *Works,* Vol. 3, p. 501). He also claims it is humanly impossible to be virtuous without believing in Divine rewards (*Emile,* pp. 314–15; *Works,* Vol. 4, pp. 636–37, 1142–43; *Geneva Manuscript,* p. 195).

[21] It is true that Rousseau presents his rejection of the life of virtue as due to a personal incapacity for self-conquest (*Reveries,* pp. 1052–53; *Confessions,* pp. 416–17). But he also claims this "incapacity" is rational (*R. Juge de J.-J.,* p. 822), that he is the best of men (*Confessions,* p. 517) and that the inhabitants of an "ideal world" would have a similar "incapacity" (*R. Juge de J.-J.,* pp. 668–72).

by J. Gutmann, P. Kristeller and J. Randall, Jr. New York: Harper and Row.

Charvet, John (1974). *The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Derathe, Robert (1948). *Le Rationalisme de Jean-Jacques Rousseau.* Paris: Presses Universitaire de France.

Ellenburg, Stephen (1976). *Rousseau's Political Philosophy: An Interpretation From Within.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Galston, William (1975). *Kant and the Problem of History.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gilson, Etienne (1960). *The Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine.* New York: Random House.

Green, T. H. (1941). *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation.* London: Longmans, Green.

Gurvitch, Georges (1932). *L'Idée du Droit Social. Notion et Système du Droit Social. Histoire Doctrinal Depuis Le XVII^e^ Siècle Jusqu'à la Fin du XIX^e^ Siècle.* Paris: Libraire du Receuil Sirey.

Hendel, Charles W. (1962, first published 1934). *Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Moralist.* New York: Bobbs-Merrill.

Keohane, Nannerl (1978). " 'The Masterpiece of Policy in Our Century': Rousseau on the Morality of the Enlightenment." *Political Theory* 6: 457–84.

Levine, Andrew (1976). *The Politics of Autonomy: A Kantian Reading of Rousseau's Social Contract.* Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

Lovejoy, Arthur (1961). *Reflections on Human Nature.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

Manuel, Frank E. (1978). "A Dream of Eupsychia." *Daedalus* 107: 1–12.

Masson, P. M., ed. (1914). *La Profession de Foi du Vicaire Savoyard.* Fribourg: Universite de Fribourg.

Masters, Roger (1968). *The Political Philosophy of Rousseau.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Poulet, Georges (1956). *Studies in Human Time.* Translated by Elliot Coleman. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *Confessions.* In *Oeuvres Complètes,* Vol. 1, pp. 1–656.

______ (1978). *Discourse on Political Economy.* In Roger Masters (ed.) and Judith Masters (trans.), *On the Social Contract, with Geneva Manuscript and Political Economy.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

______ (1979). *Emile or On Education.* Translated by Allan Bloom. New York: Basic Books.

______ (1964). *The First and Second Discourses.* Edited and translated by Roger Masters. New York: St. Martin's Press.

______ (1978). *The Geneva Manuscript.* In Roger Masters (ed.) and Judith Masters (trans.), *On the Social Contract, with Geneva Manuscript and Political Economy.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

______ (1960). *Letter to M. d'Alembert.* In Allan Bloom (trans.), *Politics and the Arts: Letter to M. d'Alembert on the Theatre.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

______. Preface to *Narcisse.* In *Oeuvres Complètes,* Vol. 2, pp. 959–74.

______. *La Nouvelle Héloïse.* In *Oeuvres Complètes,* Vol. 2, pp. 3–760.

______ (1959–69). *Oeuvres Complètes.* Edited by Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond. Paris: Bibliotèque de Pléiade. (Cited as *Works*; translations by the author).

______. *Les Rêveries du Promeneur Solitaire.* In Oeuvres Complètes, Vol. 1, pp. 993–1099.

______. *Rousseau Juge de Jean-Jacques.* In *Oeuvres Complètes,* Vol. 1, pp. 657–992.

______ (1978). *The Social Contract.* In Roger Masters (ed.) and Judith Masters (trans.), *On the Social Contract, with Geneva Manuscript and Political Economy.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Shklar, Judith (1969). *Men and Citizens. A Study of Rousseau's Social Theory.* London: Cambridge University Press.

Starobinski, Jean (1971, first published 1957). *J.-J. Rousseau: la Transparence et l'Obstacle.* Paris: Gallimard.

Stelling-Michaud, S. (1962). "Rousseau et l'Injustice Sociale." In *Jean-Jacques Rousseau.* Neuchâtel: La Baconnière.

Temmer, Mark (1958). *Time in Rousseau and Kant.* Paris: Librairie Minard.

Van Laere, Francois (1968). *Une Lecture du Temps Dans la Nouvelle Héloïse.* Neuchâtel: La Baconnière.

Rousseau's Inhibited Radicalism: An Analysis of His Political Thought in Light of His Economic Ideas

YOAV PELED
University of California, Los Angeles

It is generally agreed that Rousseau affected a pessimistic posture toward modernity and that this posture resulted from his failure to deal with the problems of modern industrial society. Underlying this failure, I would like to suggest, is a contradiction between Rousseau's economic ideas, i.e., his defense of private property, and his political ones, i.e., his call for the creation of a communal society in which freedom would be realized through obedience to the general will.

In a society based on private property, as Rousseau had to admit, an inevitable conflict exists between private economic interests and the general interest of society. In order to minimize that conflict, so that the general will would have a chance to prevail, Rousseau advocated a return to a simple society based on a primitive economy. This, however, was bound to be a short-lived solution, because, as he very well knew, the forces of economic development could not be arrested, and the appearance of a full-blown competitive economy could not be long delayed. Thus, Rousseau's clear insight into the problems of an emerging bourgeois society, coupled with his inability to find a way of alleviating these problems, constituted the root causes of his pessimism.

It is generally agreed that Rousseau affects a pessimistic posture toward modernity and that the root of his pessimism is twofold: on the one hand, he is convinced that the direction in which society is moving is bound to aggravate what he considers the most destructive tendencies within it; on the other, he realizes that his proposals for reform are grounded on precisely those conditions which are being undermined by the historical process (Masters, 1968, pp. 420–38; De Jouvenel, 1961–62, pp. 83–96; Fetscher, 1962, p. 54; Gossman, 1964, pp. 338–40). The problem, as Roger Masters points out (1968, p. 421), is that although Rousseau's analysis of modern society is extremely keen and insightful, the solution he proposes for that society's problems suffers from a "grave weakness." The weakness, Masters goes on to argue (1968, p. 422), lies in a disjunction between Rousseau's "principles of political right," i.e., his insistence on obedience to the general will as the ultimate political virtue, and his "science of legislation," i.e., his own preference for a small rustic community which could recapture the spirit of the ancient city-state. This disjunction entails a separation of ends and means, leading ultimately to an inverted sense of priorities: obedience to the general will becomes a self-sustaining principle, while the question of the preferred social order becomes a "prudential concern of secondary importance." Thus Rousseau is left with very little to say about a society in which (like in most contemporary ones) the principle of popular sovereignty serves to legitimize the very social inequities he is protesting against.

In this essay I will suggest that what appears as a separation of political ends and means is in reality a reflection of a more fundamental problem—the separation of politics and economics. My argument will be based on the assumption that the way in which people organize themselves to satisfy their material needs exerts a very strong influence on all other aspects of social life. (This, as I will show below, is an assumption which Rousseau himself shared.) Reciprocally, I assume that an author's views regarding the proper organization of the economy can be very revealing of his social and political doctrines. In Rousseau's case, I will argue, both his pessimistic posture toward modernity and the contradictory nature of some of his political proposals (i.e., those aspects of his thought that have given rise to the many conflicting interpretations of Rousseau and to the debates over the true character of his political theory) stem from the ambiguities which characterize his economic ideas. This ambiguity, in turn, reflects Rousseau's ambivalence with regard to the institution of private property (see Gay, 1975, pp. 3–8; McManners, 1968, pp. 4–5).

In his critique of civil society (related in the first section), Rousseau identifies the division of labor, private property and exchange as the main sources

---

I am greatly indebted to Blair Campbell for his comments, criticism and support. I would also like to thank Robert Brenner, Mark Gavre, Jack Jacobs, Jon Lifschutz, Teddie Maldonado, Paul O'Donnel, David Rapoport, Wendy Sarvasy, Gershon Shafir, Victor Wolfenstein, Shimshon Zelniker, the anonymous referees of the *APSR* and, especially, Horit Herman-Peled.

of moral and political corruption in that society. At the same time, he considers private property and exchange to be inevitable, if economic cooperation is to take place, and hence to be the cornerstones of society and prerequisites for civilized living. He is thus placed in the peculiar position of criticizing the economic system based on private property and exchange (a system which I will refer to as "market economy")[1] while defending these institutions themselves. It is this paradox, I am going to contend, that prevents Rousseau from dealing successfully with the problems of modern industrial society.

In the second section I will relate Rousseau's attempt to find an economic system which, while preserving private property, minimizes the division of labor (hence the need for exchange) in order to prevent the more pernicious aspects of the market economy—competition, luxury, and, primarily, inequality—from developing. This attempt, I will argue, ends in failure, because it is based on a static economy which, as Rousseau himself believes, will not be able to satisfy society's long-term needs.

Rousseau's political solution to the paradox presented in the first section will be examined in the third. That solution is based on the total alienation of each individual, with all his powers and goods, to the community, and on obedience to the general will. The latter is the will of the community as an autonomous moral being, and is also the will of each individual as a rational, moral self. But the alienation Rousseau has in mind (because he is committed to private property) is only momentary, and the society it creates, I will argue, is bound to be torn by an incessant conflict between the will of the citizens—the general will—and the wills of particular men. To resolve this conflict, Rousseau must rely on the mythical Legislator, who would miraculously alter the nature of men and turn them into virtuous citizens. But since this transformation is not based on the real conditions of life in a society based on private property, Rousseau's political solution fails, just as his economic one did.

The reasons for Rousseau's commitment to private property will be examined in the conclusion. My argument there will be that Rousseau's essentially liberal premises regarding the nature of man, his freedom and his society, made him identify bourgeois society with the idea of society as such and consider private property a constituent element of the self. Because of these views, Rousseau could not conceive of a modern, economically dynamic society which would be free of inequality and corruption. He thus confined the hope of his "principles of political right" ever being realized to small, rustic communities such as Corsica, where, he thought, private property could coexist with government by the general will. But this solution, as he very well knew, was bound to be short-lived: the pressure of economic needs would force even Corsica to succumb to the temptations of the market, and to the corruption which would inevitably come in its wake. His pessimistic view of the future resulted, then, from the realization that his fine political principles were doomed by the inevitable tide of economic progress.

1. Inequality, Private Property and Exchange

In Rousseau's view, the greatest sin committed by civil society—the sin responsible for all the evil with which that society is plagued—is the perpetration of social inequality: "The greatest evil has already come about when there are poor men to be protected and rich men to be restrained" (*Political Economy,* p. 306; see also Colletti, 1972, pp. 144–45; Gay, 1975, p. 28). And elsewhere: "It is plainly contrary to the law of nature, however defined, that . . . the privileged few should gorge themselves with superfluities, while the starving multitude are in want of the bare necessities of life" (*Inequality,* p. 271). Extreme wealth and poverty, which, Rousseau believes, are "naturally inseparable," bring about both moral corruption and the loss of political freedom (*Social Contract,* pp. 18–19). At the same time, however, he also believes that the potential for inequality, with all its consequent evil is inherent in the basic economic arrangements into which people must enter when they come together to form a society.

In the *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality,* his critical essay on the development of civil society, Rousseau identifies the social division of labor, private property and exchange as the primary causes of inequality:

> So long as [people] undertook what a single person could accomplish and confined themselves to such acts as did not require the joint labour of several hands, they lived free, healthy, honest, and happy lives. . . . But from the moment one man began to stand in need of the help of another; from the moment it appeared advantageous for one man to have enough provisions for two, equality disappeared, property was introduced, work became indispensable, and vast forests became smiling fields . . . where slavery

---

[1] The designation of that economic system "market economy," and the society based on it "bourgeois society," is meant to distinguish the society Rousseau criticizes from the one he presents as his model—a small, rustic community, based on a natural economy (cf. Masters, 1968, p. 420). By making this designation I do not, of course, mean to imply that Rousseau himself either thought or wrote in these terms.

> and misery were soon seen to germinate and grow up with the crops (pp. 243–44; see also pp. 234–35, 248–50).

Before they had reached that point, people had to move quite a fair distance from their natural state, a state in which man was "an equal stranger to war and to all ties, neither standing in need of his fellow-creatures nor having any desire to hurt them, and perhaps not even distinguishing them one from another" (*Inequality,* p. 230). What brought people together, through a long, gradual process over a "multitude of ages" (*Social Contract,* pp. 18–19), was not an innate social instinct (*Geneva Manuscript,* pp. 159–62; *Inequality,* p. 220; *Languages,* p. 32; *Emile,* p. 182) but rather the pressure of material needs. Natural calamities, climatic changes, and diminishing food supplies, forced them to seek one another's help and enter into some kind of cooperative arrangements. If not for these needs, Rousseau claims in his *Essay on the Origin of Languages* (pp. 38–39), "I cannot imagine how they would ever be induced to give up their primitive liberty . . . and impose upon themselves unnecessarily the labours and the inevitable misery of social life" (cf. Shklar, 1969, p. 175; Durkheim, 1960, pp. 76–77). And once people had been brought together by material needs, the social arrangements which they entered into were, of necessity, such as would enable them to satisfy those needs in the most efficient way: "Everything corresponds in its origin to the need of providing subsistence" (*Languages,* p. 38).

The initial interaction between people was limited, by Rousseau's account, to occasional hunting trips and to activities of "love and leisure" which did not necessitate the creation of new social institutions (*Inequality,* pp. 237–41). Subsequently, however, the need arose for cultivation of the soil, and agriculture (with its accompanying art, metallurgy) was introduced. Since the aggregate of individuals was not united by the bonds of community at that point, the new task had to be approached through individual, rather than collective enterprise. But if the individual was to take upon himself an occupation which required so much "wearisome labour," some arrangement must have been made to guarantee him the future enjoyment of the fruit of this labor. The only conceivable arrangement (given Rousseau's basic premise) was private property: "How could such a situation induce men to cultivate the land," he asks, "until it was regularly parcelled out among them?" (*Inequality,* p. 212). Thus the introduction of agriculture led to "property, government, and laws, and gradually to the misery and crime that are inseparable for our species from the knowledge of good and evil" (*Languages,* p. 37).

The postulate of a pre-social state of nature, coupled with a materialistic view of human motivation, thus led Rousseau to the conclusion that private property has played an indispensable role in the evolution of society (*Inequality,* pp. 234–35, 246). Even families, he argues, did not exist until men had their first form of property—huts (*Inequality,* pp. 214, 239; see also Rousseau's criticism of Locke's argument in defense of the natural status of the human family, 1964, pp. 213–20). Moreover, he does not see this role as having diminished at all through the ages. In his own day too, he is convinced, abolishing "*meum* and *tuum*" would mean giving up society for a return to the state of nature (*Inequality,* p. 281). As he states in the *Discourse on Political Economy,* "The right of property is the most sacred right of citizenship, and even more important, in some respects, than liberty itself" (p. 311). It is a right of such importance for three different reasons: first, because property "more nearly affects the preservation of life" than does liberty; second, because "being more easily usurped and more difficult to defend than life, the law ought to pay greater attention to what is more easily taken away"; and, "finally, because property is the . . . real guarantee of the undertakings of citizens: for if property were not answerable for personal actions, nothing would be easier than to evade duties and laugh at the laws" (*Political Economy,* pp. 311–12).

Of the three reasons for upholding the right of property mentioned by Rousseau, the first two are based on the right of the individual to have his private sphere protected against the encroachment of others, while the third is based on the interest of the community in having a sanction over the individual. This dual justification reflects Rousseau's ambivalent attitude towards private property, and his dissatisfaction with the traditional liberal justifications for it. For what he is really saying in the passage just quoted is "not only that law is made for the benefit of private property but also that private property is made for the benefit of law" (Meszaros, 1970, p. 58; cf. *Social Contract,* pp. 21–22; *Political Economy,* pp. 286, 320). And it is only in connection with the latter part of the argument that Rousseau is willing to say that, not only historically, but logically as well, private property is "the true foundation of civil society" (*Political Economy,* p. 311). (The more general point suggested by this argument, namely, that the only way to secure the interests of the community is by safeguarding those of private individuals, will be examined later on.)

Like private property, exchange, too, has maintained its significance as a social institution throughout history. Rousseau's use of the contract as a metaphor for social relations illustrates the moral import which the equitable exchange of rights and obligations has in his social scheme.

His conception of justice, for instance, is clearly based on the notion of exchange: justice, he argues, could not have existed before there was private property, because "to secure each man his own, it had to be possible for each to have something" (*Inequality,* p. 246; cf. *Emile,* p. 152; Kateb, 1969, p. 247; Shklar, 1969, p. 178). The importance of private property and exchange is also illustrated in the education of *Emile*: "The first idea he needs," Rousseau remarks, "is not that of liberty but of property" (pp. 62–63). The second idea is that of reciprocity, of exchange: "If you will give me this pleasure, I will repay it when required" (p. 125).

According to Rousseau, the appearance of social division of labor, private property and exchange, alters not only the way in which people go about providing for their material needs, but causes a profound psychological transformation as well. *Amour de soi,* that "natural feeling" of self-respect which guided human behavior in the state of nature, is turned into an intensely competitive *amour-propre,* a "purely relative and factitious feeling, which . . . leads each individual to make more of himself than of any other" (*Inequality,* p. 223n.). This psychological transformation reflects the fact that in an "unrestrictedly competitive society" (Fetscher, 1962, p. 41), people depend on one another for their very self-esteem (*Inequality,* p. 270; cf. Fetscher, 1962, p. 38; Charvet, 1972, p. 469). For in such a society, one's social position is determined not by any absolute standard, but by one's situation relative to other people (*Inequality,* pp. 248, 266). Thus people are required to "possess or to affect" (p. 247) the resources (both material and moral) which could help them secure the goods and services of others for the lowest possible price, in order to enhance their own standing in society. It is only from this point on, according to Rousseau, that Hobbes' "restless desire of power after power" (1975, p. 161) becomes the motivating drive behind human behavior.

In time, the internal dynamic of the market, intensified by the driving force of *amour-propre,* translates the small differences of skill, which naturally exist between people, into an ever-growing inequality of riches (*Inequality,* pp. 246–47). As inequality reaches the point where some people come to depend on others for their very subsistence, a Hobbesian war over property breaks out, which, in turn, results in a social contract and the establishment of civil society (*Inequality,* pp. 246–52).

The account given by Rousseau of the social contract, and of the society it serves to legitimize, highlights one of the main differences separating him from most other members of the Enlightenment. Unlike his fellow *philosophes* (and especially the political economists among them), Rousseau does not believe that the mere imposition of a legal framework over the competitive economic system can ensure that the pursuit of conflicting individual interests will give rise to the general good (see Goldmann, 1973, p. 27; Colletti, 1972, p. 205). As he vividly argues in the *Discourse on Inequality,* a contract which only provides laws that attempt to limit and regulate the basic social conflict, while leaving its underlying causes (i.e., private property, inequality and *amour-propre*) intact, a contract which fails to "alter men" (*Inequality,* pp. 263–64), to transform their egoism into a feeling of solidarity and cooperation, cannot establish a morally and politically viable society. The society it *can* establish is one in which "the interests of every individual dictate rules to him directly opposite to those the public reason dictates to the community in general" (*Inequality,* p. 268). Such a society would soon cease to function as a self-governing community. At that point, a Lockean "second contract" would have to be enacted, committing "the dangerous trust of public authority to private persons, and the care of enforcing obedience to the deliberations of the people to the magistrate" (*Inequality,* p. 254). Thus the first term of inequality—economic inequality—once it is guaranteed by law and embodied in the right of property, inevitably leads to the second term—magistracy. And the relation of poor and rich inevitably turns into a relation of weak and strong (*Inequality,* p. 263).

The institution of magistracy is the first point where the intimate connection, in Rousseau's mind, between economic inequality and the loss of political freedom becomes readily apparent. As "the flaws which make social institutions necessary make the abuse of them unavoidable," the magistrates gradually come to abuse their trust and eventually convert their legitimate authority to arbitrary power. The people, free and equal in the state of nature, have lost first their equality, then their freedom. In a sense, though, they have come full circle and returned to their original equality: all are now equally subject to the arbitrary will of their masters (*Inequality,* pp. 263, 268).

The *Discourse on Inequality* is an indictment of bourgeois society and its notion of "equality before the law." Such equality, Rousseau argues, is merely "apparent and illusory," since it functions only "to keep the pauper in his poverty and the rich man in the position he has usurped" (*Social Contract,* p. 22n.). A well-constituted society, for him, is one in which natural inequality is replaced with "moral and legitimate" equality, so that "men, who may be unequal in strength or intelligence, become every one equal by convention and legal right" (*Social Contract,* p. 22n.; cf.: "It is precisely because the force of circumstances tends continually to destroy equality that the force of legislation should always tend to its maintenance," p. 50). This type of equality is an indispensable condition for the ability of each person to obey only the law which he prescribes for himself, hence for the existence of liberty (*Social Contract,* p. 19; see also pp. 49–50; Levine, 1976, pp. 188–90; Shklar, 1969, p. 186; Lemos, 1977, pp. 130–32). And a crucial element in "moral and legitimate equality" is economic equality, at least to the extent that "all have something and none too much" (*Social Contract,* p. 22n.; cf. Fetscher, 1962, p. 50). But if private property itself is at the root of economic inequality, and Rousseau is committed to its preservation, how can moral equality be achieved? We will now turn to an examination of some of the ideas Rousseau had to offer in reply to this and to other questions which arise out of his defense of private property.

2. "Self-Sufficient and Happy"

In his critique of civil society in the *Discourse on Inequality,* Rousseau emphasizes the intimate connection between economic arrangements and the moral and political characteristics of a society. However, in those works that offer an alternative form of social organization, these two aspects of society are disjointed, both in presentation and in substance. In his economically oriented works, such as the *Considerations on the Government of Poland* and *The Constitutional Project for Corsica,* Rousseau advocates a conservative, even reactionary solution—the preservation of what was already a disappearing form of social organization, namely, individual production by artisans and small peasant proprietors. In the morally and politically oriented *Social Contract,* on the other hand, he proposes a solution far more radical than the prevailing liberal ideas of his time (and ours)—the total fusion of all members of the society into a new communal being possessed of a will of its own and enjoying complete moral autonomy. The remainder of this article will present these two separate solutions to the problems of modern society and will argue that their separateness dooms both of them to futility.

One of the main defects of the society described in the *Discourse on Inequality* was that it allowed the free play of economic forces to shape political arrangements. This, according to Rousseau, should never happen in a well-constituted society. A nation's economy must be determined by its political goals, not vice versa: "The choice of an economic system to be adopted," he says to the Poles, "depends on the purpose Poland has in reforming her constitution" (*Poland,* pp. 223–25). Rousseau's own preference is expressed already in his description of the two alternative courses. The choice as he sees it is between economic development, progress and corruption on the one hand, and "true prosperity, justice . . . liberty," and stability on the other (*Poland,* pp. 223–25).

The idea that the pace and direction of economic development should be subject to political considerations seems, at first, to be inconsistent with Rousseau's defense of the right of private property. This, however, is not the case. Rousseau views the right of property as an extremely qualified one, and his definition of that right is perfectly compatible with government regulation of economic activity. According to him, the very notion of a "right" to property (as distinguished from the actual fact of possession) presupposes the existence of civil society (*Social Contract,* pp. 4, 18–22; *Inequality,* p. 259; cf. Masters, 1968, pp. 158–65, 316; Lemos, 1977, pp. 42–45; Vaughan, 1962, pp. 16–18, 42–43, esp. 104–05, 108). It must, therefore, be sanctioned by the state. While the state is under an obligation to honor private property, which is antecedent to it, it always retains the ultimate right to interfere with its members' estates. ("The right which an individual has to his own estate is always subordinated to the right which the community has over all; without this there would be neither stability in the social tie, nor real force in the exercise of Sovereignty," *Social Contract,* p. 22.) Moreover, the state's obligation to honor preexisting patterns of ownership is not universal, but limited to cases where owners are the first occupiers of the property, do not own more than they need for subsistence; and have actually made that property theirs by working on it (*Social Contract,* p. 20). Private property, for Rousseau, is still an indispensable social institution; but the right to it is a qualified one and individuals can enjoy it only at the sufferance of the state. (Where, exactly, does the right of the state end, and that of the individual begin, in terms of public policy, is a question to which Rousseau's answer varies in different writings. See, for example, *Political Economy,* p. 312; *Emile,* p. 425; *Corsica,* pp. 317, 324.) By defining it so narrowly, Rousseau can remain true to his commitment to private property and still advocate that economic arrangement be subordinated to the overall political purposes of the community.

Another question which must be considered in this context is the relationship between economic forces and political decision making in Rousseau's thought. In his historically descriptive works, the *Discourse on Inequality* and the *Essay on the Origin of Languages,*[2] Rousseau assigns to physical needs the primary role in bringing people together in society and in shaping their psychological, moral and political characteristics (*Languages,* esp. pp. 37–50; *Inequality,* pp. 232–48). The same view prevails in most of his other works as well (*Social Contract,* pp. 50–51, 77–82; *Political Economy,* p. 293; *Arts and Sciences,* p. 147; *Geneva Manuscript,* pp. 157–58, 163; *Corsica,* pp. 284–94). Sometimes, however, this view appears there together with what can be interpreted as its opposite, namely, the idea that political decisions can, by themselves, affect changes in society and determine the course of economic development (*Political Economy,* p. 326; *Confessions,* p. 377; and, of course, *Poland* and *Corsica,* which advocate policies designed to arrest economic development; see below). Lastly, in his *Letter to D'Alembert,* Rousseau makes a very forceful argument to the effect that a purely political decision—whether or not to allow the establishment of a theater in Geneva—can determine the future course of a society, including its economic progress (see esp. pp. 62–64).

---

[2] The question whether the histories presented in these works were meant by Rousseau to be actual or hypothetical is immaterial to this argument.

However, on closer examination it becomes clear that, with the possible exception of the *Letter to D'Alembert* (which was, after all, a polemical work dealing with a specific issue on which Rousseau had very strong feelings), Rousseau's major works are all informed by the same view of the relationships between politics and economics. According to that view, material (i.e., geographic, climatic and economic) conditions determine the outer parameter within which a society can develop. Within that parameter, conscious political action can influence the pace and direction of change, primarily by effecting people's perceptions of their needs (the "will" side of the "will and power" equation—*Emile,* pp. 44–45, 197; see below) and influencing public mores.[3] But beyond that parameter lies the realm of necessity, of needs that cannot be avoided. Such, in the case of Corsica, is the need to feed a growing population, which will inevitably lead to the introduction of commerce, industry and the arts, and to the evils associated with them (*Corsica,* pp. 285, 329–30). So, while calling for strong government action in the economic sphere, Rousseau was also very much aware of the limited effect such action can have when confronted with the basic forces of nature.

To return to his advice to the Poles, Rousseau believes that the economic policy most conducive to the development of a "free, wise and peaceful nation" is one directed towards the attainment of self-sufficiency (*Poland,* pp. 223–25). He advocates that goal not only for the nation as a whole, but also for the various regions within the state, and even for individual households (*Corsica,* pp. 308–10). The ideal economic system, in his view, would consist of a large number of self-sufficient units and would involve little or no economic exchange (*Corsica,* p. 295; *Letter to D'Alembert,* pp. 60–62). Such a system, he believes, is necessary for the preservation of morality, because "With any movement of trade and commerce it is impossible to prevent destructive vices from creeping into a nation" (*Corsica,* p. 309).

The "destructive vices" Rousseau has in mind are of two specific kinds: first, the reinforcement of *amour-propre* by the process of economic competition in which one person's gain is another person's loss; second, growing economic inequality which, he is convinced, is bound to be the outcome of that process (*Inequality,* pp. 246–49; cf. Colletti, 1972, pp. 162–63; Fetscher, 1962, pp. 40–41). Self-sufficiency, by curtailing economic interaction, relieves people of the need to compete with one another and, at the same time, prevents them from turning their natural inequalities into inequality of riches. Thus it can provide immunity against both types of vice associated with economic exchange.

The advocacy of an extreme form of self-sufficiency is the only logical policy for Rousseau, in light of his identification (in *Inequality*) of the social division of labor, private property and exchange as the root causes of human corruption. If private property is essential for the existence of society and cannot be abolished, and exchange is an indispensable process wherever division of labor occurs under conditions of private property, then the only way to limit corruption is by minimizing the division of labor. This Rousseau proposes to do through an economic regime in which both production and consumption take place solely within individual households. Anticipating the objection that such an arrangement would hinder economic productivity, he argues that "It is better for the land to produce a little less and for the inhabitants to lead better-regulated life" (*Corsica,* p. 309). With low productivity, there would be no economic surplus, hence no accumulation, investment and growth. In this way, not only would exchange be drastically reduced, but also a simple way of life and basic economic equality would be certain to prevail:

> Everyone should make a living, and no one should grow rich; that is the fundamental principle of the prosperity of the nation; . . . since [under this system] superfluous produce is not an

---

[3] Regarding Rousseau's views on mores (*moeurs*) and their relations to law on the one hand, and to public opinion on the other, see *D'Alembert,* pp. 65–75; *Social Contract,* pp. 45, 48, 53, 57, 77; *Political Economy,* p. 298; *Emile,* p. 432; *Poland,* p. 175.

> article of commerce, and is not retailed for money, it will be cultivated only to the extent that necessaries are needed (*Corsica,* p. 308).

Whenever, in spite of everything, some surplus is produced, Rousseau would rather have it consumed by the "luxury of the prince" than let it be accumulated or exchanged (*Poland,* pp. 230–31). His hostility towards accumulation and exchange is also expressed in his intense dislike for money. While recognizing its nature as merely a "token of wealth" (*Poland,* p. 230), he still thinks that "money is the source of all the false ideas of society" (*Emile,* p. 153) and the "strongest and most reliable [incentive] for the purpose of deflecting . . . the [political mechanism] from its course" (*Poland,* p. 227; cf. *Emile,* p. 45; *Geneva Manuscript,* p. 171; *Inequality,* p. 248).

In order to achieve self-sufficiency, Rousseau advises, the Poles should "encourage agriculture and the useful arts, not by enriching the farmers, which would only invite them to leave their calling, but by making that calling pleasant and honorable. Establish the most necessary manufacture; multiply your wheat and men unceasingly, and do not worry about the rest" (*Poland,* pp. 230–31). The last phrase should not be taken to have any *laissez-faire* connotations. When Rousseau says "do not worry," what he actually means is "actively suppress." Among the economic measures he suggests to the Corsicans are to "impose taxes on objects of luxury, close the ports to foreign commerce, suppress manufacture . . . halt the circulation of specie," enact "sumptuary laws" and agrarian laws limiting the size of property an individual can own (*Corsica,* pp. 323–24). The intended result of all this is the simple farming community, like the one which existed in Switzerland before it was corrupted by money (*Corsica,* pp. 309-10, 314). For him it entails "true prosperity" as opposed to the false prosperity of the mercenary society. The distinction is based on a psychological observation, namely, that happiness, or prosperity, is a subjective feeling, determined less by material comforts than by one's expectations. As he argues in *Emile:*

> True happiness consists in decreasing the difference between our desires and our powers, in establishing a perfect equilibrium between the power and the will. Then only, when all its forces are employed, will the soul be at rest and man will find himself in his true position. . . . The world of reality has its bounds, the world of imagination is boundless; as we cannot enlarge the one, let us restrict the other (*Emile,* pp. 44–45).

This concept of an equilibrium between wants and the power to fulfill them is the key to understanding Rousseau's economic response to the problems of bourgeois society. The only way to avoid these problems, he argues, is to maintain a simple, stable rural economy, free of both the possibilities and the temptations of the market. The moment economic development beyond that point is allowed, a revolution of rising expectations is created which will inevitably undermine the social order. He fears economic development because he does not believe that society is capable of controlling the forces, both material and psychological, which are generated by such development. He is convinced that innocence is the best guarantee of moral behavior,[4] and would therefore forego "progress," which constantly creates new needs even as it satisfies old ones. But the static economy he advocates is a luxury few societies can afford: to begin with, his economic recommendations, he believes, could only be implemented in small simple societies such as Poland and Corsica. And even there, because they do not allow for economic growth, his recommendations are bound to clash with the needs of a growing population[5] and will have to be abandoned: "Industry, commerce or the arts" will have to be established in order to import foodstuffs from abroad. Thus even the simple, rustic nations will be drawn into the circle of developed, corrupt ones and will be infected with their diseases:

> The vices inseparable from these establishments will also arise and, gradually corrupting the nation in its tastes and principles, will alter and at last destroy the government. This evil is *inevitable*; and since it is necessary that all human things should come to an end, it is well that a state, after a long and vigorous existence, should end by excess of population (*Corsica,* p. 330, emphasis added; see also p. 285).

3. Private Property and the General Will

In the *Discourse on Inequality* Rousseau criticized the liberal version of the social contract for failing to bring about a transformation in the nature of man, from the egotistic individual of the primeval state of war into a social being capable of obeying his higher moral self. Since its only purpose was to safeguard and perpetuate the privileges of the rich, that contract deprived people of their natural liberty and equality (which, admittedly, had already been greatly corrupted by that time) without giving them anything in return.

---

[4] See his description of the state of nature, *Inequality,* p. 227, and of the early Swiss, *Corsica,* p. 295; cf. Colletti, 1972, pp. 150–51.

[5] Regarding Rousseau's views on mores (*moeurs*) and sign, and an inevitable result, of good government. *Poland,* p. 230; *Corsica,* p. 83; *Emile,* p. 432.

Thus, what was created was merely a state—a legal framework for the pursuit of individual interests—and not a real association (Colletti, 1972, pp. 166–67). Rousseau would like to design a new social contract that will achieve the declared purpose of the liberal contract, but without opening the way to the abuses inherent in it. His aim is "to find a form of association" which will not only "defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate," but will also guarantee that each person "while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone and be as free as before" (*Social Contract,* pp. 13–14). He proposes to do that not by safeguarding natural man in his inalienable rights (Colletti, 1972, p. 174; cf. Fetscher, 1962, p. 53; Vaughan, 1962, p. 48), but rather by

> changing human nature . . . transforming each individual, who is by himself a complete and solitary whole, into part of a greater whole from which he in a manner receives life and being: . . . altering man's constitution for the purpose of strengthening it; and . . . substituting a partial and moral existence for the physical existence nature has conferred on us all (*Social Contract,* p. 38; see also *Emile,* p. 7).

To effect this transformation, Rousseau states, nothing less is required than the "total alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community" (*Social Contract,* p. 14). This alienation constitutes the very essence of the social contract, the act that forges a community out of an aggregate of self-seeking individuals (cf. Althusser, 1972, pp. 12–139; Vaughan, 1962, pp. 48, 57). But Rousseau, as we saw, is a firm believer in private property, and the act of alienation is only a momentary one. The minute the community comes into being it gives back to its members all the rights which they alienated to it, including the right to own property (albeit subject to the qualifications mentioned above) (*Social Contract,* pp. 19–22).

When a community is established, the act of alienation gives rise to the general will, the will of that community as an autonomous moral being. This will corresponds, by Rousseau's definition, to the rational and civic-minded will of every citizen, thus mediating between the particular interest each person has as an economic agent, and the common interest of the community. By obeying the general will, the citizens obey their own higher selves, thus achieving moral liberty. But the general will is not Rousseau's version of the "invisible hand." He is painfully aware of the fact that in a society based on private property and exchange (limited and restricted as these might be) the divisive forces of economic competition cannot be avoided:

> In fact, each individual, as a man, may have a particular will contrary or dissimilar to the general will which he has as a citizen. His particular interest may speak to him quite differently from the common interest: his absolute and naturally independent existence may make him look upon what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution, the loss of which will do less harm to others than the payment of it is burdensome to himself (*Social Contract,* p. 14).

And although he says that "the continuation of such an injustice could not but prove the undoing of the body politic" (*Social Contract,* p. 14), Rousseau admits that an incessant conflict between the general will and particular wills is made inevitable by the simple fact of their coexistence:

> In reality, if it is not impossible for a particular will to agree on some point with the general will, it is at least impossible for the agreement to be lasting and constant; for the particular will tends, by its very nature, to partiality, while the general will tends to equality. It is even more impossible to have any guarantee of this agreement; for even if it should always exist, it would be the effect not of art but of chance (*Social Contract,* p. 23).

In a situation like this, where competitive individual interests coexist in the society with the general will, in what way can the latter emerge out the former? Rousseau answers this question by saying that the general interest is formed not through the elimination of particular interests, but through the universal opposition of all of them to one another:

> "Every interest," says the Marquis d'Argenson, "has different principles. The agreement of two particular interests is formed by opposition to a third." He might have added that the agreement of all interests is formed by opposition to that of each. If there were no different interests, the common interest would be barely felt, as it would encounter no obstacle; all would go of its own accord, and politics would cease to be an art (*Social Contract,* p. 26n.; cf. Rousseau's description of the Roman republic and of the early Swiss, where everybody had only one interest; *Social Contract,* p. 105; *Corsica,* p. 297).

Much as in contemporary pluralist theories, the common interest turns out to be, in Rousseau's view, no more than "the sum of the differences" of particular wills, once the "pluses and minuses that cancel one another" had been taken out (*Social Contract,* p. 26).[6] The active element in the society he envisions is still the particular will of the individual, and even "equality of rights and the idea of justice such equality creates originate in the preference each man gives to himself" (*Social Contract,* p. 29). Thus, as Judith Shklar points out, "if the citizen is to prefer the general to the particular will, he must readily see that his own interest is secured by such a choice" (1969, p. 186).

---

[6] Cf. Althusser, 1972, pp. 148–49. Unlike the pluralists, however, Rousseau is very much opposed to the formation of interest groups or "partial associations"

What, then, are the measures which Rousseau proposes for ensuring that the citizens will indeed make the right choice? Three of these measures are political in nature: the people must be able to vote freely (*Social Contract,* pp. 24, 40); they must be "furnished with adequate information"; and each individual must consult his own conscience, without the interference of factions (p. 27; see also n. 6, above). But Rousseau himself is not satisfied with these procedural devices: "How can a blind multitude," he asks, "which often does not know what it wills . . . carry out for itself so great and difficult an enterprise as a system of legislation? Of itself the people wills always the good, but of itself it by no means always sees it" (p. 37). What is required, he concludes, is a moral and psychological transformation, to *precede* the political one: "The social spirit, which should be created by these institutions, would have to preside over their very foundation; and men would have to be before law what they should become by means of law" (p. 40). To resolve this paradox Rousseau is forced to call in a *deus ex machina*—the Legislator. The task of the Legislator is to effect, by the sheer force of his personality, the moral conversion necessitated by Rousseau's project. In order to do that, as Rousseau readily admits, the Legislator will have to be of semi-divine stature ("It would take gods to give men laws"; *Social Contract,* pp. 37–38; see also pp. 39–42; *Political Economy,* pp. 293–94; *Poland,* pp. 161–62). His introduction at this point constitutes, in effect, an admission of failure. For without such semi-divine intervention, Rousseau is telling us, the general will, the will of the citizen, will remain forever an ideal, a mere moral "ought," while the particular wills, the wills of men, will continue to be the only ontological "is" (Meszaros, 1970, p. 53; cf. Shklar, 1972, p. 342; Gossman, 1964, p. 338).

The failure to provide a satisfactory political answer to what, in his own scheme, is the primary political problem, i.e., the forging of a general communal will out of a multitude of particular ones, and hence the need to rely on a moral solution to that political problem, stem directly from Rousseau's commitment to private property. For at every stage of his argument he makes changes in psychology and in forms of social organization dependent upon, and subsequent to, changes in material reality (see, e.g., *Inequality,* pp. 233, 235–39, 271; cf. De Jouvenel, 1961–1962; 1972, pp. 484–86). Thus the development of *amour-propre* comes only after private property had been introduced, and is directly attributed by Rousseau to the notion of possession (*Inequality,* pp. 232, 248; cf. Rousseau's quotation from "the wise Locke," p. 242). But when he comes to eliminate that psychological trait, and to replace it with a truly communal spirit, he must try to do that without affecting the necessary changes in the material conditions which gave rise to it in the first place, namely, private property and exchange. This for him is an impossible task, and he therefore turns this task over to the Legislator, exhorting him to do morally what he himself could not do politically:

> Take away from man his own resources and give him instead new ones alien to him, and incapable of being made use of without the help of other men. [For] the more completely those natural [i.e., pre-social] resources are annihilated, the greater and more lasting are those which he acquires, and the more stable and perfect the new institutions (*Social Contract,* p. 38).

Since Rousseau himself was committed to private property, and did not recommend the removal of that crucial "natural resource" from the possession of his citizens, all he could recommend economically was a reduction, through radical self-sufficiency, of the potential for corruption inherent in the market economy. However, as we saw, he himself did not believe that to be a very viable solution. No society, as he knew, could exist for very long without economic growth, and, given the existence of private property, this would inevitably bring about the market economy with its attendant inequality and moral corruption. Despondent because of his inability to cope with this problem, Rousseau ended the *Constitutional Project for Corsica* on a note no less pessimistic than the conclusion of the *Discourse on Inequality.*

4. Conclusion: Private Property and Rousseau's Basic Assumptions

If the preceding analysis has any validity at all, and Rousseau's project indeed faltered on his commitment to private property, then the question arises, why did he maintain that commitment? Why did he not extend the moral and po-

---

(*Social Contract,* pp. 27, 103; *Poland,* p. 199). His fear of these groups is so great that he is willing to declare unlawful all assemblies, except those provided for by law or called by the sovereign (*Social Contract,* p. 90; cf. Shklar, 1969, p. 188).

litical transformation he wanted to bring about to the economic level as well? The answer to that question, I believe, has to do with some of Rousseau's most basic assumptions about the nature of man and his relationships with his fellows in society.

As I have suggested above, Rousseau did not believe that people were endowed with innate sociability. What brought them together, he thought, were external conditions which forced them to seek each other's help in providing for their material needs. Since each person was concerned, above all, with his own preservation (*Social Contract,* p. 4; *Inequality,* pp. 212, 230–31, 237; *Emile,* p. 61; *Poland,* p. 227), the kind of cooperation of which they were capable was limited by each person's need to perceive how his own immediate interests were being served (see the deer and hare parable, *Inequality,* p. 238). Thus, when cooperation had reached a certain degree of permanence, private interests had to be guaranteed by the institution of private property (hence, necessarily, of exchange).

The interesting point about Rousseau's attitude toward private property and exchange is that, while he was critical of these institutions, which he saw as the roots of inequality and exploitation, he still considered them indispensable and inherent in the nature of economic cooperation itself. When he described the appearance of the social division of labor, in *Inequality,* he equated the idea of division of labor with the idea of exchange, and presented "the moment one man began to stand in need of the help of another" as identical to "the moment it appeared advantageous for one man to have enough provisions for two" (pp. 243–44). The possibility of one man being able to secure the help of another without having "enough provisions for two," that is without having to compensate the other directly for his labor, evidently did not occur to him. Thus the particular historical form which the division of labor takes in bourgeois society (i.e., private property and exchange), appeared to Rousseau as the only possible way in which social division of labor can take place (Colletti, p. 164n.). He was then forced to conclude that bourgeois social arrangements were the only ones on which society could be based (cf. *Emile,* pp. 69n., 152; *Inequality,* p. 265).

The assumptions which made Rousseau identify private property and exchange with the idea of society itself at the point of its origin, affected his thinking about society at later stages of its development as well. When *civil* society was established, he believed, each person entered into it as a free and independent agent endowed with property and with the basic capacities needed for self-preservation (*Social Contract,* p. 13). The problem with existing societies, Rousseau argued, was that they deprived people of their natural freedom and independence, and forced them into a situation of economic, psychological and political dependence (cf. Charvet, 1974, p. 27). Such societies, for him, were illegitimate by definition, since people "alienate their liberty only for their own advantage" (*Social Contract,* p. 5), and here they ended up being worse off than before. The task Rousseau set for himself, then, was to create a situation in which a man would pledge to society his force and his liberty, "the chief instruments of his self-preservation," but "without harming his own interests, and neglecting the cares he owes to himself" (*Social Contract,* p. 13).

Rousseau approached this task with a fiercely individualistic notion of freedom, one in which freedom was equated with radical self-sufficiency, with total independence of the will of others (*Inequality,* pp. 233, 255: *Corsica,* pp. 326–27; *Emile,* pp. 48–49, 147; cf. Charvet, 1974, p. 43). Given that notion, rooted in his conception of man's original condition, and his determination to preserve man's essential freedom in society, Rousseau's idea of sociability was not one of cooperation, but rather of separate and detached coexistence. The beauty of the "golden age" (the midpoint in the transition from the state of nature to civil society) was, for him, "not [that] men were united, but [that] they were separated" (*Languages,* p. 38). And in his own day, one of his models of a harmonious social situation was a mountain "in the vicinity of Neufchatel," where each of the inhabitants was "everything for himself," and none was "anything for another" (*Letter to D'Alembert,* pp. 60–61). In a situation like that, what psychological basis could there be for social solidarity? "The private self extended to the whole" was Rousseau's answer (*Geneva Manuscript,* p. 191): "Extend *amour-propre* to others," he said in *Emile* (p. 215), "and it is transformed into a virtue, a virtue which has its roots in the heart of everyone of us." In this way, "patriotism" gains "an energy which, without disfiguring it, makes it the most heroic of all passions" (*Political Economy,* p. 301).

Since it is the independent private self which gives vigor to society, the interest of society is intimately tied to the preservation of the self and all its powers. And, for Rousseau, who in his own life experienced the indignities of being propertyless and dependent on other people (*Confessions,* pp. 54, 308, 342), the possession of property was a crucial element in the constitution of the self ("their lives, liberties, and properties . . . are, so to speak, the constituent elements of their being"; *Inequality,* p. 255). The connection between the two, for him, was twofold: first, as the origin of property was in one's labor (*Inequality,* p. 246), there was, in a very real sense, a part of oneself invested in one's property. So control over one's property was merely an extension of one's mastery over one's person (*Emile*, pp. 62–63, 419). Second, in order to maintain his independence of other people, a person must be able to provide for his own livelihood by himself (*Emile*, pp. 158–64; *Confessions*, pp. 338, 342; *Poland*, p. 254). And in the society envisioned by Rousseau, the only way a person could guarantee his ability to do that was by owning property. It is not surprising, then, that Rousseau should identify "private property and civil freedom" as "the bases of the community" (*Geneva Manuscript*, p. 191).

The assumptions which gave rise to Rousseau's commitment to private property were, as many commentators have noted, quite similar to those of the liberal thinkers he was criticizing.[7] But, in spite of his insistence on the centrality of private property, the society he wanted to create was, as we saw, not at all like the one advocated by the liberals. Rousseau was thus forced into a dilemma which he tried to resolve by "abstracting the moral element from the real interests and real relations of man and by making it stand in opposition to them" (Charvet, 1974, p. 146). As a result, his "new man" was no less "at war with himself, hesitating between his wishes and his duties . . . neither a man nor a citizen" than the bourgeois of his own day he so contemptuously alluded to in *Emile* (p. 8; cf. Charvet, 1974, p. 98), and his new society was no less open to corruption than the ones he had criticized. Realizing that his "principles of political right" could not be put to action in the real world, and that the small rustic community he idealized was a disappearing phenomenon, Rousseau despaired of his ability to help mankind avoid the pitfalls of modernity.

References

Althusser, Louis (1972). *Politics and History*. London: New Left Books.

Cassirer, Ernst (1975). *The Question of Jean Jacques Rousseau*. Translated and edited by Peter Gay. New York: Columbia University Press.

Charvet, John (1972). "Individual Identity and Social Consciousness in Rousseau's Philosophy." In M. Cranston and R. S. Peters (eds.), *Hobbes and Rousseau*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.

______ (1974). *The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau*. London: Cambridge University Press.

Colletti, Lucio (1972). *From Rousseau to Lenin*. New York and London: Monthly Review Press.

De Jouvenel, Bertrand (1972). "Rousseau's Theory of the Forms of Government." In M. Cranston and R. S. Peters (eds.), *Hobbes and Rousseau*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.

______ (1961–62). "Rousseau the Pessimistic Evolutionary." *Yale French Studies* 28: 83–96.

Durkheim, Emile (1960). *Montesquieu and Rousseau*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Fetscher, Iring (1962). "Rousseau's Concept of Freedom in Light of his Philosophy of History." In Karl Friedrich (ed.), *Liberty* (*Nomos*, Vol. 4), pp. 29–56).

Gavre, Mark (1974). "Hobbes and his Audience: The Dynamics of Theorizing." *American Political Science Review* 4: 1542–56.

Gay, Peter (1975). Introduction to Ernst Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Goldmann, Lucien (1973). *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*. Translated by Henry Maas. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Gossman, Lionel (1964). "Time and History in Rousseau." *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* 30: 311–49.

Hobbes, Thomas (1975). *Leviathan*. Edited with an introduction by C. B. MacPherson. New York: Penguin.

Kateb, George (1969). "Aspects of Rousseau's Political Thought." In Isaac Kramnick (ed.), *Essays in the History of Political Thought*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Lemos, Ramon (1977). *Rousseau's Political Philosophy*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.

Levine, Andrew (1976). *The Politics of Autonomy*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

Masters, Roger (1964). Introduction to J. J. Rousseau, *The First and Second Discourses*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

______ (1968). *The Political Philosophy of Rousseau*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

______ (1972). "The Structure of Rousseau's Political Thought." In M. Cranston and R. S. Peters (eds.), *Hobbes and Rousseau*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.

McManners, John (1968). *The Social Contract and Rousseau's Revolt Against Society*. London: Leicester University Press.

Meszaros, Istvan (1970). *Marx's Theory of Alienation*. London: Merlin Press.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1953). *The Confessions*. Translated by J. M. Cohen. New York: Penguin.

______ (1953). *Considerations on the Government of Poland*. In Frederick Watkins (ed. and trans.), *Political Writings*. New York: Thomas Nelson.

______ (1953). *The Constitutional Project for Corsica*. In Frederick Watkins (ed. and trans.), *Political Writings*. New York: Thomas Nelson.

______ (1950). *A Discourse on the Arts and Sciences*. In G. D. H. Cole (trans.), *The Social Contract and the Discourses*. New York: E. P. Dutton.

______ (1950). *A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*. In G. D. H. Cole (trans.), *The Social Contract and the Discourses*. New York: E. P. Dutton.

______ (1964). *A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*. In Roger D. Masters (ed.) and Roger D. and Judith

---

[7] See, for example, Masters, 1964, pp. 6, 22; Charvet, 1974, p. 96n. Watkins (1953, pp. xvi-xviii) attributes Rousseau's individualism to Calvinist influence. On the relationships between Calvin and Hobbes, see Gavre, 1974.

R. Masters (trans.), *The First and Second Discourses.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

______ (1950). *A Discourse on Political Economy.* In G. D. H. Cole (trans.), *The Social Contract and the Discourses.* New York: E. P. Dutton.

______ (1972). *Emile.* Translated by Barbara Foxley. New York: E. P. Dutton.

______ (1966). *Essay on the Origin of Languages.* In John H. Moran and Alexander Gode (trans.), *On the Origin of Language.* New York: Frederick Unger.

______ (1978). *The Geneva Manuscript.* In Roger D. Masters (ed.) and Judith R. Masters (trans.), *On the Social Contract.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

______ (1973). *Letter to D'Alembert on the Theater.* In Allan Bloom (trans.), *Politics and the Arts.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

______ (1950). *The Social Contract.* In G. D. H. Cole (trans.), *The Social Contract and the Discourses.* New York: E. P. Dutton.

Shklar, Judith (1969). *Men and Citizens.* London: Cambridge University Press.

______ (1972). "Rousseau's Images of Authority." In M. Cranston and R. S. Peters (eds.), *Hobbes and Rousseau.* Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.

Vaughan, C. E. (1962). Introduction to *The Political Writings of J. J. Rousseau.* New York: John Wiley.

Watkins, Frederick (1953). Introduction to J. J. Rousseau, *Political Writings.* New York: Thomas Nelson.

COMMUNICATIONS

ON ARTICLES

Comment on Salkever
(Vol. 74, March 1980, pp. 70-77)

TO THE EDITOR:

The appearance in your pages of Stephen G. Salkever's article, " 'Cool Reflexion' and the Criticism of Values," testifies to the continuing authority among political scientists of Hume's teaching on *is* and *ought*. They usually infer that they must eschew the *ought* and confine themselves to the *is*, thus making their discipline either useless or shamlessly useful to whatever set of values can hire or conscript its services; or, repulsed by the barrenness and/or baseness of that approach, conclude that if the discipline is to be imbued with and driven by values, they should fight for the power to impose their own values on it. Under the circumstances it is salutary to have it pointed out that Hume himself did not draw such inferences. But can we find in Hume the inspiration or model for a political science that would at once be authoritative and consistent with the *is/ought* distinction?

We ought to note what Salkever perhaps does not stress enough, the dependence of Hume's "objectively evaluative social science" on the premise that the sentiment of moral approbation is invariably aroused by objects of the same kind. Only when that matter of fact and those matters of fact concerning the objects of approbation are sufficiently established can Hume allow political science, for instance, to deliver its verdicts on the merits of political institutions.

Hume himself displays what Salkever calls "ambivalence about affirming that there is an objective moral standard that does not depend on custom or convention" (p. 76). On the one hand, "Whenever disputes arise . . . concerning the bounds of duty, the question *cannot, by any means, be decided with greater certainty,* than by ascertaining, on any side, the true interests of mankind." (*Morals,* pp. 12-13, emphasis added); on the other hand, "The general opinion of mankind" on moral questions is "*perfectly infallible*" (*Treatise,* p. 552, emphasis added). This "ambivalence" is most adequately attributed to the ultimate incompatibility of either putative moral standard with the nature of moral judgments as Hume understands them: "The distinction of moral good and evil is founded on the pleasure or pain, which results from the view of any sentiment, or character; and as that pleasure or pain cannot be unknown to the person who feels it, it follows, that there is just so much vice or virtue in any character, as everyone places in it, and that *'tis impossible in this particular we can ever be mistaken*" (*Treatise,* pp. 546-47, emphasis added).

A Humean political science cannot hand down truly decisive moral judgments, because at bottom it rests on the infirm foundatin of radical subjectivity. Consider the topic of the duty of obedience to government. The moral obligation to obey is the pain, conveyed by sympathy, given by the damage to the public interest inflicted by disobedience, and the pleasure in the public good done by obedience (*Treatise,* pp. 545-46). Now if an "objectively critical" political science can show that a government is adverse to the public interest, the pain and pleasure will diminish proportionately (*Treatise,* pp. 550-51). But there are other sources for that same feeling of duty. "*Education,* and the *artifice of politicians* . . . bestow a farther morality on loyalty" (*Treatise,* p. 546). And so does custom: "Time . . . reconciles [men] to any authority, and makes it seem just and reasonable" (*Treatise,* p. 556). Hume faces up to the challenge: Might we not "be bound by *conscience* to submit to a tyrannical government"? (*Treatise,* p. 551). He can meet the challenge only by claiming that "all men . . . are sensible, that they owe obedience to government merely on account of the public interest" (*Treatise,* pp. 551-53), a claim at odds with phenomena he elsewhere recognizes and welcomes (*Treatise,* pp. 554-63). Hume struggles against it, but he cannot consistently deny that a "rigid loyalty" smacking of "bigotry and superstition" (*Treatise,* p. 563) is as morally respectable as allegiance solidly based on a rational appreciation of the public interest.

Hume does of course claim that moral sentiments are corrigible by reason (cf. Salkever, p. 74). He writes of them being "retracted," "reformed" and "regulated" by rational judgments (*Morals,* pp. 13-14). But they need not be: "The passions," he concedes, "do not always follow our corrections," and what is corrected may be our "abstract notions" and "general pronouncements" rather than our "more stubborn and unalterable" feelings—that is, our moral judgments (*Treatise,* pp. 585, 582).

Salkever correctly calls attention to the parallel between moral judgments and causal judgments. For Hume "all probable reasoning is *nothing but* a species of *sensation*. . . . When I give a preference to one set of arguments above another, I do *nothing but* decide from my *feeling* concerning the superiority of their influence" (*Treatise,* p. 103, emphasis added). And yet he lays down "rules, by which we ought to regulate our judgment concerning causes and effects" (*Treatise,* p. 149). But the parallel extends further. For Hume cannot explain how "reflexion on general rules" can alter or diminish feeling, let alone guarantee that it will do so (*Treatise,* pp. 631–32). Moreover, the rules that distinguish correct from faulty reasoning are said to be drawn from observation of "the more . . . authentic operations of the understanding" (*Treatise,* p. 150). Hume shrinks from the consequences of his subjectivism in dealing with causal judgments and moral judgments alike, and tries to find a more secure footing for each; but in both attempts he encounters similar difficulties, which are in the end insuperable.

If a political science capable of genuinely settling disputes about right and wrong is not after all consistent with Hume's *is/ought* distinction, this frustration of Hume's own hopes might lead us to reconsider the distinction itself. It would perhaps be found that the self-evident simplicity of it, which is probably the reason for its being thought so "powerful" and for being so "famous" (Salkever, p. 70), is illusory. If so, there are even better grounds than Salkever suggests for declining to take Hume's teaching on *is* and *ought* as warrant for a "value-neutral" political science. The authority of the doctrine should be called into question.

ROBERT S. HILL

Marietta College

References

Hume, David (1947; first published 1751). *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.* La Salle, Ill.: Open Court.

______ (1888; first published 1739). *A Treatise of Human Nature.* Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Salkever, Stephen G. (1980). " 'Cool Reflexion' and the Criticism of Values." *American Political Science Review* 74: 70–77.

Reply

TO THE EDITOR:

Robert Hill's letter admirably illustrates the danger of seeing a particular thing (in this case a philosophic text) through the lenses of a general rule. Hume describes this kind of error as follows: "When an object appears, that resembles any cause in very considerable circumstances, the imagination naturally carries us to a lively conception of the usual effect, tho' the object be different in the most material and efficacious circumstances from that cause" (*Treatise,* pp. 149–50). The object in this case is Hume's discussion of the dependence of moral sentiments upon particular pleasures and pains, a discussion which to Hill's eye justifies the leap to the effect of the doctrine of "radical subjectivism," the nihilistic view that the opinions upon which moral and political judgments rest are neither true nor false.

In order to make Hume out to be the radical subjectivist of his critical desire, Hill resorts to the device of imaginative quotation. He does this by omitting Hume's footnote to the word "follows" in his quotation from pp. 546–47 of the *Treatise,* and by implying that Hume says something about the relative moral respectability of bigotry and rational allegiance on pp. 562–63. In each case, Hume is at pains to show that moral views which are conscientiously held (and thus, I suppose, are morally respectable) can be wrong. Hill assumes that Hume is a radical subjectivist and consequently eliminates interpretive evidence to the contrary, thus making it impossible for his readers to consider the adequacy of Hume's arguments against subjectivism.

But the most egregious distortion involves Hill's quotation from p. 553 of the Selby-Bigge edition of the *Treatise* (last paragraph of Bk. 3, Pt. 2, Sec. 9). Hume is here criticizing the doctrine of passive obedience to political authority. Hill says that Hume, as a subjectivist, can only criticize this doctrine by saying that all men actually feel allegiance only because they connect it with the public interest, a proposition which Hume clearly denies. Proof of this internal contradiction in the *Treatise* is supplied by Hill's quotation: "All men . . . are sensible, that they owe obedience to government merely on account of the public interest." But Hume doesn't say that. Hill's ellipsis keeps the reader in the dark about a fundamental distinction which is critical to Hume's social science, the distinction between moral and political views which are based on sound reasoning and those which are not. Made whole, the passage quoted by Hill reads: "All men have an implicit notion of it, and are sensible, that they owe obedience to government merely on account of the public interest." The antecedent of Hume's "it" here is his argument concerning the relationship of political order to human needs, and the thought that all men have an *implicit* notion of the relationship is no more "radically subjectivist" than are Aristotle's remarks about the implicit (though generally unrealized) connection between subjective human desires and objective goodness and knowledge which form the opening of the *Meta-*

physics, Politics, and *Nicomachean Ethics.*

The adequacy of Hume's account of the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable political sentiments must be evaluated by the reader of the *Treatise,* and I contend that every political scientist is improved by becoming such a reader and engaging that argument. But to say that Hume's account is meaningless because it contradicts his supposed subjectivism serves no end other than the questionable delights of moral indignation—except perhaps to demonstrate the wisdom of Rousseau's judgment that "there are even more readers who ought to learn to read than authors who ought to learn to be consistent."

STEPHEN G. SALKEVER

Bryn Mawr College

Comment on Spegele
(Vol. 74, March 1980, pp. 104–22)

TO THE EDITOR:

In his article "Deconstructing Methodological Falsificationism in International Relations," Roger Spegele claims (p. 108) that "any competent mathematician" would derive the Richardson model

$$(P) \quad dx/dt = ky - ax + g$$

from

$$(P') \quad d^2x/dt^2 = -a.$$

I submit that any freshman calculus student would derive

$$dx/dt = -at + C$$

from (P') and there is no way to get (P) from it. An arithmetical blunder of comparable magnitude would be the assertion that $2 + 2 = 22$. In the same paragraph Spegele makes errors in describing the equation which casts considerable doubt on whether Spegele understands the meaning of dx/dt.

In subsequent discussion, Spegele attributes to Richardson a deterministic *Weltanschauung* that even a cursory reading of the latter chapters of *Arms and Insecurity,* not to mention *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels,* clearly indicates Richardson does not accept. As a scholar who, wishing to study living systems, "sold [his] physics books in order to raise money to go and see Karl Pearson and learn about statistical proof" (Richardson, 1960a, p. 286), Richardson scarcely belongs in the camp of Laplacian determinism. If the Richardsonian [sic] tradition were as Spegele described it, Richardson would doubtless have borrowed a line from another frequently misinterpreted philosopher and have concluded, "I am not a Richardsonian."

Arguing that the core of Richardson's theory is "what people would do if they did not stop to think" is equivalent to stating that *Das Kapital* consists of nothing more than "Workers of the world, unite." Since presumably that interpretation of a non-mathematical theory would not be tolerated in the *APSR,* I find it a bit bothersome that the equivalent misunderstanding of a mathematical theory is tolerated. I would suggest that the *APSR* might serve the discipline better if articles discussing mathematical models were reviewed by at least one person who understood freshman calculus.

PHILIP A. SCHRODT

Richardson Institute
University of Lancaster

References

Richardson, Lewis F. (1960a). *Arms and Insecurity.* Chicago: Quadrangle.

——— (1960b). *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels.* Chicago: Quadrangle.

Spegele, Roger (1980). "Deconstructing Methodological Falsificationism in International Relations." *American Political Science Review* 74: 104–22.

Editor's Note: Roger Spegele's reply to Philip Schrodt's comment was received too late to appear in this issue. It will be carried in the March 1981 issue.

ON BOOK REVIEWS

Comment on Fishkin's Review
(Vol. 74, March 1980, pp. 176–77)

TO THE EDITOR:

In his review of my book *Justice or Tyranny?* James Fishkin charges me with misrepresenting John Rawls' account of justice on two essential points. First, he argues that I "miss the point" of Rawls' "original position" by noting the impossibility of actually implementing it. Second, he criticizes me for "confus[ing] Rawls' position at various points with *both* utilitarianism and equality" (Fishkin's emphasis), despite Rawls' intention of carving out "a moral position quite distinct" from each of them.

It is of course wholly proper for the reviewer of a book to point out instances in which the book's author may have been guilty of misunderstanding or misrepresentation. The striking defect that I find in Fishkin's review, however, is that it entirely disregards the extensive *argument* I set forth on behalf of each point he criticizes me for maintaining.

It should be clear to any reader of my book that I understand Rawls' original position to be a purely heuristic device, rather than a practical proposal. My criticism of this device is not that it cannot be practically implemented, but rather that it is impossible for human beings to *think* in the way that the device requires us to do: the original position is not merely impossible, but literally inconceivable (pp. 29–30). I argue, furthermore, that because Rawls has abstracted from the fundamental *natural* characteristics of human life in describing the parties to the original position, his account of the hypothetical decisions that would be reached in that situation issues in principles of justice that have no relevance to the real world of political life (pp. 26–28, 30–40, 87–88).

With reference to Fishkin's second point, I think it is equally obvious that I recognize that Rawls intended to write a critique of the utilitarian position, and that his "difference principle," despite its egalitarian justification, is capable in practice of giving rise to unlimited inequalities in the so-called primary goods. I tried to show, however, that at a more fundamental level, Rawls' account of justice rests on a narrowly utilitarian and extremely individualistic view of the human good (although Rawls himself contradicts this view in Part 3). Furthermore, I argued that despite the inegalitarian implications of the difference principle itself, the justification Rawls provides for this principle, combined with his demand that all men receive an equal amount of social esteem for their activities, embodies a most extreme egalitarianism (pp. 68–69, 80–81).

I would have welcomed a review by Fishkin that took issue with me on these substantive points by challenging my arguments. I regret that he chose instead to ignore those arguments, turning my interpretation and critique of Rawls' theory into a straw man and dismissing it on superficial grounds.

DAVID LEWIS SCHAEFER

Holy Cross College

Reply

TO THE EDITOR:

I am mystified. How can David Lewis Schaefer believe he has established that the original position is "literally inconceivable," i.e., "that it is *impossible* (emphasis added) for human beings to think in the way that the device requires us to do"? The pages to which he refers merely pose some questions about how to draw the line between "particular" and "general" facts. I cannot understand how these questions (which are not new or original) could be thought to constitute an impossibility argument.

There are, of course, problems with the deduction from the original position. Yet those of us who have engaged in the long debate about what might rationally be chosen in the original position, have, nevertheless, generally agreed that we could *imagine* its hypothetical conditions with logical consistency. By contrast, Schaefer seems to believe that we might as well have been debating the shape of a square circle. Yet nowhere does he tell us precisely why. I cannot, despite an arduous search, find an argument that would support such a grandiose "impossibility" claim.

Similarly, how can Schaefer believe that Rawls' argument rests on "a narrowly utilitarian" account of the human good? Rawls' account of the "human good" is profoundly at odds with utilitarianism on two counts: First, Rawls' theory of primary goods is not defined in terms of actual want-satisfaction or utility. A person is alleged to be better off with more primary goods in the proposed order regardless of his own actual preferences in the matter. Second, Rawls is proposing to maximize the *minimum* share of primary goods rather than maximize the total. These differences make it difficult to understand how Schaefer can allege that Rawls "fundamentally accepts the Benthamite perspective" and views "the good of society as merely a *sum* of individual *utilities*" (emphasis added, p. 89).

Schaefer has not denied that he makes these surprising claims. He merely criticizes my review for failing to discuss his reasons for holding them. In a brief space, I thought it enough to identify certain extraordinary propositions; if given more space, I might have attempted the more difficult task of explaining how the author arrived at such conclusions.

Let me add that anyone reading the review in question should know that, despite my protests, the copy editor changed "maximin" to "maximum." Several sentences were thus robbed of any reasonable construction. After this experience, I can sympathize with authors who feel they have been misunderstood.

JAMES FISHKIN

Yale University

Comment on Fishkin's Review (Vol. 74, March 1980, pp. 176–77)

To the Editor:

Having read with interest and profit David Schaefer's book on Rawls, *Justice or Tyranny?,* I was disappointed to see James Fishkin refer readers elsewhere in his recent review of that book. He charges Schaefer with "missing the point" of Rawls' "thought experiment" of the original position. As I read Schaefer, however, his point was that such a thought experiment was misconceived, for reasons he argued out at some length and in the context of a thorough comparison of Rawls' original position with the "state of nature" as developed by Hobbes and Locke. Schaefer understood perfectly well what Rawls was doing; he thought it was mistaken, and in so arguing gave a penetrating analysis of the issues involved. Fishkin seems to be like some students I know, who do not believe anyone "gets the point" of what they are saying unless he or she agrees with what they say.

Schaefer also supposedly misses the point that Rawls is neither simply a utilitarian nor simply an egalitarian. While Fishkin is correct about Rawls, nonetheless that certainly does not preclude what he thinks it precludes—that in some important respects, Rawls "accepts the Benthamite perspective," and that his position is heavily weighted towards equality, even though the "difference principle" might allow a good deal of inequality.

Fishkin's summary dismissal of Schaefer's book is unfortunate, not only because it is based on such inadequate grounds, but also because Schaefer's book is a most spirited and thoughtful attack on Rawls' position. I would reverse Fishkin's advice and refer all readers interested in Rawls to Schaefer's discussion.

Michael Zuckert

Carleton College

EDITORIAL NOTE

Dina A. Zinnes, Charles E. Merriam Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois, has been chosen as the next managing editor of the *American Political Science Review.* She will assume her duties effective with the management of Volume 76 (1982). *Manuscripts should be sent to the University of Pittsburgh until further notice since Volume 75 (1981) will be managed by the current editor.*

A widely recognized scholar, Professor Zinnes has published several books and articles based upon her important work in quantitative analysis of major international issues. She was educated at two institutions with superb political science faculties—the University of Michigan for her B.A. and M.A. degrees; Stanford University for her Ph.D. For most of her professional career, she has been a member of the Department of Political Science at Indiana University (1964–1980), where she directed the work of many graduate students in international politics.

Dina Zinnes has also found time in her busy schedule for active participation in professional societies. She has served (or is serving) as treasurer and vice-president of the APSA, as president of the International Studies Association, as a member of the Council of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, and as president-elect of the Midwest Political Science Association. In addition to this full schedule of work, Professor Zinnes has given freely of her time in evaluating the work of her colleagues. She serves on the editorial boards for six major journals, including the *APSR.*

The APSA is fortunate to be able to call on the services of such an able and dedicated professional political scientist. The *APSR* will prosper under her leadership.

* * * * *

Richard L. Park of the University of Michigan passed away on September 8, 1980. He served on the Book Review Editorial Board. Richard Park's knowledge of scholarship and people in international and comparative politics was global. His special interest was South Asia, reflected in research, writing, and leadership in Asian studies. The profession has lost a distinguished colleague and the *APSR* a valued associate.

* * * * *

Erratum

A dreadful error in composition occurs in "A Comparison of Voting for U.S. Senator and Representative in 1978," by Alan I. Abramowitz (September, 1980), pp. 638-39. The first three lines under the heading "Discussion" on p. 639, along with the heading itself, should have appeared following the first full paragraph on p. 638 (ending in "among this group."). As corrected, the "Discussion" should read as follows:

Discussion

The evidence available from the 1978 election study does not allow us to answer the question of why senators were more likely to be held accountable on the basis of their overall voting record than representatives. It does appear that constituents were more likely to know something about their senator's voting record than about their representative's voting record. Whereas 51 percent of respondents were able to place their Senate incumbent on a seven-point liberal-conservative scale, only 37 percent were able to place their House incumbent on the same scale. In addition, perceptions of senators' positions appear to have been somewhat more accurate than perceptions of representatives' positions.[2] We can only speculate that this may be a function of the information available to constituents about their senators and representatives. With greater control over the information constituents receive about themselves, House members may stress noncontroversial activities such as casework and constituency service, rather than positions on controversial national issues. These findings may also reflect greater involvement of ideological or single-issue interest groups in Senate campaigns. Whatever the explanation, the result is a significant difference in the extent of ideological voting in Senate and House elections.

Even if House challengers were provided with resources which would enable them to reach many more voters with their message, most House incumbents would probably remain secure in their positions because the large majority of their constituents are very satisfied with their performance.[3] When asked to rate the job performance of their own representative, 72 percent of respondents expressed an opinion, and 65 percent of those with an opinion gave a rating of "very good" or "good," while 31 percent gave a rating of "fair" and only 5 percent gave a rating of "poor" or "very poor." In sharp contrast, among the 80 percent of respondents expressing an opinion about the performance of Congress, only 20 percent gave a rating of "very good" or "good," while 52 percent gave Congress a "fair" rating and 28 percent rated its performance as "poor" or "very poor." These findings lend strong quantitative backing to Fenno's conclusion (1975), based on his observation of ten House members in their districts, that voters love their congressmen but dislike Congress. Although the job performance question was not asked about Senate incumbents, comparison of the feeling thermometer ratings of senators and representatives indicates that voters do not love their senator quite as much as they love their representative.

It is often suggested that members of Congress can use noncontroversial activities such as casework and constituency service to earn political support from the voters and thereby gain freedom of action on important national issues as long as they answer their mail, act as ombudsmen, and bring federal projects into the district. The findings reported here suggest, however, that voters are more tolerant about their representative's voting record than about their senator's voting record. After the 1976 and 1978 elections, many senators are probably looking over their shoulders as they cast their votes.

---

[2] The correlation (Tau) between ideological proximity and perceived ideological distance was .26 for Senate incumbents and .15 for House incumbents.

[3] Two recent studies of campaign spending in congressional elections have concluded that higher spending by challengers significantly improves their performance while spending by incumbents has little effect (Glantz, Abramowitz, and Burkart, 1977; Jacobson, 1978).

BOOK REVIEWS

Political Theory and Methodology

Furious Fancies: American Political Thought in the Post-Liberal Era. By Philip Abbot. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980, Pp. x + 265. $23.95.).

What do John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Robert Dahl, Theodore Lowi, Irving Kristol, Daniel Bell, Henry Kariel, Aristides Zolberg, Herbert Marcuse, Robert Paul Wolff, Carey McWilliams and John Schaar have in common? They are "post-liberals." This means, according to Philip Abbott, that they share the view that "American society as it stands today represents the optimal range of justice that liberalism can offer" (p. 8). The "post-liberals" contend, in effect, that the solution to current American problems will ultimately require "an alternate vision of the future" based on values "neglected by liberalism: an ethics of redistribution (Rawls); drama and play (Kariel); political activism (Dahl, Schaar); utopian experimentation (Nozick); utopian criticism (Zolberg, Marcuse); fraternity (McWilliams); a sense of religion (Bell)" (p. 9). The "post-liberals" are distinguished as well by a "severe pessimism," which leads not so much to the "furious fancies" of the book's title as to a "politics of lamentation" (p. 10) over what seems to be the irretrievable loss of "the emotive in society" (p. 237).

Abbott criticizes the "post-liberals" for both their disparagement of liberalism and their failure to move beyond it. In both cases, the common fault lies in the failure of the "post-liberals" "to see the real nature of liberalism's faults" (p. 11) in terms other than those associated with "some sort of appetitive individualism" (p. 13). The "real nature" of liberalism and its faults are not easy to state, for "liberalism is not an especially cohesive political theory" (p. 14). Still, it is clear to the author that liberalism suffers from a tension between a scientific component and a utopian premise, i.e., between its "acceptance of perpetual human conflict and the belief in the existence and plurality of forms of the good life" (p. 14). Failing to understand the history of liberalism in this light, the "post-liberals" remain "trapped" in "liberalism's tangle of science and utopia" (p. 25).

In presenting his summary exposition and critical analysis of Rawls, Nozick, Wolff, McWilliams and Schaar, Abbott devotes a chapter to each. Three other chapters focus, respectively, on Dahl and Lowi, Kristol and Bell, and Kariel, Zolberg, and Marcuse. Throughout, Abbott is unremitting in his criticism of his "post-liberals." Dahl and Lowi "present dubious theories" (p. 106). Rawls, Nozick, and Wolff proceed on the basis of "a singularly liberal conception of conflict and hence suffer from all the dilemmas their accounts attempt to avoid" (p. 237). "Celebrating the self *in extremis,*" Kariel, Zolberg, and Marcuse "represent less an independent repudiation of liberalism" than "a heresy which has long attacked liberalism" (p. 238). McWilliams' fraternal vision is both "substantive-hungry" and "far too delicate a thing to be made the basis of political order" (p. 202), while "it is the Commonwealth idea now advanced by Schaar that gave birth to the interest-dominated liberalism he despises" (p. 230). As for Bell and Kristol, the new Whigs of the "post-liberal era," they leave themselves with no choice other than to "alternatively defend liberalism against what they regard as grotesque alternatives and bemoan the passing of a nobler society" (p. 239).

Notwithstanding his critical view of the "post-liberals," Abbott is not totally without respect or sympathy for their efforts. Rawls' work does prompt "new consideration of the liberal vision of society" (p. 28). Lowi's juridical democracy as a guard against "the pre-mature cooptation of social movements in a pluralist society" is perceived as something of a solution to "one of the major problems of liberal pluralism" (pp. 105–05). Bell and Kristol advance proposals in response to our current ills "that, if they are not a cure, offer at least some treatment" (p. 128). McWilliams has written a "superb book"; his is "the best writing style to be found in political philosophy since Rousseau" (p. 184). Schaar's writing "shows great sensitivity and commitment." "Moreover, his recent work comes so close to the desperately needed reconciliation between models of citizenship that it deserves the most careful attention" (p. 211).

In the final 10 pages of his text, Abbott draws our attention to E. M. Forster and Leszek Kolakowski to introduce the concept of friendship as an alternative to fraternity as a possible key to the "resolution of the historical problems of liberalism" (p. 251). Perhaps this concept might introduce "a social element to liberalism's utopianism without denying scientific premises" (p. 251). Abbott acknowledges the serious objections of the left and right to the hope he would have us invest in this particular direction of thinking. He concludes his exposition of the failure of the "post-liberals" by asking whether his own alternative approach, based on the concept of friendship, might not itself be only "an ideological efflorescence, a tiny reformation, the remains of a crysstallization of the truly final 'fag end' of liberalism?" (p. 251). Perhaps some future edition of *Furious Fancies* may include a chapter on the efforts of Philip Abbott.

DARRYL BASKIN

Elmira College

Sartre: The Arguments of the Philosophers. By Peter Caws. (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979. Pp. xiii + 210. $22.50.).

This technically excellent work views Sartre from without; while neither sympathetic nor empathetic, Caws is sufficiently "respectful" to be considered fair. With detached eloquence, he disputes the claim "that there are two Sartres, the early existentialist and the later Marxist" (p. 2), and instead reads Sartre's philosophical project as an "essentially completed whole" (p. 4).

Caws uses the juvenilia and early academic works to show that the "typically Sartrian philosophical apparatus"—e.g., the in-itself, for-itself, the nothingness of consciousness apart from its world, consciousness as freedom—"is in working order before *Being and Nothingness*" (p. 49). Next, he claims that Sartre's thought makes an "ontological ascent" (pp. 31, 155) to collective considerations of others, the group and, ultimately, the totality of human history. By the alleged "end" of Sartre's project the self is described as "universal singular" (i.e., Sartre felt that one's projects are universally singular while human history is singularly universal" [p. 190]).

This study is important for political science because what Caws sees as "the root dilemma of Sartre's philosophy" is also a central theme in political discourse: "the antinomy of the individual and collective" (p. 24). The entire "ontological ascent" consists of variations on this theme. Also, those interested in phenomenology will welcome a lucid discussion of Sartre's relation to Husserl on the nature of consciousness. The treatment of Sartre's Marxism is, however, disappointing because Caws separates party activity from dialectical philosophy, stressing only the latter to show how Sartre moves toward a collective view of history.

Caws' developmental framework is not intended to transform Sartre into an analytic philosopher; it is scaffolding constructed to "clarify" Sartre's relation to what Caws calls the "objective" tradition in philosophy (p. 5). This world (which "nurtured" Caws) treats problems concerning "the knower's relation to the natural world conceived of as independently given" (p. 5). Sartre—now subjective, now collective—was "completely indifferent" to the objective tradition. Caws hopes that these competing traditions can eventually find grounds for mutual appreciation. His book is intended to create "the right spirit" by granting Sartre "respect" and getting "clear what he actually said" (p. 6). But this spirit of toleration is at odds with Caws' reservations about Sartre's status as a philosopher.

Caws opens with the claim, "Sartre is, always and above all, a writer," but adds the qualifier, "not that this makes him any less a philosopher" (p. 8). As the critique picks up steam, however, and the focus shifts from Sartre's "style" to this "content," Caws distinguishes between philosophers who are critics and those who are writers. "Writers as such do not argue for the propositions they assert, they simply assert them" (p. 160). Caws, a critic, claims that "Sartre is one of the few [contemporary philosophers] who are writers but not critics" (p. 160). Again, he qualifies his claim, but this time by saying, "philosophy has too few writers, and needs the accounts of the world they are able to give, *if for no other reason than to keep its critical faculties in trim*" (p. 161, emphasis added). A spirit of academic imperialism replaces the earlier spirit of toleration; Sartre becomes a source of raw material.

Caws' most frequent objection to Sartre's philosophy is that it is not conclusive (e.g., pp. 131, 140, 144, 185, 197). To be "merely inconclusive" is, for Caws, to risk one's philosophical status. Caws must feel that Sartre's risk was rather great because by the end of his study, leafing through *L'Idiot de la famille,* he declines to discuss certain "pockets of philosophy . . . even though many of them show the philosopher as writer at the top of his form" (p. 193). This indicates that he sees only a casual connection between Sartre and "serious philosophy." This book is not likely, then, to contribute to an "appreciation" (p. 6) of Sartre as a philosopher. Sartre's indifference to Caws' philosophical tradition appears to be mutual. It is doubly significant that Caws did not end his reading of Sartre with, "to be continued."

On a smaller scale, however, this book succeeds in connecting selected Sartrean ideas with those of more familiar philosophers. Also, the author's use of internal evidence and straightforward style are exemplars of scholarship. But the distance between Caws and his subject (or should I say object?) parallels the distance between respect and appreciation.

WILLIAM S. CORLETT, JR.

Texas A&I University

Human Nature in American Thought: A History. By Merle Curti. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980. Pp. xvii + 453. $25.00.).

This is a very ambitious book. It not only spans the 300 years of the settlement of North America but it also reaches across an intellectual spectrum that includes theologians, lawyers and physicians, philosophers, geneticists and physicists, as well as members of many other professions whose coin is the printed word and whose influence has been felt in the marketplace of ideas. The concept of human nature enters into all fields of the social sciences as it intrudes, in one fashion or another, on social theory, jurisprudence, political theory, and intellectual history. But what indeed is human nature? There is no specific answer to this query here. What this book is about is what various writers in our history have said was human nature. Since a great number of American intellectuals held views on what was human nature, this book provides a broad sweep through intellectual history.

Students of Puritan thought will confront again Bradford, Winthrop, Cotton, Cotton Mather and Jonathan Edwards. Curti presents, as Enlightenment writers, the views of Wise, Mayhew, Chauncy, Jefferson, Rush, and Franklin, among others. These writers held an essentially optimistic view of human nature, a view not entirely shared by Madison, John Adams, Hamilton, Marshall, Fisher Ames, and James Wilson.

Curti traces the influence of the Scottish writers, such as Francis Hutcheson, Thomas Reid, and Dugald Stewart, on American attitudes toward human nature. The Scottish common-sense philosophy, "served many purposes as an unofficial, dominant view of human nature well into mid-century. Its assumption of the validity of sense perceptions, including above all mankind's common consciousness of a moral sense, elevated man's dignity in giving him an empirical key to truth" (p. 146).

By the middle of the nineteenth century views on human nature were influenced by the growth of the natural sciences. Darwin's views on evolution were reflected in America by Edward Youmans, the founder of *Popular Science Monthly,* as well as by Chauncey Wright and G. Stanley Hall. William James, William G. Sumner, Henry George, Edward Bellamy, Charles H. Cooley, George H. Mead, Lester F. Ward, and Thorstein Veblen are some of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century writers discussed by Curti.

The advocates of nature as opposed to nurture in the early twentieth century had an important influence on social policy, for some state legislatures were persuaded to authorize the sterilization of those deemed "feebleminded, and in some cases, the mentally ill" (p. 286). By 1930 some 30 states had passed such legislation. Curti also discusses the impact of Freud on American psychology, and reviews briefly the work of Karen Horney, Bruno Bettelheim, and Erik Erikson. Finally Curti takes up the work and influence of John B. Watson, B. F. Skinner, and the behavioral movement in contemporary social science.

There is a difficulty with this work of which Curti is well aware, for there is no clear definition as to what constitutes human nature. As he notes: "The boundaries of the idea of *human nature,* complex, vague, and amorphous, have been hard to define and contain. The use of the term human nature, though always present, increased during marked social and intellectual upheavals such as the American Revolution, the pre-Civil War tensions, and the social conflicts and intellectual controversies of the late nineteenth century. Yet even in these times the theme was elusive and one has trouble in clarifying and explaining it. Few who used the term defined it" (p. 408).

Merle Curti, whose *Growth of American Thought* (1943) won a Pulitzer Prize and instructed generations of students in American intellectual history, has provided a valuable guide, with a comprehensive annotated bibliography, to writings on human nature. It should prove a useful source to students of American political thought.

ALAN P. GRIMES

Michigan State University

Images of Conflict. By Albert F. Eldridge. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979. Pp. ix + 229. $12.95, cloth; $6.95, paper.)

This text provides a summary of the published research on various types of societal conflict. The theoretical work in this field is presented in the first three chapters and in chapter 7. Albert Eldridge uses this theoretical framework to analyze empirical situations in the remainder of the book. He does an admirable job of summarizing a diverse theoretical and empirical literature. If one needs an overview of the vast literature concerning racial conflict, political violence, international negotiations, war, rebellion, bargaining theory, learning theory, relative deprivation theory, and others—this is the book. The extensive bibliography at the end of each chapter fills any little holes left in the text. But if one is hoping for more than summary, if one looks for synthesis, this volume simply fails.

The theoretical chapters are followed by an analysis of the Detroit riots of 1967 as evidence of the utility of the theory. The promise is that the same framework will help us explain other conflicts—coups, revolts, terrorism, war between nations, etc. However, with each succeeding class of conflict, new theory is developed, and an almost totally new bibliography is presented. Instead of bringing some underlying unity. Eldridge's theoretical baggage becomes so complex as to impede understanding.

Eldridge seems to fear that this will be the reader's conclusion. His first sentence in his concluding chapter states, "Our discussion of the courses, processes, and effects of human conflict has been so diversified that perspective may be difficult to maintain" (p. 212). One must certainly agree with that statement.

BETTY A. NESVOLD

San Diego State University

Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis. By Anthony Giddens. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. Pp. x + 294. $20.00, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

In this, his seventh book, Anthony Giddens develops themes first broached in earlier works on Marx, Durkheim, Weber and the methodology of the social sciences. The book consists of several related papers on structuralism, human agency, and the analysis of social institutions. The author himself calls the book "a conclusion and a preface" (p. 2). It completes his "project of examining the residue of nineteenth-century European social theory for contemporary problems of the social sciences" (p. 1). And it lays a foundation for the "systematic reconstruction" that social theory requires, according to Giddens (p. 240).

This is not simply a book about key concepts in social theory, however. it is also a whirlwind critique of, among others, Ferdinand de Sausurre, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, Talcott Parsons, Ludwin von Bertanlanffy, Erving Goffman, Alfred Schutz, Steven Lukes, Louis Althusser, Gustave Le Bon, Maurice Godelier, Max Weber, Karl Mannheim, Georg Lukács, Jürgen Habermas, Robert Merton and E. E. Evans-Pritchard.

In the course of this formidable roll call, Giddens develops some very suggestive ideas. At all levels of social theory, he is concerned to "substitute duality for dualism" (p. 98). He specifically proposes a new "theory of structuration" premised on "the *duality of structure.*" At the hinge of this duality stand social practices and the "practical consciousness" of active individuals. According to Giddens, this practical consciousness is shaped by shared ways of understanding and behaving, though these common patterns are often tacit rather than explicit, habitual rather than self-conscious (see pp. 5, 117).

Two implications of this account are stressed by Giddens. One is that ordinary agents understand a good deal more about their social world than social scientists normally admit. The other is that the way time is experienced plays a central role in the reproduction of all societies, since a social structure only exists in and through the habitual beliefs and behavior that constitute common practices.

Accepting these principles enables us to recognize, first, that any social phenomenon is inherently historical, and, second, that any social phenomenon may legitimately be approached from two complementary angles, each of use for discerning one side of the "duality of structure." Research may focus on institutions or "strategic conduct." "To examine the constitution of social systems as strategic conduct is to study the mode in which actors draw upon structural elements—rules and resources—in their social relations. . . . Institutional analysis, on the other hand, places an *epoché* upon strategic conduct, treating rules and resources as chronically reproduced features of social systems" (p. 80).

Admirably open-minded, Giddens writes with an enviable self-confidence. Even faced with a daunting stylist like Lacan, his prose is unblinking. Giddens conveys an impressive sense of mastery throughout. In general, his commentaries seem sensible and fair. And his own theoretical conclusions certainly merit attention.

This is nevertheless a vexing book. To get to Giddens' own ideas, the reader must endure a tiresome parade of exegetical digressions. For his part, the author—understandably enough, given the timetable he has chosen to keep—seems impatient with nuance. In one typical aside, he concedes the difficulty of a particular reading by remarking "or so I want to interpret Wittgenstein here"—a strangely disarming gesture (p. 35).

The result is not entirely satisfactory. Some of the central sections, on class and ideology, for example, seem routine, as if all the methodological fuss didn't much matter. Complex thinkers are rushed on stage for two paragraphs, thanked for an insight or scolded for an error, and then ushered to the exit. The reader is scarcely invited to think through the ideas the prose glides over. Oddly enough, Giddens' own theory tends to get lost in the shuffle. It is never simply stated and defended. Its possible uses are never explored in detail.

Since Giddens already has more books in mind, this last cavil may prove groundless. He is working, he tells us, on a "study of contemporary capitalism and socialism." Perhaps his "theory of structuration" will give him a fresh perspective.

JAMES MILLER

University of Texas, Austin

Justice: Ideas and Ideologies. Edited by Eugene Kamenka and Alice Erh-Soon Tay. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980. Pp. viii + 184. $19.95).

This volume is part of a St. Martin's Press series on ideas and ideologies edited by Eugene Kamenka. It is derived from a symposium on "Theories of Justice in and for the Second Half of the Twentieth Century" held during the Extraordinary World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (Sydney, 1977). The contributors, with the exception of Brian Barry (Chicago) and Wieslaw Lang (Poland), are associated with Australian universities (Alice Tay, Ferenc Feher, Agnes Heller, J. A. Passmore, and Julius Stone). Although the essays are generally well written, they do not contain novel or original arguments, and yet presuppose too much specialized knowledge for an introduction to the subject. The volume is a good example of material that should have remained in the form of papers rather than being transformed into an expensive book.

Kamenka (in "What is Justice?") argues that justice is "not so much an idea or an ideal as an activity and tradition" rooted in "Weltanschauungen and emotive appeal," and he rejects the possibility of arriving at a "coherent theory" or transcendent principles "which all rational beings must accept" (p. 14, 23). In "Civil Justice and its Rivals," J. A. Passmore begins with the Aristotelian formal definition of justice as "treating equals equally and unequals unequally, but in proportion to their relevant differences," and claims that the liberal democratic tradition, with its emphasis on liberty and equal protection tempered by the criterion of competence, has given substantive meaning to this idea. He defends this tradition against what he conceives as the antithetical notion of "communal justice" with its emphasis on egalitarianism, fraternity, and uniformity, and he condemns "social justice in all its forms" (facilitative, reparative, leveling) that require special merit for the disadvantaged (pp. 31, 35). Kamenka's rejection of abstract Cartesian notions of justice and Passmore's worries about egalitarianism are complemented by Tay's defense of "The Sense of Justice in Common Law" and Stone's plea for "Justice not Equality." Tay argues that although traditional procedures of common law may require modification in light of modern conditions, its spirit, embodied in a recognition of the "flux, complexity, and historicity and of a certain intractability in human affairs" (p. 84), offers the best path forward. The tradition of common law is "pluralist, empirical, conscious of human error and limitation" (p. 87) and permits a balance of interests and purposes. Stone insists that "there is no pot of justice at the end of the rainbow of equality" or any other abstract principle, and he strongly attacks what he conceives as the dangers and distortions in both theory and practice associated with "demonic efforts to find simple answers to the grave questions of justice of this last quarter-century by expeditions into the slough of equality" (pp. 113, 115). Equality cannot solve problems of material justice, and events such as the decision in the Bakke case demonstrate "the spurious role that the prescription of equality plays in support of reverse discrimination" (p. 109) and the manner in which demands for equality obscure the real problems and complexities that must be confronted.

A different type of critique of egalitarianism is advanced by Feher and Heller ("Forms of Equality") who are dissident Marxists from Hungary and formerly associated with Lukács. They argue that "consistently implemented egalitarianism is a myth" that cannot work as "a general principle of social organization" (p. 149). Neither the capitalist/liberal model of equality nor the idea of primitive communism and other forms of universalized private property, in which the totality of individuals do not participate in the decision process, is adequate. They advocate a model in which "appropriation" is freed from "ownership" and in which alienation is abolished by participation in a purposive-rational community (Habermas). Such a model constitutes a Kantian regulative idea for unmasking and opposing inequality in ownership and the treatment of individuals.

Barry defends the idea of "Justice as Reciprocity" or fairness (Rawls) and the requirements of "requital," "fidelity," and "mutual aid," but he claims that while this notion "serves well enough for thinking about relations among contemporaries in the same society," it "fails to give us a grip on those problems of international and intergenerational justice" (p. 51). The principle of reciprocity must be complemented by the principle of "equal opportunity" which minimally entails "an equal claim on the earth's natural resources" (p. 76). Predictably, Lang has limited respect for such neo-liberal notions of justice. He juxtaposes Marx's idea of an ideal society and distributive justice to a variety of what he terms contemporary bourgeois theories which are ranked under such categories as "liberal conservative" (e.g., Hayek, Nosick) and "progressive-reformist" (e.g., Rawls). He views the latter (which he interprets, probably quite correctly, as justification of modern social programs such as the "Great Society") as an advance over classical liberalism and positivist ethics, but he claims that they still "do not consider the fundamental problem of social justice" and "remain within the ideological and conceptual framework of bourgeois liberal doctrine" (p. 148).

I suppose that this book would be considered part of what the most recent series of *Philosophy, Politics and Society* designates as "the upswell of political and social theory and speculation in the 1970s," but some serious questions must be raised about the status of this kind of literature. What, precisely, is going on here (and in the paradigm cases of Rawls and Nosick)? The ideological thrust of the arguments is clear, but it is not a politically engaged ideology. It is much like the "ideological" preferences for certain substantive scientific theories reflected in many formal philosophical analyses of scientific explanation. A certain illusion of practical relevance is created by the use of political concepts and exemplary references to contemporary political problems and events, but the arguments have about as much demonstrable contact (explanatory, descriptive, prescriptive) with concrete political issues as most arguments in the philosophy of science have with the practice of science. For the most part, the essays in this book amount to academic analyses of analytical objects. This is perfectly legitimate activity, but the implication that it is the extension of a conversation begun by Plato, Confucius, et al. (p. vii), and bears the same relationship to politics, must be questioned.

JOHN G. GUNNELL

State University of New York, Albany

Viable Democracy. By Michael Margolis. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979. Pp. 211. $18.50; New York: Penguin Books, 1979. Pp. 208. $3.95, paper.)

Viable Democracy, primarily intended as an undergraduate text, is divided into three parts. The first traces the theoretical and practical development of liberal democracy and briefly discusses the traditional critiques of liberalism ranging from Burke to Marx. The second part summarizes attempts to create more "realistic" theories of democracy based on contemporary empirical research. The final section specifies the failures of contemporary democracy and suggests "viable democracy" as an alternative.

A shortcoming of the early chapters of this book is the failure to develop a thorough critique of liberalism. Margolis avoids defining politics because "there is little to gain from doing so" (p. 20). But he does define democracy as "politics in which each citizen in the polity has an equal opportunity to participate" (p. 22), and liberalism as "facilitation of individual self-development and self-expression as the primary goals of government" (p. 26). Analyzing liberalism at this level of generality while avoiding a clear conception of politics undermines his critique and reforms. Because liberalism views politics as competition between self-interested individuals and groups, it has largely been the denial of politics as the mutual pursuit of a common good which transcends individual self-interest. This view of politics has in part led to today's hyperpluralism and the inability of contemporary democracy to deal with such problems as the concentration of corporate power and environmental deterioration—failures which are well documented by Margolis. Nonetheless, Margolis' solution to the death of democracy is essentially in traditional liberal terms. Margolis would undoubtedly reject much of this line of criticism, but a defense of liberalism today must deal directly with the question of whether the present conception of politics is adequate to solve contemporary problems.

Margolis' reforms for increasing the viability of democracy are institutional and mechanistic alterations. The central reform is the creation of an interactive computer information network that would allow each citizen to have access to all unclassified government and corporate records. Additional reforms call for the decentralization of decision making, public representation on important government and private decision making boards, policies to encourage "responsible whistle blowing" by public- and private-sector employees, and accounting methods which reflect environmental costs and resource depletion.

Much can be said about these reforms, but I will mention three difficulties. Given how little has been done with currently available information, some of which Margolis himself provides, it is unclear how more information would lead to significant change. The goal of this reform is to increase "substantially equal opportunity for meaningful participation by all adult citizens" (p. 156), but Margolis admits the likely end result will be that "a broader (albeit still elite) type of political participation will develop—a democratic form of pluralism" (p. 162). To argue that liberal democracy is self-development and self-expression and then argue for a viable reform that does not significantly increase the extent of political participation seems inconsistent.

The record of public representation on decision-making boards is not impressive. Citizens are either coopted, or, if they propose significant policy changes, they are ignored or discredited. The proposal to internalize environmental costs most clearly reflects the difficulty of reforms without a basic change in political consciousness. As Ophuls has argued, such internalization involves difficult political decisions and personal sacrifices that our present system is unwilling and, given its individualistic assumptions, largely unable to make.

There is no simple solution to these problems. As Macpherson has indicated, we find ourselves in a vicious circle. We cannot achieve more democratic participation without a change in social inequalities and political consciousness, but we cannot achieve these changes without increasing political participation. Unfortunately, Margolis does little to suggest realistically how this circle may be broken.

STUART A. LILIE

University of Central Florida

The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups. By Terry M. Moe. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. Pp. x + 282. $21.00.).

Criticisms of Mancur Olson's theory of group membership and organizational behavior and discussions of the limits of his formulations are not new, but Terry Moe has set them forth in thoroughgoing fashion, has elaborated and extended them, and has made positive new contributions. The result is a book that is valuable and constructive, one that may well revive interest in the systematic study of political groups, as the author hopes.

The five chapters constituting the first part of the study are a starkly logical analysis of interest organization. Moe starts with a critique of rational (Olson) models of individual choice, proposes a model of bounded rationality, and adds to that a conception of organizational behavior based on the leadership of a "political entrepreneur," types of participants within the organization, and actors from the organization's environment. He concentrates throughout the book on what he designates as "material" or economic interest groups—labor unions, business associations, and farmers' organizations—in which he expects to find economic self-interest prominent. He explicitly asserts that his is a theory of such "material" groups, not of groups in general, a choice that was perhaps unfortunate, since it imposed moderately narrow limits on his exploration of the implications of his own theory for a wider set of groups.

Moe is at his best in the chapters of this first part of the book, where he offers a revision of the Olson model and proceeds deductively to explore its hypothetical consequences. In particular, the chapters on organizational formation and maintenance and on internal politics, though resting on the confining assumption of economic self-interest, are closely and effectively argued and contain a number of highly suggestive inferences. For example, his treatment of information as a variable in the bargaining process (p. 108 f.) of internal politics brings even this highly deductive conception into close correspondence with diverse reality.

The final chapter in this first part, entitled "Departures from the Economic Ideal," drops the exclusive assumption of economic self-interest and permits the introduction of a variety of other values. These complicate the model of individual choice, as he acknowledges, but they also enrich it. One has the impression that he has introduced them reluctantly, since he does not call them additions but "departures," as the chapter title indicates, or "deviations." Nevertheless, his recasting of earlier propositions in the light of these diversities contributes substantially to the persuasiveness of the analysis.

The three substantive chapters of part 2 turn in an empirical direction. After a discussion of what he calls "the pluralist position" and the literature on which it is said to rely, Moe reviews the research on economic interest groups, which, by his account, contradicts what he calls "conventional notions about groups membership," and concludes with a chapter that skillfully presents the data from a mail survey of the members of five state economic interest groups. This last is the most convincing chapter in the section, because the data, whatever their limitations (carefully indicated), force the conclusion that Olson's theory "does not supply an adequate explanation of the bases of group membership" (p. 217), even for economic interest groups to which it should best apply.

It may not be accurate or fair to say that Moe reaches this conclusion grudgingly, but he gives an impression of considerable ambivalence, and the reason for this lies in what he has chosen as the basepoint of his inquiry. Having committed himself to the view that Olson's theory "subverts the traditional pluralist notion that common interests give rise to collective action" (p. 29), he never quite frees himself. Although he recognizes that Olson's model can "hold only under certain informational and value conditions" and that, under other conditions "the pluralists . . . can be quite right" (p. 8), he can never quite acknowledge that his own revisions and refinements have substantially subverted Olson. This would be of no great consequence were it not that it seems to compel him to continue to do battle, especially in part 2, behind Olson's barricades. Thus it keeps him from treating consistently that collective goods-selective incentives problem as a marginal but important issue, it leads him to make something of a straw man out of the "traditional pluralist standpoint" (p. 73), and it seems, for example, to induce him to do less than justice, in his own terms, to the evidence of Roberts, as reported by Wilson (*Political Organizations,* Basic Books, 1973, Ch. 2), that three union locals recruited between 60 and 90 percent of their potential membership with no union security agreement and with no or essentially no selective inducements. He continues to insist, though he need not, that "nonmaterial values can make a difference when *supplementing* the economic self-interest of individuals" (p. 142, emphasis added).

These are shortcomings but certainly not basic flaws in what is an important book, rewarding to read and deserving of study. It should reawaken the scholarly interest in the study of political groups that Moe looks for.

DAVID B. TRUMAN

Hillsdale, New York

Gramsci and Marxist Theory. Edited by Chantal Mouffe. (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979. Pp. vii + 288. $24.50, cloth; $12.95, paper.)

"Pessimism of the intelligence, optimism of the will" is an expression today associated with Antonio Gramsci. Its opposite, "optimism of the intelligence, pessimism of the will," is an expression appropriately applied to the Gramscian scholarship in Chantal Mouffe's anthology.

Mouffe introduces the book with this sentence, "If the history of marxist theory during the 1960s can be characterised by the reign of 'althusserianism,' then we have now, without a doubt, entered a new phase: that of 'gramscism' " (p. 1). Mouffe is optimistic that we can readily categorize Marxist theory into rather distinct phases. Other authors in the collection are optimistic that they can specify "the kernel of Gramsci's marxism" (p. 88) or "the central problem of contemporary marxism" (p. 171). Given the fragmentary nature of Gramsci's writings and the diffuse nature of modern Marxist theories, attempts to specify phases, kernals, and central problems seems almost inexplicable.

This inexplicability may be a function of the editor's implicit political pessimism. A consistent thread running through the selection of articles is the idea that Gramsci's theory is the most advanced Marxism and it legitimizes PCI variants of eurocommunism. Mouffe has chosen selections which suggest a Gramsci mainly concerned with superstructures, who sees class conflict within the growing capitalist state, and who develops a theory of hegemony revolving around democratic politics, mass parties, intellectual leadership, and pluralist alliances. This is surely a Gramsci who has simultaneously advanced beyond orthodox economism and determinism and who, were he alive today, would support the PCI's "war of position" and "democratic transition to socialism."

In good "pluralist" fashion, Mouffe includes one dissenting essay which concludes that "Gramsci's theory of hegemony is the highest and most complex expression of leninism" (p. 252). The reader can only conclude that Gramsci's intellectual authority supports *either* Eurocommunism *or* Leninism. But given the popular association of Leninism with Stalinism, especially in Italy, there is really little choice at all: Gramsci legitimizes Eurocommunism. Thus, the deck is stacked. Missing are alternative uses and interpretations of Gramsci's thought. Ralph Miliband employs Gramsci in ways which suggest that Eurocommunism might be associated with social democracy but which do not affirm Leninism. Carl Boggs suggests that Gramsci's richness lies in his having developed a Marxism which is neither Social Democratic/Eurocommunist nor Leninist. My own view is that Gramsci's writings are fragmented enough to support some aspects of Eurocommuniusm and some aspects of Leninism, and to open up new fields of inquiry which deny major aspects of both Eurocommunism and Leninism.

Why does Mouffe exclude these alternative interpretations? I do not know. However, it is conceivable that Mouffe fears that a direct confrontation between Gramsci's theory and modern politics will not fully support a Eurocommunism at present under attack from both the right and the left. It is politically wise, in these circumstances, to edit a book with a pluralist approach but a singular message. The unfortunate result is that Mouffe's "Gramscism" is the basis for a new orthodoxy.

Despite this, most of the articles in the collection are serious ones which illuminate basic issues in Gramsci and in modern Marxism. How do economic infrastructures relate to political, ideological, and cultural superstructures once economic determinism is questioned? Is Marxism a predictive science or one which outlines historical possibilities? What is the role of subjectivity in history? I see Gramsci as a Marxist gadfly who raises the hard questions which future generations must answer. Articles by Noberto Bobbio, Jacques Texier, Leonardo Paggi and others in the book are studied attempts to frame the questions in contemporary terms and to begin to develop answers. Despite what I see as the editor's ulterior motives, the texts included attack old orthodoxies and reckon with some of the complexities of continuing historical processes.

MARK E. KANN

University of Southern California

Democratic Political Theory. By J. Roland Pennock. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979. Pp. xxii + 573. $32.50, cloth; $6.95, paper.)

On all great subjects there is always much to be said; and much depends, with massive books such as the one under review, on their key or design. Roland Pennock is well aware of this, for he devotes almost half of the work to establishing a framework of analysis. His framework is far from neat, and is not easily summarized. Intricacies aside, it hinges on two major elements, namely, the "tensions" between liberty and equality, but especially between individualism (radical, modified, methodological, romantic) and collectivism (organic, egalitarian); and a typology of democratic theories, classified as being either "power theories" (elitist, populist, constitutionalist, social pluralist) or "motivational theories" (self-interest, rights-and-duties, democratic collectivism).

Theories of democracy are also subdivided into "justificatory" and "operational," and the author's claim is that this distinction "is superior to the more familiar 'normative'/'empirical' dichotomy" (p. xvii). It can be easily conceded that the profession has mishandled normativism by lumping together, under this label, entirely different norms—ranging all the way from ethical norms to technical ones of the if-then type. On the other hand, it is hard to concede that "operational"—as conceived by Pennock—is superior to "empirical." It is not only that the choice of the word is confusing in that the author does not use it in its current, technical meaning; it is also, and more importantly, that Pennock's concept remains throughout his work all too conveniently conceived. To be sure, operational theory is *non*-justificatory. In addition, it is not empirical in that it may contain very little empirical content. We also understand (although we are never told so) that Pennock's "operationalism" has nothing to share with the one of Bridgman and with operational definitions. The question remains: aside from what it is not, what is it? In Pennock's wording, operational political theory "seeks to explain, ideally to predict, the operation of political institutions. It may rely upon insight or 'understanding'. . . . This method, often referred to as 'humanistic' (as contrasted to 'scientific') is especially attractive to those who believe that any attempt . . . to separate 'facts' from 'values' goes contrary to the nature of reality. . . . More commonly today, theories of political (and democratic) operations tend to be 'scientific' in their approach. . . . Equally, however, they may derive their testable propositions from model building. . ." (p. xx). So, operational theory includes almost everything: values and their elimination, abstraction and concreteness, empirical content or its lack, measurement and *verstehen,* science and nonscience. This remarkable conceptual diffuseness beheads all the problems that confront present-day theorists. For instance, does the empirical evidence collected under operational criteria (technically understood) really match, either in terms of confirming or disconfirming adequacy, the grand generalizations of which the theory of democracy *tout court* actually consists? While Pennock often evaluates theories on the basis of existing findings, neither this nor related questions are ever addressed. And we shall see that the amorphous nature of his category brings about other weaknesses.

After the overall framework of analysis has been established, the rest of the book examines the "fit" between the typology of democratic theories outlined above, and a series of "generic problems"—e.g., responsiveness, representation, leadership—encountered in the operation of democratic institutions. This is not, however, the only "fit" at issue. The preliminary one bears on how the single authors fit into the types of theory under which they are categorized. For instance, one of the types is "rights and duties theories"; this type eminently contains Locke and Rawls; and one is bound to wonder whether this association is more deceitful than meaningful. Let us take, however, a far more manageable type: the public interest theories. Who belongs here? This may seem an easy question; but after having read that "the collectivist does of course have much in common with the public interest theories" (p. 202), and that "a natural affinity exists between collectivism and a systems approach to the study of politics" (p. 201), one begins to suspect that authors can be fitted almost anywhere, or, conversely, that the typology discriminates, when it so does, at whim.

Given these premises, it comes as no surprise that the overall exercise—the "fit" between types and problems—yields disappointing and highly unconvincing results. The fault lies in the handle, that is, the framework of analysis. Even though Pennock refers to his mapping as a classification, his construction eminently lacks the central virtue of classifications, namely, a criterion. In effect, his classes or types are highly overlapping, highly artificial, and hardly amenable to any logical interconnectedness. Since too many criteria, or dimensions, or focuses are simultaneously involved, each one of them blunts, and deprives of its sharpness, the other ones.

As illustration, Pennock's treatment of Rawls is fairly representative of his manner of developing the argument throughout most of the book. As we already know, Rawls largely (though not exclusively) falls under the "rights and duties" type of theory. Let it now be added that this type is assimilated, by Pennock, to "deontological theories"; the two are treated interchangeably. Thus, Rawls' theory is declared "stronger on the normative than on the operational side" (p. 195). Fair enough. But then one reads: "Rawls holds that legislators ought first to pursue justice . . . and only secondarily consider the interests of his constituents. One may properly wonder whether this represents normal legislative behavior" (p. 195). Properly? If a theory is declared deontological, how is it "proper" to wonder whether it reflects normal, actual behavior? A few lines below, Pennock makes the case even more strongly, or naively: "The results raise further doubts as to the accuracy of Rawls' theory as applied to political behavior in the United States" (p. 196). Thus a theory is first declared deontological, and then assessed as if it were descriptive. Rawls aside, what is the deontologist supposed to do? At one point we read: "The deontologist will argue that the average voter does not engage in elaborate calculations of interests" (p. 197). Maybe—but the assertion in question is not an *ought* proposition. A grammatical oversight? Hardly so, if one is to judge by the fact that the final, major conclusion reached in a section bearing on deontological theories is that "each one of the theories thus far discussed is valid for certain situations and none is valid for all. Clearly, theory could be helped by much more empirical research. . ." (p. 198). In any context, but one, these assertions are unimpeachable. The one context to which they do not apply is the one in which they happen to be placed: the *logos* about what should or ought to be.

Whatever else "theory" may be, at a minimum it should be cogent reasoning, the capacity of organizing a theme with order, clarity, consistency and—it is hoped—a perceptiveness of theoretical import. Pennock will agree to this, since he hopes to contribute "both to the clarity and rigor of theory. . ." (p. xvii). But these are certainly not the virtues or the characteristics of the book. If the author's primary aim is—we read in the opening sentence—"to get things straight about democratic theory" (p. xiii), then I must regretfully observe that nothing is "straight" or straightened out in what the book delivers. I painfully realize that this is a harsh judgment, and I suspect that it relates to the high expectations aroused by a book written by an author of Pennock's scholarly stature. After the recent deluge of "small" and idiosyncratic books on democracy, a "large" book of avowed synthetic scope was very much in demand. While I cannot convince myself that Pennock has met this demand, it would be unfair to conclude that the book has no merit at all. It is, for one thing, a judicious work of a very sensible and sensitive mind. If the "method" is both maddening and as feeble as can be, the substance of what Pennock has to say is almost invariably sound. I also share very much the general thrust of his argument, as expressed in the concluding sentence of the work: "It used to be thought that it was man's irrationality which posed the greatest threat to democracy. A threat it undoubtedly is, but my contention is that man's rationality, in the sense of the pursuit of individual self-interest, presents an equally serious problem" (p. 526). The utilitarian tradition has obtained, in the Anglo-American brand of democratic theory, more than the lion's share. It is important to be told, as Pennock tells us, that "the Kantian (or a similar) ethic of respect for the individual and acceptance of duties toward other individuals" (p. 526) is a side of the coin to which we should pay greater heed.

GIOVANNI SARTORI

Columbia University

Constitutionalism: Nomos XX. Edited by J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman. (New York: New York University Press, 1979. Pp. xv + 398. $17.50.)

Several of the articles in this disparate collection deal with aspects of Carl J. Friedrich's writings on constitutionalism; they represent theoretical, historical, comparative, analytical, institutional and jurisprudential approaches and many contain valuable bibliographical references. The tone is nostalgic and eulogistic. Despite Roland Pennock's sagacious epilogue, the cumulative impression is that constitutionalism is irrelevant as a field of inquiry and the American Constitution an outmoded device for realizing today the virtues traditionally attributed to constitutionalism. A stranger to the subject would conclude that political scientists have passed constitutionalism by with perfunctory oblations and that the rigorous quest for an understanding and reapplication of its underlying theoretical principles is not today a live issue. Yet the 1980s promise to introduce as flourishing an industry in constitution veneration as the 1970s did for the Declaration. This volume will be of equivocal aid to that endeavor.

Friedrich's definitions and their vicissitudes are competently treated. Other authorities such as C. H. McIlwain and Francis Wormuth possess a largely inferential existence, though ghosts of their doctrines stalk several of the footnotes. The following is a brief summary of most of the contributors' main points:

Gordon J. Schochet: A summary of the historical meanings of constitutionalism, siding with Wormuth against McIlwain, and identifying it with the liberal tradition. Behavioralism, neo-Marxism and practical irrelevance are offered to explain the academic disregard of constitutionalism. A conceptual study of the paradox of legally absolute and constitutionally limited authority is proposed.

Dante Germino: A graceful encomium on Friedrich's work emphasizing the latter's recent concentration on the Judeo-Christian contribution.

Paul Sigmund: A discussion of Friedrich's definition (restraint of government) and his studies of federalism. It is charged that the criticisms of the behavioralists were never faced and the preconditions for the appearance of constitutionalism were never analyzed.

Nannerl O. Keohane: A valuable historical essay on the constitutional ideas of the sixteenth-century French political theorist, Claude de Seyssel, introduced by the explanation that the French possessed no analogue to Magna Carta and have found divided power uncongenial. De Seyssel's "three bridles" on monarchial authority —the social force of religion, the autonomy of the ministerial orders, and "police" (interpreted as a kind of Moscan juridical defense)—and other tributaries to Montesquieu highlight the analysis.

Cecelia M. Kenyon: An historical review of pre-Revolutionary American theory and its contribution to the emergent Constitution. The English tradition, Machiavellian realism, a theory of cycles and the theory of republicanism are the chosen ingredients, but the McIlwain-Schuyler (*The American Revolution; Parliament and the British Empire*) debate is ignored.

Wilfrid E. Rumble: A prudential analysis of Madison's thoughts about the Bill of Rights, containing valuable footnotes.

Christopher C. Mojekwu: An analysis of the result of the Nigerian attempt to graft American principles onto a British colonial tradition, itself laid on top of an African base. Here, as elsewhere in the essays, familiarity with recent studies in the anthropology of law, especially those of Paul Bohannan, is lacking. However, it is obvious that the Nigerian, and other comparable efforts, will repay further analysis.

Thomas C. Grey: An analytic approach with a six-way division of the conceptual field occupied by constitutional norms rather than entire constitutions: a promising beginning.

George Kateb: The procedural aspects of constitutionalism are alleged to possess intrinsic moral value; the positivist approach to constitutionalism yielding to one reminiscent of natural law. This current runs through many of the essays.

Ronald Moore: The first of two contributions to the Rawls industry clarifying a number of structural and constitutional issues in Rawls.

Richard B. Parker: Rawls' attractiveness to lawyers is attributed to the inapplicability of the Constitution's explicit principles, and the thesis that Rawls describes the principles underlying it in a currently relevant way. The result, however, is equally applicable to any other of the Western constitutional democracies.

George P. Fletcher: The juridical disutility of certain structural features of the documentary Constitution (separation of powers and federalism) leads to an analysis of two current issues in constitutional law—searches and seizures and civil disobedience (necessity as a defense of individual law breaking)—as illustrations of the failure of utilitarian balancing principles to serve as reliable determinants of constitutionality. The result is a useful exposition of these two aspects of today's "working" constitution, incidentally revealing a method that might permit its abstraction out of case materials. These current quandaries confirm to Fletcher his initial judgment that constitutional law must abandon the positive for the transcendental: natural law may yet salvage the documentary Constitution. He will have been delighted by the obliging corroboration that has issued from the Court recently in *U.S.* v. *Bailey*.

Arthur S. Miller: An erudite discussion of "welfare jurisprudence" and its necessity today in the face of the obsolescence of traditional constitutionalism. An historical commentary on judicial activism controverts Nathan Glazer's call for judicial self-restraint. The judiciary as prudential ombudsman for welfare state needs is defended but adversarial adjudication is found inconsistent with so positive a role: an argument that could draw strength from Lon Fuller's warning that adversary proceedings are ill-suited to problems involving distributive justice.

Constitutionalism emerges from these essays as a once-noble pursuit, clinging to vestiges of stateliness in its decrepitude but functionally discredited on its own terms. From the evidence of this book, the most it can hope for is a partial rehabilitation: Its dysfunctional structural and procedural properties may be supplanted by a secularized natural law transformed into an operational ethic by an assist from Rawlsian neo-utilitarianism. This deplorable condition is as much a commentary on the inadequacies of constitutional scholarship as it is a description of its products. But there are many good contributions in this book. Those I think I shall find myself returning to are Miller's ruminative assessment of current issues, Keohane's essay on Claude de Seyssel and Fletcher's article on separation of powers.

Four of the contributors are from law schools—illustrating a growing rapprochement—but they do not reflect the collaborations that are now being facilitated by computer access to case materials. However, Fletcher's approach could provide the basis for a promising innovation. American studies of constitutionalism, in contrast to British, have not issued in analyses of our working constitution with applicability to practical problems. But it is now possible to extract from legal materials the structural principles of our working constitution and then derive from their integrations putative functional imperatives capable of utilization by legislatures and courts. A research project under the collaborative direction of, for example, George Fletcher, Francis Wormuth, Latve Zadeh (applied mathematics) and Paul Bohannan (anthropology) would hold great promise. Beyond this lies a more challenging possibility. There are now at hand analytical approaches from semiotics, information theory, sociobiology and phenomenology that permit eliciting from traditional historical and theoretical treatments of constitutionalism an implicit constitutionology potentially uncircumscribed by the concrete institutional settings of the source materials.

HARVEY WHEELER

Institute for Higher Studies, Santa Barbara

The Cult of Violence: Sorel and the Sorelians. By Jack J. Roth. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. Pp. xi + 359. $25.00.)

This is a superb book. Too few books nowadays achieve what they claim to: here is an exception. Jack Roth's study is in the "history of ideas" genre and whatever criticisms it arouses will apply to the general approach as such. His goal is to achieve a "synthesis of the literature by and about Sorel and the Sorelians" under the guiding motif that "the need for a drastic and total renovation of the social order became . . . the center of Sorel's thought and action" (p. x).

As anyone grappling with Sorel quickly realizes, organization of the material is a vexing problem. Sorel was an ideological maverick for whom sustained systematic argument was anathema both because of personal idiosyncrasy and deep philosophical reasons. Roth has coped brilliantly with such problems. After an introductory chapter, he places the next 12 chapters on Sorel himself under four basic rubrics: Revolutionary Syndicalism, Integral Nationalism, Bolshevism, and Fascism. Each rubric includes a chapter each on the "man," the "idea," and the "impact." Thus the book's main bulk examines Sorel's enigmatic intellectual-political relationship to the chief left and right radical movements in the first two decades of this century. The final three chapters look at "Sorelismo" in the decades after Sorel's death in 1922.

A brief review cannot do justice to the imposing scholarship that went into exploring Sorel's incursions into extremist politics after 1900. Suffice it to say that Roth's account of many Sorelian themes should remain definitive, barring some archival revelation that demands reappraisal. His culling through numerous political journals of the day for Soreliana was clearly a labor of love.

To many the corpus of Sorel's political thought must appear, to borrow a Churchillism, like a "riddle wrapped in an enigma." The difficulty stems from Sorel's relationship to the ideological spectrum of the nineteenth century. Then "right" and "left" seemed clearly and distinctly different. The left stood for progressivism in history, optimism about man, a rationalistic psychology and epistemology, faith in the masses, and the myth of revolution. The right stood for a cyclical view of history, pessimism about man, anti-rationalism in psychology, elitism, social quietism or gradualism, and private ownership.

Sorel's puzzle derives from his sympathy with the social groups championed by the left as combined with his receptivity to ideas from the right. Thus, we find apotheosis of the proletariat, revolution, and socialism mixed with notions from the likes of DeMaistre, Nietzsche, Newman, and Pareto. Does Sorel merely flunk our tests of ideological consistency, or is there a different sort of consistency behind his infatuations with Latin anarcho-syndicalism, French Monarchism, Italian Fascism, and Russian Bolshevism?

Roth shows us first a kind of negative consistency here: Sorel's virulent disdain for the "vital center." Doctrines of liberal democracy and social democracy he saw as either corrupt betrayals or sheer signs of social decadence. Parties, elections, compromise, and rational debate were treated with consummate contempt in all of Sorel's ideological peregrinations. Hence the prevalence of terms like "myth" and "violence" in his mature thought, which served as an ideological gauntlet cast in the face of democrats and other political moderates.

However, Roth also spies a more positive consistency in Sorelian thought. Sorel

> condemned bourgeois society for its morals, that is, its sexual license and disregard for the sacred institutions of the community. He condemned its political organization, which corrupted all parliamentarians and made the state the scene of irresponsible chatter of rationalistic intellectuals. He condemned its ultimate goals, that is, its individualism and materialism. . . . Sorel was looking for primordial forces to destroy the old order and to create a new (pp. 257–58).

To excoriate the hated bourgeois and democratic order, Sorel did not scruple to take ideas of divergent ideological provenance and to look to opposed movements as cataclysmic sources of regeneration.

It may be unchivalrous to conclude a review of such a fine book with a criticism. Nevertheless, I miss a sustained treatment of the philosophical and epistemological underpinnings of Sorel's moral and political theories. Sorel, after all, admired both James and Bergson, and pragmatism and vitalism have important things to say about freedom, truth, and reality. These process philosophers rejected the rationalist's coherence theory of truth as well as the empiricist's correspondence theories. By stressing more dynamic and activist visions of truth, such thinkers may have opened the floodgates to political opportunism and cynicism, if not worse. Outside of the careful hands of those like James and Bergson, pragmatist and vitalist doctrines often operate as a sort of errant romanticism that may speed the very social decay that Sorel so hated. Roth may be right in describing Sorel's ultimate aims as "conservative." If so, the political and philosophical instrumentalities he chose were highly inappropriate to his true goals.

MARK N. HAGOPIAN

Springfield, Massachusetts

Theories of Underdevelopment. By Ian Roxborough. (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1979. Pp. xii + 175. $22.50.)

In *Theories of Underdevelopment,* Ian Roxborough attempts to analyze the theoretical and methodological issues concerned with the study of social change in the contemporary Third World. His task is to evaluate critically basic theories of development and "indicate ways in which overgeneralizations need to be modified in order to produce a reasonably adequate and contextual explanation" (p. xi). The author uses examples from theory to suggest the composition of an adequate explanation and then draws empirically on examples from Latin America to support his position.

The basic methodological argument is that hypotheses about Third-World change must be made historically specific in accordance with the evolution of the world capitalist system, with the relationship of the particular country to that system and with the local class structure and political institutions generated as a result of that relationship. Theoretically Roxborough aptly argues that the genesis for social system change in the Third World is primarily exogenous rather than endogenous. The international context is a key determinant of change in the Third World.

Neither of these arguments is particularly new. Their articulation began in the mid-1960s and has continued with ever greater frequency to the present. However, what is necessary at this point is not another analysis of Barrington Moore's contribution to the field or the weaknesses of ECLA's development strategy, but rather a clear, systematic explanation which not only reviews past arguments and synthesizes them, but which in fact makes a coherent statement about the new international actors and processes influencing social change today. Roxborough's analysis only partially accomplishes the first task and neglects almost completely the latter.

The logic of the author's analysis is at times obscure. Ten chapters deal with discrete subjects germane to the problem of development. Few if any of the chapters, however, can leave the reader satisfied about the completeness of the analysis. For example, chapter 2 calls for a combination of both endogenous and exogenous factors in a single integrated theory. Nowhere, however, does the author tell the reader how this might be done. Roxborough's treatment of the "world system" (chapters 4 and 5) provides a credible critique of thinking in this area, but the discussion could have been easily refined with the inclusion of Johan Galtung's approach to imperialism. Also curiously neglected with Chirot's work on *Social Change in the Twentieth Century.* In a later section, Roxborough provides a compelling critique of the distribution-accumulation dichotomy which takes all decision makers (p. 115). Rather than elaborating his own notion of the resolution of this resource-related problem, he tells us about the resolution of this problem in Chile, without returning to the original and larger theoretical point. This specific problem is compounded by the more general problem of poor transition, both within and between chapters.

Roxborough does provide a number of excellent arguments. His treatment of the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Western Europe is well structured. The chapters dealing with social structure are quite useful as a review; and rural social structure is given its own treatment, a rarity in most books of this kind. And the book's general treatment of Chile as an important case in Latin America is quite informative.

Ultimately, to be useful, any book on development must not only speak to the need for the integration of exogeneous and endogenous stimuli; it must begin the actual task. This can only be done by expanding beyond the bounds of comparative political theory unto the realm of transnationalism and interdependency. *Theories of Underdevelopment* does not go beyond the narrow confines of the former. As such, it is a useful but not complete review.

MARK B. ROSENBERG

Florida International University

From Rationality to Liberation: The Evolution of Feminist Ideology. By Judith A. Sabrosky. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. Pp. viii + 175. $17.95.)

Judith Sabrosky argues in this book that feminist thought is a coherent ideology whose roots are found in the enlightenment philosophers' emphasis on the rationality of all human beings and the utopian socialists' belief in the possibility of human perfectibility. After an introductory chapter in which she defines "ideology" as "a set of beliefs about how environments operate. . . ; a set of desired goals. . . ; and a program of action that would best implement these goals" (p. 13), Sabrosky asserts that feminist theory is such an ideology with beliefs, goals, and programs of action. In her view, feminist ideology is a unified body of thought which has unfolded progressively (although with some backsliding) through the works of Mary Wollstonecraft, Flora Tristan, Frances Wright, Sarah Grimke, Margaret Fuller, Elizabeth Oakes Smith, Caroline Dall and Simone de Beauvoir.

The greatest problem with this book is Sabrosky's failure to identify the distinguishing ideas or beliefs of feminist ideology. Without such a statement, it is impossible to understand what Sabrosky's criteria for including and excluding various authors are. Why, for example, include Margaret Fuller and not Harriet Martineau? Sabrosky dismisses Shulamith Firestone's and Juliet Mitchell's works as "too polemical to be considered ideology" (p. 110), a remark I find unintelligible, since this book is purportedly concerned with the power and usefulness of ideas, not with the stridency of their presentation. Equally inexplicable is the dismissal, in a single paragraph, of the extraordinary work of Charlotte Perkins Gilman. Gilman saw more clearly than any previous thinker how private sexual relations and the organization of domestic life were linked to larger economic relationships in a capitalist economy. I may be accused at this point of simply pitting my list of "favorite feminist authors" against Sabrosky's. But in failing to tell us what ideas constitute the "feminist ideology" she is studying, Sabrosky gives us no reasons to regard her chosen authors as constituting the corpus of the Western European-American feminist tradition.

The second major difficulty with Sabrosky's work is her failure to document her important claim that these writers form a coherent tradition, not because of some accidental coincidence of their ideas, but because "these feminists . . . were known to each other. Each ideologist possessed knowledge of the writings of at least one of her ideological predecessors. Feminist ideology is therefore a consistent body of thought that evolved over time" (p. 5). But Sabrosky offers no evidence to show that these women had read one another's works, and no analysis of the specific ways in which each of these women influenced her successors. Sabrosky's claim that there is a feminist *tradition* in political thought thus remains simply a suggestive assertion. I am annoyed by Sabrosky's scholarly oversight precisely because I think there is such a tradition, and that to document it would be as useful to historians of political theory as Ellen Moers' *Literary Women* was in establishing the importance of female authors to the development of the novel and modern poetry. The possibility of a distinctively feminist contribution to political theory is greater now than in the past precisely because this is an enterprise with a history and with an intelligent body of literature upon which to build.

Because knowledge of the history of feminist thought is important not only as documentation of the past but also as the groundwork for contemporary philosophical activity, Sabrosky's book is useful despite its severe intellectual and scholarly shortcomings. It will be helpful as an introduction to feminist thought to teachers of political philosophy unfamiliar with that literature (although Alice Rossi's *The Feminist Papers* might be more stimulating), and undergraduates might fruitfully use it in selecting subjects for research papers in courses in modern political and social theory. Its greatest contribution, however, will be to have suggested a task which remains to be accomplished, the writing of a first-rate history of modern feminist thought.

MARY LYNDON SHANLEY

Vassar College

Moral Principles and Political Obligations. By A. John Simmons. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980. Pp. xi + 236. $16.50.)

This book began as a doctoral dissertation in philosophy at Cornell. It is a lucid and systematic inquiry into the problem of political obligation, using the analytical philosophic method. Unlike most other recent work on the topic, John Simmons' study concludes "that political theory cannot offer a convincing general account of our political bonds" (p. 192). He argues that most people have no political obligation. Simmons is thus a philosophical anarchist; he aligns himself with Robert Paul Wolff, although his philosophical perspective is of course quite different from Wolff's.

According to Simmons, the problem of political obligation is the problem of explaining the nature and scope of the special moral bonds which most of us feel tie us to a particular government. Political obligation for Simmons includes obeying the law and supporting the government; in simple terms, it is a moral requirement to be a good citizen stemming out of the special obligation or duty we believe ourselves to have as citizens. Simmons begins his analysis with an account of the concept of obligation, distinguishing obligation from duty, and emphasizing that, although the special moral tie in question may be one of either obligation or duty, it cannot be grounded in the mere fact that one happens to occupy the position of citizen. He then proceeds to discuss the problem of political obligation, holding that a successful theory of political obligation must, among other things, be "reasonably general in its application, that is, that it entail that most (or many) citizens in most (or many) states are politically bound" (p. 55). He rejects arguments which take the form of an analysis of political language—for example, that one ought to obey the law because that is what the term "law" means—and he also rejects arguments from utilitarian moral theory. He goes on to consider in turn four accounts of political obligation, which he regards as the most plausible within the mainstream of liberal political theory: consent theory, the principle of fair play, John Rawls' "Natural Duty of Justice," and principles of gratitude or repayment. All four, he finds, fall down on the criterion of generality and hence are unsuccessful as theories of political oligation.

The bulk of the book lies in the examination of the four theories. Simmons says nothing startlingly new. However, his discussions of tacit consent and the principle of fair play are particularly rewarding. Readers may already be familiar with the views presented here, as these two chapters are revised versions of material previously published in two articles in *Philosophy and Public Affairs.* Simmons writes that tacit consent is given by silence and inactivity under conditions necessary to show that silence and inactivity signify consent. Above all, tacit consent must be an intentional undertaking just as express consent must be an intentional undertaking; and most of the signs of so-called tacit consent which theorists have put forth, such as voting, lack the necessary intentionality. The principle of fair play may seem an improvement over consent theory because it specifies how people can become bound to institutions without the element of intentionality, by accepting benefits from a scheme in which they are participants. But in a political community, Simmons argues, people generally *receive* benefits; they do not *accept* benefits so as to be tied to the community through the principle of fair play.

If Simmons is correct in arguing that there is no special moral bond between the citizen and his or her state, what follows? There are still, he claims, very often good reasons for obedience to law and for political supports such as voting—just as there are sometimes good reasons for disobedience and nonvoting. The result which political theorists are likely to find unpalatable is that there is no moral reason why a person should obey the law and support the government in any one country rather than any other.

> But the reasons we have for obeying the law will be the *same* reasons we have for obeying the law when we are in foreign countries. And if we have reason to support our government it will be the *same* reason we have for supporting any other similar government. . . . Insofar as we believe ourselves to be tied in some special way to our country of residence, most of us are mistaken (p. 194).

Anyone who wishes to take issue with this conclusion will have to come to grips with Simmons' analysis in this concise and neatly argued essay.

KAREN JOHNSON

Long Beach, California

The City and Social Theory. By Michael P. Smith. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979. Pp. xiii + 315. $12.95, cloth; $6.95, paper.)

Studies in the field of urban politics are frequently atheoretical, and Michael Smith's book is a welcome antidote to that tendency. Smith places urban theory in the tradition of the most comprehensive kind of political theory, encompassing assumptions about human nature, reasoning about the role of conflict in society, positing values to be achieved in a more ideal society, and conceptualizing planning as the way to shape environments in which these values can be achieved.

Smith embarks upon this ambitious undertaking with synopses of the writings of the "classic" urban theorists, Wirth and Simmel, and also the work of Freud, Roszak and Sennett. The choices are apt, the works are summarized at a level appropriate for the reader who knows the theoretical issues but not the particular theories, and there are extensive citations to guide the interested reader to even the more obscure of these authors' writings. These synopses, which constitute more than half of the book, are generally sound and sometimes better than that. In particular, Smith's emphasis on the incompatibility of several of the theories, such as that of Wirth and that of Simmel, is salutary and his case that Freudian civilization is equivalent to urban civilization is convincing. The discussion of each theorist's views on planning will be new, and I think interesting, to most political scientists. Given these strengths, omissions—such as lack of attention to Wirth's hypotheses about anonymity and the singling out of Simmel as unscientific without further development of the point—can be readily forgiven.

In an even stronger part of the book, Smith offers critiques of the several theoretical approaches to urban life by debunking a series of myths on analytic and empirical grounds. The "myth of the vanishing primary group" falls to reports of extensive social networks in urban neighborhoods; the "myth of primitive communal solidarity" falls to case studies of rural communities which are highly conflicted; the "myth of pathological density and crowding" falls to a nicely made analytic distinction between density of settlement and density of living space; and the "myth of primitive aggression and acquisitiveness" falls before mention of the pacific, and primitive, Tasaday. Smith even raises the heretical possibility that urban life may be understimulating rather than overstimulating.

A final section of the book, in which Smith offers his own version of political economy, is less impressive. The author has held others to a standard of logical consistency and empirical accuracy which I believe he fails to meet himself. Overall, Smith believes that capitalism, rather than spatial or psychological factors, offers the best explanation of urban phenomena. He argues that earlier theorists were time-bound and culture-bound in that they considered cities at only one point in the development of capitalism, makes some empirical linkages between changing urban configurations and the needs of advanced capitalism, reminds us that "planning is a value-laden activity," and advocates the kind of conflict-recognizing and decentralized planning which Sennett would applaud. Some of these points are well grounded. But the reader who wonders whether aspects of post-industrial economy and/or bureaucracy distinct from capitalism are the important new forces will not be satisfied with Smith's presentation. The reader who has been impressed by Smith's downgrading of spatial considerations will wonder why he labors to illustrate a correlation between the needs of advanced capitalism and spatial changes. The reader knowledgeable about statistics will worry that Smith interprets correlations as establishing causation. The reader sympathetic to the kind of planning Smith advocates, his reference to its approximation in one city notwithstanding, will wonder about the conditions needed for its emergence and whether an account can be given which is consistent with the importance of the needs of advanced capitalism.

Overall, this is a good book with five strong chapters and a single weak one. Smith deserves commendation for the breadth of his conception of what constitutes urban theory, and his book warrants the attention of serious students of urban behavior, planning and policy. If widely read, as I hope it will be, this book can elevate discussions of urban phenomena and of the linkages among urbanism, normative standards and policy.

ELINOR R. BOWEN

University of Illinois, Chicago Circle

Continuing the Revolution: The Political Thought of Mao. By John Bryan Starr. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979. Pp. xv + 366. $20.00, cloth; $5.95, paper.)

With Mao Tse-tung's death in 1976, the time is appropriate to reflect upon the legacy of political ideas he has left behind. For John Bryan Starr, the theory of "continuing the revolution" is the central theme around which the entire body of Mao's political thought can be organized. This theory, Starr argues, reflects Mao's belief in the "idea of intentional destabilization of the society as a means for realizing revolutionary goals more rapidly and effectively" (p. 303). The major experiment in putting this theory into practice was, of course, the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s, although the basic ideas behind it go back much further in Mao's intellectual development.

Starr presents his thesis in a clear, readable style, basing his arguments on a careful analysis of Mao's writings (in their original form, where appropriate), and on a representative sample of the best secondary materials in the field. Some attempt is made to discuss Mao's ideas in a comparative context, involving Western thinkers as diverse as Jean-Paul Sartre and Ralf Dahrendorf, to name two in particular. Even so, one wishes that more attention had been paid to other Chinese Communist theorists besides Mao, for (as Mao often admitted himself), his political thinking was to a significant degree shaped by the ideas of others within the Communist movement, and outside it as well. (Ch'en Po-ta, for example, comes to mind in this regard, as does Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai.) Within this limitation, however, the book is well researched and the argumentation sound, and it makes a substantial contribution to our understanding of Mao's political thought.

Starr is correct in changing his original reading of the Chinese term *jixu geming* from "continuous revolution" to "continuing the revolution," as this is a more faithful rendering, and suggests the sense of purposeful action conveyed by the transitive verb. Mao, as Starr implies, is not putting forward a new *type* of revolution, but simply arguing that a proletarian revolution must be extended to an infinite point in the future if ultimate success is to be achieved. Likewise, Starr is wise to ignore Mao's self-conscious protestations that his idea of "continuing the revolution" is totally at odds with Trotsky's theory of the "permanent revolution." Despite undeniable differences in their thinking, the two men did share a common belief that society should be kept in a state of permanent upheaval, thus inhibiting a new state of equilibrium, until such time as it is deemed that the goals of the revolution have been reached. It is on this issue that Mao differs from the orthodox Leninist-Stalinist tradition (and, incidentally, from the Western institutional model of development as well), even if he is at pains to deny any intellectual affinity with the heterodox Trotsky.

Where Mao and Trostky do differ is in the realm of practice, for, while the Russian became an exile from his own country, Mao was the "Great Helmsman" of his, and was able to put his evolving theory to the test. The result, as mentioned earlier, was the Cultural Revolution, and one regrets that Starr did not concern himself more directly with the impact of the application of the theory of "continuing the revolution" on the fabric of Chinese society in the course of this momentous upheaval. Still, that is perhaps asking too much of a study that is primarily intellectual in its thrust, rather than dealing with the harsh world of politics in which ideas seldom survive unscathed. Starr has helped place the study of Mao's political thought on a more comparative, analytical footing in this book, and that is accomplishment enough.

At the hand of the current post-Mao leadership, many of whom were the victims of Mao's theories, his ill-starred attempt at "continuing the revolution" is unlikely to get an impartial hearing. It is all the more important, then, for social scientists outside China to subject the Cultural Revolution to a rigorous, empirical appraisal in light of Mao's theories and their practical consequences. John Bryan Starr has made a significant contribution to this enterprise, and one hopes that others will build on the theoretical foundation he has laid.

RAYMOND F. WYLIE

Lehigh University

Political Philosophy as Therapy: Marcuse Reconsidered. By Gertrude A. Steuernagel. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979. Pp. xi + 147. $15.95.)

Gertrude Steuernagel's ambition is "to construct, through a synthesis of Marcuse and Jung, a new paradigm for political philosophy" that will give political philosophy an explicit "therapeutic function" (p. 107). That she has not succeeded in constructing a compelling paradigm—a new way of seeing and ordering "the political" that proffers a dramatic alternative of sufficient conceptual coherence that it can be taken up, in turn, by others—is but one of my criticisms of this volume. The other is to call into question the whole therapeutic mode as the direction political philosophy ought to take. Such a mode turns on conceptualizing society as "sick" and in need of a "doctor" or "therapist" to "cure" it. This conception, with its attendant notions of "sick" or "pathological" individuals in contradiction to "healthy" ones—*citizens* are conspicuously absent form Steuernagel's politics—who live in "healthy" or "sick" societies—polities are similarly absent—at base secretes a set of normative implications that bode ill for participatory, democratic forms and individual autonomy alike. That is a serious matter I shall take up in a moment, but first I shall indicate how Steuernagel arrives at the point at which a particular prescription of therapy for what ails us—a return to the Great Mother and the feminization of political philosophy—seem to her irresistible.

Steuenagel begins by attempting to make a case for Jung's importance to her reconsideration of Marcuse in particular and of political philosophy in general. The problems with her discussion begin at the beginning. Her arguments are frequently choppy and seem drastically attenuated.

Commentators are introduced before they are situated with respect to the debate as a whole. Repetition tends to replace argument. Most serious of all: complex and contestable concepts with a rich history in political and philosophical discourse get tossed about as self-evident. The terms "dialectic" and "dialectical" appear with a frequency that gets increasingly distressing given the fact that we really have no notion of what Steuernagel understands by them in the first place. For example: in chapter 1, after but three short paragraphs on Jung in which we are told that Jung "refutes those therapists who speak from the seat of authority rather than as human beings," a notoriously vague formulation at best; that Jung lets "nature rule" in the therapeutic situation, again unclear; that the therapist "must be healthy" and that Jung's "theoretical preference" is "a vision of health" as "a process of complementing or compensating," Steuernagel declares: "The dialectical nature of Jung's theories and practices is evident" (p. 10). But at this point nothing is evident, least of all that Jung's theories and practices are "dialectical."

On pp. 27–30, the terms "dialectical" and "dialectic" are used no fewer than nine times and each time the term is deployed, one sinks deeper into a muddle. To assert that Marcuse's work has a "dialectical nature," or that his vision of liberation "can be achieved only through a dialectical process" (p. 27), or that Marcuse's "dialectic" must be understood as "transcendent and ordering" and to fail to understand it thus is to lack comprehension "of the nature and function of the dialectical method" (p. 28), and so on and on, is to substitute a kind of word magic for penetrating analysis. Another example of the insistent reiteration of a term as a substitute for explication occurs when Steuernagel claims that Marcuse's vision "is materialist because it is grounded in what he regards as the materialist process of fantasy" (p. 48). This, surely, is insufficient to convince us either that Marcuse is, in fact, "materialist," for we don't know what Steuernagel is packing into that term, or that the process of fantasy is materialist because Marcuse declares it so. The case must be made, not insisted upon.

Most importantly, however, Steuernagel's discussion raises the problem of political philosophy as therapy for the sick society, a function to which she first assimilates Marcuse's work and, second, goes on to insist that in this effort Marcuse would have been better served by turning to Jung rather than to Freud. Steuernagel is candid about the fact that Marcuse considered Jung's theories retrograde, reactionary, indeed, proto-fascist. But she brushes this aside as a case of mistaken identity on Marcuse's part and goes on to link Jung's archetypes and his collective unconscious—"universal collectivities which have an objective existence" or, in Jung's terms, "sheer objectivity" (p. 68) with Marcuse's insistence on a realm that transcends the historical realm of necessity and raises the possibility of "a non-repressive reality" that would restore human beings to "a realm of internal and external harmony" (p. 56). I haven't space to analyze her attempt to fuse Marcuse and Jung. Steuernagel does raise the important possibility that there are Jungian dimensions to Marcuse's thought. To the extent that this argument is correct, it raises, I shall argue, more pitfalls than possibilities for the theory and practice of politics.

Steuernagel does raise potentially dangerous and disturbing dimensions of the therapeutic vision, including the spectre of control by a "healthy" elite, but she opts out of the criticism, finally, by begging the question. She does so by setting up an unacceptable contrast model as the *only* alternative to her therapeutic paradigm when she conjures up "a potentially more dangerous alternative," namely, "the assumption that human nature is one-dimensional and that political considerations should be confined to conscious concerns" (p. 107). But surely that is not our only option! One could argue, as indeed I shall, that there is a disturbingly antidemocratic aspect to notions of "sick societies," requiring therapists to cure or heal them, particularly when it forces the thinker, like Jung, to grant agency in the world to anthromorphized entities of dubious ontic status. (Thus the archetypes, on Jung's view, can operate without regard for the human beings they act upon or through; Steuernagel herself grants agency to Symbols.) But trepidation about the model of sickness and cure need not implicate the queasy such as myself in accepting a one-dimensional view of human beings. The suggestion is outrageous. Instead, one could argue for a view of human beings as complicatedly motivated by conscious and unconscious drives, wishes, motivations and needs without depriving individuals of agency in the process and leaving "cures" to collective proper nouns that march, capitalized, over the pages of texts. It is not at all clear from Steuernagel's analysis how the political philosopher is to function as the doctor to the sick souls of a sick society if something else Steuernagel contends is also true—namely, that we cannot reanimate or put new life into dead Symbols; somehow Symbols themselves "do" it.

Finally, in Steuernagel's view, Marcuse's Great Refusal turns out to be a call for a return to the Great Mother. The problem with this Great Return is that it would not allow us any more autonomy and freely chosen participation in politics or anything else than did the putative old enthrallment to the Primal Father; indeed, it promises even les if the work of contemporary Feminist thinkers indebted to psychoanalysis is correct, because the tie to the Mother is pre-linguistic and less subject to subsequent reflective reevaluation. Jung with his feminized anima and images of "the mother-moist unconsciousness" (for Jung, Steuernagel tells us, the unconscious is feminine), "the Feminine as Great Round, as Great Container" (p. 119), and Marcuse with his insistence on women as repositories of an unspoiled aesthetic dimension recapitulate in their own ways the idealization of women that has always been part and parcel of their subjection. Each resurrects the distinction between Being and Doing as a disjuncture between Female and Male and it is one that has plagued women through the centuries. Steuernagel concludes by declaring that Marcuse is "an original thinker in a dialectical sense," but this book not only doesn't make that case, it raises many more problems than it resolves.

JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN

University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Bringing the Left Back Home: A Critique of American Social Criticism. By Gary Thom. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979. Pp. x + 303. $17.50.)

Gary Thom argues convincingly that much social criticism of liberal democracy generally and particularly of American liberal democracy emphasizes individual liberty to the exclusion of a concern for community and belonging. Thom suggests a new direction for social criticism, a direction that takes its bearings from what he calls human ambivalence. Human ambivalence involves a recognition that there are individual needs of freedom, achievement, and distinctiveness, but that these needs exist in a state of tension with apparently, but not necessarily, contradictory needs associated with being part of a community. The frustration of the needs of individualism can lead to alienation, and the frustration of the needs of community can lead to anomie. A social criticism that dwells on alienation, Thom argues, will inevitably be insensitive to the problems of anomie. The concern for community is even more crucial today because of the greater impact on individuals and society of "human congestion" and spillovers from private economic activities.

Thom chooses to emphasize social criticism from the left because it is there "that both the sense of loss and the desire for reconstruction is most keen" (p. 221). Although he cites extensively from the literature of political science, psychology, and sociology, the core of his discussion derives from what Thom calls "the leftist literature of freedom" that he finds in Etzioni, Bay, Marcuse, and Kariel. While Thom finds much to admire in this literature, he is ultimately critical of it because it "fails to take adequate account of human ambivalence; and that this failure is associated with the failure to appreciate the significance of anomie and its relationship to alienation, and to unambiguously specify how appeals to human nature underpin social criticism" (p. 121).

Unfortunately, Thom seems also to suffer from some of the same deficiencies that he sees in the leftist critics. Consider the last criticism in the sentence quoted above: the left fails to "unambiguously specify how appeals to human nature underpin social criticism." But Thom seems himself unclear on the relationship of human nature to his social criticism. He surely recognizes the importance of the question. Early on he writes: "Any way of viewing the world, any mode of democratic theorizing, relies on a view of human nature, or philosophical anthropology. . ." (p. 47). We are entitled then to ask what view underpins Thom's social criticism?

Thom does not offer us a clear guide to answering this question. He seems to reject political philosophy (pp. 60–61) without ever offering a reason for the rejection. He also seems to reject any attempt at understanding human nature: "What kind of society do we want, given that nature is no longer our guide?" (p. 273). It could be argued that Thom means this question only in an ironic fashion. That is, that the consequences of acting against nature cannot be avoided even if we think that there are no consequences. But Thom does not make his argument clearly enough for this interpretation to be unquestionably valid.

Instead of nature and philosophy, Thom more frequently refers to theories of psychological development, depth psychology, and "the sociological tradition" (p. 221). But how do theories of psychological development ultimately differ from philosophic attempts at understanding human nature other than in terms of their currently greater popularity? Is there a singular sociological tradition, as Thom implies? If so, is it the tradition that stretches from Tocqueville to Robert Nisbet or is it the tradition rooted in Marxism?

Turning from Thom's own difficulties as a social critic, how successful is he in "bringing the left back home"? There is, in fact, an ambiguity in the title of this volume which suggests two works. The subtitle tells us that this is "a critique of American social criticism." The title proposes a more ambitious project: the reconciliation of the American intellectual left. But a reconciliation to what? Thom is more successful at the more modest, but still important, level of showing the problems in "liberal-left" social criticism. At the level of reconciliation, Thom encounters difficulties which make him substantially less successful. Certainly the "home" to which the left is to be reconciled is not that of extant American political institutions. Thom is as critical of these as anyone on the left. Thom's "home" for the left is not to be found in the left's conception of human nature. Thom sees the radical critics as being escapists, at least in part, and holds that "their own escapism is reflected in their failure to articulate a convincing model of man to replace the Marxist and liberal images" (p. 221). However, beyond pointing to the significance of community, Thom has been no more successful at this than those he criticizes and, therefore, can offer them no real reason why they should retreat from those images.

"Home" seems to be a commitment to liberal democracy with a greater concern for community. Thom is appropriately critical of other social critics for the vagueness they exhibit in discussing democracy. But Thom's discussion of democracy proves to suffer from its own vagueness and represents only a marginal improvement.

PAUL PETERSON

Northern Illinois University

From Mobilization to Revolution. By Charles Tilly. (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978. Pp. xiii + 349. No price given.)

In the preface to this book Charles Tilly forewarns the reader that he is serving stone soup and, indeed, his analysis of collective action does have an unusual flavor, resulting from an idiosyncratic mixture of concrete historical example with abstract conceptualizing and causal modeling. To this reader's taste, Tilly's eclecticism dilutes the product: his soup lacks consistency.

Tilly sets himself ambitious goals. First he proposes a general theory of the determinants of collective action, called the Mobilization Model; then he broadens the scope of his analysis to encompass the causal sequence that flows from mobilization to revolution. These endeavors, however, as Tilly acknowleges, are quite loosely integrated. Chapter 7, which deals with the topic chosen for the title of the book, is a reworking of a previously published paper on revolution; this present version makes little systematic reference to the concepts used in the Mobilization Model, elaborated in the third and fourth chapters.

After an introductory chapter that gives an overview of the book, Tilly reviews the literature on collective action in chapter 2. From his point of view, there are four alternative approaches to the explanation of collective action, each identified with a major social theorist of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The prevailing contemporary explanation, according to Tilly, issues from the work of Emile Durkheim. The Durkheimian approach differentiates between routine and nonroutine ("conventional" and "unconventional," in current jargon) collective action and regards nonroutine action as the result of individual dissatisfaction and anxieties produced by disintegration of the division of labor. Classified in the Durkheimian school are Ted Robert Gurr, Samuel Huntington, and Chalmers Johnson. Another approach which differentiates between routine and nonroutine collective action is that of Max Weber, who parts company with Durkheim in emphasizing the strong direct impact of shared beliefs on nonroutine collective action. The Weberian tradition has spawned a variety of case studies of social movements. A third approach, associated with John Stuart Mill, does not distinguish between different kinds of collective action and explains collective action as strictly the result of the rational pursuit of self-interest. Contemporary Millians are collective choice theorists such as James Coleman, Albert Hirschman, and Mancur Olsen. Tilly himself does not accept the distinction between routine and nonroutine collective action made by Durkheimians and Weberians, and he strongly rejects the emphasis on individual attitudes and beliefs, however defined, common to all three approaches. Instead, Tilly places his theory in the Marxian tradition. Expanding on the Marxian analysis of collective action (of any kind) as the result of shared class interests arising from the organization of production and mediated by the internal organization of the class, Tilly introduces the concepts of mobilization, power, repression/facilitation, and opportunity/threat to constitute a Mobilization Model described as "doggedly anti-Durkheimian, resolutely pro-Marxian, but sometimes indulgent to Weber and sometimes reliant on Mill."

The third chapter focuses on the side of the Mobilization Model that deals with characteristics of a given group contending for power in a polity. Here, the relevant variables are Interests ("the gains and losses resulting from a group's interaction with other groups"), Organization ("the extent of common identity and unifying structure among the individuals"), Mobilization ("the extent of resources under the collective control of the contender") and Collective Action ("the extent of a contender's joint action in pursuit of common ends"). In the causal model connecting these variables, Organization is a function of Interest, Mobilization is a function of Organization and Interest, and Collective Action is a function of Mobilization. However, it turns out that it is virtually impossible to develop a satisfactory empirical measure of Interests, so that variable is dropped from the analysis later in the chapter, leaving the simple three-variable causal chain: Organization → Mobilization → Collective Action. Tilly then points out that the proposition linking Organization to Mobilization is "one which needs a good deal more specification before it has much value," and goes on to consider empirical work relevant to the Mobilization → Collective Action proposition. In this regard, he cites work by himself and Edward Shorter and by David Snyder that investigated, at the macro level, relationships between Mobilization, measured by the variable Union Membership, Strikes (a nonroutine collective action), and a bundle of routine collective actions labeled Other Collective Action. Given such an operational definition of the Mobilization concept, there exists a considerable body of research at the micro level pertinent to Tilly's proposition about Mobilization (read "organizational membership") being a principal cause of collective action (conventional and unconventional participation), and this chapter would have profited from a discussion of it.

Chapter 4 takes up what Tilly refers to as the "opportunity" side of the Mobilization Model: the relationship of the contender to the world around it. Three opportunity variables are considered: Repression/Facilitation ("the costs of collective action to the contender"), Power ("the extent to which the outcomes of the population's interactions with other populations favor its interests over those of others"), and Opportunity/Threat ("the extent to which other groups, including governments, are either [a] vulnerable to new claims which would, if successful, enhance the contender's realization of its interests or [b] threatening to make claims which would, if successful, reduce the contender's realization of its interests"). Where chapter 3 began with a moderately complex model and reduced it to a much simplified (oversimplified, in this reader's opinion) version, chapter 4 takes a different tack, moving from a moderately to an extremely complex model, replete with curvilinear functions and reciprocal causation. The proposed curvilinear relationship between Collective Action and Opportunity/Threat concept is defined here by *individual perceptions* of change in the realization of their interests), but many of the figures representing multivariate relationships are obscure. The clarity of the argument could be improved by attempting (1) to set some of the relationships into the form of equations and (2) to specify empirical indicators of abstract concepts. Also, a criticism of literature coverage is that, although Tilly uses historical example to make a persuasive case for his proposition stating a strong, direct, negative impact of repression on the level of collective action, he ignores the findings of Hibbs (cited in chapter 2 and depicted in Figure 2-8) which show, across a sample of 108 countries, a strong, direct, and *positive* impact of governmental use of negative sanctions on the magnitude of collective protest and internal war.

In chapter 5 Tilly downshifts from the abstractions of his Mobilization Model to consider the concrete reality of diverse forms of collective action in historical perspective. An interesting hypothesis about the relationship between routine and nonroutine collective action is offered, the argument being that the growth of routine, legal kinds of action, especially electoral behavior, also promotes increases in nonroutine, contentious action. This hypothesis particularly deserves micro-level investigation with data sets taking into account other causal variables to see if the relationship holds up independent of them and if the same causal variables predict to both kinds of collective action, or if different explanatory models are involved. (Research along this line appears in Samuel A. Barnes and Max Kaase, et al., *Political Action* [Sage, 1979].)

Chapter 6 advances a proposition advocated by Tilly since the early 1970s, namely, that political violence is simply a by-product of contentious gatherings such as demonstrations and strikes, a by-product caused by repressive actions of government forces who, Tilly claims, are the initiators of violence in the vast majority of instances. The "by-product" hypothesis requires more systematic and detailed investigation than Tilly provides. Certainly many counterexamples can be cited of dissident groups who engage in nonviolent illegal actions with the intention of provoking violence, or at least have a readiness to escalate to violence, not to mention groups who initiate violence in the form of damage to property or invite violence against their persons by the agents of the state, as well as groups who themselves are armed and ready to do battle.

The seventh chapter introduces a conceptual framework that is an original contribution to the classification of events entailing the transfer of power in a polity. Tilly distinguishes between a Revolutionary Situation (the emergence of more than one "power bloc" regarded as legitimate by some of a country's people) and a Revolutionary Outcome ("the displacement of one set of power holders by another"). Cross-classification of Revolutionary Outcome by Revolutionary Situation, conceived as continua, produces a useful means of differentiating among routine politics, coups, insurrections, civil wars, and full-scale revolutions. However, when Tilly turns to theorizing about the causes of a Revolutionary Situation, his discussion is no improvement on extant work. Here he acknowledges the relevance of attitudinal theories (but only in passing) to the explanation of why contenders for power turn against the political system and how commitment to their cause can expand, and he is quite sensitive to the different kinds of government action that affect the feeling of legitimacy, perception of effectiveness, sense of relative deprivation, and belief in the utilitarian justifiability of aggressive collective action; but perhaps because of his "dogged anti-Durkheimianism," Tilly is unwilling to make *systematic* use of any social-psychological concepts, and this restricts the scope and detracts from the rigor of his analysis.

Tilly's book is, in short, a potpourri of uneven quality—albeit a very well-written potpourri.

EDWARD N. MULLER

University of Arizona

Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development. By Richard Tuck. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Pp. viii + 185. $24.50.)

Richard Tuck's *Natural Rights Theories* is an important book, one that needs to be taken seriously by students of modern liberal thought. Clearly written and thoroughly researched in the relevant primary materials, Tuck's study traces the development of "the language of human rights." He is concerned to show that there is something to the language of rights in spite of the fact that "academic political philosophers find it on the whole an elusive and unnecessary mode of discourse."

But the book is more than a linguistic analysis of the term "natural rights"; it is an attempt to elucidate what Quentin Skinner has called a "normative vocabulary." Adequately to understand a term such as *a right,* it is necessary, Tuck maintains, to understand that such terms are theory-dependent, that they are a part of a broader theory which defines the relevant moral world. Hence his concern is with showing "what role the term played in the various theories of politics which engage our attention" and with "writing something much more like the traditional history of ideas."

At this juncture the influence of Skinner, Tuck's teacher, becomes apparent. In the preface Tuck observes, "Much of what I have to say takes on a new significance in the light of [*The Foundations of Modern Political Thought* (Cambridge, 1979)]." This is certainly an understatement, for what Tuck has to say takes on significance only in the light of Skinner's work (in spite of acknowledged differences of interpretation). Neither in his introduction nor in his conclusion does Tuck make it clear what it is he is trying to say, leaving one to wonder whether it is more than an antiquarian exercise. However, when read in the light of Skinner's methodological prescriptions, the book takes on new meaning, and what one can learn from Tuck's analysis of the ideological context in which the notion of right (*jus*) developed is greatly increased. Unfortunately, the reader unaware of Skinner's work would miss much the book has to offer.

In addition to casting new light on the ideas of more familiar figures such as Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes, Tuck deals in a fruitful way with lesser-known writers—in particular, John Selden and his followers—ascribing to them an importance not hitherto generally recognized. These writers constitute an important part of the ideological context in which the works of the more famous writers were conceived. It is unfortunate, however, that more attention was not paid to John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The latter omission seems particularly important in light of Tuck's statement that it is in Rousseau that we find the repudiation of the entire natural-rights tradition.

One could also wish for a fuller consideration of the work of C. B. Macpherson, since, as Tuck acknowledges, his enterprise has certain parallels with that of Macpherson's *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (Oxford, 1962). A theme that is sorely underdeveloped is that of the relationship between the question of natural rights and the development of a conception of society rooted in individualism, a relationship that appears to be intimate. This shortcoming could have been avoided by paying closer attention to Macpherson's argument.

These problems notwithstanding, *Natural Rights Theories* is a valuable work, one which can be read with considerable profit, if that reading is done in conjunction with Skinner's *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought* and Macpherson's *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism.*

GARY L. JONES

University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Symbol, Myth and Culture: Essays and Lectures of Ernst Cassirer, 1935–1945. Edited by Donald P. Verene. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979. Pp. xii + 304. $22.50.)

In the 35 years that have elapsed since Ernst Cassirer's untimely death in 1945, nothing has been able to erode his reputation as the greatest twentieth-century historian of ideas. And this is because in the 45 years following his *Leibniz' Sys-*

tem in Seinen Wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen (1902), Cassirer put forth a series of still-incomparable books: the great *Akademia-Ausgabe* of Kant's *Werke* (crowned by Cassirer's magistral *Kants Leben and Lehre*); the remarkable *Das Erkenntnisproblem (The Problem of Knowledge);* the all-encompassing *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (3 volumes); that wonderful trio of contributions to *Ideengeschichte—The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, The Platonic Renaissance in England,* and (above all) *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (these three even now defining the shapes of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries); finally the late and more accessible political writings, *The Myth of the State* and *An Essay on Man.* How fine it is, then, to be given a collection of "new" Cassirer pieces drawn by Donald Verene from papers and lectures dating from 1935 to 1945, and artfully grouped under the titles of some of Cassirer's best-known books.

If there is a thread (beyond the use of familiar book titles) which holds this collection together, it is plainly the all-pervasive (and expected) influence of Kant. And not just of Kant as *Ethiker,* either, though that facet is prominent: Kant is made to appear in his *full* range, as epistemologist, as aesthetician, as philosopher of history, as scientist and philosopher of science. Cassirer begins, in a superb piece called "Critical Idealism as a Philosophy of Culture," by pointing out that Kant's "critical" or "transcendental" Idealism—carefully distinguished from the idealism of Plato and Berkeley—rests on the notion that "it is not the things themselves, but . . . their determination by the different modes of cognition that proves to be the true problem of a new idealism." And Cassirer carries this Kantian "Copernican revolution" (in which *how* we know determines what we *can* know) over into a later piece called "Language and Art I," in which he insists that "language cannot be regarded as a copy of things but as a condition of the concept of things"—an argument which is completed in "Language and Art II" with the doctrine that language (as well as "myth, religion, art [and] science"(are not "imitations" or "reproductions" of a "ready-made nature of things," but rather only "different stations or holding-places on our way to objectivity." And this is quickly expanded into a general neo-Kantian theory of culture: "What we call human culture may be defined as the progressive objectification of our human experience—as the objectification of our feelings, our intuitions, our desires, our impressions, our intuitions, our thoughts and ideas." All of these, for Cassirer, are objectified in symbols, or "symbolic forms." And those forms in turn are the "conditions" of our further experience.

But the *meaning* of those symbols, which for Cassirer "objectify" human experience and constitute human culture, can be lost over time—as he makes clear in another superb essay, this one called "The Philosophy of History." Here, too, Kant is prominent; but the essential point is that "after a short time the symbols in which man expresses his ideas and feelings . . . become unintelligible." It is the "real task" of history, Cassirer argues, to "revivify these symbols," to "restore them to a new life and render them legible and understandable again." Thucydides was right, Cassirer adds, to view his own histories as "the everlasting possession of the human mind"; but that "mind," that set of symbols, that "objectification," has constantly to be "recovered" by historical effort. (Before there can *be* historical "recovery" of "faded" symbols, however—and this Cassirer stresses in a fine 1941 paper called "Descartes, Leibniz and Vico"—there must be respect for history, and thus for *time.*) Descartes, as Cassirer shows, had a mathematician's lack of interest in an "idle" accumulation of "haphazard facts"; and it was Leibniz' "monadology"—with its notion that individual substances "unfold" out of their own "concept" over time (so that Caesar's "predicates"—crossing the Rubicon, capturing Rome, being assassinated—appear sequentially) which first made the notions of *development* and *becoming* philosophically respectable, thus making philosophy of history a part of philosophy itself by Hegel's day. (This magistral essay alone is worth the price of the book.)

But it is the overtly political pieces which will be of most interest—though these are tied to the other essays by familiar Kantian threads. The already praised "Critical Idealism as a Philosophy of Culture" has a high political content, and turns on the argument that "we may consent to the conception of Kant and Hegel that the process of culture is the progress of the consciousness of freedom; for this freedom . . . leads us from a mere passive state to a definite form of activity." (In related essays Cassirer castigates Spengler and Heidegger for alleged "passivity," and even *chic* fatalism, and extols Schweitzer's *ethos* of humanitarian activity.) But if in "Critical Idealism" Hegel appears as a hero mentioned in the same breath with Kant, in "Hegel's Theory of the State"—a 1942 essay that is the forerunner of the Hegel sections of *The Myth of the State*—Cassirer argues more characteristically that while Hegel was indeed a partisan of freedom, he was also a partisan of a "divinized" state and the enemy of "natural rights." (Interestingly, however, the 1942 manuscript contains no hint of the charge in *The Myth of the State* that Hegel's over-fondness for existing power constitutes a "ruthless" intimation of "fascism.") The 1942 manuscript, indeed, while still fluttering on the outer margin of reasonable hostility, is a more balanced piece of work than the 1945 book.)

Symbol, Myth and Culture ends—except for an essay on mathematical theory written in part on the day of Cassirer's death—with an interesting and (perhaps deliberately) tentative essay called "The Technique of our Modern Political Myths." Following a few speculations on modern political science ("in the science of politics we have not yet found a firm ground"), Cassirer goes on to say that sinister political myths such as Nazism are effective precisely because of their powerful irrationality; but he finally finds some "relief" from the depressing politics of the thirties and forties with the "Kantian" thought that truly moral conduct involves acting *from* a sense of duty (rather than out of "inclination") as a sufficient motive, and that if one dutifully opposes murderous political myths which inclination might be inclined to embrace, then one can find solace in "the hope to fulfil our duty that is to say, to fulfil the function which philosophy"—active rather than passive—"has to perform in the whole of our social life." It is characteristic that Cassirer should find enough "relief" in this modest, non-sanguine, Kantian hope, even in the year 1945, to continue believing in the project of "human culture." For this collection of essays, reminding one of Cassirer's unforgotten greatness, one can only be deeply grateful.

PATRICK RILEY

University of Wisconsin, Madison

American Politics

The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty. By Russel Lawrence Barsh and James Youngblood Henderson. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. Pp. vii + 301. $14.95.)

It has become voguish in recent years to write on the plight of American Indians. Generally these tracts take the form of polemical diatribes written for the popular press. Fortunately, Russel Lawrence Barsh and James Youngblood Henderson have been able to analyze the ill-treatment of American Indians from an academically sound perspective. Clearly there is need for such a book, and scholars should welcome it. At the outset, the authors state three purposes in writing *The Road.* First, they analyze the constitutional guarantee of political liberty in the United States. Next, they turn to an explanation of why American tribes have been deprived of that political liberty. Finally, they develop a conceptual strategy for restoring tribal rights.

In discussing political liberty, Barsh and Henderson trace the development of liberal philosophy to the British common law tradition. While this analysis becomes tedious at points, it is worth the effort, since present conceptions of liberty ought to be traced to their intellectual roots, and the authors do this well. The book then moves to an in-depth analysis of the multitude of legal cases and statute laws which have had a significant impact on Indian liberty and tribal autonomy. Perhaps this is its greatest contribution. One of the ills which faces the legal scholar is the lack of consistent precedent concerning Indian and tribal righs. Barsh and Henderson present an excellent analysis; they are comprehensive and cover the cases in a thoughtful manner.

Barsh and Henderson feel the appropriate remedy for the problems facing tribes is to provide some form of "treaty federalism." They argue that the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution provides authority for tribal self-government, and that the various agreements between the federal government and the tribes irrevocably annex the "tribes to the federal system in a status parallel to, but not identical with, that of the states" (p. 270). To obtain this "treaty federalism," the authors propose adding an amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It would provide that tribes would be deemed "states," powers of self-government would be reserved to the tribes, tribes would tax persons and property within their boundaries and would determine the criteria for membership in the tribe. Congress would appropriate $500 million over a ten-year period for economic development, but the federal government would not be allowed to supervise the use of those funds. The most novel idea is that two new bodies be created as appendages of the present Congress. A Tribal Senate Caucus would send two senators as full members to the Senate, and a similar Tribal House Caucus would send two representatives to the House of Representatives. Additionally, no state would be allowed to exercise power over the territory belonging to tribes, and tribal members would not have suffrage rights in state elections.

While one might applaud the sentiment involved in this proposal, it is somewhat unrealistic, from a political standpoint. Much of the book is devoted to a discussion of the lack of congressional support for Indian needs, yet this amendment would have to be proposed by Congress and then ratified by the states. Even if there were support in Congress and the states, there are other problems. How are tribes to support themselves when the ten-year period of federal money expires if they have not become financially independent? If tribes are to determine membership individually, will they include non-Indians on their membership rolls? What will be the distinguishing criteria between "Indians" and "non-Indians"? How will Indians who have been dispersed away from their tribes be represented?

Tribal rights have clearly been abused in this country, and Indian people have been maligned. The germs of resolving this problem may be here, but they need more refinement. The dilemma is one of an overpowering majority versus a weaker minority. One cannot expect those who control the political system to rush to the defense of those who are powerless.

JANNA MERRICK

St. Cloud State University

The Politics of Opposition: Antifederalists and the Acceptance of the Constitution. By Steven R. Boyd. (Millwood, N.Y.: KTO Press, 1979. Pp. xiii + 178. $18.95.)

Despite recent efforts to retrieve the Antifederalists from oblivion, Antifederalist thought and behavior are still widely viewed as irrelevant and disorganized. Steven Boyd continues the challenge against this negative interpretation of the Antifederalist legacy and attempts to elevate their contribution to a position of critical importance in the American political tradition.

Boyd's central question is: why did a majority of the American electorate who opposed the new plan of government in 1787 and early 1788 come to accept the Constitution even before the first federal elections were held in 1789? His thesis is that "the key to understanding the initial acceptance of the Constitution by the American people" (p. 164) is to be found in the character of the Antifederalist opposition to the Constitution. Boyd's argument is that the acceptance of the Constitution was due to the *presence* rather than to the *absence* of an organized Antifedralist opposition.

With the help of new manuscript sources, and a meticulous reexamination of public records, Boyd effectively demonstrates that the Antifederalists were indeed highly organized politically. He focuses "on the electoral maneuvering that preceded and followed the state conventions" (p. 168) to demonstrate the presence of an extensive interstate and intrastate communications network between Antifederalists concerning electoral strategy, campaign procedures, delegate selection, and pamphlet distribution.

Boyd carefully documents how the Antifederalists simultaneously provided legitimacy for the Constitution and ensured their own defeat. Antifederalists in the Confederation Congress could have opposed the motion to transmit the proposed constitution to state conventions for ratification and they had the votes in several state legislatures to refuse compliance with this mode of ratification. Instead, they campaigned diligently to secure Antifederalist delegates to these conventions. They could have defeated the plan in at least six state conventions. Instead, they argued for a second constitutional convention prior to ratification and then accepted the compromise to ratify now and amend later. They could have refused to participate in the first federal elections. Instead, they decided to turn the First Congress into a second constitutional convention by electing Antifederalists to office.

Boyd's conclusion is that the willingness of the Antifederalists to operate within the framework devised by the Federalists for the formation, ratification, and implementation of the new plan of government bestowed legitimacy on the Constitution. They were the first loyal opposition party in America. Their decision to secure their political goals by continued participation "within the system" meant that they faced the risk of losing their majority status among the electorate. The risk became reality in 1789 when the Antifederalists lost their base in the state legislatures and captured only 11 out of 59 seats in the House of Representatives. The first federal elections are significant for Boyd because it meant "the virtual elimination of antifederalism as an organized opposition party and the acceptance of the Constitution by the majority of the electorate" (p. 161).

The most important defect in Boyd's otherwise solid commentary is the scant attention which is given to *why,* as distinguished from *how,* the Antifederalists opposed the Constitution. An analysis of the arguments would help explain why the Antifederalists accepted certain compromises and why James Madison considered it vital to secure amendments to the Constitution in the First Congress. This inattention to the role of ideas—

especially those articulated by *The Federalist*—is even more surprising, since the book is dedicated to the memory of Douglass Adair and Martin Diamond. Did the Antifederalists have a coherent argument against the Constitution which is significant for a critical understanding of the American political tradition? This aspect of the Antifederalist legacy is not addressed. By focusing on their electoral defeat, Boyd has, in effect, reinforced the view that the Antifederalists are irrelevant. To restore the potency of Antifederalist political analysis requires that it be rescued from its friends as well as its detractors.

GORDON LLOYD

University of Redlands

Making Foreign Economic Policy. By I. M. Destler. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1980. Pp. xii + 244. $11.95, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

The heart of this very useful book is two long case studies in the making of U.S. foreign economic policy—one on food policy from 1972 up to the beginning of the Carter administration, and the other on foreign trade policy during approximately the same period. These case studies are used to illustrate and support an analysis of the problem of coordinating the making and execution of foreign economic policy in the American government.

The case studies alone are worth the price of the book. They describe how the U.S. government responded to major changes in the domestic and international conditions affecting food production and international trade. In agriculture, a government whose policies were based on the assumption that the problem was food surpluses and the threat they posed to the incomes of American farmers was suddenly confronted with a situation in which food was scarce and therefore expensive. Moreover, the decline in the number of American farmers, coupled with congressional redistricting, meant that farmers' interests no longer dominated agricultural policy making to the extent that they had in the past; and the farmers were more divided than ever before over the question of what their interests were.

In trade, the U.S. was beginning to experience a chronic deficit in its trade balance, and important sectors of the American economy were in trouble as a result of import competition. American labor unions abandoned their support for free-trade policies. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system and OPEC's demonstration of its market power constituted major changes in the international context of trade policy. It was not clear whether the U.S. would follow the rest of the world into a phase of protectionism and neomercantilism, or would continue to use the GATT system of trade negotiations as a way of combating such policies.

Destler provides a brief analysis of the main political forces contending in each of these policy areas, and then a straightforward narrative account of the making of policy during this interesting period. His language is simple and direct, but his account embodies a sophisticated understanding of the political process. His discussion is full enough to provide material for many analytical purposes besides the one to which he puts it. An important feature of his narrative is that it extends over a number of years, and includes successive decisions in the same policy area. Thus it is possible to watch policy makers learn from their failures.

Destler's own analysis of the coordination problem is brief but weighty. He distinguishes between the oversight of official actions (to see that they all conform to high-level decisions) and the reconciliation of conflicting interests (which are the result of different actors giving different weights to the various values that must be traded off against each other in the making of policy). Because the former cannot be neatly separated from the latter, the coordination problem can have no neat and universal solution, since the coordination process will necessarily reflect the shifting balance of political power among the relevant actors.

Because there must be competing interests in policy decisions, Destler argues, foreign economic policy is inevitably decentralized to some degree. Thus it is better to adapt to what is inevitable than to pursue the unattainable by trying to centralize the making of foreign economic policy. Moreover, since the domestic interests in policy tend to be more powerful than the foreign policy interests, Destler argues that the main forum for coordination should be an economic policy forum, rather than a foreign policy one. These two propositions together lead him to defend a system of coordination managed by a very small White House staff (whose job it is to manage the resolution of conflicts among the operating departments of government); the head of this staff should be a presidential assistant coordinating overall economic policy making.

Destler's discussion of these organizational issues is an important contribution to the burgeoning literature on that subject. But his account of food and trade policies (as well as his emphasis on the political context of policy coordination) makes the book of much more general significance than that.

R. HARRISON WAGNER

University of Texas, Austin

Rules and Racial Equality. By Edwin Dorn. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979. Pp. xii + 158. $14.00.)

Edwin Dorn offers this short book as "a new and elegant way of looking at an old and persisting problem." Borrowing constructs from contemporary social theory and analytic modes from the stores of social science, he fashions from them a weaponry with which to attack the hesitancies and misconceptions which, in his view, are frustrating the attainment of true racial equality between blacks and whites in the United States.

True racial equality to Dorn is substantive equality. This means that in the allocation of primary social goods—income and wealth, prestige and status, suffrage, political representation and the power to determine political outcomes—the distribution to blacks should be, at the least, approximately proportional to population. To advance toward this equality requires more than rules barring discrimination against blacks. "There is no reason to believe that current rules will lead to racial equality, save for the equality of rights. . . . The very direction of bias must be reversed, at least temporarily" (p. 147).

Dorn appears to find a theoretical grounding for substantive equality as a societal norm in Rawlsian conceptions of justice as fairness. His own endeavor requires two major variances, however. One of these involves "injecting considerations of race" as relevant to the fairness of allocational patterns; more specifically, it entails the treatment of racial groups as entities for the purpose of comparing the distribution of goods between them. A second variance from Rawls involves justifying the attainment of substantive equality, when it does not exist, by giving primacy as a matter of justice to measures of preferment for the disadvantaged. This justification closely resembles what Rawls refers to as the "principle of redress." It is that those who have been disadvantaged through no fault of their own should be helped towards equality by compensatory means of redress. This, for Rawls, is plausible "only as a *prima facie* principle—to be weighed in the balance with others. For example, we are to weigh it against the principle to improve the average standards of life, or to advance the common good" (*A Theory of Justice,* pp. 100–01). Dorn is not concerned with the weighing. If substantive racial inequality is found, redress becomes an overriding imperative. Or so fair-minded persons themselves free from racial bias would determine. The rules of society are to be evaluated accordingly, as to their adequacy for bringing redress to the disadvantaged group.

From these premises Dorn undertakes to examine the distribution of various kinds of goods between the races as categorical groups, and to depict the influence of rules affecting those distributions. Relative particularly to the distribution of economic and social goods (to which this discussion must be restricted)—family income, wealth, employment levels, occupation categories, education levels—he uses a considerable range of analytic models and techniques. These include quantile comparisons, Pareto-optimizing models, probability paradigms, and exercises in formal logic. His finding is that in the economic sectors examined there is indeed evidence of persisting unequal distribution according to race; that in few sectors have blacks as a group much improved their relative position in recent years, that in several instances the trends are ambiguous, and that in others the situation (through the mid-1970s) has been one of increasing inequality. Further, basing his conclusions on his analysis of the probabilities affecting distributional patterns, he finds slight prospect that existing disparities will be eliminated or greatly reduced, or in some sectors prevented from growing, unless suitable measures of redress, offering preferment to blacks as a group, are brought firmly to bear.

The problem is, of course, that a commitment to the necessary preferential arrangements still encounters considerable resistance. Dorn finds several reasons for this, including doubt of their necessity, based perhaps on the too sanguine assumption that substantive racial inequalities are rapidly diminishing, now that our past malific treatment of blacks has to a considerable degree abated. That assumption he links, in turn, to a difficulty in understanding or acknowledging that the "open" rules of traditional liberalism, which premise equality as being procedural, not substantive, and which are focused on justice for persons, not groups—that such rules not only cannot assure the redress of group disadvantage, but can easily be construed, and have been, in ways that serve to perpetuate it. Thus, for example, rules of equal opportunity in employment applied to exclude either penalty or preferment related to group identity, sustain and may well increase the balance of advantage to the already advantaged group. In this situation, as Dorn sees it, procedural equality for blacks is really a continuation of discrimination for whites.

While it must be doubted that Dorn's efforts will cause many to quit their hesitancies and rally to his banner, he does indeed offer some interesting new ways of looking at the problem he addresses. His premises, his analyses, and his arguments are all, in various ways, subject to effective challenge. They do, however, deserve the degree of attention from which such challenges may come.

ROBERT H. STERN

State University of New York, Buffalo

Presidential Influence in Congress. By George C. Edwards III. (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1980. Pp. x + 216. $13.95, cloth; $6.95, paper.)

Studies of the U.S. presidency generally have been devoid of the rigorous empirical analysis found in many studies of both Congress and the Supreme Court. The reasons for this, as all students of the presidency know, are the relatively small numbers of presidents, varying historical contexts, the absence of fixed decision points, and the non-visibility of presidential decision processes. The lack of basic empirical research led Hugh Heclo to write, in 1977, that "beneath the extensive veneer of Presidential literature, there are immense gaps and deficiencies" (*Studying the Presidency,* 1977, p. 5).

Recently, two works have appeared that constitute exceptions to Heclo's indictment. They are Stephen J. Wayne's *The Legislative Presidency* (1978) and, the subject of this review, George C. Edwards' *Presidential Influence in Congress.* Both significantly add to our understanding of the presidency by drawing upon novel and imaginative sources of data.

Edwards has previously published several excellent articles that empirically address presidential influence in Congress. His book features those previously published findings as well as new findings, presented in a rather comprehensive survey of presidential efforts to influence Congress. Although Edwards describes his approach as one which "uses empirical methods . . . to test propositions about Presidential influence" (p. 2), the book also contains much material of a traditional, descriptive nature. Still, the book offers data arrays, hypothesis testing, and attempts to explain behavior rarely found in presidential studies.

Presidential Influence in Congress contains seven chapters plus an exemplary introduction giving an overview of the book. The sequential development of chapters presents a very logical way of examining the topic. Edwards begins with a consideration of presidential success in Congress. He concludes that "the president often—but not always—gets his way with Congress. Thus, he must influence Congress to support his policies" (p. 31). The remainder of the book examines the setting of, sources and techniques of, and impediments to presidential power-wielding on Capitol Hill.

In considering the setting of presidential influences, Edwards examines the sources of conflict between president and Congress: different constituencies, different internal structures, different time perspectives, varying degrees of information and expertise, and different policy roles. Sources of presidential influence considered are political party affiliation, presidential electoral performance and coattail effect, and presidential prestige and popularity. Their impact is assessed through analyses of *Congressional Quarterly*'s (*CQ*) presidential support scores. Techniques of presidential influence examined are bargaining, professional reputation, White House services, personal amenities, and White House-generated constituency pressure on members of Congress. The author analyzes the effectiveness of each of these with case studies of recent administrations.

There are four important conclusions that leap out from among the many interesting findings. First, "party affiliation is a source of influence for the president," especially among members of his party (p. 81). Second, a reduced coattail effect means that "presidents have lost a potential source of influence in Congress" (p. 77). Third, "presidential prestige and presidential electoral performance must be added to the list of variables that have been found useful in explaining roll call behavior" (p. 109). This latter finding, based on correlations between *CQ* support sources and both Gallup polls and election returns, provides empirical confirmation of Richard Neustadt's thesis in *Presidential Power* (1959) that a president's "public standing" is strongly related to his potential for power. Fourth, "surprisingly, . . . our comparisons of presidents do not show any pattern by which we can relate legislative skills to presidential support in Congress" (p. 10).

To Edwards, the major implication of his findings is that "there is little the president can do about his degree of influence in Congress" (p. 206). For me, this is an especially bleak and disconcerting assessment, given William Muller's research (*War, Presidents, and Public Opinion,* 1973). If Muller is correct that (1) a temporary foreign policy crisis is associated with upsurges of support for the president and (2) due to a "coalition of minorities," all presidents will experience an inevitable decline in popularity; and, if Edwards is correct in assuming that a president's legislative skills are largely ineffective, it may be that there are incentives in our system for presidential exploitation of and perhaps even the fabrication of international tension. Certainly, more light should be shed on this by an examination of the relationship between international tension and congressional support, a topic Edwards did not consider.

A few criticisms of a nit-picking variety: first, Edwards argues that he is assessing "power" when in reality he presents merely "tendencies" among data. Second, although he discusses the limitations of his *CQ* data, he fails to impress upon the reader that such studies may mask much relevant congressional behavior. For instance, it may be that presidential influence is to be found not in win/loss ratios but in (1) negotiations between White House and congressional staffers that occur at the committee stage or (2) the behavior of key congressional leaders as they anticipate the position of the White House in an effort to secure support and avoid a veto. To adequately survey presidential influence, roll-call and *CQ* analyses should be supplemented with detailed case studies of behind-the-scenes bargaining.

With those limitations kept in mind, we should warmly welcome Edwards' effort. It truly begins to fill the lacunae lamented by Heclo and all those who study the nation's highest office. It affords the opportunity to test commonly accepted, but never tested, suppositions. As a result, certain conventional wisdom—such as that concerning President Lyndon B. Johnson's presumed legislative skills—is refuted. If our understanding of the presidency is to advance concomitantly with our knowledge of other political institutions, more studies of this type are needed.

DAVID C. KOZAK

United States Air Force Academy

Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review. By John Hart Ely. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980. Pp. vii + 268. $15.00.)

John Ely's central thesis boils down to this: neither of the dominant modes of constitutional interpretation is consistent with representative democracy. "Interpretists," who rely primarily on language and historical intent, confront a number of constitutional provisions which cannot be, and arguably were not intended to be, construed by reference to text or history. Moreover, they are attuned to voices from the past, not to the (democratically relevant) voices of contemporary society. "Noninterpretists," on the other hand, seek fundamental constitutional rules in their own values, principles of natural law, "neutral principles," reason, tradition, or perceptions of popular consensus. And while their approaches ultimately seem consensus-oriented, there would appear to be no effective way to discover such a consensus, even if one exists. Another approach to constitutional interpretation is available, however, one that is both consistent with democratic principles and eminently suited to judicial application. The heavy emphasis on process in the Constitution's civil liberties provisions, Footnote Four of Justice Stone's *Carolene Products* decision, and the egalitarian patterns of Warren Court rulings, among other sources, suggest the wisdom of a "participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing" approach to judicial review. Under such a formula, judges would invoke those constitutional provisions that need "filling in" primarily to clear the channels of political change and facilitate effective minority representation in the political processes, leaving largely to those processes the choice of substantive policy values. As experts on questions of process and as political outsiders, judges would be well qualified for such a task; and their decisions would serve to enhance, rather than obstruct, the practice of representative democracy in the United States.

For those disturbed by the propensity of judges to find substantive values—whether of the *Lochner* or *Roe* variety—within the vague contours of general constitutional provisions, Ely's theme is not unappealing. His book is filled, moreover, with other intriguing propositions. At one point, for example, he defends "one man, one vote" as an administratively simple standard that minimized rather than aggravated judicial involvement in legislative reapportionment. Elsewhere, he supports a strict version of non-delegation doctrine to enhance bureaucratic accountability to the voters' elected representatives, effectively rebuts those who consider the affirmative action issue constitutionally simple, and questions the established notion that the Fifth Amendment's due process guarantee incorporates equal protection principles. Beyond its substantive merits, the book is written in a highly readable, conversational style which should find favor with today's students, most of whom presumably would relate positively to any writer who would refer to a Supreme Court justice (Harlan II, no less) as "hung up" on a legal issue.

In one important sense, however, the book is unsatisfying: apart from the fact that judges are highly unlikely to embrace Ely's formula, his approach seems grossly underinclusive. In varying degrees, of course, each of the Constitution's civil liberties provisions (and others) needs "filling in" by judges. And while most call for procedural value judgments, such judgments are extremely significant, many (e.g., those relating to search and seizure, self-incrimination, cruel and unusual punishments) are permeated with substantive considerations, and a large number simply will not fit comfortably into Ely's "participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing" box. Ely suggests that judicial creativity in the procedural field has a more limited impact, and thus is somehow less offensive to democratic principles, than its substantive counterpart. If that is his point, however, it is debatable at best. Certainly, justices on the modern Supreme Court do not appear to have shared his assessment. After all, most of their significant debates over constitutional interpretation (in *Adamson, Rochin,* and *Duncan,* for example) have arisen in procedural contexts.

My concern should not be interpreted, however, as a suggestion that Ely's study should be ignored. To the contrary, it is must reading for the student of constitutional politics. It is provocative and effectively written. It no doubt will prove to be a major addition to jurisprudential literature. Most significantly, it reflects the importance of judicial philosophy to an understanding of judicial behavior.

TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH

East Carolina University

Judicial Review and the Reasonable Doubt Test. By Sanford Byron Gabin. (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1980. Pp. 125. $15.00.)

The question of the proper role of the judiciary in the American political system is an important one. This book explores that question and analyzes the rationale for judicial review. Sanford Gabin argues that the rationale expounded by Hamilton and Marshall is best expressed by James Bradley Thayer's "reasonable doubt test" and is incompatible with the actions of the Old Court and the Warren Court. He argues that the Warren Court, relying on the faulty logic and authority of Stone's "Footnote Four," improperly exercised judicial policy-making power. The justifications for special judicial protection of individual, "preferred" rights are analyzed and found unpersuasive when judged by the reasonable doubt logic.

Gabin's first two chapters are the most valuable, for they present his analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of judicial review. He first argues that the interpretation accepted by the Framers was that based on Locke's argument for impartial resolution of disputes over law and best expressed by Alexander Hamilton in *The Federalist* and applied by John Marshall in *McCulloch.* Judicial review was to be very limited in scope; judges had a duty not to consider the wisdom of legislation but only to void legislation where an "irreconcilable variance" existed between the Constitution and the challenged enactment.

The proper role of the courts is, according to Gabin, best defined by James Bradley Thayer in his influential 1893 article, "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law." Perhaps the major contribution of the book is that it may renew interest in and inspire informed criticism of Thayer's argument. That argument is that judicial overturning of the actions of elected officials should be confined to clear violations of the Constitution—when there is reasonable doubt, the Court should refrain from the drastic, undemocratic action of judicial veto. Thayer's "rule of administration" held that the proper question for judges to ask was not "Is the law constitutional?" but only "Was the legislature reasonable?" Gabin argues that Thayer's standard of review is consistent with the Hamiltonian doctrine and the intentions of the Framers. Gabin attempts to defend Thayer's standard against several proponents of judicial policy making. Gabin (unsuccessfully) argues that Thayer's thesis would be strengthened by applying it not only to judicial review of national legislation but also to state legislation which is "not unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt."

The next several chapters analyze several judicial eras from the perspective of the reasonable doubt test. Gabin argues that both the Old Court period of 1895 to 1936 and the Warren Court era were examples of the exercise of improper judicial policy making; "If the political processes failed to make the 'good' choice, the Warren Court was often ready to substitute its independent judgment" (p. 90). He argues that "Footnote Four" of *Carolene Products* does not make a persuasive case for abandoning the reasonable doubt test of Hamilton, Marshall and Thayer in order to protect whatever "preferred freedoms" the Court chose in updating the Constitution.

These later chapters are the weakest part of the volume. This argument against judicial activism has been expressed better in several works, particularly Alexander Bickel's *The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress.* In addition, Gabin is most prone to criticism when discussing specific cases: *Whitney* is incorrectly interpreted (p. 73); Cardozo's opinion in *Palko* is made insignificant (p. 99); and *Brown* v. *Board of Education* is held to be simply an activist Court's attempt to institute their idea of what is "good" for the society (p. 88). The concept of equal protection, which is central to any argument about "strict" or "traditional" judicial scrutiny, is largely ignored. The major criticism, of course, is that the reasonable doubt test, or any other standard, still remains a highly subjective means by which to proceed perhaps to whatever destination desired. Several opinions of the Old Court explicitly stated that the proper standard was the reasonable doubt test and proceeded to eviscerate the New Deal or other state or federal economic regulation. Nevertheless, *Judicial Review and the Reasonable Doubt Test* makes a valuable, although limited, contribution to our understanding of the role of the judiciary in American politics. Its significance is that it reminds us of the importance of consistent standards for judicial action and invites us to continue the search for those standards.

NEIL D. MCFEELEY

University of Idaho

Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice. By Alexander L. George. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. Pp. xviii + 267. $24.00, cloth; $10.00, paper.)

Alexander George has written a treatise on how the impediments to the effective use of information and advice in the formulation of American foreign policy might be avoided or overcome so as to achieve policy decisions that are qualitatively superior to those currently being made. In pursuing this enterprise, George observes that all too often rational-choice theories put forward by academics make only a limited contribution to clarifying and analyzing the policy maker's problem because "in making his choice the decision-maker typically must be responsive to variables not considered in available theory"—principally variables involving the situation that confronts the decision makers as well as domestic political problems and constraints upon the president's prudent management of time and other policy resources. George has sought to avoid this defect by keeping constantly at the forefront of his analysis the array of intellectual and emotional constraints with which the president must wrestle: namely, the value complexity and uncertainties involved in assessing the expected outcomes of different courses of action.

In conceiving and writing this work, George has brought to bear a lifetime of thought and research, not to mention reading on the subject. For a generation or more there has been a rising tide of literature dealing with the impediments to effective, high-quality decision making of personality, misperception, bureaucracy, and small group dynamics. There has been a cumulative and generally fruitful effort to apply the insights from the study of personality, social psychology, organization theory, bureaucracy, and political behavior to the analysis of foreign policy decision making. As mentor and intellectual godfather to many of these studies, George has appropriately brought the scholarship of the entire subject into focus and applied its insights to the executive branch in a most systematic and definitive fashion.

George takes as his starting point the premise that calculation and choice of policy occurs in three interrelated subsystems; namely, that of the individual personality context (the president, secretary of state, etc.), the small group context in which the president deals face-to-face with a relatively small number of advisors, and the organizational context involving a hierarchically organized bureaucracy. He is refreshingly helpful in offering clearly stated definitions and criteria (of great operational precision and value) for what he means by such terms as effective decision making, value complexity, uncertainty, incrementalism, etc., and for all the other categories developed in explicating the subject. Above all, those who appreciate such things know that it is a political scientist writing with a fine sensitivity for the ambiguity and normative dimension that politics, properly understood, encompasses. Finally, George has drawn upon a wealth of historical evidence and examples to illustrate his analysis.

The analysis unfolds in a rich but pithy form. Far from eschewing the difficult task of incorporating the role of personality into his analysis, George takes the position that "the expression of personality needs is a necessary but insufficient condition for establishing the critical causal importance of those personality factors for the behavior in question." A president's behavior is sensitive to situational and role variables as well as to character-rooted needs or to psychodynamic patterns, and his behavior will be shaped also by a variety of cognitive beliefs (ideology, world view, beliefs about strategy and tactics) as well as by a set of skills and a sense of personal efficiency. This allows George to caution against "the common tendency to explain too much of an individual's performance in terms of personality flaws." He then goes on to a highly suggestive analysis of how the individual's personality may lead him to deal with the psychological stress of decision making under the demanding conditions of "value-complexity" and "uncertainty" characteristic of the foreign policy field.

Among the personality and small group impediments to effective use of information and advice, George identifies: avoiding hard choices, reasoning by historical analogy, the pressure for conformity, and the tendency to rationalize one's own behavior in terms of compelling situational variables while emphasizing a malevolent disposition when explaining the behavior of one's adversary.

The middle part of the study is devoted to the impediments and risks to effective decision making that arise as a consequence of organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics. The vast literature on this subject is boiled down to a tight analysis of the effects on four key aspects of the president's management of foreign policy. The impact on each aspect is assessed in cogent logical terms attended by a host of relevant examples.

George then adumbrates a set of management styles and models that a succession of presidents have employed, pointing out where each has served or failed its user. He identifies three such models: the formalistic (Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon), the competitive (FDR), and the collegial (Kennedy), with Carter apparently attempting to operate with a mix of the formalistic and the collegial. Finally, he contrasts the ways in which successive administrations have attempted and failed to ensure that unpopular, nonconformist views are given a proper hearing. He finds that the attempts to institute a "devil's advocate" approach, a "formal options" system, and a multiple advocacy model all involve problems and limitations which George skillfully elucidates.

Just as one begins to ask the question—is not the greatest need in all this for some systematic discussion of the criteria by which the decision makers might be expected to appraise the vast external realm of adversaries, allies, and Third-World discontents, and to differentiate between what are the irreducible minimal interests that American foreign policy must defend and advance?—George devotes the final two chapters to the subject. One discusses the concept of national interest and the other, policy-relevant theory. George suggests that for all of its deficiencies the concept of the national interest may serve to introduce discipline and restraint into the formulation of foreign policy. The discussion of crisis management, coercive diplomacy, deterrence, and detente is intended to suggest to the policy maker that there are criteria, costs, and benefits governing each of these policies that, better understood, might make their employment both safer and sounder. Given the fact that we cannot hope to change the basic causes of international conflict, George's penetrating analysis of the impediments to effective policy decisions may help us to escape the worst consequences of the unavoidable situation.

DAVID S. MCLELLAN

Miami University

Toward the Endless Frontier: History of the Committee on Science and Technology, 1959–79. By Ken Hechler. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980. Pp. xxxvi + 1073. $11.00, paper.)

The story behind the writing of this massive committee study is, in many ways, as interesting as the book itself (and just as revealing of the workings of Congress). Olin E. Teague (D-Texas), who chaired the House Committee on Science and Technology, 1973–1979, decided that a history should be written. It was a small task to get committee approval. Teague then got Ken Hechler (D-West Virginia) to write the history. Hardly a detached observer, Hechler served on the committee from its founding in 1959 to his retirement from the House in 1977. He chaired important subcommittees during most of his service on the Committee on Science and Technology. Hechler is not without scholarly credentials, however. He has written three books, one an authoritative account of insurgency in Congress during the early part of this century; he has taught briefly at several universities; and served as associate director of our own American Political Science Association, 1953–1956.

Then there is the matter of the cost of the project. Legislative committee scholars supported by puny summer grants can only envy the support provided for this study. The reported salary costs were $125,700, exclusive of secretarial and research assistance provided by regular committee employees. Typesetting, composition, and printing costs were estimated to be $200,000. Further, though the cost per copy was $65, the document is being sold for $11 by the Government Printing Office. (Cost data from *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,* January 26, 1980, p. 230).

Was it worth it? Has former member Hechler written a valuable history of his committee? The first question may be answered properly with another question: Who knows? My guess is that the end product is as socially useful as that for many government grants in the $350–400,000 range. But who can tell for sure?

The answer to the second question is most assuredly "yes." Ken Hechler has provided an interesting, even fascinating, chronology of the committee and its work. Don't expect a lot of political or policy analysis within these many pages. Do expect a careful chronicling of the committee's organizational developments, legislative work, and complex external relationships. In regard to committee organization, Hechler offers detailed and candid portrayals of Democratic and Republican committee and subcommittee leaders. He also provides interesting material on the role of staff (typically including comments on specific people) and the organizational changes over time (in staff, subcommittees, work groups, etc.).

In regard to legislative work, this particular committee reflects major developments in the ebb and flow of science and technology. Hechler takes the reader from the excitement and optimism of space exploration to the many policy concerns associated with limited energy resources. The committee's agenda has changed dramatically in its short life, but one detects as well a shift in committee spirit that may reflect less positive public attitudes toward science and scientists. By the way, social scientists will be particularly interested in Hechler's account of the problems encountered by MACOS (acronym for "Man, A Course of Study," a project funded by the National Science Foundation).

Finally, Hechler contributes great quantities of descriptive detail on how a congressional committee fits into the whole network of policy associated with its subject matter. Thus we are treated to rich and interesting material on how the committee established itself within the House and then how it developed vital connections to executive agencies, the White House, industry, and the complex worlds of private and public science. Hechler does not consider it his mission to interpret these many associations. Rather, he tries to set it all down in print, roughly in sequence.

In his introduction to the book, Charles A. Mosher, former member of the Committee on Science and Technology, observes that: "This is far different and better reading than the ordinary congressional report. Personally I find it more fascinating than I could have hoped. . ." (p. xxix). I agree wholeheartedly. Hechler is direct and has a sprightly writing style. He is successful, therefore, in conveying to us just how this committee works. One other point. It may justifiably be said that *Toward the Endless Frontier* tells us more about the House Committee on Science and Technology than anyone would ever care to know. It is so magnificently subtitled and indexed, however, that a scholar can easily read those sections of immediate interest, saving the rest for another time. The author has even provided chapter summaries for those wishing the quick tour. This book is a must for the library of any serious student of Congress. And what a bargain!

CHARLES O. JONES

University of Pittsburgh

Mashpee: The Story of Cape Cod's Indian Town. By Francis G. Hutchins. (West Franklin, N.H.: Amarta Press, 1979. Pp. 202. $12.50.)

One of the tragic defeats of the recent Indian renaissance was the rejection of the Mashpee Indians' contention that they constituted a federal Indian tribe within the meaning of the Trade and Intercourse Acts. Francis G. Hutchins appeared as an expert witness in this important case. Using his research, together with data collected by the attorneys in the case, Hutchins compiled a lay person's history of this Indian community, simply articulated in this little volume.

As one who also served as expert witness in that case, I can verify the difficulty of presenting the Indians' story before a court which had little comprehension either of Indians or of the federal laws which encompass them. Continual confusion reigned in the courtroom and among the attorneys, for both sides seemed more interested in trying to determine what outstanding characteristics of Indian culture should have remained in order to qualify the Mashpees as an Indian community worthy of federal protection. Hutchins' volume does little to speak to this point; it does not clarify the issue, nor does it confuse it. Perhaps that is the tragedy of the Mashpee history: cultural persistence cannot be described by legal and political concepts.

The Mashpees constitute one of the few remaining Indian communities east of the Hudson for which a continuous historical record exists. Hutchins does an admirable job in taking us from the earliest Pilgrim days through the twists and turns of Mashpee fortunes. With the intensity of the Pequot wars, Indians who had been converted to Christianity gathered at Mashpee and several other "safe" locations and sought protection from marauding Pilgrims. Recognizing that their survival depended largely upon external conformity to the ways of white people, the Mashpees and their Indian neighbors adopted many of the institutions and cultural patterns of their white friends who helped them escape the genocidal wars in Connecticut and Massachusetts in the seventeenth century.

Over the years Mashpee collected dissident Indians, free colored people of all backgrounds, and considerable Europeans, to produce an astounding mixture of families who focused their lives around some of the traditional customs and social activities of the original Indian groups of Massachusetts. The 1870s were a critical period for these Indians because the community became split between very progressive individuals and the mass of people who conformed more closely to their ancient Indian heritage and customs. In a crucial town meeting, the progressives got the community to agree to the division of common lands which had been preserved for nearly two centuries. This decision, considered at the time as a step toward ultimate independence of the more assimilated members of the community, proved in 1978 to have been the fatal step, at least in the eyes of the jury and subsequent judges of the appeals courts, in the final assimilation of this group beyond the point where they could be considered a tribe under federal protection.

Hutchins seems to adopt the attitude that, in deciding that the Mashpees were so assimilated as to fall outside the federal trust responsibility, the jury and the judges reached the proper conclusion. His book reflects a desire to reconcile the decision with the obvious feeling of the Indians that they have been cheated of an important part of their heritage. However, I could not but feel, while sitting in the courtroom, that other attorneys before another court could easily have carried the day. Other expert witnesses expressed similar sentiments to me during and after the trial. Regardless of post-mortems on the conduct of the trial, this is a very valuable book because it does give us an idea of the uniquely difficult problems which Indian claims cases represent. Policy analysts might well ponder the complexity of the Mashpee history and take a more serious look at the ripe field which Indian Studies offers to political scientists for consideration. This book might provide a good introduction to the particuliarity of the field.

VINE DELORIA, JR.

University of Arizona, Tucson

Voting in Indiana: A Century of Persistence and Change. By Charles S. Hyneman, C. Richard Hofstetter, and Patrick F. O'Connor. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980. Pp. x + 298. $18.50.)

Charles Hyneman's 1938 article in this *Review* on "Tenure and Turnover in the Indiana General Assembly" pioneered the ecological study of state politics drawing mainly on election returns, census records, and other aggregate data. In the next four decades of his distinguished career Hyneman's scholarly attention was focused mainly on the national politics of the bureaucracy, the Supreme Court, and the Founding Fathers. In this book, however, he joins two of his former students in another ecological study of Indiana politics.

The book has limited objectives, achieves them well, and reports the results in scrupulously appropriate and modest language. As in most voting studies, the book is concerned with two main dependent variables: turnout, which is operationalized as the number of persons voting for the office of state secretary of state (a good choice since elections for that office have rarely been rendered "unusual" by hot issues or charismatic candidates) divided by the voting age population as estimated by the Bureau of the Census; and party success, which is operationalized as the proportion and margins of wins and losses for the office by the two major parties. For most purposes the principal units of analysis are Indiana's 92 counties, although there is also some discussion of election outcomes in the townships. With the exception of one chapter on contests for county offices, only general elections are analyzed and the general scholarly silence on state primary elections remains largely unbroken.

The bulk of the book is devoted to the results of a series of correlational analyses of the impact of various independent variables upon voting turnout and party competition in the counties. The authors are careful to avoid the dread "ecological fallacy," and offer no statements about individual voters' attitudes that might explain the voting behavior of the counties in which they live.

Many of their findings simply confirm generalizations from other studies—for example, they find that Democratic candidates generally do much better in the urban counties than in the rural counties. Some of their conclusions are quite surprising, however. The most notable of these is their finding about turnout rates. They construct a six-class "life style" typology for their counties based upon 18 socioeconomic variables: urban-industrial, bedroom-suburban, rural-pious, rural-rustic, rural-depleted, and rural-transitional (close followers of Hoosier political science may be pleased to learn that Gibson County is classified, with singular appropriateness, as rural-transitional). And they find that turnout is generally lowest in the urban-industrial and bedroom-suburban counties and highest in the rural-rustic, rural-depleted, and rural-pious counties.

Voting in Indiana rests upon an enormous body of aggregate data, much of it collected with considerable effort over the years by the senior author and his colleagues at Indiana. The data are analyzed to give the reader both a complete longitudinal profile of turnout and party success in Indiana statewide elections since 1880 and a cross-sectional picture of voting in the townships and for county offices. When we finish the book we know a great deal about how Hoosiers have voted for the past century.

But why go to such effort to tell us so much about voting in just one of the 50 states? The authors offer two justifications. For one thing, they argue, Indiana is the most typical of the states in that its scores on 9 socioeconomic indicators (population density, percent of the labor force in agriculture, per capita income, years in school, etc.) approach the means for the 50 states more closely than do the scores of any other state (Table I-3, pp. 12–17). For another thing, they suggest that, by combining their Indiana case study with others, such as Howard's work on Louisiana and the study of Oklahoma by Kirkpatrick, Morgan, and Kielhorn, political scientists can build a solid empirical base for a truly comparative study of state politics.

There is something in this, but, regrettably, the time seems far off when scholars in the other 47 states will have produced one-state aggregate-data voting studies as exhaustive as this one.

AUSTIN RANNEY

American Enterprise Institute

Money in Congressional Elections. By Gary C. Jacobson. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980. Pp. xv + 251. $15.00.)

Anyone involved with collecting data regarding congressional campaign finance prior to 1972 can attest to the difficulties and frustrations inherent in the effort. The research fruits of campaign finance reforms began to be harvested in 1972 and have provided data to support some of the seat-of-the-pants theories that had prevailed prior to that time. Gary Jacobson, using data from 1972, 1974, and 1976 (with an epilogue that includes 1978) has sought to develop a theory as to the effects of money on congressional campaigns. The tests that Jacobson applies confirm that campaign spending has a strong effect on congressional election outcomes and that money is particularly important to nonincumbent challengers. In fact, incumbents do not seem to benefit from campaign spending to nearly the same degree as their opponents. The more they spend, the worse they do, although a couple of caveats tend to dilute the definitiveness of the assertion. Nevertheless, Jacobson's analysis strongly suggests that in contests between an incumbent and a challenger, the critical variable is the amount spent by the challenger.

In a series of five provocative chapters, Jacobson investigates the sources of contributions, the motives of the contributors and the identity of those who give. He considers the impact of contributions from business, labor, ideological committees, and political parties. His discussion of political action committees (PACs) and their recent mushrooming growth is excellent, and he even considers the differences between challengers and incumbents in contributing to their own campaigns. He concludes that money from every source, excepting only the candidates themselves, arrives in quantities that vary according to the incumbency status and the competitiveness of the election.

In his last two chapters, Jacobson focuses on the politics of campaign finance reform. Concentrating on those reforms that affected congressional campaign spending, he reviews the history of the effort and details the important changes adopted in the 1960s and the early 70s. He uses the regression equations developed in the earlier part of the book to project the likely electoral consequences of various public funding schemes for congressional elections. He gives individual attention to the effects of public funding of congressional races on the parties and group and individual expenditures. Jacobson describes the dilemma of public funding very well. He notes that there is no way congressional candidates can raise enough money to finance a competitive race. They are forced, therefore, to rely on individual or special-interest contributions or public funding. If they opt for the former, they are open to suspicions of selling out or of corruption. If they opt for the latter, they are open to accusations of going on politicians' welfare with taxpayers' money. Most incumbents, however, will only support a system that does not effectively increase their competition from challenger candidates.

Jacobson has written an excellent book. He has made good use of newly available campaign finance data and in doing so has produced a fine addition to the literature. It contributes to our understanding of campaign finance and at the same time is a worthwhile addition to the ongoing public policy debate over public funding. It is well written and easy to read. It is a first-rate piece of work.

ROBERT J. HUCKSHORN

Florida Atlantic University

The National Interest and the Human Interest: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy. By Robert C. Johansen. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980. Pp. xxviii + 517. $32.50, cloth; $6.95, paper.)

In several respects, the volume before us is unusual—one that is almost impossible to review according to the usual criteria employed for that purpose.

The National Interest and Human Interest is an analysis of several important issues in recent American foreign policy written from an explicit value orientation. (Robert Johansen is to be commended for identifying his values clearly for the reader.) The standard applied to postwar United States foreign policy is that of a "global humanist," and the success of the nation's diplomacy is the degree to which it has or has not (nearly always the latter) contributed to achieving the goals of "global humanism." This concept does not differ fundamentally from what has traditionally been called the "idealist" approach to American foreign relations vis-à-vis the *Realpolitik* perspective of commentators like Walter Lippmann, Hans Morgenthau, and Henry Kissinger.

As Johansen identifies it, the "global humanist" scheme of values holds that the United States should accord highest priority to objectives like the promotion of international peace, the massive reduction of global armaments, the creation of a true global "community," the elimination of poverty throughout the world, the strengthening of international law and institutions, and the respect for human rights throughout the international system.

This global humanist frame of reference is applied to four specific problems in recent American diplomacy: the effort to reduce the level of global armaments, culminating in the SALT I and the (recently postponed) SALT II arms-control agreements; the extension of American foreign assistance to India, as a case study in efforts by the United States to aid Third-World countries; intervention by private business organizations and American officials against the Allende regime in Chile, illustrating the larger problem of America's devotion to the cause of international human rights; and attempts by the United States and other countries to formulate and codify international law relating to the extraction of raw materials from the oceans. In the last chapter, entitled "Building a Just World Order," Johansen focuses upon America's overall contribution in creating a more peaceful, benign, economically equitable, and presumably more stable international system.

Johansen's verdict in every chapter is the same. In its diplomacy toward these diverse external problems, the United States not only failed to advance the cause of global humanism; even more lamentably, American diplomatic behavior has been *highly inimical* to its realization. Washington, for example, has been unable to halt the global arms race. As Johansen sees it, private and official groups in the United States actually *wanted* the quest for arms control to fail and used their political influence to accomplish that end. Similarly, American officials and private business corporations jeopardized the human rights of Chileans; and in the process they seriously damaged the cause of human rights globally—in part because they did not believe in the concept of democracy themselves, even for Americans.

Such examples are sufficient to illustrate the tone and approach of Johansen's analysis. In effect, he has provided us with a detailed, well-documented, and readable prosecuting attorney's "brief," indicting American foreign policy for a long list of major and minor offenses against the code of global humanism. His book typifies the "muckraking" tradition in American life—and it is a very good example of that genre.

No adequate critique of the assumptions underlying, and main tenets of, "global humanism" is possible in the space available. It is enough to note that it is a venerable tradition in the American diplomatic experience. Johansen's study would have been strengthened had he acknowledged that fact—and, in the process, examined the manifold and difficult problems encountered by the United States historically in efforts to base its diplomacy on the ideas of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt and other idealists.

The book has other defects, some of which seriously detract from its persuasiveness and its claim to objective scholarship. Johansen has, in effect, offered us an updated "devil theory" of American diplomacy. Few major problems would be encountered in the attempt to realize the goals of global humanism, his treatment strongly implies, were it not for the egocentric and profit-seeking impulses of vested business interests, the machinations of the "Military-Industrial Complex" and other anti-democratic forces within the American society.

Significantly, Johansen devotes little or no attention to the influence of American public opinion on the nation's diplomatic behavior. Quite possibly, this was not an accidental omission. It can be convincingly demonstrated that the main lines of American foreign policy since World War II—such as the containment policy, the declining public and congressional enthusiasm for foreign aid, and the low priority accorded the promotion of human rights abroad—have enjoyed massive public support. Indeed, American officials in some instances may have been *more* dedicated to achieving the objectives of global humanism than the American people.

An ideological contradiction lies at the heart of the author's insistence that global humanism become the basis of American diplomacy. On virtually every page, he inveighs against American "interventionism" in the affairs of other countries, such as Chile. Yet nowhere does he really address the consequences of what his own call for goals like the elimination of global poverty would mean in terms of interventionist behavior by the United States. To cite the country he discusses (India), the elimination of poverty there would require the massive and continuing use of American power and influence to change class, caste, and religious systems—on a scale perhaps unwitnessed in the nation's diplomatic history.

Finally, the concept against which D. W. Brogan cautioned the United States in the early postwar era—"the illusion of American omnipotence"—is an implicit premise of Johansen's study. The net impression left by his analysis is that if Americans were truly dedicated to the goals of global humanism, today there would be no arms race, no global poverty, no violations of human rights around the world, and no clashing national ambitions in efforts to extract the resources of the ocean. Almost no attention is paid to the lack of commitment to global humanism by the Soviet Union, by the Third World, or, more generally, to the absence of a common moral-ethical standard by which the behavior of all nations can be equitably judged.

After Johansen has presented his case—forceful and eloquent as it is at times—the judgment on the recent American diplomatic record must be the old Scotch verdict of "not proved."

CECIL V. CRABB, JR.

Louisiana State University

Silent Hattie Speaks: The Personal Journal of Senator Hattie Caraway. Edited by Diane D. Kincaid. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979. Pp. ix + 151. $16.95.)

Anyone wishing to read about a day in the life of a congresswoman has two choices: *Bella! Ms. Abzug Goes to Washington* by Bella Abzug (Saturday Review Press, 1972) and now *Silent Hattie Speaks,* the diary of Senator Hattie Caraway of Arkansas. There is no confusing the two: as a first-termer, Abzug takes firm stands; she carries the fight to the enemy; she manipulates the institution to her ends. In her first term, Caraway has no identifiable position on any issue; she carries no bills; she is bored by the institution of the Senate. In short, she is neither a political animal nor a feminist, both of which Abzug clearly is. What then is the justification for devoting a book to Hattie Caraway?

The book's editor, Diane Kincaid, sets forth two reasons for the diary's publication: Caraway's feelings may represent the feelings of those many widows who succeeded their husbands and thus her diary is more typical than Abzug's account; second, her decision to run for reelection is a notable achievement for her time (the 1930s). She was, after all, the first woman elected to the U.S. Senate. Kincaid might have added that the diary also gives us insight into the fashions of the day and the price of a meal, for Senator Caraway always records these items. Her attention to these details and not to the business of the Senate strongly suggests that she was bored in her job, an attitude shared by many women in jobs. Otherwise, the diary provides little insight into the inner workings of the Senate, or of Arkansas politics, probably because Caraway was an outsider in those environments. Even as a native Arkansan and as a teacher of women's courses, I find it difficult to argue that the diary has a broad appeal to a political science audience.

The more valuable portion of the book is the editor's contribution. Kincaid does an excellent job of annotating the diary entries so that the reader is aware of what is taking place on that particular day. For her opening essay, Kincaid did extensive research on Caraway's career, including reading newspaper accounts of the period and conducting interviews. She sympathetically portrays Caraway's career and justifies her resurrection from the annals of the Senate. In this part of the book I learned that I had incorrectly portrayed Caraway to my students as a "ritualist" because of her decision rule: "Aye one amendment, nay, the next" (p. 59). Kincaid assures us that the senator did not use that formula after all. So the book is of value in "setting the record straight" for those who teach about women.

VIRGINIA GRAY

University of Minnesota

United States Foreign Policy Toward Yugoslavia, 1943–1963. By David L. Larson. (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1979. Pp. vi + 380. $11.75, paper.)

This is a puzzling book in many respects and it leaves one wondering why it was published in 1979, or for that matter why it was published at all. It makes an extremely limited contribution to a better understanding of the rationale underlying U.S. foreign policy toward Yugoslavia in the two decades from 1943 to 1963. The narrative consists almost exclusively of a staccato recitation of events in bewildering rapidity, with a profusion of footnote references to a plethora of secondary sources that should be well known to academicians and of no interest whatever to general readers. Among the better-known tomes on which the author draws are Robert Byrnes' *Yugoslavia,* from the series on East Central Europe under the Communists, published in 1957; Fred Warner Neal's *Titoism in Action,* of 1958 vintage; and annual volumes on the *United States in World Affairs* written by Richard P. Stebbins for the Council on Foreign Relations. There are also lengthy quotations, running several pages each, from congressional and State Department publications.

The time span covered in this book is wholly artificial. There is no reason for the 1963 cutoff date, except, perhaps, that the author appears to have finished working on this manuscript that year. The events of 1962 are discussed in the present tense—as written at that time.

As for analysis, one is hard put to find any. The author does propound a thesis. He approves of U.S. policy in the years 1949–1951 and is critical of it both before and after this time span. In his own perception, 1949–1951 is the centerpiece of his work (though not treated at greater length nor more analytically than other periods) while the years before and after are identified by him as a prologue and epilogue.

Although he states that U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia is a function of Soviet-Yugoslav and Soviet-U.S. relations as well as of "economic aid and interenational trade," he fails to give any evidence of a relationship among these factors. He offers no explanation why and in what way U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia failed to meet the fundamental objectives of national interest, except in the short heroic period, and he does not suggest what considerations might have guided the United States to devise a more effective policy.

In addition to these shortcomings the book is marred by an abundance of typographical errors, such as "Gorege" for George, "calcualted" for calculated, "Tyrkey" for Turkey, "personns" for persons, and many others.

The author's observation that "U.S.-Yugoslav relations have been fundamentally opportunistic and based upon the mutuality of interests and not upon any consistent principles or traditional relations" may give rise to some questions. Yet, the central problem he addresses, that is, the place of Yugoslavia in the spectrum of U.S. national interest, is as vital today as it has ever been. U.S. policy makers are likely to confront anew acute problems about the degree and type of support they are willing to give Yugoslavia to help that country to maintain its stability and to fend off would-be foreign encroachments, or as the author puts it, "to deny the Soviet Union the control of this strategic area." To meet this challenge, U.S. policy makers will undoubtedly have to rise above narrow considerations designating Yugoslavia merely as a strategic area to be denied the Soviet Union, and regard it as a friend worthy of support in safeguarding its national sovereignty and pursuing its national objectives.

PAUL E. ZINNER

University of California, Davis

Reasoning About Discrimination: The Analysis of Professional and Executive Work in Federal Antibias Programs. By Richard A. Lester. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980. Pp. xv + 384. $17.50.)

In the past decade we have witnessed an enormous increase in publications reexamining and evaluating social and regulatory programs and policies in the United States. This is partly the result of disillusionment with programs that were not working and partly the result of the introduction of new and more sophisticated techniques in program analysis and evaluation. Many of these reviews have been strident in style or represent analyses by individuals unfriendly to the program goals being studied. Some, like Richard Lester's *Reasoning About Discrimination* which examines federal antibias programs of the 1960s and 1970s, must be taken seriously.

A manpower economist, Lester served as vice-chairman of the President's Commission on the Status of Women during the early 1960s. He describes himself as "an early advocate of positive federal action to eliminate discrimination in employment not justified on performance grounds and of special efforts to increase the supply of women and minorities well qualified for high level professional and executive positions throughout the economy" (p. xi). In short, Lester regards himself as a supporter of equal employment opportunities, but within a framework of performance or merit criteria.

Methodologically the Lester critique focuses on three dimensions of the issue: (1) employment practices and governance mechanisms in the occupations examined; (2) career development and progress on an individual basis; and (3) environmental and market forces that have an impact on (1) and (2) over time. The occupational groups studied are university professors, private-sector executives, and federal government career personnel. Each is examined from the point of view of the three listed analytical dimensions.

In the academic environment, Lester points to the heavy emphasis placed on collegiality in decision making and the notion of performance and merit in the reward structure as opposed to age and seniority. Evaluation of executives in the corporate setting is, also, supposed to be measured on the basis of individual performance and career opportunities available in a national marketplace. Such evaluation differs, however, from that of universities in that performance ratings are undertaken in a far less collegial manner. The federal civil service system has developed in a negative environment designed originally to eradicate patronage from the system. Although occasional efforts such as the newly created Senior Executive Service have placed emphasis on performance, most reward decisions in the federal establishment have avoided sharp distinctions often found where merit is a primary variable. The net effect is a reward structure linked largely to seniority and age. These, as well as numerous other differences among the three occupational groupings, suggest to Lester the need for different sets of analytical techniques to determine the presence of bias based on race, creed, or sex.

Lester argues that federal officials have used a single approach, devoid of any device to measure differences in quality of performance, to determine anti-discrimination efforts in all three work environments. The approach is especially unsuitable in research universities and large corporations. He implies that the limitations of experience of the regulators to the federal bureaucracy may be partly responsible for their failure to develop appropriate analytical tools to measure bias within the context of the other two arenas.

Lester examines a series of problems created by the analytical techniques and argues that they represent a "regulatory program that is based on concepts and analytical methods designed for standard manual work . . . not likely to be well suited for application to high level mental work" (p. 137). He concludes by citing a set of proposals for reform of the Federal Contract Compliance Program generated by the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education that recommended, among other things, overhauling existing antibias programs in order to build into the system greater flexibility to accommodate differences in work situations and organizations.

Lester's critique is painstaking and well documented. In his appraisal he implies that failure to revise the rigid techniques, suitable perhaps in the federal establishment, but not in universities or the private sector, could lead to reduced effectiveness in those occupational settings without resolving the problem of discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or sex. My only reservation about the analysis is its tendency to understate the case for the author's conclusions. A strong explicit statement speculating on the inadequacy of the existing program in dealing with discrimination in the context of quality performance standards would have made this a more valuable contribution to encourage decision makers to change existing practices. Nevertheless, the book represents a valuable contribution to the growing public policy analysis literature.

ROBERT S. FRIEDMAN

Pennsylvania State University

The Third Century: America as a Post-Industrial Society. Edited by Seymour Martin Lipset. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1980. Pp. 471. $14.95.)

The formula is, on the whole, pretty safe. Hit on an interesting theme. Invite a number of distinguished academics to lecture on it. Give the lecturers a chance to edit their remarks. Publish the results. The book that emerges is bound to be uneven, but with luck it will contain at least a few essays that are interesting enough or novel enough to stand up in their own right.

So it is with this volume. Seymour Martin Lipset was the coordinator two years ago of a series of guest lectures at Stanford. Sixteen lectures were given altogether, on topics ranging from demography and religion through women and the blacks to the presidency, the judiciary and America's political parties. The resulting essays vary greatly in level, style and tone, but all are intelligent and informative; the best will be quoted for years to come (and xeroxed, legally or illegally, by innumerable graduate students). The reader needs to be warned, however, that the contents of the book bear little relation to its title. The lecturers were evidently asked to speculate on developments in America's "third century"—but most declined. All they felt able to do was ruminate on America as it now is, in the early 1980s. Indeed, Lipset in his opening chapter asks, with regard to predicting the future of post-industrial society, "Can we do it?" His answer, from which few will dissent, is "no."

Of most direct interest to political scientists are chapters by Daniel J. Elazar on federalism, Martin Shapiro on judicial activism, Sanford Weiner and Aaron Wildavsky on the "prophylactic presidency," and Everett Carll Ladd on the party system. But political scientists interested in the book at all should not confine themselves to these four chapters. Nathan Glazer, for example, offers a series of subtle, rather sad, reflections on the uneasiness of America's Jews, torn increasingly between loyalty to America and loyalty to Israel, disturbed and divided by the implications of affirmative action ("Jews are at a disadvantage in the United States in not being able to show disadvantage," p. 230), and apprehensive lest conversion to other faiths, intermarriage and American individualism in the end undermine the American Jewish community.

Elazar reverts to themes he has already made familiar. Federalism, in his view, is "more than simply an arrangement for power-sharing among territorial units of government" (p. 80). It is, more generally, a pattern of decentralized relationships among governments, groups and institutions, each respecting the others' autonomy. Federalism stands in contradistinction to Jacobinism. The former emphasizes the diffusion of power, the protection of minority rights and the retention of a large domain of private thought and action, the latter the power of the state, subject only to some "general will." This, *non*centralization in government is federal in inspiration; *de*centralization is Jacobin, since a power that gives is also a power that can take back.

According to Elazar, "extreme activism" in government, together with the centralization of America's economy and communications, have tended in recent decades to erode federalism in this broader sense. However, he sees encouraging signs of change in "a renewed popular concern for decentralization, local control, debureaucratization, and a general effort by Americans to regain some measure of control over their own lives" (p. 106). Elazar is undoubtedly right to claim that federalism has been one animating spirit of American history. Perhaps, as a student of de Tocqueville, he should be readier to acknowledge another such spirit—the regulatory spirit, the spirit of moral compulsion. The federal regulators of today are surely the direct descendants of the Puritan magistrates who, in seventeenth-century New England, punished boys who wore their hair long and girls who permitted themselves to be kissed.

Shapiro's brilliant essay on judicial activism will not be—but ought to be—read by every American judge. It might give him or her pause. The author's central point is simple. Judicial lawmaking is universal; the question is not whether judges will make law but how they will make it and on whose behalf. In the era of confident technocratic government, roughly from the late 1930s to the late 1960s, American judges were reluctant to second-guess administrators. They, after all, knew the facts. Since the late 1960s, however, everyone in America has become suspicious of administrators. It turns out that they often do not know the facts; and, even when they do, their decisions may be determined not by the public interest but by what is good for the administrative agency in question. Judges, sharing in this general suspicion, have become readier to substitute their own opinions for the experts':

> Once it was recognized that the virtues of technical specialization brought with them the vices of narrowed and distorted perspective and clientelism, the judge, precisely because he lacked technical perspectives, suggested himself as a generalist watchdog against the pathologies of bureaucratic specialists (p. 124).

In other words, the judge was entitled to political power precisely because he was ignorant; the greening of America was accompanied by the lawyering of America.

And the costs, Shapiro points out, have been enormous—in terms of delay, the expense of litigation and the inherent unsatisfactoriness of deciding broad social issues on a case-by-case basis. He predicts that legislators will more and more provide for administrative discretion in the language of statutes precisely in order to insulate them from judicial policy making:

> For the ultimate cost of judicial policy making is that judges are essentially irresponsible. . . . First, courts can and frequently do impose enormous financial and political demands on other portions of the political system without themselves taking any responsibility for finding the resources to meet those demands. The court that orders bussing does not have to find the money to pay for the bussing or the policemen to protect the buses. . . . [Second,] judges clothe their policy intervention in the language of legal rights. When particular social, economic, and political interests are translated into legal or constitutional rights, they cease to be political agenda items to which varying priorities can be assigned and become absolute claims on available resources. . . . Once a court declares that the handicapped have a right to equal access to public transportation, then the money must be spent even if the cost benefit ratio is insane (pp. 129–30).

Shapiro expects, and clearly hopes, that as the costs and incapacities of judicial intervention become apparent, the courts will voluntarily relinquish, or else be barred from, their recent "quixotic adventurism."

The two chapters by Weiner and Wildavsky, and by Ladd, cover more familiar ground, at least to those who know their writings. Weiner and Wildavsky warn us that a "prophylactic presidency"—that is, one that not merely responds to events but protects all Americans against all conceivable untoward events—is both impossible and undesirable. Planning on the requisite scale ("central cognitive choice") would tend to destroy alternative social structures, and therefore alternative perspectives, and anyway would be futile: "What if we run short of oil after a master energy plan has been implemented?" (p. 151). Ladd reminds us that a core function of democratic political parties is "to assess popular wishes and to convert those wishes into candidates" (p. 156). But America's political parties have ceased to be able to control candidate selection; they have therefore been unable to ensure that candidates for office broadly represent the electorate's wishes. Moreover, the party system has failed to deliver sustained and reasonably even party competition. The result has been widespread, and justified, dissatisfaction with the quality and sensitivity of America's political leadership. Ladd is not sanguine about the future.

Indeed, the foreign reader of this volume must be struck by the atmosphere of gloom and uncertainty pervading it. In the view of almost every contributor, everything is for the worst in this worst of all possible worlds—or soon will be. Even the few expressions of qualified optimism sound like whistling in the dark. Perhaps a European can follow Ladd in quoting de Tocqueville's remark about Americans' tendency to exaggerate their difficulties: "One does not know whether to pity a people that takes such wretched trifles seriously or to envy the luck enabling it to do so." American optimism used to be overdone. American pessimism is overdone today.

ANTHONY KING

University of Essex

Parties, Interest Groups, and Campaign Finance Laws. Edited by Michael J. Malbin. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980. Pp. xiv + 384. $11.75, cloth; $5.75, paper.)

Recent reforms of federal and state campaign finance laws were intended to broaden participation and diminish the influence on public policy of wealthy individuals and groups. Paradoxically, the new era of disclosure, subsidies, and spending limits has witnessed further decline in voter turnout, escalation of interest-group activity and skyrocketing campaign costs. Whether legislation has fostered these trends or merely has been ineffective in halting them, there is little doubt that election campaigns are substantially different in the U.S. since the enactment of major legislation in 1971. The conference papers compiled here attempt to identify changes that have occurred and to link their probable causes and consequences with FECA, and to a lesser extent, state statutes. More than half the material covers political action committees (PACs), with other sections devoted to campaign strategies, party organizations, and finance provisions used in other democracies.

The proceedings are dominated by practitioners of various political backgrounds and ideological views. The access to so much "inside" information is the volume's greatest strength; but, unfortunately, little effort has been made by either the panelists or the editor to resolve the many contradictions in fact and interpretation that arise. It is unclear, for example, if PACs have infused more money into the electoral arena or simply institutionalized political giving (Malbin's old wine in new bottles argument); or, if increased reliance by candidates and parties on direct-mail fund raising has crippled centrist politicians by giving greater voice to the ideological fringes.

Several trends were identified with sufficient regularity to serve as conference themes. First, participants from all parts of the political spectrum were troubled by the civil libertarian aspects of campaign regulation. The issues raised ranged from charges of manipulation by the FEC to concern over the very real discrimination in the law against congressional challengers and third parties.

Second, the detailed reporting and financial planning necessary for compliance with federal regulations were perceived as fostering bureaucratization of electoral politics. The complexities of resolving national and state spending limitations, of weighing the relative utility of in-kind contributions, and of managing cash flow under strict credit controls require candidates to keep tighter rein over local organizations. The centralization and diminished activity at the grassroots were viewed as partially offset, however, by the gains in professionalism and increased organizational resources to political parties. Notably, the shift by the Republican National Committee away from reliance on a few large contributors and the receipt of public subsidies by some state committees have produced greater party influence over candidate recruitment and campaign strategy. For those who favor strengthening political parties, there are some highly suggestive findings in the papers by Kayden and Jones about how changes in campaign finance might help to bring this about.

Third, the inefficient use of resources was regarded as a major by-product of campaign regulation. The money spent on accountants and attorneys produces neither votes nor enhanced participation. This factor appears to be overshadowed by the considerable effort reported by participants in circumventing the provisions of the regulations. As a result, there was considerable support expressed for European and Japanese policies of direct subsidy for such campaign costs as mailing, television, office space and voter registration drives, as less costly means of reducing the dependence of candidates on potentially compromising donations.

Finally, the difficulty of controlling individual behavior through procedural change was cited as the principal lesson of eight years' experience with federal and state campaign legislation. The unintended consequences commonly cited in studies of other types of regulation appear in these pages as well: commission rulings that are delayed, made on a case-by-case basis, or do not necessarily reflect the merits of a case; high costs of compliance when compared to benefits; and even a novel version of agency capture, attributable in this instance to the absence of *non*-politicians on the FEC.

The fact that such motifs appear and reappear throughout the papers only serves to underscore the failure of the conference as a whole to grapple with the continuing fragmentation of American politics. The debilitated state of political parties, the continued separation of presidential and congressional constituencies, and the institutionalization of subcommittee government in the House and Senate create the opportunities for interest-group manipulation. As COPE's David Jessup noted, piecemeal regulation of campaign contributions is unlikely to bring about more than a marginal change in the wildly decentralized American system, as long as the unequal distribution of influence remains untouched.

LINDA L. FOWLER

Syracuse University

The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946–1976. By Michael Mandelbaum. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Pp. x + 277. $14.95.)

The Nuclear Question is a history of the development and interrelationships of strategic doctrine and strategic arms limitations. The author begins with a carefully reasoned analysis of nuclear arms control's initial failure, the Baruch Plan, detailing how its provisions gave way to the mutual mistrust of the cold war, the arms race, the bomber and missile "gaps," and finally, to the weapons employment strategies that dominate Soviet-American relations and dictated the parameters of arms control efforts in the 1960s.

The strategic innovations of the Kennedy administration are central to Michael Mandelbaum's analysis. The ironies of the nuclear age confronted Kennedy and McNamara with the need to find a formula for controlling these weapons while simultaneously developing credible strategies for their employment. Unlike strategic planners of the past who had been charged with the task of finding ways to increase the force they could bring to bear upon the enemy, Kennedy and his advisors sought to restrict the violence of warfare by shaping military responses that were commensurate with a broad range of provocations, from nuclear warfare at one extreme, to guerrilla insurgencies at the other. Above all, Kennedy's "graduated deterrence" sought to ensure that minor provocations or limited wars did not escalate or approach the nuclear threshold.

Perhaps the most important "nuclear question" identified by Mandelbaum is the difficulty Kennedy and his successors had in moving from the realm of theory to that of force procurement and deployment. "Friction," a term used broadly in the book to include virtually all domestic political pressures, pushed nuclear stockpiles in the United States higher than strategic principles prescribed; meanwhile, in Europe, "friction" precluded major allied augmentation of NATO's conventional capabilities. The results were (and continue to be) too many nuclear weapons and too few foot soldiers for credible non-nuclear options.

The Cuban Missile Crisis also undermined the assumptions of graduated deterrence by demonstrating that where Soviet-American crises were concerned, all roads too easily lead to nuclear confrontation despite declared policies of limited response, firebreaks, and escalation control. And if Cuba demonstrated that crisis management was more difficult in practice than in theory, Vietnam showed Kennedy's dilemma in developing military responses to Third-World conflicts far from the nuclear threshold. Guerrilla wars were not fought with the same risks of escalation associated with the Missile Crisis, but they could—as in Vietnam—produce a national disaster whose roots lay in the efforts to devise usable military strategies for the nuclear age.

Cuba and Vietnam were crises at opposite ends of the military spectrum. Together they form a critical part of the author's compelling history of U.S. efforts to coexist with the age-old "anarchic" international system and the terrifying capabilities of modern warfare. That, according to Mandelbaum, has been the main achievement, and unquestionably the purpose, of both nuclear strategy and nuclear diplomacy. These points may be arguable, but the author greatly weakens his own case by restricting his study to the 1946–1976 period, while making only passing reference to SALT, and completely ignoring the major doctrinal innovation of the 1970s which threatens the strategic and diplomatic achievements identified in the book. The latter, of course, refers to the Schlesinger doctrine (1973) and the introduction of limited war fighting options (hard target-counterforce) in U.S. declaratory policy and force procurement decisions. The omission is a serious one. Nevertheless, the book is valuable for its many insights into the decisions of the early 1960s. Readers will find it easy going, carefully carved from solid English, and unmarred by the acronyms that so often numb experts and enmesh laymen in thickets of incomprehensible strategic shorthand.

GARY L. GUERTNER

California State University, Fullerton

Urban Policy Making. Edited by Dale Rogers Marshall. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979. Pp. 283. $18.50, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

Those who have attended panels at major political science conventions have a right to be wary of any volume composed of convention papers. On the whole, however, this collection of papers drawn from the panels in the urban and rural politics section of the 1978 APSA meeting will surprise all but perhaps the most hardened skeptics of such a venture.

Like most edited volumes, the selections presented in *Urban Policy Making* vary in quality, significance, and relevance to the stated themes of the volume. Much of this problem is overcome by the very excellent introduction by editor Dale Rogers Marshall which carefully combines the tasks of summarizing the various papers included in the volume with an insightful statement of the past, present and future of research in the area of urban policy. In addition, this volume has the good fortune of having at least one solid, well-written, and theoretically useful contribution in each of its four sections.

Part 1, which deals with the determinants of policy, is especially strong. Readers who did not catch the version that appeared in the *New York Affairs* (Spring, 1979) will find "the Mayor's Eight-Ring Circus" by Douglas Yates both interesting and insightful for its optimism about the impact of fiscal scarcity on the ability of mayors to influence the policy process. For balance, one can turn to Demetrios Caraley's contribution which paints a more critical picture of what "formula politics" and other federal policies have done to the shaping of public policy in urban America.

The section on minorities and policy is perhaps the weakest in the volume. Nevertheless, readers will find Peter Eisinger's findings, which contrast sharply with other studies concerning the impact of black participation in community action programs, rather interesting.

The best contribution from a theoretical standpoint in the section on the fiscal crisis and policy is probably that of Paul Peterson. Although many urbanists will disagree with this piece, which also appeared in the *British Journal of Political Science* (July, 1979), it is a refreshing statement of the unitary model of local taxation and expenditure policies. For these who savor the decentralism themes of Louis Massotti, this section also includes a selection that is Massotti at his best.

Part 4 of the volume deals with the distribution of benefits in urban areas. Hard-nosed empiricists may be critical of this section. But this reader found Richard Rich's plea for looking at the inter-jurisdictional dimensions of this problem most useful. The metropolis, after all, has replaced the city and *intra-jurisdictional* service distributions as the critical dimension of urban life for several decades. Finally, Sara Silbiger's piece on unions and the distribution of benefits, while limited to that gigantic exception to everything—New York City—offers a chance to explore the interesting question of how public sector unions impact the distribution of public goods among various sectors of urban society.

W. E. LYONS

University of Kentucky

World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States. By Paul L. Murphy. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979. Pp. 285. $16.95, cloth; $3.95, paper.)

Although the title of historian Paul Murphy's book presumes that civil liberties do exist in the United States, were a Martian to read his account and no other, he would have considerable doubt. It is Murphy's thesis that during World War I the government was playing a new, coercive and repressive role; that its actions affecting civil liberties were unprecedented; that it manipulated public opinion and criminalized disloyal expression. In short, civil liberty, in the view of the nation's leaders, was a "condition conferred by the community at its discretion, usually only to 'good people' who had earned their prerogatives, . . . a fringe benefit for the successful, gained with the acquisition of power and status" (p. 40).

During the Progressive Era, Murphy observes, civil liberties had been in a state of benign neglect, and even the nation's press, so uninhibited in its attacks on the corruption and graft in the establishment, was not very sympathetic with those "bad" people—socialists, pacificists, hyphenates, Wobblies and the like—who were poisoning the well of traditional American values. With the coming of the war, however, and Wilson's systematic attempts to root out disloyalty in order to attain consensual support, civil liberties emerged as a serious public policy issue. Under the dedicated and tireless efforts of Roger Baldwin, the National Civil Liberties Bureau came into being and quickly emerged as a powerful voice in publicizing the outrages committed by President Wilson's lieutenants. At the same time the "respectable" and respected leaders in business, politics, and education, along with the bench and the bar, defended the Wilson principle that temporary suppression was necessary in order to "minimize the dissonance" which might impede the attainment of the higher goal, the winning of the war and making the world safe for democracy. Even the Supreme Court viewed the civil liberties issues casually as it strained constitutional doctrine to support the government's actions.

Suppression of dissent, however, left some interesting and unintended legacies. As Murphy sees it, the Wilson government, in permitting only conservatives the luxury of uncensored liberty, left them free to undermine Wilsonian principles in the postwar period, and they mounted the assault with a vengeance. Moreover, official harassment of dissent gave rise to a permanent status for civil liberties and to the development of a public conscience which could be aroused over official persecution of dissidents. Yet, as Murphy concludes, it has not been difficult over the past half-century to revitalize the "various federal agencies of repression which arose during the First World War and to use them as devices for managing civil liberties" (p. 272).

Those hostile critics of America who seem to revel in the misdeeds and hypocrisy of a government founded on the principles of liberty and justice, will devour Murphy's book with relish. It is an unending litany of official malevolence, of bureaucratic prejudice, of insensitive, xenophobic public servants who deliberately curtailed or deprived hundreds of Americans of their constitutional liberties. It is, in the final analysis, a strong indictment of majority rule which always harbors an incipient intolerance and a "mean spirit" beneath the surface. However, what Murphy did not say is that in those systems that lack constitutional forms, dissenters in wartime—or peacetime, for that matter—are simply lined up and shot.

ROBERT J. STEAMER

University of Massachusetts, Boston

Setting National Priorities: Agenda for the 1980s. Edited by Joseph A. Pechman. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1980. Pp. xiii + 563. $18.95, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

This is the eleventh in the series of books on the federal budget published by Brookings since 1970. Like the 1976 volume and unlike its other nine predecessors, this volume focuses on more than just the budget for a single year. Rather than analyzing budget proposals for fiscal year 1981, it focuses on policy options and prospects for the decade of the 1980s (a fortunate choice both because the FY '81 budget remains in considerable flux and also because longer-range discussions are more interesting anyway).

The 16 chapters in the volume are authored by 19 different people, 11 on the Brookings staff and 8 located elsewhere. Almost half the chapters are given to different aspects of foreign and defense policy. Four domestic social policy areas receive concerted attention. There are also a single overview chapter, three chapters on broader economic questions, and a chapter on "The Crisis of Competence in Government."

This volume has something for almost everyone in the best sense. It's not comprehensive in literally addressing every policy area, but it deals with most of the most important areas. It provides a supermarket in which readers can shop for ideas, analyses, and at least limited data. There is no Brookings "company line" (Brookings expressly tries to avoid developing or peddling such a line), although authors are not shy about stating their preferences (some preferences are offered with considerable argumentation in their support; others are just asserted).

Each essay in the volume typically describes where we as a nation have been in terms of policy choices and apparent impact in a specific policy area, assesses where we are now in that area, and lays out some options for the 1980s and their likely results. The essays are cautious and balanced, as one has come to expect from this series. The "on the one hand" and "on the other hand" style of writing predominates, as does the frequent reminder in almost every essay that the United States faces complex problems to which there are no easy solutions. A careful reader comes away quite sober about the nation's future prospects for controlling any part of its own destiny, either domestic or international.

Detailed discussions of the intricacies of domestic politics are missing in most of the essays. But the volume is not intended to provide such discussions, for the most part. "Political economy" is still mostly economics at Brookings. A political science reader can provide his or her own political explanations and commentary for many of the policy phenomena being addressed.

The chapter on "The Crisis of Competence in Government," by James Sundquist, is an exception to a number of the above generalizations and therefore probably is likely to be of greatest interest to most political scientists. It is one of the few chapters with a thesis and using a fair amount of political data. It is also the one chapter that comments centrally and directly on political institutions and their relation to policies. Sundquist's thesis is that the crisis of confidence in government on the part of the American populace (as amply demonstrated in all kinds of opinion surveys) has become a "crisis of competence" on the part of the government itself. He identifies five "deep seated trends [that] have been, and are, at work that will make effective government even more difficult to attain the 1980s than it has been in the decade just ended and those that have gone before" (p. 531). These trends are "the disintegration of political parties, the popularization of presidential nominations, the rejection by Congress of presidential leadership, . . . fragmentation of authority in Congress that prevents its development as an alternative source of policy integration and leadership . . . [and] the gradual deterioration of administrative capability" (p. 540).

Sundquist argues well that these five factors acting together have rendered the federal government unable to proceed with any degree of effectiveness to shape and implement policy. The impact of the five together has been devastating, in his opinion. Like the other authors in the volume, he sees no easy solutions, but writes wisely about possible short-run developments, some of which might ameliorate the situation. This is an essay on the interrelation of politics, institutions, and policy that may not convince everyone of the correctness of its conclusions but requires empirically based rebuttal if those conclusions are to be rejected.

RANDALL B. RIPLEY

Ohio State University

The Seventy-sixth Congress and World War II, 1939–1940. By David L. Porter. (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1979. Pp. x + 236. $19.50.)

Long ago, in olden times (e.g., circa 1960, in New Haven, inter alia), the budding behaviorist learned to denigrate the historical case study: it ignored the general in favor of the particular, it seldom took advantage of the full array of relevant and available data, and in consequence, it produced little of value to the political scientist. David Porter has written a book to challenge these prejudices. His study is at once a case study and a comparative analysis; he treats three major issues—the repeal of the arms embargo, the offer of economic aid to beleaguered Finland, and the enactment of a selective service system—within the context of a single Congress, the 76th (1939–40). Moreover, he employs an impressive arsenal of data to analyze congressional consideration of these bills. In addition to the usual published materials, he uses much newly available legislators' correspondence, oral history, and public opinion and ICPSR statistical data.

Several "revisionist" conclusions emerge from the treatment. Four distinct phases of legislative activity appear: "isolationism," which blocked repeal of the arms embargo in early 1939, gave way to "internationalism," which favored limited, non-belligerent aid to the allies, and the repeal passed later that year; "interventionism," arguing for more forceful resistance to aggression, triumphed with the adoption of Finnish aid, only to be cast aside in favor of "preparedness," which in enacting a peacetime draft began the process of readying the nation for eventual involvement in the European war. Second, the role of Congress in shaping foreign policy was much more pronounced than is commonly assumed; indeed, the legislature moved in vigorously to fill a leadership vacuum left by White House timidity. Third, in the voting on the three issues, "some unusual political, sectional, and ethnic alignments occurred" (p. 185). Coalitional alliances were more complex and less stable than traditional historical analysis portrays them. Each of these generalizations, in fact, requires rethinking the conventional wisdom.

The behavioral purist will, nonetheless, despite the intriguing quality of these conclusions, find much to quarrel with in Porter's work. Some readers will wonder whether the Finnish aid questions, committing the country to assist a small, helpless nation against the Soviet Union, is comparable to the other issues, which focused on Germany as the aggressor. Conceptually, the use in some places of distinctions among isolationists, interventionists, internationals, preparedness advocates, rearmament opponents, and the like, contrasted with a more manageable typology of isolationists, moderates, and internationalists (Appendixes 1 and 2), causes confusion. Moreover, the statistically sophisticated may find the quantitative analysis a bit naive: most of it is bivariate, thus missing some rather basic interactions (say, between party and region), and even then some is based on such small numbers of cases that the conclusions are suspect (see, for example, Tables 15 and 17). Indeed, even the laudable effort to compare voting alignments across the three issues is marred because the author makes his comparisons by pairs (Appendixes 3 and 4). Finally, there is a disturbing tendency to advance unwarranted generalizations: where is the evidence to sustain the argument that representatives of German ancestry "*identified* with their ethnic heritage" and behaved accordingly (p. 43), or that "hostile constituent mail . . . *caused* several internationalists to oppose rearmament" (p. 138), or that "pressure groups *affected* more decisively the Senate voting" than that in the House? (p. 167, emphasis added).

In sum, there is much of interest here; Porter's study is rich in historical detail and is enlightening about the 1939–40 period. As historical case study, however, its promise outstrips its performance.

LEROY N. RIESELBACH

Indiana University

We Don't Want Nobody Nobody Sent: An Oral History of the Daley Years. By Milton L. Rakove. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979. Pp. xii + 404. $12.95.)

Seldom can we expect a collection of basic, almost wholly undigested data to make fascinating reading, but, for the most part, this book succeeds in doing just that. Milton L. Rakove asks the questions and tape records the answers of 40 persons inside, outside, and tangential to the machine during the long Daley years and some of them from even before the Boss took office in 1955.

The machine that Daley commanded was founded in the early 1930s by Anton J. Cermak, Edward J. Kelly, and Patrick A. Nash, based upon the William E. Dever organization that had managed to keep itself together during the bombastic years of William Hale (Big Bill) Thompson, Republican. Cermak, before his untimely death, had welded together a strong, centrally controlled machine. It was this that Daley inherited and ruled for so long. Jacob M. Arvey and other old-timers give the background.

The title comes from the experience of Abner Mikva, later a member of Congress, who in 1948 as a first-year law student, entered the Eighth Ward Regular Democratic Organization headquarters (in the Hyde Park-Kenwood area) and said he wanted to help the Paul Douglas-Adlai Stevenson ticket. When he explained that no one had sent him, he was told, "We don't want nobody nobody sent" (p. 318). It might have been the theme song of the closely knit, by-invitation-only Daley machine. (Mikva never was invited in.)

There are many fascinating interviews. One is with Vito Marzullo (on the council since 1953, its dean, and leader of the Italian bloc) who explains, "I take care of my people like I take care of my own family" (p. 50). From his 25th Ward, West Side, with its blacks and people of Italian, Polish, and Mexican descent, were selected all the precinct captains interviewed here.

Another fine interview is with Marilou Hedlund, the first woman alderman (48th Ward, North Side, 1971), a young Catholic journalist who was treated warily by Daley and "differently by different ethnic groups" (p. 207). Then there is an interview with Jane Byrne, probably before she even hoped to become mayor. With Daley gone, she predicted "a much more fragmented Democratic party," one in which "commitments that are being made won't last" (p. 203). Other discussions are with young Turks, outsiders, excommunicants, reformers, and suburban critics.

Unfortunately, Rakove himself offers only a four-page preface. The short foreword is given to Richard M. Daley, the son and possible heir, and the epilogue to Michael A. Bilandic, mayor when the book was finished, but who was about to be buried by violent blizzards and Jane Byrne. Perhaps Rakove felt he had said enough in his excellent 1975 analysis of the Daley machine, *Don't Make No Waves, Don't Back No Losers,* but this book lacks definition. You must make something of it yourself; that is possible if you know a bit of Chicago politics. There is the added weakness of much repetition. Things do get boring if told too often. The lumping of interviewees by category adds to the echo, but some kind of organization was necessary, of course.

The eager inside-dopester should be warned that there are few secrets unlocked here. What you gain are insights into the rather complex Daley character and how the participants, from the divas to the spear carriers, do their jobs.

There is a good picture collection and a helpful glossary of names, but no index to aid the researcher.

CHARLES R. ADRIAN

University of California, Riverside

Interest and Ideology: The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen. By Bruce M. Russett and Elizabeth C. Hanson. (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1975. Pp. xiv + 296. $13.00, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

Interest and Ideology is an important book for both substantive and pedagogical reasons. To get right to the point, the authors' conclusion, based on an analysis of different studies, is that there is "*weak and rather fragmentary evidence in favor of theories attributing wars to economic interests*" (p. 249, italics in original), and strategic and ideological theories contribute more to the explanation of businessmen's (sic) views about foreign policy than do theories of economic motivation. The authors use a multi-method approach to test a number of hypotheses about the nature of and underlying motivations for the beliefs of businessmen about foreign policies. Thus the conclusions baldly stated above are not arrived at lightly but rather are grounded in three different imaginative and carefully constructed studies.

Questionnaires were sent to vice-presidential-level business executives and high-ranking military officers to probe each group's beliefs about foreign policy and their antecedents. Basing their conclusions on approximately 1200 responses, Russett and Hanson found business executives to be less "hawkish" than their military counterparts, though more so than most other categories of civilian elites except Republican party leaders. This latter result was obtained by analyzing the Yale study in conjunction with Allen Barton's study of elite attitudes conducted at Columbia in 1971–72.

Using a less participant-reactive methodology, the authors studied the response of stock market prices to conciliatory, non-conciliatory, and escalatory events during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. For the latter conflict, special analyses of the price fluctuations of defense-related companies and firms with substantial interests in LDCs were undertaken. Generally, by 1967 investors seemed to have turned against the Vietnam War, with investors and companies in defense industries and those with interests in LDCs no more positively inclined toward the war than investors in other firms.

The third investigation involved a content analysis of the comments of the business and military press about U.S. intervention in various international crises and the reasons offered to support or oppose such intervention. While space considerations prevent an adequate summary of the findings here, for the most part, this test confirmed that the business press was less "hawkish" than the military press.

The findings of these three studies in their full complexity shed much light on economic theories of foreign policy, and thus the book makes a major contribution. However, the book is also valuable for the authors' success in providing an excellent though not perfect model of a carefully and creatively conceived and executed study. On such an important issue as this, it is instructive to new and old scholars alike to observe how the authors creatively "mine" the data derived from the different methodologies and information sources to study this issue from various perspectives.

Russett and Hanson have been careful to approach each study and the subject in an even-handed manner, although they acknowledge that decisions on the structure of the research design affect the results. For example, in two of the three studies the prime reference group is the military, leaving one to speculate about what the results, or at least what their interpretation, might have been if the reference groups had been quite different—such as labor leaders. The authors readily acknowledge the limitations of correlating international crises with stock market prices, but one can further question the judgment of limiting the stock market reactions to those of the same day or the day following a particular event. Somewhat similarly, the content analysis of the business press assumes too quickly the high correlation between the words of the press and the beliefs of executives. Perhaps an analysis of the speeches of business executives would have been more appropriate as opposed to the statements of those who write about business.

These and other questions can be fairly raised about the book and its various methodologies. However, such questions do not detract from the excellence of the work, for the authors' care in describing their methodologies and indicating their limitations makes the job of questioning their procedures easier for the reader.

The findings are interesting and important. The book is generally well written, though at times the results of the survey analysis become tedious. However, most importantly, the book represents the careful and serious investigation of a major theory of foreign policy. Its scholarship and professionalism are of the highest order.

DAVID H. BLAKE

Northeastern University

Crusaders and Pragmatists: Movers of Modern American Foreign Policy. By John G. Stoessinger. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979. Pp. xvii + 334. $16.95, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

This book covers a lot of ground. The eight chapters dealing with Presidents Wilson, Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, Johnson, Carter, and Secretaries of State Dulles and Kissinger are connected by a series of "interchapters" to provide the historical context in which these architects of American foreign policy have operated. It is Stoessinger's thesis (pp. xvi-xvii) that these individuals are "movers," and not merely "players" on the stage of history who happened to occupy leadership roles when important decisions were made. "The mover's distinctive quality is that he leaves his personal imprint upon history . . . and this imprint . . . stems from the very nature of his personality."

Stoessinger classifies the personalities of these leaders into two types: pragmatists and crusaders. Wilson, Dulles, and Johnson are predominantly crusaders whose foreign policy decisions are inordinately influenced by rigid, preconceived ideas and/or emotional problems; Truman, Kennedy, and Kissinger are pragmatists whose decisions tend to be guided by evidence and common sense. Carter (p. 284) falls somewhere between the crusader and the pragmatist.

The treatment of the Dulles decisions over Suez, Johnson's domination of America's Vietnam policy between 1964 and 1968, and Carter's difficulties with his human rights politics are the stronger parts of the book. However, the analysis of these topics does not break any new ground. The chapters which focus upon Wilson and Roosevelt reach familiar conclusions. President Wilson is the archetype of the crusader, while FDR successfully tempers the idealism of a crusader with the realism of a pragmatist.

The studies of Truman, Kennedy, and Kissinger also reveal little that is new, and they illustrate the difficulties associated with applying the crusader/pragmatist dichotomy to more complex cases. Truman and Kissinger are not universally viewed as pragmatists, and Stoessinger's interpretation of Kennedy as a pragmatist does not always square with the evidence which he offers to support this conclusion. On p. 167, he concludes that JFK's decision making during the Cuban missile crisis "shows us the pragmatic leader at his best." Yet, only a few pages earlier (p. 159), he indicts Kennedy "for risking nuclear Armageddon . . . over what appeared to be a side issue. . . . A deeply ingrained reaction against the 'Munich syndrome' and the determination not to appear weak made [Kennedy] risk nuclear war over missile bases in Turkey." Khrushchev's pragmatism, and not

Kennedy's, avoided nuclear war when JFK's intransigence over the missiles in Turkey left the ultimate decision between peace and war to the Soviet leader (pp. 159–60).

Stoessinger does not distinguish in a sophisticated fashion between situations in which his "movers" have their unique impact upon history and circumstances when they behave like "everyman." He blames Johnson the crusader for driving the United States deeper and deeper into the Vietnam quagmire between 1965 and 1968. However, he does not explain why it took Kissinger the pragmatist as long to get the U.S. out of Vietnam. Stoessinger's analyses of the Dulles decisions over Suez (pp. 128–31) and Carter's unsuccessful human rights policies (pp. 283–85) come close to addressing this problem, but he never really comes to grips with it in theoretical terms. The reader will also look in vain for theorizing regarding when a crusader is likely to make "good" decisions and a pragmatist is likely to make "bad" decisions. Stoessinger's portrayal of Kennedy's intransigence during the Cuban missile crisis, for example, begs to be reexamined in this light. The sketchy, 3½-page, concluding chapter to this book stands in silent testimony regarding such theoretical shortcomings.

STEPHEN G. WALKER

Arizona State University

Rhetoric and Reality: Presidential Commissions and the Making of Public Policy. By Terrence R. Tutchings. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979. Pp. xviii + 164. $18.50.)

In analysis covering the period from Truman through the first term of the Nixon administration, Terrence Tutchings has invested presidential commissions with more significance than is usually accorded them by the conventional wisdom. He makes a good case for this approach, particularly noting that "commissions provide evidence of what policy is not" (p. 120). The fact that the commissions duplicate the jurisdiction of existing government entities and are frequently and regularly in use, "demonstrates innate incapabilities on the part of the routinely organized branches of the federal system" (p. 121). The potential of this insight is not fully explored by Tutchings, but it does reflect his concern with the application of several conceptual models of policy making to the "atypical" example of presidential commissions.

Tutchings seeks to code and quantify his data as fully as possible to permit more rigorous fits to the conceptual schemes that he utilized. His imaginative but careful methodology makes the most of the commissions' varied and often incoherent recommendations, as well as the great range of their concerns. There is some problem in the integration of the data in the overall analysis. The individual chapters are valuable, but the shifting focus from chapter to chapter does reduce the clarity of the presentation and the emergence of overall generalizations. However, the author is entitled to the defense that he has stuck closely to the limitations of the data. There is also the substantive problem found in many recent presidential studies as to whether the Nixon administration represents a sharp discontinuity in presidential practice or reflects patterns that will continue. The Nixon administration was atypical in its preference for limited research, the dominance of commission membership by the corporate sector, and the president's disinclination to support commission recommendations.

The analysis classifies commissions by: issue area; temporal variations in demand; size of commission staff; use of consultants, hearings, and new research; representation of types of elites; type of policy recommendations and their political manipulation requirements. The cross-classification of these variables generated a number of suggestive findings, including a high rate of presidential success with enacting commission recommendations when the president chose to support them (higher than normal for his legislative program, for example). The mixture of the vague and highly specific among the recommendations does not prevent presidential commissions from having a significant impact. Most interesting among the results was the large role public sector representatives played on such commissions, often as great or greater than that of the corporate and governmental sectors. What emerges is a picture of presidential commissions not as status quo instruments, but rather as innovative forces. This vision invoked by Tutchings' work does make one regret that the symbolic action conceptual scheme of Murray Edelman was not also applied to this data.

DOROTHY B. JAMES

American University

The National Planning Idea in U.S. Public Policy: Five Alternative Approaches. By David E. Wilson. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. Pp. xv + 359. $28.50.)

Comprehensive national planning (CNP) in the United States, like adoption of the metric system, has been a subject of debate for many years. Never mind the advantages offered; critics repeatedly stress the disadvantages, the shortcomings, or the "un-Americanness" of each. David Wilson has written an exhaustive review of attempts to establish national planning practices in this country, chronicling the recurrent efforts to establish control over the economy. Beginning with the first tentative efforts during the Progressive Era to assert social welfare and needs over capitalism-run-amok, Wilson reviews the high- and low-water marks of national planning.

In recent years, major American institutions, including congressional committees and some federal agencies, have accepted the utility of planning efforts. The U.S. Forest Service, for example, has a 100-year planning horizon. However, during the second Nixon administration and the Ford administration, the executive branch systematically blocked or even dismantled national agencies and plans for CNP. The National Goals Research Staff, the last such institution, was disbanded soon after Moynihan left it in 1969. Today, there are only a few favorable bases upon which CNP could be built, such as a desire for better leadership from the White House, information processing technologies, and America's international interdependence on resources and markets. These factors notwithstanding, other factors militate against CNP efforts. The prevailing political philosophy of a pluralistic, patchwork federal system, belief that CNP is socialistic, opposition to data-gathering needed for CNP and other factors have contributed to the dismantling of CNP institutions and proposals.

Wilson's objective is more than pursuit of historical records. His objective is to identify "the major alternative theoretical approaches to American national planning, and . . . [the potentials] for synthesis of these approaches into current theory and national policy-making practice" (p. 1). Wilson examines five approaches (rational, incremental, mixed scanning, general systems, and learning-adaptive), reviewing their evolution, strengths, weaknesses, and future.

The rational approach, favored by policy scientists, has improved as information processing and decision-making technologies have developed. Its stress on empiricism, efficiency and systematic problem solving has been criticized as being too elitist, too mechanistic, and too "data-heavy." The logical counterpart, the incremental approach, enjoyed some favor in the early seventies, as a pluralist approach to strategic planning. However, incrementalism in recent years has been criticized as too reactive.

Etzioni's mixed scanning approach was proposed as a compromise, combining both long-range scanning and short-range or incremental development. Neither fish nor fowl, the approach has proven difficult to implement without its drifting toward rationalism or inrementalism. It did provide a conceptual transition into the last two approaches. The general systems approach proposed a holistic, self-controlled society, capable of learning (in the cybernetic sense), incorporating values into dynamic models of society. Underdeveloped techniques and imprecise theory and system concepts have deterred acceptance of the approach. The last approach, the learning-adaptive one, is principally a transactive, social-planning alternative emphasizing the importance of individual and social values, human potential and participation. The approach relies heavily on a participative process generating constant feedback and creative ideas for social change. At this time, the approach is criticized as too undeveloped, naively utopian, and too bound to the behavioral sciences. The performances of these last two approaches in the early seventies in response to economic crises and in limited program areas demonstrated their potential for handling anticipated shifts in American values. The approaches promised flexible, adaptive, group-learning methods for resolving national problems.

Wilson believes that the general systems and learning-adaptive alternatives have a synergistic potential capable of fostering a new era in CNP. The main sticking point is the tension between the competing ideologies of property, competition, elite rule and equality, cooperation and pluralism. Indeed, the current political climate seems to be drifting back toward the former ideology, despite the crises it engendered in the early seventies. Wilson argues that the general systems and learning-adaptive approaches "are facilitating movement away from [incrementalism] toward real and enormously hard, structural and value questions of citizen involvement to achieve widespread public control over mounting social control pressures, in quest of the future of democracy" (p. 312).

Wilson's book, and its companion volume—*National Planning in the U.S.: An Annotated Bibliography* (Westview Press)—is an excellent examination of attempts to establish CNP in the United States. His exhaustive review of the five alternative approaches to comprehensive national planning should be read by anyone concerned with leading society into the twenty-first century.

RUSS SMITH

North Texas State University

Decision on Palestine: How the U.S. Came to Recognize Israel. By Evan M. Wilson. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979. Pp. xviii + 244. $14.95.)

At the height of the struggle over the creation of the state of Israel, President Truman exclaimed that "not even at the time of General MacArthur's dismissal had he been under such pressure" (p. 127). This statement dramatizes the extraordinary challenge which the Palestine issue posed for the United States: an irreconcilable conflict, of great importance for all the world, between two populations, one of which exerted tremendous influence within the American government, with no adequate means of achieving a viable compromise. Evan Wilson analyzes this experience as a case study of U.S. foreign policy making, concentrating on the years 1942–48 during which the major steps were taken which led to the birth of Israel. Wilson writes with authority, since he dealt intimately with the Palestine problem as a staff member in the State Department's Near East Division from 1943 to 1947. After an introduction briefly describing the background of the problem, the main body of the analysis examines the course of events from 1942, when Zionist leaders proclaimed the goal of a Jewish state in Palestine, to 1948, when such a state was created.

Within the Jewish community, it was the Zionists who espoused the most extreme goal of a separate independent Jewish state in all or part of Palestine. Despite considerable Jewish opposition to this militant strategy on the part of groups such as the American Jewish Committee, the Zionist position rapidly became dominant. Contributing factors included the plight of European and other Jewish refugees who desperately sought a haven from persecution; the skill, organization, and financial resources of the Zionists; and the British Balfour Declaration of 1914 which had promised to work for "a national home for the Jewish people" in Palestine.

On the other side, the Arabs had long been the dominant population in Palestine, with twice as many inhabitants as the Jews as late as 1947, and owning most of the land. During World War I the British had promised the Arabs independence and had emphasized that the Balfour Declaration was not to prejudice the rights of the "existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." When Jewish immigration began to increase markedly during World War II, the Arabs protested, and the United Kingdom, as the administrator of the Palestinian mandate, agreed in 1939 to set a quota of 75,000 Jewish immigrants annually for five years, after which time the consent of the Arabs would be required for further immigration. The Arabs opposed any form of partition and advocated a single, secular, democratic state in all of Palestine. However, the Arab community was seriously divided, weakly organized, and poorly represented abroad.

The main force affecting the issue within the United States was the Jewish community. There were no comparable countervailing forces, including the oil companies which were relatively quiescent. A small but able staff in the Department of State tended to believe that the welfare of both Arabs and Jews would best be advanced by a unified binational state in which both communities would have considerable autonomy. Because of the political significance of the dispute, however, most crucial decisions were made in the White House, strongly influenced by staff members, especially Clark Clifford, and others friendly to the Zionist cause, particularly Rabbis Wise and Silver. There was little cooperation with the British and often there was bitter conflict.

All the ingredients in this witches' brew came to a boil in 1947–48. The United Kingdom deposited the problem in the lap of the UN General Assembly in February 1947. In November the Assembly approved a majority report which called for partition of Palestine, after a two-year trusteeship, into Arab and Jewish states joined by an "economic union," international administration of Jerusalem, and admission of 150,000 Jewish immigrants. A minority report, calling for a unified federal state, was defeated. While the Zionists welcomed the recommendation, the Arabs opposed it. The United Kingdom, unable to cope with increasing chaos, announced a much earlier termination of the mandate effective May 15, 1948. As violence escalated, triggering a massive flight of Arabs from Jewish-controlled areas, the United States asked the UN Security Council to call for a truce and temporary trusteeship pending a viable settlement, but it was too late. On May 14, the last British officials fled aboard a cruiser, Zionist leaders announced the creation of the state of Israel, and armies from Egypt, Trans-Jordan, Syria and Lebanon entered Palestine to join local forces in battle against Israeli troops—a conflict which continues today, 32 years later.

This analysis—well-researched, balanced and literate—emphasizes that the American difficulty was not so much its democratic system as the fractious behavior of the antagonists. The system demonstrated its many strengths, including ample opportunities for popular participation and good staff work within the government. The greatest weakness, found in all political systems, especially autocratic ones, was undue influence exercised by groups able to exert extraordinary political leverage unchecked by adequate countervailing participation. The answer is not to abandon the democratic process, which offers the best hope of remedying these ills, but to improve it by strengthening general involvement, including the media, and making it less vulnerable to powerful interests.

H. FIELD HAVILAND

Tufts University

Comparative Politics

Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? By Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979. Pp. xii + 308. $22.50, cloth; $5.95, paper.)

Research and writing about South Africa has, in the last three decades, become something of a growth industry, and fewer nation states generate more rhetoric and rectitude than South Africa does. For the most part, such studies neither appeal to the higher echelons of those who are responsible for governmental or private-sector policies nor to those academics who concern themselves with the development of middle-level theory building and testing. Consequently, South Africa is poorly understood by those in the citadels of government who have little time for serious reading or long-range planning, and it rarely finds a secure place in the main-line literature in comparative and international politics. Paradoxically, the literature on South Africa is voluminous but not especially edifying, and South Africa becomes the bailiwick of the special pleader (who finds Pretoria's anticommunist pronouncements soothing to the cold warrior who never rests or who, conversely, finds that Pretoria is the epitome of colonialism, racism, and possibly fascism run amuck) or the country specialist who is sometimes thought to be a mindless data-gatherer and a conceptual illiterate.

Happily, this work by Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee will please those who have both theoretical and pressing practical interests in South Africa. Both authors have taught in South Africa and both have published in the field. Adam is probably best known for this revisionist study, *Modernizing Racial Domination* (1971), while Giliomee has published in the *Archives Year Book for South African History* (1966) and has become a specialist on early nineteenth-century South African history. Both authors were invited to Yale University to participate in its Southern African Research Program, which was supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Ford Foundation. The book is composed of a preface, written jointly, and ten separate chapters, seven of which were written by Adam and three of which were Giliomee's work; however, each contributed roughly half of the total manuscript. The book, however, is superbly organized and the parts fit together remarkably well, and the work is the better for its interdisciplinary approach. The authors draw comparisons with the United States (pp. 205, 209), the Weimar Republic (p. 193), the Bonn Republic (p. 300) and Canada (p. 300), and canvass the germane literature in three languages (Afrikaans, German, and English). They write with lucidity and elegance, and both have a manifest concern with the universal and theoretical in addition to a commendable grasp of the wide-ranging literature on, and the realities of, South Africa. Their work uses West German survey data from South African respondents as well as interviews with well-placed South Africans in South Africa itself, which lends authenticity and currency to the quality of their research.

Afrikanerdom is the central focus of the study, rather than the dispossessed Africans or the politically ineffectual English-speaking whites whose predecessors won the 1899–1902 Anglo-Boer War but eventually were routed on the political field of battle in 1948. Adam and Giliomee are at their best when surveying, classifying, and evaluating the state of the literature on particular topics (Ch. 2), and Adam's chapter on the demise of the liberal tradition (championed by notables such as Alan Paton, author of *Cry, The Beloved Country*) is incisive and remarkably profound (Ch. 9). Equally praiseworthy is Adam's appraisal of the plural societies concept as a tool for analyzing South African politics (pp. 42–45) and his subsequently arresting examination of the present inapplicability of Arendt Lijphart's theories on consociationalism to the present regime in South Africa (Ch. 10). Their analysis of "Afrikaner politics of privilege maintenance" (p. 13) is particularly illuminating in terms of the Afrikaans press, the Dutch Reformed Church, Afrikaner intelligentsia, and the defense force. This is an immensely important book and can justly be regarded as being among the handful of works on South Africa that deserve the kind of scholarly acclaim that Gwendolen M. Carter's landmark study, *The Politics of Inequality*, received after its publication in 1958.

RICHARD DALE

Southern Illinois University, Carbondale

Poverty, Politics and Policy: Britain in the 1960's. By Keith G. Banting. (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1979. Pp. x + 187. $30.00.)

In Britain and America, the 1960s witnessed the rediscovery of poverty as the plight of the poor emerged as a leading social issue. Although the social upheaval which characterized American poverty politics during the 1960s was not duplicated in Britain, this decade was an important turning point in British social policy. The optimistic belief that poverty had been eliminated and that equality was declining was shattered as academics, government committees, journalists and social reformers all pointed to those left behind during the decades of relative postwar prosperity; consequently, proposals for reform proliferated and by the late 1960s a wide range of policy changes were adopted in order to shift more resources towards the poor.

This volume analyzes the politics of poverty during this period in an effort to identify the processes which shaped the responses of government. Keith Banting examines how the issue of poverty was raised, the sources for reform proposals, and the political forces which influenced government policy. Drawing on original research as well as interviews with major participants, Banting surveys these dimensions of poverty politics in three detailed case studies: the 1965 Rent Act which imposed new controls on privately rented housing; the introduction of Educational Priority Areas for providing compensatory primary education; and the decisions during 1967–68 to assist poor families by increasing family (dependency) allowances and to "claw back" the increase from better-off families through the tax system.

Seeking to explain these innovations in social policy, Banting rejects as inappropriate approaches which emphasize broad socioeconomic changes, class unrest and the like; the social reforms of the 1960s were introduced at a time when the threat of social disorder was remote and the poor were unassertive. Instead, Banting focuses on the role of political processes in interpreting social problems and designing social policies.

In this view, innovative decisions are considered a product of the ideas and perceptions of individual policy activists and the constraints imposed on them by key political institutions, particularly the party system, the bureaucracies and the pressures of organized groups. It is by examining the changes within and the tensions between these intellectual activities and institutional processes that Banting attempts to reveal the forces that shaped reform during the 1960s.

Given such a broad-gauge perspective, one might expect the book to dissipate into a loosely related collection of case studies on social policy. As noted below, the rather ambiguous framework Banting employs falls far short of producing a tightly knit analysis of social policy making. Nevertheless, he does elucidate some very interesting themes about the seeming autonomy of Britain's policy experts and political leaders and he reveals how they attempt to use their institutional power bases for influencing policy outcomes. In case studies which are exceptionally well written, Banting drives home the argument that the professionalization of reform has made social scientists major agenda builders; this role, however, is counterbalanced by institutions of power which usually act to blunt their more redistributive proposals. As a result, the policy innovations generated during the 1960s produced slender gains. By the end of the decade, poverty was still a major problem and those most committed to reform were bitterly disappointed.

Although this volume constitutes an interesting description of events, this strength is diminished by Banting's weak conceptual approach. Dividing policy making into the realm of ideas and the world of institutions and then examining the intricacies of both is weak social science. Professional reformers often appear as though they are driven by ideas alone, unfettered by their own narrow institutional biases and constraints. Similarly, the world of power politics is painted as largely reactive, responding to pressures and proposals generated elsewhere.

This sort of formalistic analysis costs the author dearly. In the end, Banting is unable to answer convincingly how poverty was "rediscovered" and why reform ultimately failed to secure substantial change because the more probable answers lie outside of his analytical framework. Professional reformers undoubtedly played an important role in drawing attention to the forgotten poor Briton, but this "rediscovery" was surely precipitated by larger events, particularly governments which became more receptive to changes in social policy. By the same token, many of the barriers to reform which blunted proposals for government intervention probably cannot be found in the intricacies of the decisional process; more likely, they are related to Britain's severe economic deterioration which, as Banting tacitly recognizes, increasingly constrained social policy alternatives and put the poor again on the back burners.

While the larger questions about the politics of poverty in Britain remain unanswered in this book, it is a worthy piece of scholarship. Because the case studies are skillfully written around an interesting theme and are well researched, this volume deserves the attention of those concerned with social policy development.

PAUL KANTOR

Fordham University

The Limits of Politics: Collective Goods and Political Change in Postindustrial Societies. By Roger Benjamin. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. Pp. xiii + 148. $15.00.)

Among several themes developed in this tightly written little book, one especially stands out: "My overall purpose . . . is to move us away from explanations based on systems and cultures toward those based on individuals" (p. 6). Dressed in the clothes of rational choice, collective goods, collective action, or social choice theories or approaches, *The Limits of Politics* appears to have rediscovered, some 30 years later, an epistemological foundation of some moment and lingering vitality. Designated "hominocentric politics" by Abraham Kaplan and Harold D. Lasswell (*Power and Society,* Yale, 1950), its earliest proponents, this individualistic view of man and our means for viewing the human condition was presented as being consistent with the main currents of political thought, both past and present:

> As science, [hominocentric politics] finds its subject matter in interpersonal relations, not abstract institutions or organizations; and it sees the person as a whole, in all his aspects, not as the embodiment of this or that limited set of needs or interests. As policy, it prizes not the glory of a depersonalized state or the efficiency of a social mechanism, but human dignity and the realization of human values (p. xxiv).

Human dignity includes freedom, the sharing of power among the many rather than the few, as well as widespread participation in all other value processes. Our inheritance of normative propositions is adequate. Even though circumstances change, the aims of a democratic society are permanent. The task is to specify and re-specify them in concrete circumstances, so that whatever potential for progress exists can be realized. Political scientists presumably have roles and responsibilities in this task. Roger Benjamin begins to sketch out what some of these might be.

The concrete circumstances of much of the "post-industrialized" world have changed, although our institutional instrumentalities have not evolved apace or in harmony: the service sector grows to dominate the production sector; economic growth slows as material needs are generally met; the public sector grows while the private sector declines in relative importance; and value preferences shift away from predominantly wealth-related concerns to those centered on other legitimate human needs. Increasingly, efficiency bangs into various inequities endured while primary material needs were being satisfied (at least for a few); depersonalization becomes more evident, and intolerable; and institutions themselves, many of which seem to have been designed for permanence and armed for self-preservation, are no longer regarded as benign or essential as they once were.

Intellectual sterility and dead-ends, stemming in part from the misguided presumption that abstract institutions provide the appropriate conceptual basis for study and in part from the mistaken notion that human needs and interests are both limited and immutable, are relentlessly dissected in this book. The overall impact is stunning: no less than an indictment of years of effort, countless books and articles, and more than one theoretical formulation whose elegance no longer suffices to mask its irrelevance to anything going on in the world. Benjamin is polite as he goes about wreaking havoc, but havoc it is nonetheless.

While I fail to agree with the dust-jacket hyperbole ("[this] work represents a genuine advance in theoretical argument and thus has the distinct prospect of being the pioneering work that provides a new paradigmatic thrust," and so forth), mainly on the ground that the pioneering work has already been done—a long time ago—it is encouraging to see that at least one political scientist is ready to take his responsibility for the hominocentric view seriously. It's about time.

GARRY D. BREWER

Yale University

Politics of Compromise: Coalition Government in Colombia. Edited by R. Albert Berry, Ronald G. Hellman and Mauricio Solaún. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980. Pp. xii + 488. $29.95, cloth; $7.95, paper.)

Faddishness and fickleness may too frequently intrude into political science, yet we who focus upon Latin America are particularly susceptible. Conceptual commitments and intellectual flirtations have often been transitory and inconstant. Attachments to democratic pluralism and developmentalism in the 1960s gave way to the dependency school, and even more recently we have been wooed by the Circean seductiveness of corporatism and authoritarianism. Similarly, we have largely ignored political systems seen as deviating from the norms of prevailing analytic trends. Thus this collaborative work by 19 students of Colombian politics must be greeted with particular enthusiasm. It presents a thoughtful and perceptive treatment of a Latin American nation whose politics are dissimilar to those of many others in the region.

In 1958 Columbia's two historically dominant parties negotiated an unusual arrangement whereby they would share political power to the exclusion of any other groups. The principle of *paridad* mandated an equal division of seats between the Conservatives and Liberals in all legislative bodies, while that of *alternación* provided that the presidency would alternate between the two traditional antagonists. This so-called National Front endured for 16 years, and informal vestiges remain today. It was with the purpose of evaluating the Front that four meetings were convened in 1974 by the Center for Inter-American Relations. The fruits of these discussions constitute the volume under review.

While the Front was without direct counterparts elsewhere in Latin America, its coalitional quality was not unique to the Colombian experience. In chapters 1 and 2 Mauricio Solaún and Harvey Kline, respectively, place the Front within the national historical perspective. The former describes the pre-1958 pattern as the institutionalization of what he terms "protodemocratic" regimes. Civilian control was the rule rather than exception, with the traditional system characterized by parties of notables rather than middle-class-led parties. Solaún employs sociological concepts in dissecting the pre-Front system, stressing societal normlessness and low cultural secularization as major factors in the ultimate failure of the protodemocratic regime.

Kline documents episodes of bipartisan coalitions which emerged periodically prior to the National Front. Thus, while the latter is treated as *sui generis,* it represented a logical response by the party elite to the breakdown of the system in the 1950s. The characteristics of Colombian party politics were therefore restored, permitting a continuation of control by the elite. Among the related consequences were aggravated factionalization of the two traditional parties, increased electoral abstention, and consolidation of the multiclass nature of the parties. The discussion is particularly germane for students of coalition regimes.

Each of the contributors—several of whom are themselves Colombian—explicitly undertakes an assessment of the performance of the Front. Among the institutional dimensions considered are electoral participation, congressional behavior, the military and the Church. The chapters on public policy incorporate analyses of economic development, industrial policies, agrarian reform, education, and population. While identifying both credits and debits, the authors appropriately note that in many instances conclusive judgments cannot be rendered. Causality is often uncertain, and the extent to which the Front was directly responsible for given elements of post-1974 Columbian reality verges on the speculative.

The volume is better integrated and far less prone to repetition than one usually expects in a multi-authored compendium. Analyses and interpretations unfold in coherent and cumulative fashion, a tribute to those who organized and edited the work. Berry and Solaún succinctly synthesize major findings in their conclusions while linking them to relevant disciplinary issues. Consequently, the book has heuristic value for readers only marginally concerned with Colombian affairs.

Central to the objectives of the Front's founders was the desire for a political stability protective of the central role of the civilian party elite. Rhetorical reformism was accompanied by modest achievements and adjustments in policy and, as critics have correctly noted, "The coalition regime meant the continued strength of a very traditional, hierarchical, and rigid social structure, the continued political control of old leaders and traditional vested interests" (p. 437), and the like. Policies responding to mass demands carefully eschewed measures seriously threatening to dominant social groups. Indeed, major challenges to the Front came from within the regime, not from outside. These were confronted without the repressive extremism endemic to many Third-World nations.

The years since 1974 have seen the continuation of civilian government under traditional party leaders, although a solid Liberal majority has denied the presidency to the Conservatives. There is a pronounced continuity extending from the experience of the Front, and those who would understand the Colombia of the 1980s cannot fail to read this book and to ponder the lessons of the recent past.

JOHN D. MARTZ

Pennsylvania State University

South Africa into the 1980s. Edited by Richard E. Bissell and Chester A. Crocker. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979. Pp. xvi + 254. $22.00.)

The avowed purpose of this book is to help the American public to understand the complexities of the South African situation in anticipation of another great debate over the issues at stake for the United States in southern Africa, and its available and desirable policy alternatives. Since the book was published, the peaceful transfer of political power in Zimbabwe after a long guerrilla struggle has made it still more important to evaluate the role likely to be played both internally and externally by the last, and by far the strongest white minority regime ruling on the African continent. With its notable military and administrative power, strategic position at the foot of the continent, rich mineral resources and substantial industrial capacity in which American and European funds have been invested, South Africa may appear almost impregnable. But South African military leaders themselves estimate that only 20 percent of danger to white control comes from outside, and 80 percent from the restless, embittered black majority that, despite "homeland" and other separate development policies, permeates the whole country.

Everyone who writes about South Africa, including myself, tries to analyze the strength and direction of the two dominant forces in that country: Afrikaner and African nationalism. John Seiler sets the tone of the book in its first essay in which he accepts the standard South African view that, short of civil war and "sustained" international intervention, change in South Africa will continue to be defined by Afrikaner perceptions of their own ethnic interests, and that separate development will be its "only" acceptable platform. He fails to analyze, however, the genuine tensions within Afrikanerdom over how to preserve its dominance in an increasingly mobile situation.

In contrast, Stephen F. McDonald emphasizes the disunities in the black front while underplaying its basic commitment to equality of political rights in an undivided country. Stressing differences between Africans, Coloured and Indians, and also of generation, education, and domicile, i.e., between urban dweller and what he terms the usually "apathetic masses" of the "homelands," he sees blacks as "a disorganized and unhomogeneous whole." He gives less than adequate weight, therefore, to growing African-Coloured solidarity within the Black Consciousness movement, especially among the young; to the role of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, and his 300,000-member Inkatha movement in bridging the rural-urban gap; and to the widespread acceptance of Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress as the outstanding black leader in the country despite his long incarceration on Robben Island.

The significant role of black labor in South Africa is handled separately by Roy Godson who rightly points out the growing potential of African labor for achieving change in an economy needing ever-increasing numbers of skilled workers. But whether African unions remain unregistered, or take advantage of new provisions that enable them to function, like all other unions, under the Industrial Conciliation Act, they are subject to carefully designed official restraints on their actions that do not bode well for the kind of development and power that Godson suggests might evolve.

The second set of essays deal with military balances inside southern Africa, and with outside influences: those of African states, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and the United States. Oddly enough, China is omitted despite its significant aid for Robert Mugabe's ZANU which now dominates Zimbabwe, and also for Mozambique on South Africa's eastern flank. Chinese support, of course, has been qualitatively different, i.e., economic rather than military, from that of the Soviet-Cuban role in Angola.

The essays by Chester Crocker on current and projected military balances and I. William Zartman on the African states as a source of change are clearly interrelated, and impressively argued. They stress the obvious, and by all expectations the continuing, imbalance of power within southern Africa, and the geographical restraints on effective pressures on South Africa by the states to the north. Despite the commitment of the frontline states to eventual "liberation" in the south, their heavy sacrifices in aiding the process of change in Zimbabwe, coupled with their dependence on South African ports and transport for goods and even food, handicap them in supporting efforts against that country. It seems even possible that while Zimbabwe is undergoing its long, essential economic recovery, there may be a period of semi-detente in which guerrilla activity is restrained in return for South African acceptance of Mugabe and perhaps SWAPO. But, as Zartman points out, such local arrangements, if they are made, need not curb anti-South African pressures on the West from states like Nigeria whose balance of trade with the West is strong, or in international forums, and on sensitive consciences in Europe and the United States about their investments that play significant roles in the South African economy and thereby strengthen its regime.

W. Scott Thompson and Brett Silvers echo common South African warnings about a "developing" Soviet strategy in southern Africa aimed at "*resource denial* to the West" and accompanying heavy losses to private American and European investors. They describe the American decision not to match the Soviet arms race in Angola in 1975 as a "paralysis of American will," and fear it is being repeated as they see the Soviet-Cuban role in southern Africa grow stronger. Fortunately, the authors were proved as mistaken, as were Soviet expectations, when Robert Mugabe, rather than Joshua Nkomo, came into power in Salisbury.

In contrast to what the last-mentioned authors describe as clearly defined Soviet aims, Bruce Oudes sees American policies in southern Africa resulting from an interplay between its domestic, racial, and foreign policy detentes. He regards as a "faux pas" Mondale's affirmation in his meeting with Prime Minister Vorster in 1977 of the ultimate American goal for South Africa as "full participation" by all South Africans in determining their own policies and his agreement that this is the equivalent of "one man, one vote"; and terms the imposition of embargoes on Rhodesia and on arms for Souith Africa a "muddle." While admitting that in the 1980s, South Africa is at the "cutting edge" of American intellectual interest in the "evolving relationship between race and democracy," he suggests without elaboration that nervousness about American policy toward South Africa will "effectively" reduce "still further" whatever changes that country has for a "relatively peaceful evolution to a just and stable government." The one touchstone for such evolution in the coming decade that Oudes seems to suggest is whether or not South Africa extends the franchise on equal terms to the Coloured, far less than even the white opposition endorses. Oudes' laissez-faire policies would probably appeal to Lawrence G. Franko, presently in a Geneva post, who stresses European concern over possible American unilateral moves against South Africa that might affect their substantial interests in that country, and makes a good case that policies should be multilaterally designed.

The latter two chapters might be expected to sum up conclusions out of what has been presented, to outline specific policy alternatives among which Americans can choose and to suggest both their cost and likely benefit. Though their tenor, like that of several of the other essays is markedly conservative and seems to urge a hands-off policy, no clear answers emerge. Thus while this collection of material and opinions has its own usefulness, it seems unlikely to help the American public to think more clearly about what kind of policies toward South Africa are in the best interest of the United States.

GWENDOLEN M. CARTER

Indiana University

The New Authoritarianism in Latin America. Edited by David Collier. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979. Pp. 456. $25.00, cloth; $5.95, paper.)

The relationship between economics and politics has long fascinated social scientists. Among the most interesting treatments are those which suggest a direct causal linkage between certain economic stages, systems, or transitions thereof and particular outcomes in the political system. Marx's interest in this question sparked many others to plow this fertile field of inquiry; Seymour Martin Lipset has suggested a link between economic development and political democracy; Barrington Moore, Jr. has seen a close connection between the nature and timing of the commercialization of agriculture and the establishment of either democratic or dictatorial regimes; while Eric Wolf has found that the rise of agrarian capitalism in poor nations gives rise to peasant uprisings.

Since the early 1970s Latin Americanists have devoted considerable attention to the possibility that certain problems in the economic sector have given rise to what can be considered a new form of political rule, namely, the bureaucratic-authoritarian (B-A) regime. The major proponent of this new linkage between economics and politics is Guillermo O'Donnell, founder and former director of CEDES (Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad) in Buenos Aires, Argentina. In several publications O'Donnell points to the exhaustion of import substitution industrialization, the seeming inability of Latin America's most economically advanced nations to "deepen" their industrial systems, the failure of populism, and the increasing need for political stability as the primary factors which motivate the rise of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes. The B-A regime is seen as a subtype of authoritarianism in which the "upper bourgeoisie" seeks to overcome the barriers to advanced industrialization by excluding from power the previously mobilized popular sectors and by offering incentives to and promoting the interests of transnational corporations. It does all of this within the context of a highly technocratic, nonpersonalistic political arrangement which relies very heavily upon coercion to enforce acquiescence to the new rules of the game. Hence, B-A regimes are not to be confused with the old style personalist military dictatorships so typical of Latin America in the past, and which still persist in Paraguay and elsewhere. Nor are they to be confused with German and Italian Fascism, which relied heavily on the party and a repressive force composed of its fanatic members. Rather, such regimes are typified by contemporary Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and possibly Mexico. They have also been found outside of Latin America, in Spain, for example, during the late Franco period, as well as in some Eastern European countries during the interwar period.

It is easy to understand why O'Donnell's work has sparked so much interest. His ideas were in print before the coups in Chile and Uruguay; hence his argument that the economic factors which gave rise to the Brazilian and Argentinian B-A regimes were present elsewhere in Latin America and would give rise to additional B-A regimes took on added force when both Chile and Uruguay seemed to begin following the course that he had traced.

Despite its widespread appeal and its apparent uncanny ability to predict the nature of regimes yet to come into existence, the B-A model has met with increasing dissatisfaction. In an effort to examine the model in greater detail than had been possible by the scattering of journal articles in print at that time, the Joint Committee on Latin American Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies, together with the Social Science Research Council, established a working group coordinated by David Collier and Julio Cotler. Meetings were held between 1975 and 1976, and a formal two-day seminar was held in early 1977, at which time papers, revised forms of which appear in this volume, were presented.

The papers subject the B-A model to very careful scrutiny from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. Enough evidence is marshaled in this rather large volume to lead most observers to seriously question many of its central assumptions. Perhaps most importantly, the close linkage between the above-mentioned economic problems and the emergence of B-A regimes is refuted by several of the papers. In addition, one comes away with the clear impression that much of what is viewed as the distinctiveness of this "new" authoritarianism has been seen before. As an analytical tool for understanding the etiology and functioning of these authoritarian regimes, the model leaves much to be desired.

The analysis of the shortcomings of the B-A model serves as the basis for a very impressive collection of papers. Collier's introduction and concluding essays provide a clear and concise synthesis of the major themes of the volume. Fernando Henrique Cardoso offers a provocative theoretical overview, pointing out the paradoxical simultaneous advancement of modernization and authoritarianism in Latin America. Albert O. Hirschman, whose early brilliant analysis of the causes of Latin American economic underdevelopment was used by O'Donnell in the construction of his thesis, offers the most thought-provoking essay in the volume. Hirschman reminds us that many purely political factors, not the least of which is the fear that the Cuban revolution will spread to other parts of Latin America, are sorely missing from the economic-to-political link which O'Donnell posits. He also points out the numerous misinterpretations of the economic factors which O'Donnell sees as underlying the "new" authoritarianism. Finally, Hirschman makes some highly plausible suggestions of his own which help explain authoritarianism in Latin America's most advanced economies.

The essay by Robert R. Kaufman is both broad in scope and thoroughly grounded in historical and empirical materials. He provides an excellent synthesis of the major events in the development of B-A regimes in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, going on to examine critically the economic patterns which preceded the rise of B-A in these nations. In addition, he provides a wealth of information on the economic performance of these countries once the turn to B-A was made. In my opinion, this is the strongest contribution to the collection, one which should be read first by those unfamiliar with the B-A debate.

Other contributions include a devastating critique by José Serra of the putative economic-political linkage, a discussion of "enclave" societies by Julio Cotler, and a comparative analysis drawing on European cases by James R. Kurth. O'Donnell himself contributes a paper, which, while pointing out some of the difficulties faced by B-A regimes, fails to address the criticisms leveled by the other contributors. In that sense, this paper is the only disappointing one of the lot, not because of what it does, but because of what it does not; a volume dedicated exclusively to reviewing one individual's work deserves some sort of response from that individual, either accepting or rejecting the criticism leveled against it.

Two themes are largely ignored. First, almost no mention is made of the possible impact that the "demonstration effect" may haved had on Chile and Uruguay when the leaders of those regimes were seeking an economic strategy to follow. Can we assume, with O'Donnell, that B-A was a natural (inevitable?) consequence of certain economic problems in Chile and Uruguay, or were these two nations largely attempting to copy the Brazilian "miracle"? Second, the authors do not address themselves to the question as to why Chile and Uruguay, in spite of the democratic traditions for which they have long been noted, would fall victims to such ruthless authoritarian regimes. Have the analysts of these two nations exaggerated the extent to which Chileans and Uruguayand are committed to democratic norms? If not, of what relevance is democratic political culture to the survival of democratic government?

This is a well-edited, stimulating book. Collier provides a very helpful glossary of technical terms employed in the papers and an extensive and well-organized bibliography. Although O'Donnell's model may not survive very long as an important concept in the study of Latin American politics, the many important ideas contained in this volume surely will.

Mitchell A. Seligson

University of Arizona

Workers' Control Under Plan and Market: Implications of Yugoslav Self-Management. By Ellen Turkish Comisso. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979. Pp. x + 285. $22.50.)

Yugoslavia's development after 1948 continues to fascinate left-wing intellectuals in the West. Over the last three decades, Josip Broz Tito advanced one of the few models of socialist society which did not carry its authoritarian regime to brutal extremes. To some observers, Yugoslavia's evolution during the Tito era represented "the most interesting and most significant development in Marxism since the Russian revolution," because Titoist "reforms apparently reflect an effort to create a society that is socialist and yet has within it some elements of political democracy" (Fred Warner Neal, *Titoism in Action: The Reforms in Yugoslavia After 1948,* Berkeley, 1958, p. 7).

Most pronounced in Tito's economic design is "workers' control," a system of enterprise management operating through councils of workers at the firm or plant level. Introduced in the aftermath of the break with Moscow, "workers' control" is a principal device by which Tito sought to distinguish Yugoslav socialism from Soviet communism.

Ellen Comisso candidly admits that her study of the Yugoslav experiment "was largely inspired by the concerns of radical political economists and left-wing activists in the United States and Europe" (p. 209). She reports "great debate" as to "whether workers' councils would best serve the ends of workers' control by operating within the competitive market or in a planned economy" (p. 1). This issue is important for the trend of the experiment suggests two remarkable conclusions: First, market conditions, rather than central planning, tend to produce superior economic results. Second, political intervention in industrial affairs tends either to circumscribe the sphere of self-management or to weaken economic output.

The trend is seen most clearly in the 1965 transition from central planning to "market socialism." The "workers' control" system was implemented soon after Tito's declaration of ideological independence from the Soviet Union in 1948. During the period from 1950 to 1965, workers may have elected firm-level councils, but state central planners generally allocated resources and set quotas for production. Beginning in 1965, however, formal political and planning restraints were relaxed. Workers' councils have come more and more to compete both for resources and for customers, and thus appeared as participants in a comparatively free market system. Comisso examines the performance of the "workers' control" experiment during both the plan and the market periods through 1977.

Comisso explores Yugoslav experience on both theoretical and empirical levels. She projects "pure" models of central planning and "market socialism," those of Antonio Gramsci and P. J. Proudon, respectively, and assesses Yugoslavia's experiment in their light. She also assimilates data from a seven-month field study in one industrial enterprise in Zagreb, Croatia. Having warned the reader that she would avoid evaluations and judgments (p. i), Comisso's results are muted: "I myself have not come to any firm conclusions on the practical desirability of workers' control or adopting the Yugoslav model elsewhere." She adds, ironically, that the Yugoslav system "works according to its own dynamics and may very well create many of the problems its proponents argue it will solve" (p. 216).

If Comisso seems at times to paint in *chiaroscuro,* it is less because of her methods and more because of contradictory tensions inherent in a system which seeks to synthesize market economics (within whatever institutional framework) with political control. Comisso describes paradoxes found in both the plan and the market periods of "workers' control": (1) "If enterprise-level workers' councils operate within a planned economy, they will become a primary source of pressures for enlarging the sphere of enterprise autonomy. If government proves responsive to these pressures, there will be a movement toward replacing the decisions of political planning bodies with the cues provided by a market system." (2) "If enterprise-level workers' councils operate within a market economy, they will become a primary source of pressures to restrict the scope of the market through political means. If the government proves responsive to these pressures, there will be a movement toward replacing the allocation of resources according to the market with the allocation of resources according to the decisions of political bodies" (p. 20).

These pressures are not peculiar to Yugoslavia and its "workers' control" system. They exist in every economy where one can compete to turn government regulation to one's own advantage and to the disadvantage of competitors. It is interesting that the Yugoslav experiment, and Comisso's study, provide evidence that the marketplace responds rationally both to competition and to political intervention, no matter what form of organization firms may take.

Hence, the fundamental question raised by the Yugoslav experiment is not if "workers' control" will enable Yugoslavia to steer an independent path between East and West. There is no evidence that such an overarching issue can be decided on this ground. Nor is it if "workers' control" can solve the problem of "alienation," a recurring

Marxist concern. The data are far too inconclusive. Nor does Comisso address the relationship, if any, between industrial "self-management" and the perennial challenge of preserving Tito's political amalgam of constituent Croat, Serb, Slovene, Macedonian, Bosnian, and Montenegran republics.

Instead, the real issue is whether or not Tito and Yugoslavia discovered how to immunize an industrial economy from the discipline of the market at the microeconomic level. The only conclusion permitted by Ellen Comisso's study is that they did not.

FEDOR I. CICAK

Indiana University Northwest

Decisions, Politics and Change: A Study of Norwegian Urban Budgeting. By Andrew T. Cowart and Karl Erik Brofoss. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979. Pp. 149. $11.00, paper.)

This contemporary study of the budget process in Oslo, Norway is based on data for 1974. The Norwegian and American coauthors duly credit Aaron Wildavsky with having shown that a budget process advantageously may be viewed as a political process.

To carry out their study, Andrew Cowart and Karl Erik Brofoss subjected Oslo city officials to interviews and written questionnaires. From these they obtained responses which, for the purposes of testing for correlations with "budget change," they scaled and quantified. "Budget change," central to the study, was defined as the difference between an agency's initial budget request and its final appropriation. City agencies which scored high on "budget change" were said to have achieved "budget success," which was what happens "when an agency budget request, reflecting substantial increases over prior appropriations, sails unmarred through subsequent points of review."

Separate chapters in the book cover separate topics on which the city officials were asked questions. Thus one deals with clientele satisfaction with city agencies, or, more accurately, with city officials' perceptions of clientele satisfaction. These perceptions are then correlated with "budget success." Similar treatment is given to perceptions of the compatibility of politicial party programs with the agencies' goals and to perceptions of institutional structures. Happily, the correlations turn out to be statistically significant.

Though coherently organized and skillfully executed, the study is diminished by the fact that on both sides of the correlations the data are soft. On the one side, the variables stem from respondents' perceptions about the reality they encounter. Certainly, subjective impressions provide good clues about objective reality, but it is a pity that Cowart and Brofoss make no attempt to supply some independently derived empirical data to corroborate the survey data.

On the other side, there is "budget change"—a measure of how fortunate an agency is at getting what it wants out of the city budget. Even going along with the debatable view that the budget process is a game in which agencies compete for higher appropriations, there remains the question as to whether this measure is best for keeping score. How about the appropriations themselves? They at least are public knowledge and need not be concocted by the investigator.

The really extraordinary thing about this book about Oslo budgeting is that it reports nothing about actual revenues and appropriations. One can read the book from cover to cover, and finish as ignorant as one started about the city's tax base, revenues, expenses, functions and problems. Since Cowart and Brofoss have seen no need to establish any connection between their own numbers and authentic budget data, the study has no practical value. Certainly one could not predict, on the basis of what is presented here, that Oslo in the near future will budget more for welfare, public housing, mass transportation, or whatever. Nor could one even predict which agencies will be consistent winners in the budget game, because the study identifies none. It must be said, though without any intent to doubt the authors' integrity, that since the connection with reality is so tenuous, the numerical data in this study could just as well be fictitious and nobody would know the difference.

BERTIL L. HANSON

Oklahoma State University

The Changing British Party System, 1945-1979. By S. E. Finer. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980. Pp. xviii + 244. $7.25, paper.)

S. E. Finer's work is divided into two parts. The first is a description of changes in the party system of the United Kingdom from the general election of 1945 to the general election of 1979. Included are considerations of the evolution of the parties at various levels from constituency to governmental, and parties other than the Conservatives and Labour receive considerable attention. The second part of the book is more subjective and includes readily identifiable judgments about the adequacy of the performance of the party system during the era under consideration. Finer sets forth various reforms which are being advocated for a more effective system of self-government in Britain, and he offers his considered views about their value, clearly indicating a preference for some of them in what he calls "A Personal Postscript."

Since the publisher is the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, the work should aid various publics, from scholarly to the generally well informed, in understanding the British party system. One of the strengths of the work is that Finer has succeeded in writing in an understandable way for different publics whose sophistication about British politics varies considerably. Never is the language too technical nor too British to mislead the well-informed American reader; and, at the same time, readers with more professional concern about the British parties will find the book a useful, concise review of the political events of the post-World War II era and a well-structured summary of reforms of the party system currently advocated by various political groups in the United Kingdom.

Throughout the work, there are references to political party practices in liberal democracies other than the United Kingdom. Some of these comparisons include party roles and the means of making political decisions in France, Italy, Switzerland, West Germany and the United States, as well as in various Commonwealth nations. Such comparisons suggest to the reader that the ever-evolving British party system still has potentials for future development. Undergraduate students in courses on British government and politics should find this aspect of the book a stimulant to their thinking about liberal-democratic party systems. The book could be well used as one of a set of paperbacks for a course in British government for students who have already had an introductory course in comparative politics.

One of the more positive and refreshing aspects of Finer's new book is that it does not reflect the currently fashionable notion writing off the liberal-democratic tradition in the United Kingdom as no longer viable. At no point does he contend that the party system, so basic to the effective functioning of parliamentary democracy in Britain, is a perfect model of liberal-democratic philosophical goals, but he never contends that change and, more importantly, improvement of the present system are impossible. Liberal democrats have assumed that their goals are constantly changing under the impact of events, experience and scientific-technological change, and Finer's judgments about the British party system show this rational accommodation to new circumstances.

In the second part of the book, Finer sets forth some preferences for incorporating into the British system devices that he calls "the popular initiative and the popular veto." These are well known to the student of politics. The initiative permits a portion of the voters to force a referendum on some public issue, and the "popular veto" refers to the practice of the electorate voting on the continuance of existing legislation. Finer thinks that these procedures will provide a new vitality to British political life. An American must view Finer's hopes with some skepticism, since both types of referenda have an electoral record here.

There are a number of minor problems with this paperback. First, it does not have an index. This limits the book's utility in many ways. Second, the general table of election results, 1945–70, leaps to 1979. For some reason, the two general elections of 1974 do not receive comparable treatment. With these minor technical complaints, one must judge Finer's work as a refreshing approach to the literature on the British party system.

C. F. Poke

University of Pittsburgh, Greensburg

India's Rural Development: An Assessment of Alternatives. By Marcus Franda. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980. Pp. xi + 306. $17.50.)

Marcus Franda, a well-known South Asianist, has written many books and papers on Indian politics. The dust jacket of his latest work sports Myron Weiner's comment: "by far the best account I have seen of the politics of rural development." Also, Richard Park likes the author's combination of "high journalism" and "scholarly knowledge."

When the Janata party leaders assumed power in New Delhi in March 1977 with an interesting coalition of Hindu Nationalists, Rajas, labor leaders, disgruntled Congress party members, Sadhus and some avowed communalists, the new party merely represented a "label" rather than a coherent set of public policy alternatives. The ouster of the personal dictatorship of Indira Gandhi was its avowed goal.

Franda has tried hard in the book to say that the Janata party's rural development policies represented a new type of leadership with a policy emphasis on rural development. In his preface he says, "Most observers are convinced that the Janata originally came to power primarily because of widespread sentiment against Indira Gandhi (or, perhaps more accurately, against her son Sanjay) in the wake of the 21-month period of authoritarian rule that was imposed on India beginning in June 1975. Nevertheless, attention has quickly shifted to the Janata's rural development efforts as the most likely future determinant of party fortunes. If only because the Janata is the first Indian government to attempt a distinct break with the urban-oriented, heavy-industry development strategy of the first three decades of independence, the 'Janta phase' is likely to have widespread consequences for the Indian nation well into the future."

Franda has analyzed the promises and the performances of the Janata regime in New Delhi in certain specific policy areas: the growth of cooperatives, reform of Panchayati Ray, rural employment and agrarian reform. Moving beyond such output-oriented analysis, the author has also looked at the regime's political performances including party reorganization and the search for power base among the unorganized rural voters of India. Field work for this book was done by extensive traveling and interviewing throughout India, but much data used by the author were obtained from government reports, scholarly studies, newspapers, and unstructured interviews with members of the political elite.

In his assessment of the performance of the short-lived Janata regime, Franda is rather symathetic. He gives greater credit to Janata promises than to the party's performance. For instance, in his evaluation of Janata performance in the area of rural industries and employment, Franda concludes that the Janata party had shifted the focus of industrial development to rural India but the government's effort to induce private business to invest in rural areas has not been well received.

The Janata party's policy in relation to the Panchayat Raj institutions are laudatory, according to Franda. He is appreciative of the work of the Ashoh Mehta committee on Panchayat Raj which also included India's well-known political scientist Iqbal Narain. Among other things, the committee recommended reserving seats in the Panchayat Raj institutions for members of the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes and devolution of taxing power to Panchayat.

In the area of rural voluntary action groups, the Janata government worked closely with them and funded them at higher level. According to Franda, this produced some rather new and creative patterns of cooperation between government and private rural development groups in some area of Rajasthan and Gujrat.

In his concluding chapter, Franda foresees the possibility of Mrs. Gandhi's return to power as a consequence of the overwhelming problems of India that Janata regime could not possibly handle.

Most methodologically oriented public policy analysts would not care too much about the author's methodology of evaluation research. Anticipating that his critics would say that the task is too big for him, Franda says in his preface that the book is "a modest attempt to understand the broad contours of Indian rural development and to assess the myriad options open to Indian leadership. In place of the usual focus on a particular village or a region or a problem, I have tried to gain a perspective on the entire phenomenon of rural development, including much of its complexity. To those who would label as hopeless the very attempt to undertake such a task, I would first admit the possibility and then argue for the attempt."

Considering the overt pro-Western bias of the now-defunct Janata party (1980), critics might even label Franda as an apologist for Janata's poor performance record in office. But Franda certainly puts in perspective the complexities of Indian society that clearly impede the implementation of public policies that may have been formulated with very good intentions by members of the Indian elite in New Delhi. Janata leaders have already vacated the seats of power (1980) but Mrs. Gandhi's policy stalwarts may still find this book very useful in their daily confrontations with Indian realities.

MANINDRA KUMAR MOHAPATRA

Kentucky State University

Technology, Defense, and External Relations in China, 1975–1978. By Harry G. Gelber. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979. Pp. xii + 236. $18.50.)

A timely publication on several important topics concerning China, this is an informative book with some bad patches. Its strength lies in an extensive coverage of China's potentials and limitations as a modernizing state. Its weakness stems from its many questionable and superficial statements about the Chinese political system, internal politics and ideology.

Gelber's remarks regarding "the historical continuities of two thousand years (why two?) of a self contained cultural and political system," the Chinese consciousness of the "superior qualities" of their culture, their view of foreigners as "lesser breeds" and of international relations as relations between "superiors and inferiors," their use of "traditional tactics of playing off barbarians against one another," and Gelber's attempt to link the Gang of Four to the nineteenth-century reformers and to emphasize the weight of tradition on Chinese policy making—all these, interwoven throughout the text, seem to indicate more of his own biases and misconceptions than the inability of the Chinese to adapt themselves to the conditions of the modern world. Other unsubstantiated statements which Gelber makes in describing the Chinese political system refer to "the urban middle class," "the bourgeoisie" in large cities, "the Confucians" in the Deng regime, "the private and semiprivate sector" in the industrial structure, and the expansion of "private activities" and "more freedom of enterprise." If these phrases are intended to convey the notion that there is a private sector in the Chinese economy, it is totally without foundation. Apparently, Gelber takes the polemics and innuendoes used by the rivaling factions against each other in the mid-1970s as statements of fact without a basic knowledge of how the system really works.

In discussing China's foreign policy, Gelber points to the Soviet Union as its core problem because it affects almost every aspect of its foreign relations. He does not, however, treat Sino-Soviet relations in depth except to compare the two nations' respective military capabilities and to theorize about various contingencies of a possible military confrontation. It should be stressed here that the Soviet move to strengthen their border defenses began in the 1960s when the Maoists insisted that they had a right to cross the frontiers to awaken the Soviet people to the danger of a revisionism in Moscow. The border dispute, never a main issue, was a by-product of the political dispute. The Soviet fear of subversion was much greater than their fear of a Chinese attack to rectify boundaries by force. Now that China too is restructuring its political economy along the lines developed by the Soviet Union and Eastern European states, there are few reasons for either side to start a war.

In regard to modernization, Gelber rightly points out that its current phase has its origin in Zhou Enlai's efforts between 1971–1975 to form an alliance between the PLA and the state administrators and to redirect the country's energy toward rapid industrialization. The key problem of economic development lies in sufficient food production, on which raising the standard of living and the growth of the non-farm economy depend. In terms of industrial priorities, Gelber sees a focus on cultivating large-scale modern industry in such fields as energy, transport, machinery, chemicals and steel, and acquiring fthe world market capital-intensive high technology. It can be argued, however, that China is also putting emphasis on light industry to boost consumption and through this to accumulate capital for investments. There has been some institutional flexibility to accommodate change and innovation. Decentralized planning, local initiative and managerial rationality are all designed to stimulate productivity and to increase the general rate of growth. However, in the field of technology, a wide gap exists between China and the advanced countries. The acute shortage of trained personnel and the retardation of the educational system during the cultural revolution have made it difficult for China to make headway in this field. I share Gelber's view that because of the high cost and lead time needed to develop the country's major industries into high-technology sectors based on diversified research and development programs, it is unlikely that any major industrial, economic or military breakthroughs can take place in China before the year 2000.

IKUA CHOU

Southern Illinois University, Carbondale

Marginality. By Gino Germani. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980. Pp. vii + 98. $5.95.)

In *Marginality* Gino Germani, who has written extensively on "marginal" groups in Latin America, extends the concept of marginality to sectors within industrial, modern societies, giving an historical and universal perspective. Germani defines marginality as the ability to participate in a dominant society. As a result, he identifies the multi-dimensionality of the subject in terms of participation in economic, political, demographic, cultural, and psychosocial factors.

The book is divided into two parts, "The Problematics of Marginality" and "A Theoretical and Methodological Outline." In the introduction Germani states that he will "first consider the most important themes . . . taking into account recent contributions to the subject" (p. 12f.). However, part 1 is a slightly re-edited manuscript written by the author dated November 1970 and titled "Marginality in Latin America: On Some Theoretical Aspects of Marginality." In order to generalize the earlier manuscript, Germani has deleted a number of references to "Latin America" and has added paragraphs on Croatia (p. 24) and on marginal groups in industrial countries (pp. 40–45).

Unfortunately, nothing in the book reflects any scholarship or research published since 1971. A footnote cites a 1970 study as "one of the most recent contributions" (p. 91, n. 1) and claims a 1969 report contains "the most current ideas" (p. 92, n. 3). Among the better studies ignored by Germani are Janice Perlman's *The Myth of Marginality* (Berkeley, 1976) and Alejandro Portes' "Modernity and Development: A Critique," *Studies in Comparative International Development* (Spring, 1974, pp. 247–79). For a book published in 1980, this lack of recognition of the volume of work published during the last nine years on the subject of squatter settlements and other areas normally subsumed under the rubric of "marginal" is not justifiable, especially since some of it brings Germani's analysis into question.

In the second part of the book, Germani analyzes the "causes of marginality." Correctly he identifies its normative basis, the importance of available material resources, and personal conditions as determinate. He creates a taxonomy of marginality based on the degree of participation and one's cognitive evaluation of one's own and others' marginality. Using statistical tables of population characteristics obtained in Buenos Aires in 1961, Germani illustrates his analysis.

Marginality is a handy treatise on pre-1970 concepts of persons labeled "marginals," and as such is a good introduction to a highly controversial subject. Unfortunately, the book is outdated in terms of current scholarship.

WILBER A. CHAFFEE, JR.

Saint Mary's College of California

Young Mussolini and the Intellectual Origins of Fascism. By A. James Gregor. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. Pp. xii + 271. $16.50.)

Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship. By A. James Gregor. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980. Pp. xv + 427. $27.50, cloth; $9.75, paper.)

A. James Gregor is a prolific, revisionist writer on the controversial subject of the ideology of Italian Fascism and its possible relationship to the crisis of "classical Marxism" as well as to the category of "developmental dictatorships" posited by proponents of economic "modernization" theories. Much of what Gregor argues at length in these two books has already been suggested in his earlier works. Thus in *The Ideology of Fascism: The Rationale of Totalitarianism* (Free Press, 1969), he insisted that conventional wisdom was wrong in asserting that Mussolini and Italian Fascism possessed no coherent belief system before coming to political power. On the basis of his examination of materials on Mussolini's thought from 1900 to 1914, Gregor concluded that Fascism was a variant of the radical socialism prevalent in Italy before the Great War. In *The Fascist Persuasion in Radical Politics* (Princeton, 1974), Gregor argued that modern radical movements of mass mobilization bear more similarities to Mussolini's "paradigmatic" Fascism than to "classical Marxism." Thus he offered a new conceptual framework for the analysis of such movements and regimes as those of Lenin, Mao, Castro, and others in the Third World. Some of these contentions were also set forth in his *Interpretations of Fascism* (General Learning, 1974).

Gregor's *Young Mussolini and the Intellectual Origins of Fascism* is dedicated to Giuseppe Prezzolini, who edited *La Voce* (1908 f.) and wrote a book in 1909 on the theory of syndicalism—both of which attracted the attention of Mussolini. The author's new book goes over much of the ground explored by Gaudens Megaro in his classic study, *Mussolini in the Making* (Houghton Mifflin, 1938), but Gregor contends that Megaro was incorrect in asserting that Mussolini did not yet hold nationalist views at the time he lived in the Austrian Trentino in 1909. Poring over the collected writings of Mussolini now available, Gregor finds phrases here and there that prove, to his satisfaction, that Mussolini was developing a coherent sense of patriotic nationalism.

Gregor is particularly determined to relate the thought of Mussolini—whom he describes as a Marxist "heretic"—to that of a number of revolutionary syndicalists who shifted toward national syndicalism by the time of the Great War. Thus he gives considerable space to synoptic accounts of the thought of such men as the German-born Roberto Michels (1875–1936), Angelo O. Olivetti (1874–1931), and Sergio Panunzio (1886–1944), all of whom were influenced by Georges Sorel. Panunzio is also the subject of still another book that Gregor has just published: *Sergio Panunzio: Il sindacalismo ed il fondamento razionale del fascismo* (Volpe editore, 1979). It is to be noted, too, that Gregor is not alone these days in exploring the syndicalist current of thought that inspired the left wing of early Italian Fascism. David D. Roberts has just published *The Syndicalist Tradition and Italian Fascism* (North Carolina, 1979)—an excellent study whose focus is broader than Gregor's and whose tone is less strident.

Gregor's usual style of argumentation is to seize upon whatever fleeting passages Mussolini may have written during his long journalistic career as a Marxist that bear any resemblance to the writings of the syndicalists mentioned above, and then to assert that all of this demonstrates that Mussolini consciously borrowed from these writers and therefore really possessed a coherent ideology of Fascism prior to the actual founding of the movement in Milan in 1919. Sometimes the author comes across some interesting nuggets, but in his obsession with the syndicalist connection, he often leaves out things that do not fit neatly into his thesis. His streamlined version of Fascist intellectual history largely ignores such writers as Gustave Le Bon, Friedrich Nietzsche, and others whose thought may on occasion have been equally or perhaps more influential on Mussolini than the above syndicalists. And Gregor virtually dismisses the fact that many of the early Fascists who emerged from the syndicalist camp were to be quickly shunted aside after the Blackshirt regime came into power and were replaced by such intellectuals as Alfredo Rocco, Enrico Corradini, and Luigi Federzoni, who came out of the rightist Nationalist party tradition. Gregor contends that the Nationalist party was not needed to give Fascism an ideology, since the revolutionary syndicalists had already been shifting toward nationalism on their own during the war. He does not give any attention to the possible Catholic roots of Fascist economic and social thought, and in neither of the two books under review is there any clear explanation of the Corporative State.

Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship is dedicated to the Fascist historian, Gioacchino Volpe. Its first four chapters ("The Ambiguous Legacy," "The First Revolutionary Socialist Heresy," "The First National Socialism," and "The Program of Fascism") largely recapitulate what Gregor has told us in *Young Mussolini and the Intellectual Origins of Fascism.* One wonders why he and his publishers felt it necessary to indulge in so much overlapping. The meat of this book appears in the second half, where the author discusses Fascist practice rather than its belief systems. Separate chapters consider the political economy, labor policy, and social policies of Fascism, the orchestration of consensus, and Fascism and development in comparative perspective.

With some embarrassment, Gregor concedes that Fascism did not have a labor policy when the movement was founded in 1919. Only after the great strike in the metallurgical plants of September 1920 were rival Fascist syndicates formed to challenge the Socialist and Catholic ones. The author deliberately avoids discussing the violence employed in this offensive. He does declare, however, that Fascists can be credited with proclaiming their labor policy faster than did Soviet Russia's Bolsheviks, who waited until the Five-Year Plans to clarify the role of their trade unions.

Gregor argues that by 1929 Italy's index of industrial output per man-hour was 143.7 (1913 = 100), exceeding that of all European competitors save France, which has 154.6. He does not comment on the fact that Fascism outlawed strikes, but he concedes that Italy's economic growth under Fascism was achieved at the expense of the workers, whose real wages declined between 1922 and 1939. He also concedes that industrialists were not too happy with the Fascist party's intervention in labor negotiations. He argues that Fascist economic policy was not just an ad hoc response to the 1929 world crisis but had already taken on a distinctive configuration two years earlier.

Although Gregor presents some interesting arguments and revelations, he is not persuasive in his major contention that Italian Fascism can best be understood as a "developmental dictatorship" and, indeed, as the model for much of the world. No doubt some of Fascism's policies did strengthen Italy's infrastructure, but that is hardly enough to designate "economic development" as the chief feature of the Fascist dictatorship. One misses any discussion of other important aspects of Fascism, including violence, militarism, and imperialism. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that Italy's rate of economic growth was higher during the Giolitti era perior to Fascism and again in the post-Fascist era than it was under Mussolini's dictatorship. Despite the reclamation projects and autarky, it is hard to make a convincing case that Fascism really sought to modernize the rural economy. Reform of land tenure and the release of surplus labor had to await the actions of the postwar Italian Republic and the spontaneous upsurge of the peasantry after the 1950s. Gregor's lumping of Italian Fascism with the disparate regimes of Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Castro, and others in the Third World would seem to confuse and obfuscate more than it clarifies.

CHARLES F. DELZELL

Vanderbilt University

Ein schwieriges Vaterland; Zur Politischen Kultur Deutschlands. By Martin and Sylvia Greiffenhagen. (Munich: List Verlag, 1979. Pp. 484. DM 39.80.)

The immediate occasion for the publication of this book is the thirtieth anniversary of the Federal Republic of Germany; it marks the longest period of peace and prosperity Germany has known during this century. This book, conceived for a general audience and extensively excerpted in the news magazine *Der Spiegel,* is designed to take stock after these 30 years, and to attempt a prognosis at the same time. But the stimulus of this anniversary coincides with a more substantial interest in looking back and ahead. West Germany has perhaps the most thoroughly researched political culture of any country. Of the many treatments, Gabriel Almond's and Sidney Verba's *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, 1963) is probably the most influential and widely read empirical work (at least outside Germany!). Martin and Sylvia Greiffenhagen now present extensive evidence of the dramatic changes which have transformed West Germany into a country characterized by affluence and social security, political satisfaction and stability, and international prestige. Moreover, Germany no longer suffers religious tensions or political radicalism, and there are few underprivileged regional or ethnic minorities, apart from the foreign "guest"-workers. (A similar, although narrower account of the changes since 1959 available in English is David Conradt's chapter in *The Civic Culture Revisited,* edited by Almond and Verba.)

The picture drawn by the Greiffenhagens is not entirely positive, however. The current ambivalent evaluations of the "real" Germany are expressed in the first chapter, where two pages recounting the achievements are balanced by over three pages of critical and pessimistic judgments. For Almond and Verba there was a comfortable "fit" between the survey evidence of German attitudes, orientations and values on the one hand, and the historical experience and elite behavior, on the other. Throughout the Greiffenhagen book, the facts of the German past are juxtaposed against empirical evidence of a remarkable progress toward a "Civic Culture" in the mass public; this leads the authors to the question of which of these realities can be believed and which will more likely determine the German future.

In their quest for an answer to this query, the Greiffenhagens have produced an impressive and valuable book. It is impressive in its broad approach, which is documented by the wide range of chapter topics. The first and last chapters suggest interpretations, and three others deal briefly with the concept of political culture, the German political tradition, and the problem of succeeding the Nazi regime. Some of the other 20 chapters cover topics central to the main theme, such as the Germans' perceptions of democracy, attitudes toward conflict and protest, the proper extent of state activity, and the roles of various socialization agents. Other chapters pursue specific contemporary issues of German politics and society. Among these are: the political dissent within the Social Democratic party, which has felt the largest impact of changing values and political goals; the question as to how open German society is to real reforms; the future of German education between reform and restoration; the relation between intellectuals and politics, and the recent withdrawal by many intellectuals after tentative attempts at becoming involved; the effects of unemployment, especially among the young, on the ability and willingness to participate as citizens; and the continuous class differences in German society, which are associated (next to generational differences) with the largest contrasts in political orientations toward democracy, conflict, and the roles and opportunities of citizens. The individual chapters glean not just points immediately relevant to a narrow conception of the main topic, but also explore each area sufficiently to be of independent interest. The result is a much broader picture of German political culture than is commonly found.

As I have indicated, the picture is not always positive, but the ambiguity in the authors' evaluations goes deeper than that. As they note themselves, "The positive judgments [about a growing potential for democracy among the German public] are based upon empirical survey evidence, while the doubts are based upon subjective impressions, comments of liberal intellectuals, specific laws and measures, and, in general, upon the interpretation of a 'political climate' " (p. 319). This represents an ironic reversal of earlier patterns, where the outward stability and high performance of the German state and economy were contrasted with the strong remnants of undemocratic patterns of thinking in mass survey responses. Now, the roles are reversed: doubts about the viability of the German democratic polity arise from state activity and elite behavior, and their understanding and tolerance of democratic activity and conflict appear to lag behind the responses of the German public. The Greiffenhagens conclude that "governments [should] make use of the [public] potential for reform, and not be more timid than the people they are to represent and lead" (p. 325).

Even if some chapters (averaging 10–15 pages) are too short for the book to serve as a full reference text on German politics, the data and the literature sections make *Ein schwieriges Vaterland* a very useful source of materials on a wide variety of aspects of German politics and society. (I suspect, however, that the yield will be lowest for specialists in any given area.) The data section has 107 tables, mostly of survey responses to a wealth of questions; almost all tables are clearly labeled and well documented. Besides enabling readers to draw their own conclusions, the data presented are rich enough to allow considerable probing beyond the ground covered by the Greiffenhagens.

In addition to the 103 pages of tables, there are 46 pages of bibliographical references, divided into 41 substantive areas. This makes it easy to find some of the major and recent works in each of the areas covered in the chapters. Since the bibliography sections do not run directly parallel to the chapters, however, it can be time-consuming to identify complete citations for works cited only by the author's name in the text. An authors' index, and even more so, a substantive index, would have been useful.

However, the major "criticism" concerns the possible use of this work in North America: it is an expensive book, especially if one envisions its use as an extremely stimulating supplementary source, rather than as a text. Even more than for a paperback edition, however, one has to wish for an English translation.

KAI HILDEBRANDT

University of Windsor

State and Society in Contemporary Europe. Edited by J. E. S. Hayward and R. N. Berki. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979. Pp. x + 269. $22.50.)

In recent years the field of comparative politics has increasingly displayed a more serious commitment to the comparative method. In the place of single-country studies and serial, compartmentalized treatments of several political systems, we now have a number of series which compare dirictly how a group of nations line up along a series of well-specified dimensions. As a consequence, we now have a better grasp of the parameters of politics, and the extent to which certain trends and political processes are unique or common, ephemeral or enduring.

State and Society in Contemporary Europe is one example of this movement towards genuine comparative inquiry. The book focuses on a very complex issue: the process by which groups and political parties come to influence the policy process in Western and Eastern Europe. It is an analysis, then, of interest formation and intermediation under advanced capitalism and developed socialism.

The strengths and weaknesses of the book are typical of those rare attempts that combine similar and different systems analysis. On the one hand, the endeavor is admirable, since it "forces" scholars to think in terms of functional equivalence and basic issues. Moreover, by dealing with interactions between state and society, Hayward and Berki have taken on an area of study that is both critical and difficult to understand in one system, let alone a cluster of polities that belong to two different types of political economies. The result is that the book offers strong evidence to support a number of important generalizations. First, there are some trends that seem to encompass East and West; for example, a proliferation of cause-based groups that influence the policy process through parties and through pressure on the bureaucracy. Second, there seems to be a widespread expansion of the role of the state, growing institutionalization of and bureaucratic participation in the policy process, and finally, surprising adaptability on the part of established parties to what has become a merger of economic and political power at the apex of both socialist and capitalist systems. At the same time, the study is careful to point out the variance within these trends—for instance, differences among Western European and socialist states as to their adherence to, respectively, the corporatist model and "apparatus pluralism." One emerges with an understanding, then, of how planning, economic decision making in general, the role of parties and trade unions, and the like, vary—from France to Scandinavia and from Hungary to Bulgaria, and more generally, from developed capitalism to developed socialism.

However, this is not to argue that this study is devoid of problems. On a general level, one cannot help being disappointed by the decision to devote each chapter—with the exception of the introduction and conclusion—to one topic as applied to one cluster of system types. A great deal more, for example, could have been done with planning, the privileged role of business, corporatism, and party adaptability to dissent and growing socioeconomic diversity across the entire European continent. Second, I was not at all convinced by the comparison of the transcendental versus instrumental philosophical bases of interest mediation in Eastern as opposed to Western Europe. It would seem to me that one point which emerges from the book is precisely the degree to which such distinctions are withering away; and in the case of some countries—Poland and Hungary, and France and the Scandinavian states—such distinctions were never particularly apt in the first place. Finally, the book seems to lack much concern with the actual policy process—what the state does and why—and therefore at times fails to explain how and how much various groups influence either the process or the outcome of decisions. The existence of groups per se rather than the nature of their penetration seems to be the dominant emphasis.

On a more specific level, the essays seem to be rather uneven. For example, both Jack Hayward and Neal Elder lay out very well the reasons for increased state intervention in Western Europe, but do not deal very much with (or explain) variance in the forms of that intervention or the dilemma of greater state power and yet reduced capacity to influence outcomes. M. S. Joseph's discussion of trade unions suffers from being insufficiently concerned with the complexity of the embourgeoisement thesis, given recent work on the topic by Douglas Hibbs and Leo Panitch. The final chapter on Western Europe, which is concerned with political parties, is disappointing, primarily because it covers again the familiar terrain of cleavage structures without every confronting issues having to do with the actual influence of political parties.

While the Western European sections are in general quite good and provide a nice balance between general trends and specific variations, the

Eastern European portions—reflecting the lagging conceptual development of that literature—seem to be less rigorous and less able to confront the general issue of group-state interaction. Terry McNeill's piece on nationalities, for instance, would be aided by a more systematic analysis of the dimensions (class, ethnic, sexual, and the like) and types (economic, political and social) of inequalities. Moreover, McNeill seems to misunderstand the degree to which self-management in Yugoslavia goes "below" ethnic divisions and thereby may ameliorate, not exacerbate, tensions. It is also surprising that Jerry Hough's notion of "institutional pluralism" appears nowhere, despite its relevance to the changing role of the party. Finally, I found Robert Furtak's discussion of Yugoslavia impressive in its emphasis on the innovativeness of that system's experiments with interest representation. However, the interpretation of the "non-importance" of the imperative mandate was, in my view, too harsh an assessment.

The concluding section on the international system, while good particularly with respect to the structural inadequacies of Comecon in comparison with the Common Market, did not seem to fit in with the rest of the book. One could only wonder how the general concern with state/society interactions related to the discussions of foreign, particularly economic relations. Even where linkages could be drawn rather straightforwardly—as in the case of multinational corporations—they were not.

The strength of this book, then, lies in its attempt to explain interest intermediation and the role of the state and interest groups in the *domestic* policy process East and West. That it does provide a clear sense of general trends in these areas, and the parameters and origins of their development, is no small achievement. However, as is necessarily the case with studies that try to compare across system types, the endeavor is laudable and informative, but limited by the state of the literature. The monastic development of the two area studies has meant that generalizations based on similar questions and concepts are necessarily difficult to achieve. It is within that context that this book should be evaluated.

VALERIE BUNCE

Northwestern University

An African Experiment in Nation Building: The Bilingual Cameroon Republic Since Reunification. Edited by Ndiva Kofele-Kale. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. Pp. lii + 369. $26.50.)

The Cameroon Republic is one of the most fascinating countries in Africa. Its mixed colonial experience of German, French and British ingredients, the dynamic nature of its federation, its degree of political stability and economic growth, all merit our attention. Unfortunately, there is little in the way of current literature on its available in English. Willard Johnson's study of the Cameroon federation is now a decade old, as is Neville Rubin's account of its independence politics; and Victor LeVine's several analyses date from the mid-1960s.

So the Ndiva Kofele-Kale book is both welcome and needed. Bringing together 15 different political scientists and economists to create a dozen different essays dealing with the history, politics, economics and society of the Cameroon Republic, it presents a variety of viewpoints.

The essayists, many of whom are African and Cameroonian, such as Kofele-Kale, provide us with a number of perspectives. Bongfen Chem-Langhee and Martin Njeuma, for example, contribute an insightful piece on the Pan-Kamerun movement, and John Kalla Kale and Omer Weyi Yembe do a good job in discussing educational reform. As one might expect, there is also an unevenness in quality among the individual essays. Remi Clignet's short but perspicacious analysis of "The Multiplicity of Times Operating in the Cameroonian Modern Labor Force" is stimulating, while Mbu Etonga's "An Imperial Presidency" is thin and unnecessarily legalistic.

Yet the volume disappoints. There is no overarching conclusion to draw the disparate pieces together, and rather incredibly, given the complexity of the study, no series of maps to orient the uninitiated. In addition, the beginning of the book is cluttered with a foreword, a preface and an introduction, including some rather shrill claims that the volume is necessary to combat the "insidious ethnocentricism" (p. xxiv) of "the pontificating arm chair theorists of very recent memory" (p. xxv). Regrettably, we are left pretty much in the dark as to who these people are, what they said, and how they were wrong.

CHRISTIAN P. POTHOLM

Bowdoin College

Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat. By Gerhard Lehmbruch. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, 1976. Pp. 187. DM 6.50.)

Is responsible party government possible in a strong federal system? This question, long a concern of political scientists in the United States and Canada, is the subject of Gerhard Lehmbruch's important study of federalism and the party system in West Germany.

Lehmbruch, known to Anglo-American scholars for his work on consociational democracy and neo-corporatism, contends that the complex German federal system, with its reliance upon the states (*Länder*) for the administration of most national legislation, functions well as long as there is no major programmatic thrust at the federal level. When both levels understand politics as largely a matter of administration, of *sachliche Arbeit,* conflict is minimal. This has also been the historic pattern with relatively weak and unstable parliamentary coalitions at the national level making few innovative programmatic demands of the states.

In the postwar period, however, and especially since 1969, this pattern has changed. Contrary to the expectations of West Germany's "Founding Fathers," the party system now approaches the Anglo-American bipartite pattern. National governments have been stable and, since the Socialist-Liberal assumption of national political responsibility in 1969, increasingly committed to far-reaching reforms. But the states and particularly those governed by the national opposition party, the Christian Democrats, have been able to block some domestic reform legislation (education, urban development) and force the national government to compromise on other issues (taxation, environmental protection). Thus the system needs more federal-state cooperation at the executive-bureaucratic level than before. Yet the party systems at federal and state levels have become more polarized and conflictual, with the two major parties being unlikely to be in coalition at either level.

Ironically, a strong federal system, including responsible-party government at the state level, was envisioned by the framers of the Basic Law as a safeguard against the chronic instability which had characterized the national party system. But Lehmbruch now regards the states as a hindrance to stable party government and argues that their ability to block national legislation can ultimately undermine the "new" national party system and reintroduce fragmentation and instability.

For the most part, this is a solid historical, institutional analysis which should be of considerable interest to students of comparative federalism and modern West German politics. The book's major shortcoming lies in Lehmbruch's neglect of the electoral dimension of the problem. The composition of the supposedly obstructionist state governments is also largely determined by elections which in recent years have become more oriented to national policies and leaders. It is thus not "accidental" (p. 159) that the opposition party at the national level has a majority in the Federal Council (*Bundesrat*). The question of federalism and party government may be as much a problem of electoral mobilization as it is of intergovernmental administrative and legal structure.

Lehmbruch also overestimates the extent to which the national electorate in 1969, 1972 or 1976 gave the Socialist-Liberal coalition a mandate for major domestic reform. The 1969–72 government, throughout most of this period, had a majority of only 10 seats, hardly sufficient to institute major changes. While this increased to about 50 seats after 1972, most observers attribute the government's difficulties not to the states, but rather to ineffective national leadership in domestic programs and to post-1973 inflationary pressures. In 1976 the majority was again reduced to only 10 seats. In short, there is little evidence that a consensus for sweeping domestic reforms has been present in West Germany. There is more to the problem of policy innovation in the Federal Republic than federalism.

DAVID P. CONRADT

University of Florida

US and UK Educational Policy: A Decade of Reform. By Edgar Litt and Michael Parkinson. (New York: Praeger Publications, 1979. Pp. x + 161. $19.95.)

Buffeted by a host of controversies over the past two decades, public education has become highly politicized. Not surprisingly, a rapidly growing literature on educational politics and policy has emerged, including a number of works by political scientists.

This collaborative effort by two political scientists, one American, the other English, makes three worthy contributions to this line of inquiry. First, it attempts a comparative study of public educational policy in the United States and United Kingdom. Second, it provides an overview of policy developments during a period of economic retrenchment. And third, it urges a serious reconsideration of prevailing policy approaches. Advocates of a more rigorous and selective educational system and those who seek greater autonomy for institutions of higher education will find this book to their liking. Its authors have gathered a range of useful information in sketching their interpretation of the past decade's developments in both elementary and secondary and higher education.

The authors' main thesis is that the expanded commitment to equal educational opportunity in the 1960s combined with the budget cutting and bureaucratic retrenchment of the 1970s have resulted in three questionable policy outcomes in both countries. These are: increased centralization in educational policy making, the replacement of educators by bureaucrats in decision making, and what the authors refer to as "policy leveling," or an emphasis on low-quality, mass institutions.

Litt and Parkinson examine three policy developments in each country. In the United Kingdom, they trace the growth of the Department of Education and Science, the evolution of a binary system of higher education, and the rapid expansion of comprehensive high schools. Comparably, in the United States, they focus on the expanding role of the federal government in higher education through policy interventions like affirmative action, the emphasis on student as opposed to institutional aid in higher education, and growing centralization in the financing of public schools.

While the book's contributions are significant, one is left with the feeling that it tries to do too much in too little space. To be fully effective, each area of contribution requires greater attention. For example, the most important contribution of the book lies in its comparative policy focus, resulting in useful insights into factors which contribute to coherent and effective policies. However, this perspective could be made more explicit throughout the work; curiously, the epilogue addresses comparative issues most directly. A more explicit comparative focus might also benefit from the inclusion of theoretical material, such as Ralph Turner's "contest and sponsored mobility" models.

The overview of expansive policies during a time of retrenchment provides a good descriptive account of policy developments in the two nations. It is, however, severely limited as a causal explanation of the phenomena the authors criticize. Better documentation and more serious consideration of additional variables are needed before the authors can attribute centralization and policy leveling to the combination of expansionary policies and retrenchment practices. While Litt and Parkinson rightly criticize ways in which higher education policies perpetuate class divisions, the analysis of this development needs to be more fully developed.

This need for more thorough analysis is particularly critical, given the tone of the authors' reconsideration of substantive policies. While the book rightly criticizes "token" federal efforts that only serve to raise student expectations, the authors' conclusions clearly imply that things would be better with less governmental intervention—a view that has become popularly labeled "neoconservative." It is not clear, however, whether expansive government involvement or fiscal retrenchment (or additional factors) is at fault.

One senses that Litt and Parkinson feel strongly about recent trends in higher education. However, in the absence of more coherent and systematic analysis, the book's main contribution lies in its observations about comparative developments in the two countries, not in its policy recommendations.

EDWARD P. MORGAN

Lehigh University

Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages: The Implementation of a Rural Development Strategy. By Dean E. McHenry, Jr. (Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies, Research Series No. 39, 1979. Pp. xi + 268. $5.95, paper.)

Over the past decade *ujamaa*—socialism—in Tanzania has attracted a good deal of international attention. In a Third World of military coups, stagnating production, rampant corruption, and authoritarian rule, Tanzania's commitment to self-reliant socialist construction seemed to set an example. Most recently, the initial enthusiasm about Tanzania's strategy has been supplanted by strident critiques.

Dean McHenry offers a rich harvest of detailed information on the progress of *ujaama,* gathered from his own experiences in Tanzania, from wide reading, especially of local research reports, and from a four-region survey he conducted. His goal is to provide a systematic analysis of *ujamaa:* stated intentions, formal policies, implementation efforts, results, and applicability elsewhere. His is a major addition to this literature, sure to be consulted widely.

McHenry focuses on two major components of the *ujamaa* strategy. First, he examines efforts to transform rural Tanzania from a predominance of nucleated homesteads to concentrated villages. Having reviewed the colonial experience and the environmental (socio-political as well as physical) constraints, he notes substantial success by the mid-1970s. Second, McHenry looks at efforts to promote communal agricultural production, efforts he finds much less successful. His explanation for that is something of a catch-all, referring to the individuals and groups involved (government officials, party and village leaders, peasants), the approaches used (unviability of class-based campaigns, ineffective organization and remuneration, flawed policy, planning, and implementation), and the factors that were largely beyond local control (climate, oil price, regional tensions, international context).

McHenry's basic explanatory model relies on a combination of pragmatic leaders and rational peasants. When there is tension between ideological commitment and practical needs, McHenry argues, leaders alter their ideas to conform to the actions they see as necessary. And, consistent with what is now a vast literature on peasant behavior, McHenry rejects claims of peasant irrationality and conservatism and finds Tanzanian peasants to be reasonably careful and accurate benefit-maximizers and risk-minimizers. For example, McHenry traces the villagization effort, which began during colonial rule and showed only modest success during the early post-colonial years. As inducement (the provision of material rewards) and compulsion (forced movement or at least its threat)—both of which had initially been explicitly rejected—were added to persuasion, the majority of the rural populace moved. Believing villagization essential to any development strategy, the leaders overcame their resistance to inducement and compulsion. For the lack of success in promoting communal production, McHenry points to a wide range of factors, but of those within the leaders' grasp, he emphasizes the failure to assess accurately peasants' cost/benefit analysis of compliance (and noncompliance) with stated policies. Had leaders been more attuned to the rational calculations of the peasantry, McHenry implies, they would have employed more successful tactics, or at least they would have understood why the tactics that were employed have not worked.

In all of this, McHenry is quite right. Leaders are generally pragmatic and peasants are reasonably rational, in Tanzania as elsewhere. But that does still not tell why they do what they do. Pragmatic leaders do what they think they must. But agreement on what they must do is far from universal. In fact, to different leaders, pragmatism may mean rapid industrialization or continued reliance on agriculture, expanded or reduced trade with the West, more peasant participation in planning, or less. Here, then, is an unfortunate weakness in this book: its inattention to the by-now extensive analyses of the politics of the Tanzanian leadership (or, as many would have it, the ruling class). McHenry is clearly familiar with these analyses and finds them partial. Probably so, but that does not eliminate the need to sort out who is in power in Tanzania, moving in which direction, and why.

That relates to a second weakness of the analysis, examplified in the discussions of a Tanzanian style of development administration—wide-ranging "operations," in which an impossible goal is announced for achievement tomorrow, and from which results not the full accomplishment of the stated aims but probably more progress than would have been possible had the implementation process been much more bureaucratic and orderly. What, in fact, is the policy? To talk of policies requires differentiating between stated policies and actual policies. And that in turn requires sorting out *whose* actual policies. If the communalization of production has progressed slowly because implementation has been inadequate (in McHenry's terms, peasants find it insufficiently attractive), then why is that? Do the adopted strategies reflect a lack of commitment to stated goals, or an unstated commitment to alternative goals? By whom? Who is in a position to affect the goals? the implementation?

What, then, of *ujamaa*? As McHenry shows, the villagization effort has been extraordinarily successful, involving almost all of the rural populace. Communalization of production has progressed slowly, but McHenry rejects the pessimism of the right (communal production can never match the results of individual farmers) and the left (communal production cannot expand with a bureaucratic bourgeoisie in power) for a cautious optimism. As Tanzania's President Nyerere commented in his ten-year review of Tanzania's socialist strategy, change in a peasant country is a much slower process than he had hoped (and than scholars seem to expect).

JOEL SAMOFF

Stanford University

Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949–1977. By Donald H. McMillen. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979. Pp. xix + 373. $23.00.)

This book throws substantial light on the largest but least-known Chinese province with rich natural resources and great strategic importance. In order to answer the large question of how "the Peking regime sought to integrate Xinjiang province with the rest of People's Republic of China" in the past 30 years, McMillen focuses his analysis on the changing provincial leadership and their policies in the broad context of national politics.

Chronologically organized into five parts and 20 chapters, the book starts with the natural setting and historical background of the province, and then proceeds to describe the establishment of the Communist elite largely composed of Han officers from the First Field Army under the leadership of Wang Enmao. Part 3 includes 6 chapters discussing specific policies pursued by Wang's group in such areas as cadre recruitment, minority, and agriculture. Part 4 is devoted to the Cultural Revolution in the province; findings here largely coincide with the national patterns of the mass movement. The last part traces the leadership and policy changes since the Cultural Revolution up to the downfall of the Gang of Four.

Despite the neat organization and minutely detailed description of some events and personal background of the local leaders, the book suffers form several shortcomings. One of the major weaknesses is the lack of overall organizing theme. McMillen fails to make the question of integration the major theme running through the entire book. He touches upon this interesting question only in a passing way. After describing in very general terms various policies in the province, the author makes an uninteresting assertion that the regional leaderhsip under Wang and the central authorities had an identical goal: "Xinjiang's ultimate political, socio-economic and cultural integration with the rest of People's Republic of China." Then, only in the concluding chapter he contrasts casually Mao's approach of integration—which he calls "political-ideological integration" with Wang's "developmental integration." If the author were a little bit more careful in analyzing how the need for integration was taken care of in the process of implementing the national policies, he would have made his conclusion more convincing.

Similarly, the lack of in-depth analysis also mars his discussion of the changing provincial elite. His use of the theses of power struggle, factionalism, and policy difference is purely ad hoc and confusing. Particularly unconvincing is the assertion that Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army officers replaced the dominant group of the First Field Army officers. That Long Shujin—belonging to the Fourth Field Army and purged with Lin Piao—replaced Wang does not necessarily make the field army thesis valid. Unfortunately, his handling of biographical data is unsystematic and his tables are too badly organized to test the thesis. Even the author's handling of qualitative data is indiscriminate; instead of being selective, he describes or quotes newspaper articles or leaders' speeches extensively regardless of whether or not they are related to the points the author wants to make. The massive presentation of undigested materials, plus his narrative style which often sidetracks from the main points, makes the book extremely difficult and boring to read. In addition, the author should have been more specific on his sources; for instance, the radio broadcast from Urumqi and *Xinjiang ribao*—after the 1960s—the two major sources need mentioning where they are available. In brief, the book offers a lot of detailed and sometimes irrelevant bits of information on Xinjiang politics, but no coherent explanation.

HONG YUNG LEE

Marquette University

Western European Party Systems: Trends and Prospects. Edited by Peter H. Merkl. (New York: Free Press, 1980. Pp. xi + 676. $39.95.)

Western European Party Systems provides 25 chapters by 19 contributors in 8 states and 4 foreign countries; over 200 pages were written by the editor, Peter Merkl. An index is supplied. Long content footnotes are placed at the end of some chapters; bibliographies, annotated or otherwise, would have been more convenient for reference purposes.

Those who would consult this massive volume to ascertain such practical details as party procedures for leadership and candidate selection, legal definition and protection of the party label, or the formalities for getting a party on the ballot, are likely to be disappointed. Largely unexplored is a major contemporary issue in political party studies, which is whether the highly structured mass-membership parties, with all their internal pressures and problems, are still essential for contemporary election campaigns. Similarly, with one important exception, the authors do not substantially confront the challenge of post-industrialism, as variously defined, to the traditional political party systems. Since the authors are much concerned with party system fragmentation, cross-cutting cleavages, the relative influence of class, religion and ethnicity, not to mention party realignments, the omission of Belgium from the country studies without compensatory coverage in other chapters is difficult to understand in view of the recent evolution of the Belgian party system.

But the value of this collection for serious students of democratic political parties far outweighs any possible objections. Eleven articles are devoted to country studies, while the rest cover various research trends and topics. Among studies of the four major countries, the most complete in both coverage and theory is Zariski's superb analysis of the Italian party system. Rather than drawing conclusions exclusively from current British vicissitudes, Arthur Cyr perceptively evaluates the long-term strengths and weaknesses of the British party system. Lowell Noonan not only updates the relationships among French parties as well as their role in governance, but also merits the gratitude of students and teachers of French politics for his translation, in useful detail, of the Common Program of the left. Also exceptionally useful is Merkl's discussion of the *Jusos,* the young left-wingers of the German Social Democratic party, in his extensive survey of the German party system.

Among the essays on the smaller democracies, the Finland article by Suhonen stands out; a good book would have been even better if the country articles had generally resembled Suhonen's essay in the coverage of party organization and operation. Donald Hancock's explanation of the Swedish parties will be very helpful both to those unfamiliar with Sweden and to others who require an update on Swedish affairs. Nilson emphasizes the impact of the European Community issue on Norwegian politics, briefly reviews the Danish system, and then discusses cross-cutting cleavage and party fragmentation. In another essay, Nilson combines the Phillips curve with Downsian theory to suggest possible relations between economic policy and the voter's choice. Similar models with different curves are applied to Sweden, Denmark and the Third French Republic. Michael Carey's essay on Ireland is full of suggestive insights that a clearer writing style would have rendered even more effective. Mommsen-Reindl gives proper emphasis to the continuities of Austrian politics in explaining the transition from coalition to single-party government. Galen Irwin's healthily skeptical description of the Dutch party system may be too complicated for someone unfamiliar with Dutch politics. The new democracies of Spain and Portugal are given the treatment they now deserve in Howard Wiarda's illuminating essay. Although he makes no comparisons with the rest of Latin Europe, one may notice the resemblance between twentieth-century Spain and Portugal and the nineteenth-century development of political parties in France and Italy.

Diversity of opinions and approaches among the authors renders the sections on research topics and trends especially stimulating to read. A party aggregation index based on the strength of the largest coalition party is found by Lawrence Mayer to explain cabinet instability better than Rae's fragmentation measure. Mayer shows that party aggregation is declining in Europe; for example, Belgium and France, respectively, scored 7.4 and 7.1 in 1965 and 3.9 and 3.7 in 1973. These figures may reflect the evolution of the Belgian party system but would seem somewhat misleading for France where a dramatic *increase* in party aggregation is convincingly demonstrated by Frank Wilson's enlightening essay. Wilson also cites a widening ideological gap between the French left and right which is squarely contradicted by the contention of John Clayton Thomas that interparty ideological differences have declined in France as well as in the rest of Europe. Even though not apparent in some statistical studies, the transformation of the French party system is real enough, and is attributed by Wilson more to party leaders and changes in the "competitive situation" than to the economy, constitution, or political culture.

In a careful study, Neal Tate reports decline in party identification combined with increase in party affect. Party is less central in voting choice, partly because of ongoing party realignments. For Kaltefleiter, the legitimacy of German parties is associated with the availability of authentic and effective opposition, while Stephen Fisher points out that minor parties may be essential, rather than dysfunctional, for the health of a democratic party system. Zelime Amen Ward suggests that the rise of cross-national parties in the directly elected European Parliament may be impeded by the decline of political parties as such. Parties from newer member states of the Community join less in cross-national partisanship than parties from the original six. Only in Jutta Helm's essay on German citizens' lobbies are the concepts of post-industrial politics substantially applied to a national system. This very informative article does not, however, really explain *why* the citizens' lobbies have been as effective as they are said to be. Finally, Merkl's two substantial and detailed works on German and Italian party members and on the sociology of European parties constitute a veritable gold mine of information and data that will be consulted by scholars for years to come.

ELIJAH BEN-ZION KAMINSKY

Arizona State University

Towards Total Revolution: Vol. 1, *Search for an Ideology;* Vol. 2, *Politics in India;* Vol. 3, *India and her Problems;* Vol. 4, *Total Revolution.* By Jayaprakash Narayan. Edited by Brahmanand. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1980. Pp. 1,148. $50.00, the set.)

The four-volume collection of the writings of Jayaprakash Narayan includes papers and publications going back to his days as a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin in the 1920s; through his periods as, first, a leader of the socialist wing of the Indian nationalist movement prior to 1947, and then of the "Gandhian" movement in the 1950s and 1960s; and finally as the founder of a political movement that was a major factor in the declaration of Emergency Rule by Indira Gandhi in June 1975. It is by no means a comprehensive collection, but it has been carefully selected to include those documents that portray accurately his own intellectual and political evolution over a long and fascinating period.

Narayan returned from his stint as a student at the University of Wisconsin as a self-proclaimed "Marxist," but of a rather peculiar variety for India in the 1930s when British-derived intellectual influences still were dominant. At Madison, Narayan had been exposed to that curious combination of Marxist and American Populist ideologies that was then a prevalent intellectual fad, and it was the basic contradictions between these two ideological traditions that strongly influenced Narayan in the 1930s and thereafter—in particular his perceptions of the Indian communist movement. For some time he sought to combine a Marxist class analysis approach with the highly individualistic populist values, but eventually this proved impossible. Gradually, the populist strand prevailed; Narayan first rejected the Soviet model of a Marxist society and then finally Marxism itself. It was at this point that he became a real radical through his espousal of a modified Gandhian philosophy that accepted a Gandhian-type mass mobilization strategy but for the attainment of goals that are difficult to define as Gandhian.

Volumes 1 and 2 are largely devoted to his process of disillusionment with the Soviet Union and, eventually, the Indian communists. There is not much new here, for this was a phenomenon common to socialists elsewhere, although Narayan may have learned faster and better than some of his European and American counterparts. Volume 3 includes several incisive criticisms of the Western-style democratic system established in India by Nehru and his Congress party, but is notably weak in defining the structure, form and operating principles of the indigenous democratic system that Narayan advocated.

This inability to project his own political concepts in practical terms, long recognized as Narayan's basic weakness as both a political philosopher and leader, is very evident in volume 4 which includes several publications that seek to define what he means by "total revolution." The results are rather confusing, but it is clear that Narayan's "total revolution" was much more dependent upon fundamental changes in human nature than in economic, political and social structures. The latter is expected to follow from the former rather than vice versa, another instance perhaps in which his populist values triumphed over competing revolutionary ideologies.

Narayan eventually became a charismatic political figure who transcended the normal political process in India, and it is doubtful that his specific contributions to Indian political philosophy will long endure. But it is also the case that he strongly and eloquently reflected important strands in Indian society, including some intellectual and political forces that are dedicated to the introduction of real processes of change. A total revolution is not likely to be the result even if his followers should somehow emerge triumphant—an unlikely prospect. But this does not diminish Narayan's status as a critic of other revolutionary ideologies and as a spokesman for political and social values and concepts that are intrinsic to contemporary India.

Leo E. Rose

University of California, Berkeley

Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule, 1966–79. Edited by Oyeleye Oyediran. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980. Pp. xii + 319. $22.00.)

Nigeria has been a favorite subject for students of African politics. In recent years much of the research and many of the publications on Nigeria have been undertaken by Nigerian political scientists. Many of the publications are by American and British presses, but Nigerian companies, such as the well-known Ethiope and the newer, but very active Fourth Dimension Publishers, have been playing increasingly important roles. Among the latest publications of Nigerian political scientists are volumes edited by A. Akinyemi (*Nigeria and the World,* Oxford, 1978) and the collection edited by Oyelele Oyediran reviewed here.

Fourteen essays are presented in an attempt to examine the impact of 13 years of military rule on the Nigerian political system. The reader is to "see the effect of military rule on the processes and institutions of certain aspects of government and politics" (p. ix). As the editor notes, this is an important topic for consideration, and one that has not been well analyzed in other publications. Unfortunately, although there are some excellent articles in this volume (for example, A. B. Akinyemi, "Mohammed/Obasanjo Foreign Policy"), most of the essays fail to describe and, more importantly, fail to analyze the *effects* of military rule. There are two difficulties. First, several of the papers deal with conditions prior to or after the end of military rule and with the causes of the civil war. Second, those articles which are actually concerned with the period of military rule often fail to show any relationship between the events, occurrences, or phenomena they describe and the presence of military rule. Akin Iwayemi, "The Military and the Economy," claims that "the military contributed significantly to the development of the Nigerian economy during its regime" (p. 63), but all he really shows is a coincidence. The military was in power and the changes occurred in the Nigerial economy. Did the army cause these changes? Probably not, and many Nigerians believe that the changes took place in spite of the army. One might argue that the growth of petroleum exploitation was the more significant factor in economic change.

This is indicative of a major aspect of several of these essays; they are descriptive, not analytic. In some instances, the authors are really expressing their opinions, not reporting research results. The effect of this is that we have several descriptive, even anecdotal, essays, and only a few that actually analyze. In part, this charcteristic is not surprising, for several of the authors are not social scientists of any stripe. Seven political scientists, an economist, journalists, civil servants, and businessmen are included. But in part, this weakness is due to a lack of editorial control.

The two essays on foreign affairs, one by Akinyemi mentioned above and one by Ray Ofoegbu ("Foreign Policy and Military Rule") should be noted. Both provide important insights into the making of Nigerian foreign policy and, on at least one point, they disagree on an important statement of fact. Ofoegbu's essay is descriptive, but he appears to have had access to information not well known to scholars on Nigerian policy, particularly on Nigerian relations with the USSR. Akinyemi presents a good analysis of the role of the military in Nigerian foreign policy, and the effects of that role. He gives us the best available analysis of U.S.-Nigerian relations and stresses the significance to Nigeria, and to Africa, of Nigeria's conflict with the U.S. over the recognition of the MPLA government in Angola. He notes that Nigeria "launched a diplomatic blitzkrieg" (p. 155) in Africa to gain support for its Angola policy. Ofoegbu claims that "regrettably, Nigeria did not launch any diplomatic offensive" (p. 136) in Africa to gain support for its policy.

This volume fails to serve the purposes set forward by the editor; we still do not have an analysis of the effects of 13 years of military rule on Nigerian politics. Of course, it is not necessary that a collection of essays meet the purposes of its editor to be a contribution to knowledge. Several of these articles are valuable because they express the opinions and views of influential Nigerian citizens. See, for example, the essay by Lateef Jakande, a well-known journalist, on the role of the press. And, some of the essays are valuable because they do analyze the effects of military rule.

MARK W. DELANCEY

University of South Carolina
University of Yaounde, Cameroon

The Australian National Elections of 1977. Edited by Howard R. Penniman. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1979. Pp. 367. $8.25, paper.)

This is the second in a series of Australian election studies produced under American Enterprise Institute auspices. As in the earlier volume, the contributors, mostly academics, are among the best available for the job. There is a balance among essays dealing with parties as such, with special aspects of the campaign such as the role of the news media, and with the wider political setting. It seems useful to reconstruct the book according to its presentation of the 1977 election per se, of linkage to the Australian political process, and of cross-national applications.

The December 1977 election was held a year before Parliament was scheduled to run its full, three-year term. Liberal Prime Minister Fraser's call for an early election, unusual by Australian standards, was inspired by his wish to avoid potentially less favorable political circumstances later in 1978. Economic conditions were likely to worsen. The Labor party leadership would likely pass to someone more electorally viable than former Prime Minister Whitlam, whose previous government's economic and other shortcomings were still clearly recalled. As the contributors show, the return of the Liberal-National Country party government by another handsome margin therefore did not defy the rules of the electoral pendulum, which presuppose that a government with a lavish majority will lose ground, especially since economic frailty at the end of 1977 could successfully be defined as Labor's legacy. Moreover, in the course of an election that lacked sharp polarization or turgid rhetoric, substantial electoral movement was not to be anticipated. In his introductory essay, David Butler reflects that "there must be some wistfulness about living in a lucky country so contented that there are no great issues, no public challenges and no outstanding leaders to stir the imagination of the bulk of voters" (p. 18).

The 1977 election did have a special quality, but its effect on the representational outcome was negligible. A new and untested party, the Australian Democrats, gained nearly 10 percent of the popular, House of Representatives vote. Their appeal, which drew almost equally from the two major party groups, may have signaled something other than diffused public dissatisfaction with conventional alternatives. The Democrats emphasized their freedom from traditional group-party ties such as trade union links with Labor, business links with the Liberals, and rural interest connections with the NCP. They also stressed life-quality and environmental issues. Their performance, among other things, seemingly underscored the increased volatility of the electorate, and the deterioration of already frail class and other, partisan-shaping cleavages within Australian society. David Kemp's essay on the Australian electorate provides much of the sociological setting in which the Democrat phenomenon can be appraised. Whether the slippage of main party support is a systemically healthy sign is another matter. Jean Holmes is skeptical: "The pluralist and federalist structure of the system may well be adequate to accommodate the new voting interests that are emerging, but it is important that the major parties retain their role as the spokesmen for the consensus value positions in Australian society" (p. 122). This notion, directly or inferentially pursued by several contributors, invites more elaborate analysis.

The book makes no systematic effort to fit its Australian material into comparative electoral and related studies, but suggestive argument is scattered throughout. This includes such themes as the determination of issue salience, factors affecting the nationalization of party politics, the systemic significance of cleavage/consensus traits, and post-industrial electoral habits. In sum, at least for the attentive reader, the book's value exceeds its primary, one-election focus, or indeed its insights about Australian politics generally.

HENRY S. ALBINSKI

Pennsylvania State University

Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment. Edited by Carl G. Rosberg and Thomas M. Callaghy. (Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies, 1979. Pp. x + 426. $8.50, paper.)

Books on contemporary Africa are all too rare these days. This book is especially welcome, since it is an updating of topics considered in the 1967 volume edited by Rosberg and Friedland entitled *African Socialism.* It provides new analyses of some countries previously studied, and also provides information on countries that are rarely studied, including Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Benin, and Congo-Brazzaville. These country case studies are based at least in part on field research in an era when research access has become problematic. The country studies are complemented by several general comparative articles on African socialism.

The main difficulty in discussing African socialism centers on deciding what it is. The editors assert in the book's first sentence: "Socialism in Africa is no longer in its infancy" (p. 1). The editors suggest that there have been two "waves" of socialism. The first wave emphasized African uniqueness, while the second wave identified with "scientific socialism." Yet, as the editors and several of the authors observe, the second wave has retained a pragmatic concern with African conditions. Within this framework, each of the authors develops a particular definition of socialism in Africa. This eclectic approach gives the reader maximum information about the authors' field research. It does, however, leave some unasked and unanswered questions about African socialism.

In the absence of a general definition of African socialism or a general framework for its analysis, the various authors explore several important themes. These include the nature and role of the state; the content and functions of socialist ideologies; the nature of classes and class systems in African societies; the relationships between class and other forms of identity and cleavage; and the global context of contemporary efforts at socialist transformation.

The state is the central focus of all of the articles. All of the country studies accept Callaghy's conclusion that, for socialist transformation, "The role of the state is central and predominant" (p. 112). The country studies give readers a wealth of information on the organization and personnel of various regimes. Declao's article on Benin and Congo-Brazzaville is extraordinarily informative. There is less concern than there might have been with the role of the state in socialist transformation. Callaghy suggests that the importance of the state makes these regimes mercantilist rather than socialist. Yet none of the authors discusses democratic socialist alternatives or explores the possibility that contemporary African governments may be barriers to socialist transformation. The democratic socialist theoretical literature and the East European attempts at democratization are not pondered in relation to African regimes and societies. Yet the country studies do not give compelling reasons for deciding whether African citizens are rejecting socialism or statism. The failure to investigate the implications of statism for socialist transformation shows the lingering influence of modernization and political development theories. The old assumption that governments are more modern and innovative than their citizens still plagues studies of political and social change.

Discussions of the constituencies for socialism within African populations leave the impression that there are virtually no such constituencies. Civil servants, traders, peasants, and workers are all presented as opposed to socialism. Students, or some factions of students, seem to be the only consistent supporters of official socialist initiatives. This is not stated explicitly in the book and no one speculates about the reasons for this apparent regularity. A concluding chapter on such issues could have been fascinating. The sketchy discussion of constituencies for actual socialist programs weakens attempts at general analyses of classes and class systems in African conditions. The second wave of socialist regimes emphasizes class analyses, but there is little information on what is meant by "class," how classes are formed, and class consciousness is generated. Adamoleku writing on Guinea and Laitin writing on Somalia note the continuing importance of religious identities. Mozambique and Angola face serious problems of ethnic and racial cleavages. Some general assessment of new persistent identities would have enriched our understanding of attempts at socialist transformation.

Most of the articles deal more with ideologies than with programs. Information on ideologies of the new regimes in the "second wave" of African socialism is extremely useful. However, discussions of ideology and of articulated programs lead to questions about program implementation. It is difficult to distinguish the special problems of implementing socialist programs from the general problems of implementing any development programs in the new states. Considered explicitly, this could have been a major contribution to comparative development theory.

Most authors mention the global context and the operations of multinational corporations. This remains a difficult area to research and to conceptualize. The country studies contain little specific information on actions of particular companies when dealing with various socialist or nonsocialist or quasi-socialist regimes. Most regimes seem to prefer multinational corporations to a domestic capitalist class. The early faith in nationalization and the establishment of parastatals as effective means of focusing multinationals on national objectives seems to have waned. Yet the transnational presence is growing in Africa. What does this mean for socialism, or, indeed, for any other form of development?

A provocative book generates discussion. Any scholar interested in contemporary Africa should read this book and join the debate. One looks forward to another version of comparable quality in the coming decade.

FRANCES HILL

University of Texas, Austin

The Foreign Policies of the French Left. Edited by Simon Serfaty. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979. Pp. xi + 124. $13.50.)

A current disarray of the French left makes it difficult to believe that only a few years ago the parties of the left seemed on the verge of acceding to power. At the time, observers in France and elsewhere were concerned with foreseeing the domestic and foreign policies that the left would enact when it returned to power after more than 40 years. Originally presented in 1977/78 as seminars at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, the essays in this book represent efforts to determine probable defense and foreign policies of a leftist government in France. They also provide good illustrations of the left's divisions and misunderstandings over concrete policy options that contributed to the split of the left after 1977 and to the end of nearly all hopes for a left-wing alternative to the ruling Giscardian and Gaullist majority.

Serfaty's introductory essay argues correctly that the left's defeat in the 1978 elections came as marginal voters voted less for the right than against "a Left within which the Communists were deemed to be too influential" (p. 10). The divisions of the left had undermined its credibility as a viable alternative government, but many voters were more alarmed at the policy compromises between the minimal position of the Communists and the maximal position of the Socialists presented in the left's Common Program.

Essays by Michael N. Harrison on defense policies, J. William Friend on European policies, and Ronald Tiersky on the position toward the Third World show the fragility of the agreements between the two main partners of the left. And on several issues even the Socialist party policy was unclear with different factions advocating conflicting options. Holding all this together, "through a cultivated talent for ambiguity, indecision, vacillation, and dissimulation" (p. 24), was François Mitterrand. As the authors admit, an examination of these precarious policy balances is of "limited political relevance after the legislative election of March 1978" (p. 67), but it does serve to illustrate the fundamental problem for the French left: the difficulty of dealing with a strong Communist party which is among the least "liberal" of European communist parties.

Indeed, the question of relevance goes beyond this book. American and European political scientists have been preoccupied by a left that has not governed since the Popular Front in the 1930s. We have too often neglected the parties of the right and center which actually have governed France. We have here an excellent study of the foreign policy agreements and disagreements of the parties of the left who have not governed and seem unlikely to govern together, but there is no comparable book evaluating differing foreign policy positions of the ruling Giscardian and Gaullist parties. We have had many good studies of the French Communist and Socialist parties and of their efforts to build a coalition. Comparable studies of the Giscardian and Gaullist parties are far fewer and there is very little research at all on their often turbulent alliance. As one who has contributed to this imbalance, I would like to see new attention and research directed toward the parties that have governed France for the past 20 years and seem likely to continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

FRANK L. WILSON

Purdue University

Democracy in Western Germany: Parties and Politics in the Federal Republic. By Gordon Smith. (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980. Pp. x + 225. $17.50, cloth; $9.95, paper.)

This is not just another textbook on West German politics. Instead, Gordon Smith has written a tightly argued interpretation of the West German polity focusing on the pivotal role of the political parties in it. With this emphasis, Smith follows Lehmbruch, Hennis and others who have advanced the concept of the "party state" to capture the distinctive nature of West German politics. He argues that the political parties that established themselves after 1945 are largely responsible for the development and present shape of the political system. Smith is most concerned with the new political forms and practices that emerged after 1949, but the fact that he never loses sight of historical continuities and traditions is one of the strong points of his interpretation.

The first chapter provides the needed historical perspective and discusses the large questions that still inspire heated debate about German politics. Most importantly, does the notion of restoration adequately explain the nature of the West German political system, or was 1949 a fresh departure? In the second chapter, which sketches the new constitutional framework, Smith seems to stress innovation rather than restoration after 1949. By endowing the parties with the same legitimacy and status as other state organs, the Basic Law certainly departed from older German traditions. But the manner in which the parties grew into their new roles again suggests elements of continuity. As Smith reminds us, the "officialised" nature of the parties is somewhat at odds with their original role as reflections of social pluralism. The third chapter is devoted to a discussion of the parties and the party system which developed after 1949. Many readers will welcome the brief sketches of the minor parties that enlivened the political scene during the fifties, but the bulk of the chapter provides useful discussions of the two major parties.

Throughout, Smith stresses the development of the parties, both at the elite and mass levels, and the resulting consequences for the party system as a whole. At present, West Germany has a "balanced party system," which operates almost like a two-party system. Earlier fears of a possible resurgence of the fragmented party system of the Weimar Republic no longer seem relevant. The memory of Weimar has faded in yet another respect. Because all three of the remaining parties share a strong governing orientation, West Germany has enjoyed exceptional governmental stability. The dynamics of coalition politics as well as the complicated relationships between *Bund* and *Länder* politics are explored in chapter 4. Smith's discussion of the changing role of the *Bundesrat* provides some interesting material for speculation about the future. This is just one example of Smith's skill in isolating the dynamic, fluid elements in the political system. The strained relationship between CDU and CSU, and the uncertain future of the FDP, which is no longer represented in 3 of the 11 *Länder* legislatures, are other examples. The final chapter is a very perceptive discussion of several key issues that have loomed large on the political agenda: the national issue, the social market approach to economic policy, the legalistic orientation to politics and the problems of tolerance and conformity. How the parties have responded to these issues and in turn have defined them gives West German politics most of its distinctive contours.

This book does not follow the topical outline of most comparative government texts. Some readers may deplore the lack of chapters on bureaucracy and the executive, or political participation and socialization. But they will find that Smith covers a good deal of the relevant material. The book may not appeal to beginning students because it shuns the "nuts and bolts" approach. However, for students interested in "the German problem," or the general reader who wants to get a sense of what West Germans have made of their second democracy, I cannot think of another book that packs so much insight and perceptive analysis into a little more than 200 pages.

JUTTA A. HELM

Western Illinois University

Legislatures in Development: Dynamics of Change in New and Old States. Edited by Joel Smith and Lloyd D. Musolf. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1979. Pp. xvi + 407. $19.75.)

Where no more than a decade ago legislative studies concerning developing states were sparse and vast areas unexplored, the scholarly terrain has filled rapidly. Much of the credit is due to the

Consortium for Comparative Legislative Studies, through its sponsored research and publications, including this edited book by Joel Smith and Lloyd Musolf. The collected papers greatly expand a literature concerned with the contribution of legislatures to national development. No claims are made that these institutions assume prominent roles in charting policy, molding mass opinions, or supervising executives. Instead, the studies reinforce a view that legislatures' involvement with system change is more informal, though not inconsequential to development policies.

The chapters offer several diverse approaches to the study of legislatures. Separate country studies also fail to identify a single configuration of legislative activities critical in accelerating or retarding change. Still, considerable agreement exists among the authors that legislatures in developing states should be evaluated more by their individual than their collective actions. Raymond Hopkins finds legislative roles in Kenya and Tanzania that conform to largely contrasting capitalist and socialist development strategies and yet are alike in providing linkages between the countryside and central government. Joel Barkan shows in the same two countries that MPs, though pursuing their own interests, succeed in helping to overcome obstacles to rural development. Writing on Thailand, David Morell notes the legislators' ability to articulate rural attitudes and aspirations and points to their considerable influence in project location and certain budget allocations. In studying Malaysia, Lloyd Musolf and J. Fred Springer describe a two-way communication process in which individual legislators' activities in the representation and education of constituents can figure importantly in economic policy.

Another general theme concerns the viability of legislatures and the political systems that contain them. In an analytically rich essay, Richard Sisson and Leo Snowness examine conditions that sustain legislatures, and argue that they are critical to regimes that try to build national authority and also maintain pluralistic processes. In a more narrow vein, Allan Kornberg and Kennieth Pittman explore military interventions in new states and indicate how they are related to the same factors that give rise to and revive representative institutions. Victor Le Vine argues that the fact that parliaments in 14 former French African colonies play an only marginal role in decisional processes is responsible for the decline or disappearance of these bodies in the face of military coups, diminished political mobilization, and new economic and social problems. The adaptation of a legislature is treated more closely in a study by Arturo Valenzuela and Alexander Wilde. They trace the expansion and contraction of Chile's Congress against broader system changes, particularly the emergence of powerful extra-parliamentary forces. The authors show how the legislature was strongest when individual congressmen were allowed to act on behalf of particularistic interests. Juan Linz's study of the Cortes in pre-democratic Spain reveals efforts to institutionalize corporative principles and the legislature's failure to provide the authoritarian regime with ideological legitimacy.

A policy focus offers the point of departure in three chapters. R. B. Jain's account of the involvement of India's Parliament in economic planning identifies the body's legitimizing and publicizing functions, and the centrality of party initiatives. Terry McCoy presents a cross-national survey of the role of legislatures in making and implementing population policies in the Third World. This unproductive exercise is partially redeemed in its discussions of constitutional and political barriers, and institutional weaknesses that explain the marginal and often negative role of legislatures in population control. A case study by Abdo Baaklini and Alia Abdul-Wahab of Kuwait's National Assembly appears to provide the book's sole example of legislative leadership. In fact, the seeming legislative-executive struggle over the country's oil policies is revealed to be an integrated, cooperative process that served to strengthen the executive.

There are some minor disappointments in the book. Although Smith and Musolf identify leading issues in legislative research in their comprehensive introductory chapter, they never manage to lay out a clear set of boundaries or promising directions. A few tentative attempts are made, as in a suggestion that these institutions may be distinctively adaptable, but potential organizing ideas are not adequately elaborated. The poor fit of some chapters with the rest can be excused in edited works of this kind. Less understandable (in a book published in 1979 and based on a 1975 conference) is the editors' failure to require the authors to update their studies. In particular, the fuller incorporation of legislative developments in recent years would have enhanced most of the analysis. No less unfortunate, for most studies the cited literature on legislatures ends in 1974. Typical is the introductory chapter that ignores other books in a comparative legislative series in which this is the eighth volume.

If comparative legislative studies have come far in the 1970s, and the large number of excellent chapters here are good testimony, the field of study is still not secure. There remains too often a defensiveness about legislative research, especially in the Third World. The field's coming of age will be signaled when authors no longer feel obliged to try to justify their study of the institution. In helping us to understand why legislatures in developing states should be accepted on their own terms, this volume makes important progress toward that maturity.

MARVIN G. WEINBAUM

University of Illinois, Urbana

Scientists in Power. By Spencer R. Weart. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979. Pp. xiii + 343. $17.50.)

This is a fascinating and thoroughly researched account of the politicalization of French nuclear science. Weart—a historian and physicist by training—describes the role of the leading atomic physicists, notably Frederic Joliet-Curie and his co-workers, in launching the French atomic energy program, and seeing it through to its full-scale establishment by 1960.

Chapters 1–6 focus on the period up to the fission breakthrough in 1938. Joliet-Curie and his co-workers saw science as a politically progressive force which they expected would transform society. The separation of science and politics, so dear to American scientists, was never taken seriously by French scientists, probably because they saw very early that science had become a key national resource, and an important source of national pride. What Weart makes clear is that until the Americans entered the scene in 1940, the French were in the forefront, made notable theoretical and practical advances, and had persuaded both government and industry to underwrite their research. As early as 1939, Joliet-Curie had written a secret patent for a crude uranium bomb and a nuclear reactor. Once the economic and military potentials of nuclear energy were evident, Joliet-Curie and his team obtained substantial and continuing support from government and industry.

Chapters 7–14 deal with the wartime period. With the defeat of 1940, Joliet-Curie remained in France, appeared to collaborate with the Germans and Vichy, while actually working in the Resistance. Kowarski and Hans Halban, his top assistants, fled to Britain and Canada, worked on allied nuclear projects, while also trying to retain considerable independence for their own team.

The difficulties of working with the British and Americans are fully described. The major powers were suspicious of each other, looking already to their postwar policy interests and a potential monopoly, in the case of the American effort. French scientists were distrusted because most of them were associated with the Communist party, and because of their close connection to French industrialists.

Chapters 15–18 deal with the organization of nuclear energy in post-World War France, the creation of the Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique, the building of the first French reactor and the dismissal of Joliet-Curie in 1950 when his political connections became an embarrassment to the government, and after considerable pressure from conservative elements and American policy makers.

Rather than scientists being *in* power, as the title suggests, scientists were excluded *from* power. Joliet-Curie had considerable influence upon the development of the nuclear energy program, but only as to the means of achievement, not the political ends for which it was to be used. The large-scale provision of resources and personnel by government and industry gave the scientists some power, but only *within* the scientific establishment. As has been true in all the advanced industrial states, scientists remained in a subordinate position, and acted primarily as servants of power, both of the state and the industrial order. Interestingly enough, Joliet-Curie, notwithstanding his ideological position, found no difficulty cooperating with the captains of French industry. In 1939, he also refused to go along with Szilard's "conspiracy of silence," published his theoretical results, even though this meant that it would then become available to the Germans. National prestige, and the ideology of science—publish regardless of consequences—took precedence.

This history deals fully with the early and wartime period, and far more cursorily with the period from 1945–1960. It was then that France decided to build its own nuclear capabilities, and Joliet-Curie and the French nuclear scientists were taught the lesson of who was really in charge. A more detailed history of this postwar period is needed. Weaver's work makes a major contribution to the political history of twentieth-century science. An added bonus is that the book is well written. It should provide both the interested scholar and lay person with much food for thought and some insights into the contemporary politics of science.

JOSEPH HABERER

Purdue University

After Mussolini: Italian Neo-Fascism and the Nature of Fascism. By Leonard B. Weinberg. (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1979. Pp. iii + 88. $6.75, paper.)

Leonard B. Weinberg has produced a very brief but interesting study of Italian neofascism. He displays a good acquaintance with the literature, takes a commonsensical and relaxed attitude, and writes clearly.

Attention is focused on the principal neofascist group, the *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (MSI), its efforts to become a mass party, and the splits and secessions which attended this process. Weinberg shows that neofascism is not the political projection of big business, nor does it find its alleged "natural" cônstituency in the lower middle class (pp. 65-66, 74). Indeed, the latter hass found a comfortable niche inside the Communist party.

My problems with the work arise from the author's efforts to tie it in to the mainstream research on prewar Fascism. Surveying the disagreements on the nature of Mussolinian Fascism which characterize the literature, Weinberg suggests that all the contending schools are partially right. He further maintains that a study of neofascism will throw light on the Fascism of the Mussolini era.

Both these propositions disturb me. Weinberg's desire to transcend the embarrassing *odium theologicum* which characterizes academic controversies over Fascism is entirely laudable. But it is far from clear that any real reconciliation is possible between, for example, Organski's view that Fascism was "the last stand of the landed aristocracy" and hence slowed down economic development, and those like Gregor and others who vigorously advance the thesis that Fascism was a successful developmental dictatorship. As for what neofascism's vicissitudes can tell us about the earlier version, this seems very problematical given that neofascism has operated for three decades as a minor party in an environment conditioned by the colossal defeat of the Mussolini regime, a democratic constitution, and the domination of politics and society by the Catholic Church and the Communist party. (Weinberg himself is aware of these difficulties.)

But these objections have to do with the short introductory and concluding chapters. They do not destroy the usefulness of Weinberg's analysis of a phenomenon on which the literature, especially in English, is curiously scanty. *After Mussolini* should be of interest to all those concerned with anti-system parties operating in democratic environments.

A word should be said about the book's physical aspect. While all may endorse the aim of the University Press of America to hold down rising book costs, the lack of an index in this book, the absence of regular right-hand margins, and numerous typographical errors (including misspelling "Fascism" on the cover and title page) indicate that many problems remain to be solved.

ANTHONY JAMES JOES

Saint Joseph's University

The Continuing Struggle for Democracy in Latin America. Edited by Howard J. Wiarda. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. Pp. xvi + 313. $24.50.)

This book, a *Festschrift,* is dedicated to Harry Kantor who, as Howard Wiarda says in the preface, "has been one of this country's foremost champions of democracy in Latin America." Those contributing to it are all former students of Kantor, and in one way or another they deal in their essays with that principal interest of their mentor, although he may well not agree with all of their conclusions.

The volume includes two essays, plus an introduction and conclusion by Wiarda, as well as a piece on Latin American populism by Ronald Newton; one on Latin American worker and peasant unions by Neale Pearson; on population control as an aspect of women's rights in Latin America by Ieda Siqueira Wiarda; about the importance of opposition parties in Latin American democracy by Michael Kryzanek; concerning the attitude of elite groups towards democracy by Jack Hopkins. The other essays are one by William Furlong on Latin American democracy and the Alliance for Progress; on the relevance of alternative economic strategies to Latin American democracy; about the importance of political party leadership and the fate of democracy by Lee Fennell; concerning "ideological dependency and the origins of Socialism in the Caribbean" by Anthony Maingot; and on the relationship of democracy to the "bureaucratic state" in Latin America by Lawrence Graham.

There are many comments that one could offer on each of these papers. However, space permits only a few. Ieda Wiarda presents information and observations on the population control problem which for me, at least, were new and very interesting. Michael Kryzanek's comments on the importance of opposition parties is very much to the point and emphasizes the fact that perhaps the hardest lesson for a Latin American politician to learn is how to lose an election (and to admit it). Furlong's observations on the Alliance for Progress and Democracy might have been somewhat different if he had accepted the notion that the Alliance died with John F. Kennedy, as I am certain that it did, since President Johnson and his advisors dropped completely the social reform and political democracy aspects which were central to it.

The most important and original parts of this volume are the four essays of Howard Wiarda. In all of them he pushes the idea that the problem of democracy in Latin America should be judged form a Latin American perspective rather than from a North American one. Most such discussions in this country, he argues, have hitherto been from the viewpoint of the "Lockeian" theories underlying the democratic system in this country and Northwestern Europe, rather than from that of Latin America's own institutions and traditions.

There is much to be said for this argument. Certainly, without an appreciation of the history and culture and current state of affairs in Latin America it is difficult if not impossible for a North American to judge the status of democracy in the countries south of the United States. There is also a strong argument to be made against judging that any country which doesn't behave strictly according to the rules of democratic procedure in which we are supposed to believe in the United States is automatically not democratic.

Wiarda is right in arguing that the Latin American tradition places strong powers in the hands of the central government, which does not necessarily make such a government undemocratic. He is also correct in noting the relative preponderance of the executive among the three branches of government, without that necessarily reducing the democratic quality of the regime involved. His argument that the way in which a particular regime deals with the established rights of "corporative" groups—such as the university, the various economic groups, the labor movement, and professional organizations—is a measure of the democratic nature of a Latin American regime, is also valid. Finally, his insistence that the mere existence, and occasional use, of constitutional powers for a government to suspend certain rights through a "state of siege" is not in itself undemocratic is certainly correct, given the threats of conspiracy and efforts to overthrow by force even the most democratic regimes of the area.

However, as Wiarda himself suggests, his analysis leaves "those who believe democracy is one and universal, or approximately so, . . . vaguely uncomfortable." Although he introduces elements which certainly ought to be taken into account in the Latin American context when judging the democratic nature of a particular regime, his modifications of the "universal" concept of democracy are not entirely satisfactory.

For one thing, in his argument Wiarda sometimes seems to confuse the question as to whether Latin American countries have a functioning political system with whether they have a democratic one. One must certainly recognize that the coup d'état is the normal way of changing governments in several, if not most, Latin American countries. However, it does not follow that this is democratic. Clearly, the military plays a major role in making and unmaking governments, but that does not inevitably drive one to admit that that fact is necessarily democratic. The widespread persistence of paternalism and nepotism is a fact but not necessarily a democratic one.

Also, Wiarda's use of the concept of "participation" as a function of democracy raises serious questions. His implication that the extension of the right to vote—for the single slate presented by Trujillo—meant a move toward democracy under the Dominican dictator is dubious at best. Also one wonders whether "participation" in the form of attending mass meetings to cheer the dictator is an evidence of democracy. Hitler did that every year at Nuremberg.

I wonder, too, whether redistributive policies—whether by Velasco in Peru or Castro in Cuba—are evidences of democracy, in a U.S. or a Latin American context. They may or may not be good, in and of themselves, but they don't necessarily have much to do with democracy. One of Wiarda's contributors suggests that these measures by the Velasco regime in Peru failed politically because that regime refused to allow any real participation in decision making by the groups which benefited from these redistributive policies.

It is undoubtedly true that for a democratic regime to succeed in Latin America today it must have redistributive policies as well as policies of economic development. However, distribution of wealth or income is not itself political democracy.

Perhaps the fundamental problem in this book is that it does not clearly define political democracy. Several of the contributors, including Wiarda, classify the present regimes in Venezuela, Costa Rica and Colombia as the most democratic ones in the area, which does define by implication what they mean by democracy. Wiarda might observe that those are the three regimes which most clearly conform to what he argues to be the "ethnocentric" North American definition of democracy.

Perhaps it is "ethnocentric," but it seems to me that a simple and meaningful definition of democracy is a system in which the rulers are chosen by the votes of the majority, and the rights of the minority to continue through peaceful means to try to become the majority are preserved. No country in the world has a perfect democracy, or anything approaching it. But it seems to me that that definition presents a measuring rod against which any regime in Latin America, the United States, Northwestern Europe or anywhere else can be judged. Each country which has a system which approaches being democratic will more or less closely approximate this definition. Any which does not approach it may have virtues or vices by other criteria, but is not a democratic government.

The Latin American countries where democracy is more or less a reality will have and do have different institutional arrangements, peculiar to their own histories, cultures, and traditions, for instituting and conducting a democracy. Given social tensions, the tradition of military intrusion into politics, and a number of other factors, they will from time to time act in a way which would not have been approved of by the Warren Supreme Court. Wiarda is correct in saying that the democratic bona fides of a Latin American regime must be judged within the context of its own national circumstances. But there also must be certain "universal" elements involved in any standards of judgment.

ROBERT J. ALEXANDER

Rutgers University

The Politics of Faction: Christian Democratic Rule in Italy. By Alan S. Zuckerman. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979. Pp. xviii + 251. $18.50.)

This is a study of primary interest to persons concerned with the theory of clientelism, political party factions, and Italian politics. Alan Zuckerman's basic purpose is to provide an interpretation of the sources, types, and effects of political party factionalism, especially that type based on clientelism. The study surveys the literature of party factionalism and clientelism, develops some hypotheses on political clientelism, examines factionalism within the Italian Christian Democratic party, and concludes with a final chapter that compares the experience of political clienteles in Japan and India with the Italian case.

Zuckerman's methodology is a conventional one. Much of his information is drawn from secondary sources, such as news accounts, anthropological studies and mass surveys, and other studies of party factionalism in Italy. Original data were generated from the author's fieldwork in Italy, which he conducted in 1968–69, 1972, and 1974. This research included interviews and discussions with national and local political leaders and party officials, observations of local party meetings, and a detailed examination of the Christian Democratic party structure in dissimiliar locales—Potenza, Vicenza, and Milan. He relies on preference votes as a "rough indicator of the presence and strength of political clientelism" (p. xiii). Few original data from the author's fieldwork are presented in a statistical form, but excerpts from interviews are quoted at length to illustrate points. Zuckerman chooses this manner of presentation because his findings are "remarkably consistent" and directly contributed to his "synthesized" picture of the Christian Democratic party (p. xv). His goal is not to make a multifactor analysis or to test the validity of hypotheses with statistical argumentation, but rather to simplify the argument (p. 183) and to explore the logical consequences of his interpretation of Italian factionalism (p. xi).

Zuckerman has two central theoretical concerns. First, he wishes to explain why clientelist factions continue to exist in modern industrialized states despite the common view that clientelism is a function of early stages of development. Secondly, he wishes to specify the consequences of clientelism on the patterns of political competition and public policy in a political system where political clienteles persist. He argues against Marxists who believe that clientelism is tied to early stages of industrialism and will die with the growth of industrialization and the consequent "rational politics" based on political issues and social class. He agrees with the views of Gaetano Mosca who argued that industrialization and democratization give rise to professional politicians who thrive in societies where clientelist ties and norms abound and government patronage persists.

The picture of Italian factionalism that emerges from Zuckerman's approach is also conventional and tends to support the findings of other studies. The underdeveloped South is the classic home base of political clientelism, but the norms and practice of this phenomenon are also found in the industrial North. The Christian Democratic party (DC), which has dominated Italian politics since World War II, benefits from and promotes the existence of political clientelism by controlling patronage in the state administration, public corporations, and local governments. The DC is a mass party, but membership rolls are padded and only a few members are activists. These activists in turn are professional politicians whose livelihood depends on patronage. It is this combination of political dominance of the DC, vast government resources, and professionalism of the party activists that perpetuates clientelism. Zuckerman estimates that from 20 to 40 percent of the DC popular vote is cast for reasons associated with patronage and political clienteles.

According to the author, most of the seven to eight factions within the dominant Christian Democratic party are political clienteles. These factions are typically headed by a national patron who heads a network of regional and local party officials who exchange support and loyalty for jobs and patronage rights. Although clientelist factions increased in the 1960s and 1970s, there are groups of younger people in various party sections and some national leaders who are ideologically or policy-oriented. Yet clientelist factions monopolize party policy-making positions and are primarily concerned with maintaining political alliances and controlling patronage, and not with pursuing long-run economic and social reforms. Although cabinet instability is high in Italy, inter-party competition is at an impasse and unable to break the hold of the DC and its clientelist factions.

This book is not intended for a general audience, but there is little by way of new information, empirical testing of hypotheses, or methodological innovation that specialists can learn from it. Although Zuckerman acknowledges the limitations of his narrow focus (p. 181), his pursuit of the logical consequences of a thesis yields results that are not quite convincing. By basing his case on the structure of Italian politics, he overlooks the existence of clientelism in other factions and parties, downgrades the persistence of political culture and the role of other factors, and is forced to seek evidence in Japan and India for some of his conclusions.

The book also betrays the dualism that pervades much writing about Italian politics. In the present case, the evil clientelist factions, which are not policy-oriented, are posed against the good reformist factions, which are not clientelist. Zuckerman argues that continued clientelist domination of the DC will lead to a loss of power in subsequent elections (belied by the actual results) and he believes that generational change will lead the DC out of its morass. These views are derived more from his bias for social reform, governmental stability and policy-oriented factionalism rather than logical deduction or empirical evidence. However, the book deserves the attention of students of political clientelism and Italian politics because it clarifies some of the theoretical issues, develops an interesting set of hypotheses, and points the way for the comparative study of clientelism.

ERNEST E. ROSSI

Western Michigan University

International Politics

Threat Perception in International Crisis. By Raymond Cohen. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979. Pp. vii + 229. $17.50.)

Raymond Cohen's thesis is that threat perception in international crises is an appraisal process (rather than a flash recognition, as "perception" might imply), involving reasoned and intuitive elements, through which one nation's leaders assess the actions of another nation's leaders as violating rules of international conduct. These violations are disturbing because they confront statesmen with the possibility of chaos by threatening the destruction of diplomacy pursued in accordance with predictable expectations.

Cohen examines six instances of international conflict: French leaders' fears of Bismarck's actions in 1875, Crispi's fears of a French naval attack in 1889, Russian leaders' concerns over the Liman von Sanders affair of 1913, British and Polish leaders' reactions to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and related German actions in the spring of 1939, and the United States leadership's troubles with Soviet actions toward the Turkish Straits in 1946. These cases and other introductory material (on threat perception and building theory through case studies) are presented in an economical fashion that allows Cohen to devote the bulk of his work to a step-by-step development of his thesis. But his brevity leaves only cursory discussions of matters such as the irrelevance of hypotheses drawn from social pyschology for threat perception in international crises (p. 14) and eliminates other matters (acknowledgments) altogether.

Cohen's work is valuable less for the novelty of his thesis than for its detailed, step-by-step development. His distinction between threat perception and threat appraisal or assessment is well taken and interestingly developed (see particularly pp. 159–61). As he works through his argument, Cohen raises a series of issues related to the work several contemporary scholars have done on perception in international relations. But the cases he constructs on these issues are sometimes marred by several disconcerting features.

For instance, in contrast to the contributions of other scholars, Cohen argues (pp. 82–83) that statesmen do not make much use of historical analogies in appraising the threats he studies. Cohen finds virtually no historical analogies in his case materials, and he contends that this dearth has four possible explanations. Relevant historical analogies were: (1) so obvious to the statesmen's audiences that they could be left unvoiced, (2) consciously suppressed since they were disturbing to the statesmen's audiences, (3) unconsciously repressed by the statesmen because of their disturbing associations, and (4) not used frequently by these statesmen. Cohen does not include the possibility that statesmen may fail to reproduce the complete intricacy of their thoughts (especially commonly held presuppositions) in their written memoranda. (An excellent example of this possibility appears on p. 154.) Cohen opts for possibility (4) over the others by reason of its straightforwardness. He modifies this position (p. 84) by suggesting that historical analogies are used in the assessment of threats, but statesmen rely on historical analogies less extensively than other scholars suggest. Cohen subsequently argues: (1) the "roots" of the French war scare of 1875 lay in the experience of 1870 (pp. 105–06), (2) the American concerns in 1946 arose "in light of a previously observed behavior pattern [on the part of the Soviets in Eastern Europe]" (pp. 155–56), and (3) the "recurrent nature of international relations has at least one important implication: it raises any single example of interaction between states beyond the level of a momentary encounter to a learning situation with implications for any future transaction in the continuing process" (p. 187). These passages raise doubts that Cohen's ideas differ in any important way from the prevailing wisdom on statesmen's use of historical analogies.

I discuss this material on the importance of historical analogies in some detail since it reflects limitations that appear in several places in this work. Cohen's book has several strengths. It is clearly organized and well written; it elaborates more thoroughly than any previous work an interesting, and I believe accurate, thesis; and in the process of developing this thesis, Cohen draws several valuable distinctions. Yet some aspects of the argument have a disturbing, forced quality. These problems by no means destroy Cohen's argument, but they do detract from the merits of this interesting book.

CHARLES LOCKHART

Texas Christian University

Capitalism and the State in U.S.-Latin American Relations. Edited by Richard R. Fagen. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1979. Pp. viii + 446. $22.50, cloth; $6.95, paper.)

The editor of this stimulating volume set out to organize a fundamental analysis of the political economy of U.S.-Latin American relations from a critical perspective, with special emphasis on the "deep sources" of U.S. foreign policy. In his introduction, Fagen disarmingly acknowledges the failure of the book to achieve that goal. The result, however, is a collection of essays and case studies with an unusually high proportion of quality.

Two of the best deal not with U.S.-Latin American relations as such, but with the impact of the international financial community. Roberto Frenkel and Guillermo O'Donnell analyze the IMF's "stabilization" programs in the 1960s and 1970s, with particular reference to Argentina, and conclude that the structure of the economy accounts for the highly unstable situation that results. Speculation, not productive forces, come to the fore, and the only goal that is achieved is correction of the imbalance of payments. Frenkel and O'Donnell also suggest why authoritarian regimes cling to such unsuccessful policies. It is extraordinarily difficult to specify when the future gains that repression is supposed to provide are in fact not going to come, particularly when the repression reduces political debate to mere "bureaucratic politics." Barbara Stallings contributes an interesting summary of the return of private banks to international financing in Latin America. She notes their own attempt at a "stabilization" program for Peru in 1976, followed once again by the assumption of responsibility by the IMF a year later.

Two other noteworthy essays deal with the potential political consequences of the internationalization of production. Steve Volk, in a contribution with no specific Latin American reference, discusses the losses to American labor from the declining competitiveness of U.S. industry with cases fteel and electronics. Peter Evans provides a stimulating insight into the complex set of potential "nationalisms" which have only partly emerged in the U.S. and Brazil. Both of these contributions suggest the importance of the role of what Evans calls the "hegemony of internationalist ideology" in the United States.

Several of the contributions are useful case studies without providing much analysis or new perspectives. Fagen and Henry Nau narrate the 1977–78 confrontation between Mexico and the United States over gas prices. Anthony Maingot gives a history of socialist politics in Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana, concluding that it has been mostly rhetoric masking state capitalism. Michael T. Klare and Cynthia Arnson expose the continuing transfer of arms and military training in Latin America despite "human rights" programs. Angela Delli Sante documents the public information programs promoting "free enterprise" by the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico. Alan Wolfe and Jerry Sanders turn to American politics and discuss the "Committee on the Present Danger" in which they see a resurgent "cold war ideology" taking the shape of a sort of perverted Social Democracy. Their essay is followed by two "comments" (which seem almost a parody of debates on the left) which argue that the authors have missed the deeper, unchanging character of "state monopoly capitalism" or the permanent commitment of the American elite to "managed interdependence."

Ira Katznelson and Kenneth Prewitt contribute a stimulating "think-piece" suggesting that the special character of American politics, particularly the relative incoherence of the state apparatus and the weakness of class-based political organizations, might account for the fluctuations in American foreign policy. It remains highly speculative for the topic at hand, however, because of its lack of reference to Latin America. The implied conclusion that the European combination of a more centralized state and large parties on the left would provide a more consistent and popularly based foreign policy towards Latin America seems at least questionable.

This reader comes away from this volume with the impression that the objective of a comprehensive theory or critique of American foreign policy towards Latin America is more remote than ever. The problem would not seem to be in the editor's lack of discipline or the need for more and more case studies and essays. Such a comprehensive critique depends, I believe, on an assumption of a basic historical process that is unfolding, whether it be "development" or the march of "the revolution." Aside from a very few scattered incantations about "sharpening contradictions," the overwhelming impression left by these essays is complexity and diversity, in the actors involved in the drama, and in the plot. The loss of faith in the ever-upward climb of economic growth and modernization is now joined by the growing remoteness of the cataclysm which was supposed to follow an economic crisis and the imposition of fascistoid regimes. Without a relevant theory of historical change, we are cast adrift among the fascinating particulars. It is in the latter that one finds the strength of this book.

DOUGLAS A. CHALMERS

Columbia University

Psychological Models of International Politics. Edited by Lawrence S. Falkowski. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979. Pp. xiii + 312. $22.50.)

This book purports to present "the major approaches to international relations using psychology as a base" (p. 13), a commendable goal given the scarcity of such syntheses in this area. But despite the consistently high quality of the articles contained in the collection, this work fails to provide a broad representation of the research on psychological approaches to world politics. Instead, what is presented is a narrower overview, which might be more appropriately titled "Motivational Analyses of Decision Elites in Foreign Policy Making." By consciously including only selections that fall under this more limited topic, Lawrence Falkowski neglects much recent research in at least three areas: (1) psychological studies of international conflict that do not focus on the decision-making context (see Albert F. Eldridge, *Images of Conflict,* St. Martin's, 1979, and Ross Stagner, *Psychological Aspects of International Conflict,* Brooks/Cole, 1967); (2) studies of international perception that are not restricted to the decision-making context (see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics,* Princeton, 1976; and Robert Mandel, *Perception, Decision Making, and Conflict,* University Press of America, 1979); and (3) psychological studies of international bargaining that transcend the decision-making context (see Daniel Druckman, ed., *Negotiations: Social-Psychological Perspectives,* Sage, 1977). The essays included in the Falkowski book thus end up being relatively homogeneous both in substance and in methodology, in contrast to the substantial diversity which characterizes the field.

This homogeneity, however, works well in terms of the potential for comparing and integrating insights from the chapters and developing some cumulative understanding. Two of the chapters emphasize comprehension of the personalities of foreign policy elites: Margaret Hermann's study examines traits and orientations of heads of state in order to assess the types of leaders that arise in certain types of nations; and Thomas Wiegele's essay suggests looking at "signal leakages"—unintended betrayals of feelings shown through language, facial expressions, voice stress, and body language—in order to develop better psychological profiles of foreign policy makers. Two other chapters concentrate specifically on decision makers' "operational codes" as a way of explaining their foreign policy behavior: Alexander George's selection provides a general framework linking operational codes to bureaucrats' definition of the situation, information search, evaluation of options, and choice propensities; and Hoagland's and Walker's article applies operational codes and specifically to crisis behavior of the United States and the Soviet Union. Finally, four chapters explore the impact of other closely related independent variables on the behavior of foreign policy makers: Lawrence Falkowski investigates how a decision maker's memory affects behavioral flexibility, Stephen Walker how national role conceptions influence the type of foreign policy pursued, Gerald Hopple how elite values affect international behavior, and Semmel and

Minix how the composition of a decision-making group influences the riskiness of the policies undertaken.

This collection of articles is even more methodologically standardized than it is substantively. All of the included studies presenting new research use some form of content analysis of public documents as the data base, the sole exception being the Semmel and Minix piece, which uses small-group experimentation. Noticeably absent is the use of computer simulation, which has been employed recently to explore psychological processes in decision making in Stuart A. Bremer *Simulated Worlds: A Computer Model of National Decision-Making* (Princeton, 1977). All of the selections in the Falkowski book are sophisticated and fairly explicit in their methodology, and they manage to overcome to a reasonable extent the inherent difficulties of analyzing psychological variables indirectly when dealing with relatively inaccessible and unmanipulatable foreign policy elites. Most of the articles are full of technical jargon, which though intelligible could be more consistent across essays: for example, the term "congruence" or "congruity" appears (and is of some importance) in the chapters by Hermann, Falkowski, George, Hoagland and Walker, and Walker, yet is used differently in almost every case. The absence of explicit discussion of the policy implications of the findings (with Semmel and Minix again the notable exception) seems surprising, given the decision-making focus of the book.

It is indeed refreshing to see so much systematic research in one edited collection that escapes the constraints of using objective aggregate data and of assuming complete rationality on the part of each actor. What is really needed now (p. 291) is a comparative assessment (relative to more conventional economic, political, and military influences) of the extent to which, and under what conditions, psychological variables are critical in explaining and predicting foreign policy.

ROBERT MANDEL

Lewis and Clark College

West German Foreign Policy: 1949–1979. Edited by Wolfram F. Hanrieder. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. Pp. xii + 245. $22.50.)

This volume is the product of a conference held in the United States in early January of 1979 to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the Federal Republic of Germany. Taken together, the 16 essays which comprise this volume successfully bring into focus a number of issues important to postwar German foreign policy. Several individual contributions are particularly helpful. Included within this group is an essay by David Calleo which applies a balance-of-power approach in an effort to debunk the notion that the horrors of the Nazi past—and presumably Germany's involvement in the two major wars of this century—can be attributed to a character flaw found in all Germans, past or present. This stereotype which assigns a certain level of immorality and guilt to being German, is "simple-minded" and "provincial" (p. 13), according to Calleo. But a tantalizing opportunity raised here is lost. At this point it might seem useful to expand upon or at least suggest a new perspective for interpreting German policy and behavior. However, that objective remains unfulfilled. If the old perspective of Germany is fading along with the generation who spawned it, we are left without an alternative paradigm to replace it beyond ad hoc analysis.

This volume certainly would be serviceable in an undergraduate course in German politics. Included are essays on German economic policy (Julia Dingwort-Nusseck); on monetary policy (Gerhard Zeitel); on the past and the expected future role of West Germany in NATO (Catherine M. Kelleher)—including within the context of what she sees as a virtually "inevitable" withdrawal by the United States from West European security matters (p. 50); on the *Ostpolitik* of Adenauer (Hans-Peter Schwarz); on the *New Ostpolitik* of the post-Adenauer periods (Karl Kaiser); and, on bilateral relations between the Federal Republic and other major states, including the Soviet Union (William G. Hyland), France (F. Roy Willis), and the United States (Martin J. Hillenbrand).

If there is a theme which bonds this volume together, in some essays running just below the narrative surface, and in others made explicit, it would be a growing apprehension on both sides of the Atlantic of drift and deepening division in U.S.-West German relations. No one factor, as Jan Reifenberg, among others in this volume, elaborates somewhat repetitiously, can be singled out as entirely responsible for this. However, one gleans from these essays that at the top of any list of principal causative influences one would find the following: the evolving maturity of West Germany itself, especially its widening economic responsibilities; the changing complexities of the international system; the diminution of American economic and security credibility generally; and a lack of vision, an indecisiveness, and a mediocrity of American leadership, especially regarding European affairs, coupled and hampered further by a blandness in cultural and social values among the American people. The expectation for continuing uncertainty and deepening divisions in U.S.-West German relations, voiced by J. Robert Schaetzel—especially with regard to economic matters—is echoed again and again by most of the other contributors as well.

Perhaps the most threatening and fundamental question concerning West German foreign policy over the long haul, centers on that country's policy response should the security credibility of the United States erode further. The same question might be raised should the Soviet Union decide to play its "German card." These collateral issues are treated most candidly in the essay by Hans J. Morgenthau. One scenario, as touched upon in the essay by Manfred Wörner, calls for the Soviet Union to apply essentially psychological pressures against West Germany from the vantage point of the Soviet's existing military superiority over the West. The Federal Republic, it would seem, is today the most powerful and yet most vulnerable European member of the Atlantic Alliance.

The second scenario calls for the Soviet Union to buy Bonn off, not through military intimidation, but by dangling an offer before the Germans promising reunification. Although the means differ, the result of these two scenarios is expected to be roughly the same: the "Finlandization" of West Germany. Fortunately, however, the majority of contributors seem in agreement that the neutralization of the Federal Republic in the immediate future is unlikely. West Germany is today simply too integrated with the West across a variety of dimensions—economic, cultural, social, political—to permit that government to shift its foreign policy to the East radically. Yet, one must mention that this question is considered important, or likely enough, to form a central motif in this volume.

The selection and treatment of topics included herein certainly are worth close attention. Yet in several instances the data employed are already dated, e.g., the essay on public opinion and foreign policy. The volume itself is premature insofar as no attention is given to the recent hardening of superpower relations, and implications for the Germans as well as their probable response. The essay on West German-Third World relations is particularly disappointing. Instead of focusing on the issue at hand, the author prefers to develop an argument that West German foreign trade and aid policies should mirror domestic social-welfare programs. The remark is made in this essay that since the mid-seventies "Africa has become the heart of German world politics" (p. 193). Yet only one page on African-West German relations is tacked onto the end of the essay. Also worth noting is that although there is ample opportunity to do so, none of the essays deals meaningfully with the Federal Republic's positioning on energy-related matters, an issue of some concern today.

RICHARD D. PARTCH

Niagara University

The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Psychological Obstacles to Peace. By Daniel Heradstveit. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979. Pp. 233. $17.00, paper.)

This volume will interest those engaged in the emerging field of psychology and international relations and also students of Middle East conflict. It is based on interviews with a purposive sample of Arab and Israeli leaders and members of the elite from 1970–76. In a chapter on methodology, Daniel Heradstveit persuasively discusses such issues as reliability of the data and relevance of the sample, usefully integrating and adding to the literature on such interviews. Both the contributions of the work and its lacunae point to needed research for the future.

The data suggest relationships between certain aspects of self-imagery, perceptions of the opponent, and positions on the issues, keeping in mind the author's particular indicators for these broad concepts. Self-imagery refers to perceptions of the goals of one's own side and whether or not there are differences. Images of the opponent connote perceptions of his goals, threats, and good and bad aspects. Positions on the issues are dichotomized as compromising or uncompromising. Among the study's key contributions are the findings that respondents with unitary self-images and perceptions of the enemy (those who see no differences in goals on their side or in the opponent's camp) tend to be uncompromising, while those with pluralistic perceptions are divided. Heradstveit interestingly theorizes about the relationship between unitary perceptions of the enemy and "hawkishness." Why this aspect of self-imagery seems to be related to choice propensities needs further explication. Future work in this field will also benefit from exploration of additional features of self-imagery and enemy perceptions, related needs, and influences upon conflict positions.

A basic aim of Heradstveit is to test the major hypotheses of consistency and attribution theories. While consistency is generally found, the central propositions of attribution theory are not as clearly supported. Heradstveit suggests a number of instructive refinements (p. 55). He also demonstrates that some of the beliefs of the Operational Code, particularly those regarding the enemy and prospects for the future, can be readily explored through interviews, thus extending the methodologies applicable to this research domain. Other beliefs—for example, "What is the essential nature of political life?"—are not directly usable for interview research and will need further translation into viable questions.

Collapsing the data into broad categories, necessary for quantitative analysis, also highlights the need in this field for qualitative probing and data presentation in the tradition of Lasswell, Leites, Lane, and George, if we are to understand as fully as possible, the requirements for mutually acceptable solutions in seemingly intractable conflicts. Heradstveit emphasizes the broad coding of images in the text, while brief examples of what Arabs and Israelis actually say are provided in an appendix. We also need analysis of the most important of these images, their relationship to positions on the issues, and their implications for conflict resolution.

The extensive coding scheme will provide useful guidelines for future researchers. At the same time, breaking down complex interview materials into "meaningful simplifications" has its price. While much of the coding is understandable, some choices raise questions. For example, regarding solutions to the Palestinian problem, it is not clear why Arab responses suggesting "self-determination," "a separate Palestinian state" on the West Bank/Gaza, and "a plebiscite among the Palestinians" to determine the establishment of a Palestinian state are coded uncompromising, compromising, and mixed, respectively. All of these responses *can* have equivalent meanings, ranging from two states living side by side to zero-sum outcomes. For Israelis, the responses, the "Palestinians are not a nation," and, the Palestinian problem should be solved as part of an Israeli-Jordanian solution, are both coded uncompromising (p. 164). While these responses may have similar meanings, there can also be significant differences, in terms of implications for conflict resolution, between those who use the first response to help rationalize incorporation of the West Bank/Gaza into Israel, and those who, in accord with the second response, would be ready to return most of the territories to Arab sovereignty. The point is that in work on psychological aspects of international relations, we will also need to probe and analyze the *meanings* of particular responses for the actors themselves.

Dichotomizing conflict positions, while it facilitates correlation with other variables, also masks important differences. Heradstveit notes that there are different kinds of "hawks" and "doves." Delineating the attitudes of these subtypes will be useful. Mutually acceptable outcomes will not emerge from overlap in the positions of pure "hawks." Nor are they likely to result from the convergence of pure "doves," since the latter will probably not hold power among all the relevant parties. In the case under review, analysis of the positions of subtypes of "hawks" and "doves" (e.g., Begin versus Dayan, or Shelli—which has no power—versus the "doves" of the Labor Alignment who may hold positions of influence) will be necessary in order to fully discern the political possibilities for overlap in the positions of Israelis and Arabs.

Heradstveit concludes that cognitive rigidity is one of the major blockages to peace. Interpretation of bad enemy behavior in dispositional terms and moderate action as the result of situational constraints prevents basic changes in images of the adversary. The overall data on such attributions is striking, though there is no relationship between dispositional versus situational attributions and "hawks" and "doves," respectively.

This work is one of the most thorough and considered applications of consistency and attribution theories to international conflict, demonstrating both their utilities and limits. Heradstveit surmises that awareness of bias is not sufficient for changing behavior and suggests more attention to situational changes that may produce changes in beliefs. But what will bring about situational changes in such conflicts? The implication, here, is that consistency and attribution theories are useful for understanding thought processes which may obstruct conflict resolution but cannot, by themselves, suggest feasible policies for facilitating mutually acceptable outcomes. We will also have to explore which strategies on the part of whom, will produce what effects in which adversaries, *integrating* this work with the different needs and processes, manifest and underlying, which are illuminated by various psychological theories. Heradstveit's work forwards this enterprise, theoretically and methodologically.

NOEL KAPLOWITZ

Mills College

Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917-1939; The Frustration of a Nationalist Movement. By Ann Mosely Lesch. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979. Pp. 294. $20.00, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

The twentieth century has witnessed the progressive decline of European imperial power and the concomitant rise of new nationalisms and nation-states. Only in rare instances after World War II—i.e., France in Indochina and Algeria—did the imperial powers fight to retain their hold on their colonies. In sharp contrast in the interwar years, the West usually retreated when challenged by nationalist movements which soon were permitted to achieve independent statehood. According to Ann Mosely Lesch, the changed Western response was due to the decline of imperial strength as well as to the transformation of West European attitudes toward colonialism. Consequently, she perceives little correlation between the intrinsic strength of particular nationalist movements and the willingness of the imperial powers to retreat. As a case in point, Lesch observes that the Arabs nationalist movement was no less active in Palestine than in Egypt or Iraq; yet Britain refused to grant to the Palestinians concessions similar to those granted Egypt and Iraq, due to its pledges to the Zionist movement.

In a refreshing departure from the commonly accepted interpretation, Lesch ascribes the failure of the Palestinian quest for statehood to adverse historical circumstances rather than to any inherent weakness of their nationalist movement. Within this context, a cogent and objective analysis of the controversial history of Arab Palestine is presented, covering the mandatory period until the outbreak of World War II. Instead of focusing narrowly on elite factionalism, the study casts elite behavior within a broader framework that highlights the complex network of interactions between the Arab Palestinian elite and a host of other actors—the British authorities, the Zionist elite, the Arab states and the Palestinian community. Particularly significant is the explication of the increasingly militant behavior of the elite in terms of the social and economic changes within Palestinian society which included the rise of radicalized middle-class groups—youth, labor and scouts—whose challenge worked to reduce the decisional flexibility of the Arab traditional leadership.

The study is divided into three parts. Part 1 sketches the background of the Palestinian national movement under Turkish rule, until the breakup of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. The progressive growth of an indigenously Palestinian nationalism is seen as a direct result of increasing Jewish immigration to Palestine. This was in sharp contrast to Arab nationalism which was directed first against the Turks and later against the British and the French imperial presence. Also significant is the periodization of the rise of Palestinian nationalism. The common impression that the Palestinians were late in recognizing the Zionist threat is erroneous; as early as 1891 when the Zionist movement was in its infancy, Muslim and Christian notables joined to urge the Ottoman government to prohibit Jewish immigration and land purchasing. Equally valuable are the author's concise account of the pro-Jewish nature of British policy, the growth of the Zionist movement in Palestine and the abortive attempt to establish effective relationships between the Palestinian and Jewish leaders.

Part 2 is devoted to the growth of the Palestinian nationalist movement in the interwar period. A persistent problem was the Arab failure to forge unity, particularly at the elite level. Even more than the Muslim-Christian cleavage, the ongoing conflict between the various Arab families and leaders weakened the Arab community as a whole vis-à-vis the British and the Yishuv.

Part 3 is fittingly entitled "The Politics of Frustration"—a detailed account of Palestinian attempts to further their cause through international diplomacy, negotiations with the British, and ultimately the use of violence. The diplomatic initiatives were directed at the neighboring Arab countries and the larger Islamic world. The most important consequence of these appeals was the abortive London Conference of February-March 1939 which brought together Egyptian, Iraqi, Saudi, Transjordanian and Yemeni leaders with Palestinian and Zionist leaders. Indeed, the Arab and Jewish positions remained far apart: the Arabs insisted on curtailment of Jewish immigration, while Ben-Gurion proposed that all Palestine become a Jewish state federated with surrounding Arab states. Nor did the British agree to form a legislative council which could bring together the two sides and provide a platform and vehicle for Palestinian participation in the political process. The author indicates that the outcome of the protracted frustration of the Palestinian Arab community was the resort to violence as a political weapon. Basing her conclusions on the theoretical literature on violence—by Gurr, Lupsha and Johnson—Lesch identifies the specific crisis catalysts which were at work in the Palestinian Arab society leading to periodic strikes, riots and revolts. However, these manifestations of violence were not always beneficial to Palestinian interests. Arab violence brought mostly incremental concessions from the British authorities, without weakening the Yishuv. On the contrary, the Jewish minority accelerated its own mobilization to confront the growing Arab challenge.

The author concludes that the outcome of the Jewish-Palestinian nationalist struggle was influenced, but not determined by Palestinian actions. Instead, three factors coalesced to the detriment of the Arab Palestinian community: (1) The dominant international milieu between the World Wars was still one supportive of European imperialism over non-European peoples. Thus, there was no moral pressure on Britain to permit Palestinian self-determienation. (2) The British government was reluctant to relinquish its Palestinian mandate, due to its strategic interests in the area and the fear that withdrawal would result in instability and intervention by outside powers. (3) The Zionist claim to settlement in Palestine won British and international recognition despite its explicit rejection of the legitimacy of Arab national aspirations.

These environmental factors went against the Palestinian cause which was further weakened by the existing cleavages within Palestinian society, between elites, families, classes, and religious groups. The Arab political elite adhered to maximalist goals, while lacking the power to realize these goals. Nevertheless, according to Lesch, this inflexibility was hardly a sufficient explanation for the failure of the Palestinian national movement.

Ann Mosely Lesch has presented a highly dispassionate and authoritative account of a complex and controversial subject. It should be regarded essential reading for those seeking to understand the origins and recent configurations of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

RICHARD HRAIR DEKMEJIAN

State University of New York, Binghamton

Dependency Approaches to International Political Economy: A Cross-National Study. By Vincent A. Mahler. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. Pp. viii + 218. $17.50.)

In a day long past, publication of a dissertation was, at certain of the more prestigious institutions, one of the requirements of the Ph.D. One wonders, were such a convention to exist today, whether the net effect would be to raise the quality of dissertation writing or to excessively stylize that of scholarly publication. Probably both.

Dependency Approaches to International Political Economy is, in many respects, an admirable example of quantitative analysis. While breaking no new methodological ground, it productively uses a panoply of multivariate procedures, including both R- and Q-factor analysis, multiple regression (with appropriate concern for residuals), and analysis of covariance to test a wide variety of hypotheses concerning the domestic implications of international economic dependency. The effort required to assemble reasonably complete data for 70 less developed countries (LDCs) over two dozen indicators (some of them quite new to the literature of quantitative political science) must have been both vexing and time-consuming. An apparent mandate (self-imposed?) to leave virtually no analytic stone unturned is, however, one of the book's most serious weaknesses. Chapter 7, for example, "Linking LDCs to Their Principal Partners" adds very little, other than a measure of numerical precision, to what is already known about "core-periphery" relations. It comes as no surprise to learn that Latin American countries trade largely with the United States and that economic linkages with former colonial powers tend to be perpetuated in a post-colonial world. An effort to cluster LDCs by means of a Q-factor analysis of external dependence is also less than satisfying, despite pre-segregation into Black African, Latin American, and Asian groups after an initial "seventy-variable model proved rather unwieldy and difficult to interpret" (p. 99).

Substantially offsetting these weaknesses are the R-factor and multiple regression analyses reported in chapters 3 and 5, respectively. As a means of "Operationalizing External Dependence" (Ch. 3), 13 variables were assembled: exports/GNP, export concentration (proportion involving two leading trade partners), commodity concentration (modified Hirschman index), trade composition (Galtung index), terms of trade (decrease over 3-year period), private foreign investment/GNP, investment concentration (principal private foreign/total private foreign), public development assistance/GNP, aid concentration (principal donor/total), debt service/export earnings, international reserves/imports, arms transfers/GNP, and university students abroad/total university students. Of the 13, 3 (private foreign investment, students abroad, and arms transfers) were excluded from the R-analysis as tending "to load positively on more than one factor" (p. 43), the remaining 10 being rotated to a 4-factor oblique solution yielding dimensions identified as "trade," "finance," "concentration," and "aid-trade terms," respectively (p. 44).

In chapter 5, a collateral analysis is reported of 8 variables reflecting "particular internal characteristics of LDCs [deemed relevant to] dependency theory" (p. 70): educational enrollment/school age population, social insurance coverage (Cutright procedure), social welfare (based on four ordinally scaled welfare characteristics), educational expenditures/total public expenditures, direct taxes/total government revenue, military expenditures/GNP, internal security forces/population, and military personnel/population. These variables yielded three factor dimensions identified as "welfare," "coercive potential," and "educational budget," respectively (p. 75).

In essence (the actual analysis was a bit more complicated), factor scores from chapter 3 (together with GNP/capita and national resource endowment as control measures) were used as independent variables in a series of multiple regressions in which factor scores from chapter 5 were employed, seriatim, as dependent variables. In most cases (including subsets of the general sample based on absolute GNP and population, region, and former colonial status) the significant relationships that emerged were in accord with those predicted by dependency theory. Of the latter, perhaps the most crucial is the proposition that "in highly dependent LDCs an 'internationalized' elite, its position reinforced by external contacts, [will] pursue a development strategy to improve its own standing and that of the transnational class to which it [belongs], but which [will] result in an overall decline in the standing of nonelites" (p. 145).

Although his findings are somewhat flawed (in part because they are based exclusively on cross-sectional evidence), Mahler deserves credit for attempting to meet head-on, with substantial empirical rigor, what is perhaps the most central issue in contemporary political economy. All in all, he enters the profession with distinction. We shall, I trust, be hearing from him again.

ARTHUR S. BANKS

State University of New York, Binghamton

The Global Predicament: Ecological Perspectives on World Order. Edited by David W. Orr and Marvin S. Soroos. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979. Pp. xvi + 398. $19.00, cloth; $9.00, paper.)

In this volume, David Orr and Marvin Soroos bring together 17 essays on a set of issues which received scant attention in international politics prior to the 1970s, and which continues to receive less than it merits: the political implications of global ecological problems. The scope of this work is extremely broad, and for the most part the essays are speculative rather than empirical. While some political scientists will question the utility of such an approach, the authors direct their work primarily at a larger, interdisciplinary community of scholars, policy makers, and political activists. Moreover, the editors and contributors would argue that there is at least as much need at present to engage in critical evaluation and conceptual development as there is to produce systematic empirical analysis. What they offer here is a clear and highly readable exposition of environmental, resource, energy, and population problems within an international context, with special attention paid to the fundamental challenges posed for conventional international politics in the decades ahead.

Orr and Soroos argue that new approaches to international politics are needed if we are to cope effectively with global ecological limits and resource scarcity. They acknowledge that the 1970s saw a very substantial increase in the level of international environmental concern and activity, and the creation of a variety of new international organizations and agreements focusing on the environment. However, they find such developments only slightly encouraging; none, they say, "has done more than nibble at the fringe of the larger crisis of planetary ecology" (p. 7). Nor do they believe that incremental policy changes and technological fixes in the future will suffice. Effective solutions require institutional, value, and behavioral changes transcending the "state-centric, conflict-oriented paradigm of power politics" (p. 8). Thus the book is devoted to exploring, developing, and applying new "ecological perspectives on world order" and new research approaches which may help build an international politics more suitable for an ever-more-interdependent and fragile world.

In the international political system, the ecological perspective encourages a systemic or holistic view of global problems, and calls attention to resource limits and the limits imposed by the carrying capacity of ecosystems. Such limits will have a profound impact on North-South relations, future population growth, and global economic growth, and will force reexamination of the assumptions underlying most theories of development and modernization, namely, continual abundance of energy and natural resources. Ecological scarcity suggests the need to redefine development, to reconsider the equity of international resource allocation, to reexamine the basis of national sovereignty, and to incorporate ideas of intergenerational equity into present policy decisions. These and similar ideas receive extensive discussion in the book.

To address these issues and needs, the editors have assembled the 17 essays into 6 sections, with some balance between the more conceptual work and that dealing with specific policy problems or issues. In the former category are two contributions on anticipating the future, three on growth and development in ecological perspective, and three on social dangers and challenges. The other sections include three essays on global food alternatives, three on the politics of resource scarcity, and three on international environmental management. Soroos has authored three of the selections, and Orr two of them. Most of the authors are political scientists; several are resource specialists, and one is an economist.

Like many edited collections, *The Global Predicament* suffers to some extent from an uneven coverage of the issues, some overlap among the essays, and the lack of a common analytical framework. The editors have chosen not to integrate the contributions beyond their arrangement into the 6 sections and the offering of some brief introductory commentaries at the beginning of each section. Most readers will not find this omission serious, however, primarily because most of the authors share the basic concerns outlined above. This shared environmentalist perspective adds to the coherence of the volume, although at the same time it limits its use for exposing readers to opposing points of view.

The book should be particularly useful for those seeking a sophisticated and provocative introduction to the wide range of problems constituting the "global predicament." The essays offer concise, informative, and thoughtful overviews of the issues, and include a good deal of fresh and insightful material. Given their paradigm-challenging and exploratory nature, it is not very likely that confirmed skeptics will be won over by these arguments. But they should at least find them interesting to read.

In short, this is an excellent and important book, and it deserves a wide readership. The problems addressed here are of enormous consequence to the future international political system and to the quality of life of much of the world's population. The book might be used as a supplementary text for undergraduate courses in international politics, but its potential use extends to a variety of more advanced courses both within political science and in interdisciplinary programs. A substantial bibliography provides the reader with a convenient guide to the literature in this emerging but ill-defined "subfield."

MICHAEL E. KRAFT

University of Wisconsin, Green Bay

Diplomatic Dispute: U.S. Conflict With Iran, Japan, and Mexico. Edited by Robert L. Paarlberg, with Eul Y. Park and Donald L. Wyman. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1979. Pp. 173. $11.95, cloth; $5.95, paper.)

This study, which includes so many references to Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr.'s *Power and Interdependence* that it seems designed to be read in tandem with their work, is a serious attempt to explain a world in which the powerful nations are increasingly unable to employ power in its traditional manner, that is, to settle all disputes in their own favor. The authors, using the Keohane and Nye research design that studied U.S.-Canadian and U.S.-Australian relations, applied their "complex interdependence" concept to a treatment of diplomatic disputes between the U.S. and Iran, Japan, and Mexico.

The Keohane and Nye characteristics of "complex interdependence" are explained as "not using military force to settle conflicts," having "an agenda of multiple conflict issues without structured priorities," and showing "the existence of multiple channels connecting the societies and governments" (p. 89). The contention of the Paarlberg-Park-Wyman study is that their materials show that U.S. relationships with Iran, Japan, and Mexico "fall short of the fully developed model of complex interdependence" (p. 148). In view of the present state of U.S.-Iranian relationships, it is quite significant that this study, completed in 1975, clearly states that U.S.-Iranian interdependence to be nonexistent. The study prophetically anticipated the current difficulties between the two nations. In addition, Wyman's treatment of U.S.-Mexican diplomatic differences hints of similar areas of trouble.

While there is great merit in this attempt to explain diplomatic relationships in a quantitative way, some limitations are rather obvious. First, merely enumerating the many disputes cannot account for the great difference in the intensity of some conflicts. For instance, the politico-military conflicts waged between the U.S. and Japan previous to WW II can hardly be considered qualitatively comparable to the economic (trade) issues involving the same countries. Second, a great deal of subjectivity must be admitted when selecting which disputes to include or exclude when many disputes overlap. Finally, the "outcome determination" is certainly questionable especially when it is admitted that the "U.S. was willing and strong enough to set the rules" (p. 154). Discounting these limitations of the method used, the study certainly provides an innovative way to gain insight into the scope, variety, and tenor of U.S.-Iranian, U.S.-Mexican, and U.S.-Japanese relations.

In the context of an ever-changing, complex world, vast disparity in power relationships cannot be expected to determine automatically the outcome of disputes between nations. What still remains unclear, even after this study, is whether a viable alternative to the use of an ambiguous term such as "power" has been offered by the equally porous concept of "complex interdependence." By demonstrating that "complex interdependence" cannot be applied to the quality of the relationships between the U.S. and Iran, Japan, and Mexico, Paarlberg-Park-Wyman are saying that a redefining of the concept is needed, or that U.S.-Canadian-Australian relations are unique, or that a whole new description of the dependency inherent in greatly disparate power relationships is essential.

CHARLES A. RAITH

Albright College

Understanding Conflict and War: Vol. 4, *War, Power, Peace*. By R. J. Rummel. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979. Pp. 447. $27.50.)

Perhaps the most important point to keep in mind about *War, Power, Peace* is that it is the fourth volume in a five-volume series, and that its purposes and contents draw from the previous works and lead on to the last. R. J. Rummel, in the first chapter, presents his scholarly concerns and outlines how the volumes of this series address those concerns. Simply, the focus has been on *understanding* war. Rummel notes, "This has been my single, superordinate passion, regardless of my change in perspective on truth or in political views" (p. 20). Rummel briefly reviews his notions about "understanding." He sees three paths to understanding, and hopes in this series to merge the three: metaphysics, experience and analytic theory. In seeking to generalize through finding the common elements of conflict and war, social philosophy, analytic theory and empirical science are required to present a "unified picture" of man, the state and war (e.g., see p. 25). This picture, then, is the result of intuition, reason and experience.

Rummel outlines five "distinct but related" lines of inquiry in pursuit of his understanding: formal work in international relations; analytic theory (e.g., systems theory, game theory, the work of Richardson); methods for operationalizing and testing a theory of war; quantitative empirical analyses; and the philosophical understanding of man, society and conflict. Volume 1 of this series, *The Dynamic Psychological Field,* developed the philosophical and psychological components. An attempt to outline a general understanding of conflict was presented in volume 2, *The Conflict Helix,* while competing theories of conflict were discussed in volume 3, *Conflict in Perspective.* The primary purpose of the first two volumes was the "unpacking" of the concepts on which the present volume is based. It is crucial to understand the five lines of inquiry and the concerns of the previous volumes, because *War, Power, Peace* is "the consummation of this work, the integrative (hopefully) volume on the subject of understanding war, the conflict out of which it grows, and peace" (p. 20).

Rummel succeeds admirably in his purpose. This volume summarizes and pulls together the concepts, approaches and ideas set out in the first three volumes, as well as his work in social field theory. It is not an easy read; the book is overloaded with footnotes and appendices. But, if covered closely, these items indicate clearly where and how the ideas presented derive from the earlier volumes. More importantly, this volume not only integrates Rummel's own earlier volumes (to the point where it is probably unnecessary to read them), it synthesizes these materials within a broader context of views and findings found in the literature on international conflict.

Rummel provides a good outline of the book in chapter 1, and a summary of its major propositions and principles in chapters 19 and 20. He has integrated the earlier books through abstracting 23 major principles of man, society and international relations which relate to conflict, war and peace; 8 of the most general propositions on social conflict; and the application of empirical evidence to 54 explicit propositions derived from social field theory. The propositions from social field theory (which is presented very concisely and intelligibly), and the 8 "primary" propositions on social conflict, are evaluated in terms of the results of several hundred empirical studies. In sum, Rummel finds "circumstantial evidence" in support of social field theory, with 80 percent of the evidence either positive or strongly positive, against 13 percent which is negative. The various tables and appendices which categorize and organize the large number of empirical studies cited make this book a most valuable one for the student of international conflict.

The summary of propositions and principles follows the organization of the book into these sections: part 2, International Behavior; part 3, The International Field; part 4, The International Conflict Helix; and part 5, The Balancing of Powers. The book is far too rich in concepts, propositions, arguments and evidence even to begin to summarize the results. In particular, the discussion of the conflict *process*—the conflict helix—in parts 4 and 5, is thoughtful, provocative, and an excellent synthesis of the literature. Rummel's concern with the "balancing" of actors and power, seen primarily as a "bargaining process" (e.g., see p. 175), makes this volume an interesting companion to Snyder and Diesing's *Conflict among Nations.* Additionally, while one might disagree with the views on detente which Rummel presented in the mid-1970s, the issues, processes and findings that led him to *his* conclusions, emerge in this synthesis.

As I have noted, this is not an easy book to read. Some of the figures and diagrams lack clarity. Jargon becomes a problem in some instances. However, Rummel indicates his intention to present a "non-technical" text for undergraduates which will display these ideas in a less complex and cluttered way. The reader will, despite these problems, come away with an understanding of where Rummel has come in this thinking about war, and how he got there (and where he will go in a fifth volume on controlling war, especially nuclear war). Given the current state of theory and research, this volume requires close reading by students of international conflict, war and peace.

HARVEY STARR

Indiana University

The Correlates of War: Vol. 1, *Research Origins and Rationale*; Vol. 2, *Testing Some Realpolitik Models.* Edited by J. David Singer. (New York: Free Press, 1979, 1980. Pp. xix + 405, xxxviii + 328. $17.95, $25.00.)

The Correlates of War, Vols. 1 and 2, provide "another interim report" (Vol. 2, p. xxxvii) of the Michigan "COW" Project. Whereas all of the essays in the first volume of *Correlates of War* have been published elsewhere, nine unpublished tests of "some realpolitik models" constitute the second volume, many being reports of Michigan doctoral dissertations. The substantive findings of the empirical work are briefly summarized in a serial fashion by Karl Deutsch in his end essay in the second volume, pronouncing that the studies "mark a well-balanced and far-sighted research effort" (Vol. 2, p. 295). These two volumes have since been complemented by a third collection of some 13 pieces, *Explaining War: Selected Papers from the Correlates of War,* all of which have appeared previously in various SAGE publications (most from the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*).

Although there are many findings extending beyond mere tests of realpolitik models, some of the excitement of the substance in the *Correlates of War* is conveyed in the ways it confirms as well as contradicts the conventional "wisdom." For example, Singer and Small present a critique of the following propositions in various versions of the Nixon-Kissinger "State of the World Message": (1) "Acceptance of War Leads to More War"; (2) "Weakness Leads to War"; and (3) "Alliances Help to Deter War" (Vol. 1, pp. 308–26). The empirical findings are illuminating:

(1) Yes, "Acceptance of War Leads to More War." As Yamamoto and Bremer report, "In the nineteenth century the first power's decision to enter or not to enter produces modest increments in the probabilities that other powers will do likewise. Similarly, in the twentieth century, if the first major power decides *not* to intervene, the resulting increments in the probability that other powers will follow suit are also modest." But, according to the findings from their "two-way conditional choice" analysis, "if the first major power should decide to enter, the expansion of a war to include all major powers becomes very likely. It is in this sense that the 20th century appears to be a great deal more dangerous than the 19th" (Vol. 2, pp. 227–28), yielding "Wider Wars and Restless Nights," as Yamamoto and Bremer entitle their intriguing piece.

(2) No, "Weakness [does not] Lead to War." Bremer's study of "National Capabilities and War Proneness" indicates "it is precisely the nations that have the greatest actual and potential military capability that are disproportionately involved in war" (Vol. 2, p. 81).

(3) No, the nineteenth-century "lesson" that "Alliances Help to Deter War" does not apply in the twentieth century. Singer and Small found, "The observed relationship between alliance aggregation and the onset of war in the nineteenth century, then, is clearly a negative one, and shows a distribution which is diametrically opposed to, and almost as strong as, that found for the twentieth century" (Vol. 1, p. 258).

Yet this critique of Nixon-Kissinger doctrine was rejected for publication by both *Foreign Affairs* and *Foreign Policy,* before being accepted by *Policy Sciences.* Throughout the COW studies, the "knowledge" of the diplomats is often challenged implicitly. It is sad that the two volumes contain few explicit confrontations of the empirical findings with the maxims of traditional statecraft.

Volume 1, subtitled "Research Origins and Rationale," consists largely of reprints of essays written in a quasi-polemical style by Singer from 1958 through 1974. If Singer's competence in epistemology and his normative views have developed as much as his methodological postures (as revealed in his essay, "The Historical Experiment as a Research Strategy in the Study of World Politics"), then one might feel short-changed by a mere reprinting of those earlier essays. One might have preferred, instead of new "headnotes" of apology and explanation for the early works, an integrated statement of Singer's orientations as they have evolved in the last half of the 1970s. One does, however, gain better understanding of the rationales and rationalizations by reading his "history" and "retort" in Hoole's and Zinnes' *Qualitative International Politics* (Praeger, 1976, pp. 21–42, 128–45) than by perusing the often redundant and incomplete statements of earlier vintage. If the reader is easily irritated by contentiousness, it may be well to read first the mellower introduction to the second volume written by Singer in 1979 before delving into the effervescent initial 10 essays (published from 1963 to 1974) reprinted in volume 1.

Although the three reprinted "test" studies placed at the end of volume 1 and the nine new studies of volume 2, subtitled, "Testing Social Realpolitik Models," are not prefaced by separate abstracts, each is well written, containing a definitive summary/conclusion. The essays are encompassing, despite the deliberate neglect of decision making: "We insist on black-boxing these phenomena" (Vol. 2, p. xxvi). The essays range broadly within their concern with the correlates of war. The research stretches from an examination of the causes of war, as in the studies on independent variables by Singer (often with Small, and also with Bremer and Stuckey), Bremer (working alone and with Yamamoto), Gochman, Leng, Sabrosky, Cannizzo, and Wheeler (with focus on national capabilities and alliances), through such dependent variables as postwar industrial growth. Although not often commensurate with each other, these preliminary research reports live up to standard unimagined by most of us when Singer wrote about "Threat Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma" in 1958 (Vol. 1, Ch. 2). If one assesses these data-based explanatory achievements against the substance presented by the 73 authors of articles about war and international relations published in 1969 in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* as so insightfully collated as a propositional inventory by Alker and Bock (*Political Science Annual,* Vol. 3, 1972), one says "well done" to the Michigan team.

The research in *The Correlates of War* indicates the numerous and colossal tasks ahead, along with the urgency of more adequate funding for studies in international politics. Three components of the challenge are clearly illustrated in the empirical work presented in Singer's two volumes: (1) Present knowledge constraints, on both theory and data, exercise a powerful impact upon model building and model testing, as Singer's colleagues struggle to "make do." (2) The findings of the Michigan empirical studies—given their frequent inconsistencies—seem to belie hopes for a general theory of international relations. Perhaps for the nonce we will have to be satisfied with mere partial "models." The conclusions reported in the 12 empirical studies indicate that the search for the nomothetic often ends with a strong tilt toward the idiographic. (3) Singer's realpolitik orientation excludes the development and testing of competing models on a priori grounds. Living creatively with these three constraints presents a surfeit of demands on those working in quantitative international politics, as recently noted by Dina A. Zinnes in her critical appraisal of *Contemporary Research in International Relations* (Free Press, 1976).

Singer's partners in the project on the Correlates of War cope well:

(1) In generating and using their data and in applying models, the Michigan researchers have been creative, diligent, and resourceful. They seldom rest content with the original Singer-Small data bank as given, but continue to reexamine its coding rules and data transformations, probing as to whether the new context within which they are working might call for reformulation of the data set. Too often adjustments are made, it seems to me, thereby assuring eventual incomparabilities. In their translation of verbal formulations from the Nixon-Kissinger "State of the World Message" into testable hypotheses, for example, Singer and Small reexamine and rephrase the policy makers' assertions so as to give them every chance to be congruent with the empirical tests. In the use of probability models, Yamamoto's and Bremer's circumspection in making the fits is exemplary. In this joint piece, they carefully recheck the numbers they earlier obtained empirically for their equations to see whether their original assumptions about "temporal invariance" and "major power homogeneity" were warranted.

Despite all the sophistication in using numbers and models, the limitations of both create heavy burdens for the reseachers. At times members of the Michigan team rebel, throwing off the constraints. It is wondrous to see how Deutsch manages to "number crunch" his way to quite qualitative conclusions in his mini-essay on "The Distribution of War and Its Implications" (Vol. 2, pp. 289–92). It is encouraging to See Yamamoto and Bremer transcend the theoretic limitations as they move beyond their models to consider the nightmarish effects of major powers intervening on opposite sides of minor power wars (Vol. 2, p. 226). The rigors imposed by limited numbers and extant models do not constrain the imagination of these researchers.

(2) *The Correlates of War* will disappoint those who hope that employment of quantitative data and explicit models will lead to the rapid development of more generalized, nomothetic knowledge about international affairs. The Michigan researchers found themselves constantly becoming more idiosyncratic, as they attempted to use the numbers across larger "spatial-temporal domains." Parameters change; first one variable, then another will drop out and another will be "made"; an equation which fits for one situation must be modified considerably to fit another. Sometimes it looks as though the circle is being rounded. The more general speculations derived from the descriptive materials are then retailored to fit the "special cases."

(3) The Correlates of War project's use of competing mini-models is surprisingly frequent, even though emphasis is not given to such a strategy in Singer's pronouncements in the first volume. Singer's younger colleagues find rival views plausible, given the relative absence of reproducible evidence. A number of times contrasting differentia-

tions in the models simply "fall out" in an a posteriori way, as the parameters change between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Vol. 1, p. 165). At other times, there is an a priori arrangement of varying time lags between independent and dependent variables in order to examine varying versions of a given model. Further, the terms within an equation may be posited in both linear (i.e., additive) and nonlinear (e.g., multiplicative) terms, as appropriate to a field that still has so far to go. Venturesome is the way in which a simple model (and not always the statistical "null" model) is contrasted with two or three competing formulations, as when Yamamoto and Bremer move from Bernoulli to the Rutherford to the Polya variations in their war entry probability equations. Quite elegant here is Leng's qualitative molding of a competing model in his augmentation of the Morgenthauian "realist model" by construction of a "counter-realist model," based upon the thinking of the conflict strategists, such as Schelling (Vol. 2, pp. 127–28; Hypotheses 4 and 5, p. 129, 150–53). The early "barefoot" approaches have given way rapidly to theoretic knowledgeability. It would have been even more exciting had Singer entertained simultaneously a whole competing meta-framework, such as the Correlates of Peace.

The Michigan researches have weathered relatively well the buffeting of constraining numbers and semi-tractable models, as compared with the relative lack of success in their aspirations to be policy-relevant. As they point out, most of the variables upon which they have centered tend to be less than easily re-formed by policy makers, even were the latter ever persuaded to change policy by virtue of empirical findings. Self-awareness of the limitations of knowledge seems to have grown over the years, as Singer himself now professes "agnosticism" (Vol. 2, p. xiv) and his colleagues devote less and less space to the normative "implications" of their work. Yet in working as a co-editor with Michael Wallace on a book of essays (*To Augur Well,* Sage, 1979), drawn largely from the researches of non-Michigan scholars, Singer's persisting interest in policy-relevance surfaces again.

The research developments reported in these two volumes indicate how gruesomely painstaking and persistently disciplined one must be in the scientific study of international affairs, while maintaining imaginative thrusts. No grand theory has evolved, but then Singer never promised such—in fact, his euphemistic use of such words as "taxonomy" and "frameworks" (and daringly, even "models") has allowed him to defend his epistemological ramparts well. It is heartening to know that most of his colleagues are just arriving at their professional maturities; let us hope there are few defections.

Karl Deutsch indicates, "Singer and his colleagues are now at work on a book-length effort to integrate their own and others' results to date in a more theoretically ambitious enterprise" (Vol. 2, p. 293). The greatest element of commonality among the researches presented is found in their use, often in a modified and extended form, of the Singer and Small variables and the associated data bank. The reference made by each to the other's work is but cursory, so Singer as integrator has quite a task ahead. His collaborators have not helped him on his way, as the works are fragmented and partial, even though Singer believes they point to "an increasingly coherent body of explanatory knowledge on the incidence of international war" (Vol. 1, p. xix). Singer explains, "Projects involve not only several people; they involve individuals whose concerns and commitments are not identical with those of the principal investigator. . . . Not only do they have diverse priorities but, since the project director's responsibility is to help educate these students as well as to conduct research, he or she cannot run the project like an assembly line. Thus we seldom turn out our findings in a neat and linear fashion, building step by inexorable step to the final synthesis" (Vol. 1, pp. 265–66). If the Michigan team can get their studies together, they will demonstrate they have made top-flight performance within an island of theory of great significance.

Now that we have these two collections of an interim nature, can Singer's integrative efforts meet our ever-rising expectations? Will the team provide a glossary of variables, with both conceptual and operational definitions, as well as studies of the indicators involved, per the exemplar provided by Singer and Small in their "extension and refinement" of indicators of "The Diplomatic Importance of States, 1918–1970"? Will the integrative work include an inventory of propositions, displaying interrelationships, meeting the standards set by Alker and Bock? (Vol. 1, pp. 199–222). Will some members of the team develop a catalog of COW findings, commensurate with the excellence of the codifications of the empirical literature in international affairs made by Jones and Singer (*Beyond Conjecture in International Politics: Abstracts of Data-Based Research,* [Peacock, 1972])? Will a member or two of the team display sufficient courage to mount the integration, with its quasi-competing models, as an all-computer simulation, as recommended by Singer in 1974? (Vol. 1, pp. 192–94). And finally, once the integration has been mounted, will Singer devote himself to the systematic study of implications in terms of "The Normative Orientation" he espoused so eloquently in his 1971 article? (Vol. 1, pp. 3-23).

I have trouble in believing that Singer and his associates can ever complete the tasks just posed, given the immensity of the challenge and the pittance of their fundings. Can we ever meet our obligations in "little" science, working with leftover funds after BIG SCIENCE has preempted the budgets for their laboratories and their cohorts of non-teaching professionals and bands of technicians? In the future there may be a paradigmatic or methodological breakthrough in the social sciences—but as of the present, no such intellectual revolution seems on the horizon for international affairs. Must we develop focused national research institutes and disciplined research corporations, divorced from the fragmenting academic norms of individual autonomy? It could just be that there's no quick-and-cheap social science. But are not the achievements as represented in these two volumes on *The Correlates of War* sufficient tender to warrant more generous investments by all? In the meantime, let us wish the Michigan gang, "Good speed ahead—fine work to date. Can you make it add up, despite the handicaps of limited data, semi-intractable models, and too few dollars?"

HAROLD GUETZKOW

Northwestern University

INDEX TO VOLUME 74

Abbott, Philip. *Furious Fancies: American Political Thought in the Post-Liberal Era.* Reviewed by Darryl Baskin. 1052

Abramowitz, Alan I. "A Comparison of Voting for U.S. Senator and Representative in 1978." 633

Abramson, Paul R. Communication. 780

Abu-Lughod, Ibrahim. Review of William A. Rugh, *The Arab Press: News Media and Political Process in the Arab World.* 857

Adam, Heribert, and Hermann Giliomee. *Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change?* Reviewed by Richard Dale. 1102

Adams, Ruth S., and William H. McNeill, eds. *Human Migration: Patterns and Policies.* Reviewed by Rosemarie Rogers. 881

Adams, Walter, et al. *Tariffs, Quotas and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism.* Reviewed by Wayne Lewis. 873

Adrian, Charles R. Review of Milton L. Rakove, *We Don't Want Nobody Nobody Sent: An Oral History of the Daley Years.* 1096

________, and Ernest S. Griffith. *A History of American City Government: The Formation of Traditions, 1775-1870.* Reviewed by Raymond E. Owen. 494

Agranoff, Robert. Review of Austin Ranney, ed., *The Past and Future of Presidential Debates.* 513

Ahmed, Bashiruddin, and Samuel J. Eldersveld. *Citizens and Politics: Mass Political Behavior in India.* Reviewed by Aruna N. Michie. 233

Alba, Victor. *Transition in Spain: From Franco to Democracy.* Translated by Barbara Lotito. Reviewed by Goldie Shabad. 221

Albinski, Henry S. Review of Howard R. Penniman, ed., *The Australian National Elections of 1977.* 1125

Albright, David E., ed. *Communism and Political Systems in Western Europe.* Reviewed by Richard Gunther. 526

Aldrich, John H. "A Dynamic Model of Presidential Nomination Campaigns." 651

Aldrich, John H. Review of Benjamin I. Page, *Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections: Rational Man and Electoral Democracy.* . . . 212

Alexander, Herbert E. *Financing the 1976 Election.* Reviewed by Michael Margolis. 812

Alexander, Robert J. *Juan Domingo Perón: A History.* Reviewed by George I. Blanksten. . 222

________. Review of Howard J. Wiarda, ed., *The Continuing Struggle for Democracy in Latin America.* 1131

Alexander, Yonah, et al., eds. *Terrorism: Theory and Practice.* Reviewed by Michael Stohl. 577

Alford, John R., and Michael S. Lewis-Beck. "Can Government Regulate Safety? The Coal Mine Example." 745

Allen, Harris M., Jr., et al. "Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting." 670

Allinson, Gary D. *Suburban Tokyo: A Comparative Study in Politics and Social Change.* Reviewed by John C. Campbell. 835

Allworth, Edward, ed. *Nationality Group Survival in Multi-Ethnic States: Shifting Support Patterns in the Soviet Baltic Region.* Reviewed by Ihor Kamenetsky. 222

Amacher, Ryan C., et al. *Tariffs, Quotas, and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism.* Reviewed by Wayne Lewis. 873

Ambler, John S. Review of J. R. Frears and Jean-Luc Parodi, *War Will Not Take Place: The French Parliamentary Elections, March 1978.* 542

Andersen, Kristi. *The Creation of a Democratic Majority, 1928-1936.* Reviewed by Paul A. Beck. 185

Anderson, Stanley. Review of Erik Solem, *The Nordic Council and Scandinavian Integration*; Bengt Sundelius, *Managing Transnationalism in Northern Europe*; and Frantz Wendt, *Nordisk Raad 1952-1978.* 599

Appleton, Sheldon. Review of Arthur J. Lerman, *Taiwan's Politics: The Provincial Assemblyman's World.* 250

Arndt, Sven W., et al. *Tariffs, Quotas, and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism.* Reviewed by Wayne Lewis. 873

Arnold, R. Douglas. *Congress and the Bureaucracy: A Theory of Influence.* Reviewed by Charles O. Jones. 494

Aronson, Jonathan D. *Money and Power: Banks and the World Monetary System.* Reviewed by Robert W. Russell. 284

Aronson, Shlomo. *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective.* Reviewed by Alan Dowty. 285

Ashcraft, Richard. Review of Geraint Parry, ed., *John Locke.* 487

Ashford, Douglas E., ed. *Comparing Public Policies: New Concepts and Methods.* Reviewed

by Alberta Sbragia. 527
Atkins, Barton M. Review of Malcolm M. Feeley, *The Process Is the Punishment: Handling Cases in a Lower Criminal Court.* 820
Auster, Richard D., and Morris Silver. *The State as a Firm: Economic Forces in Political Development.* Reviewed by Gerald Strom. 470

Babai, Don, et al. *Scientists and World Order: The Uses of Technical Knowledge in International Organizations.* Reviewed by Victor Ferkiss. 291
Baker, Benjamin. Review of Gary A. Tobin, ed., *The Changing Structure of the City: What Happened to the Urban Crisis.* 519
Baker, Kendall L. Review of Edward N. Muller, *Aggressive Political Participation.* 486
Baker, Raymond W. *Egypt's Uncertain Revolution Under Nasser and Sadat.* Reviewed by Louis J. Cantori. 224
Bale, Malcolm D., et al. *Tariffs, Quotas, and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism.* Reviewed by Wayne Lewis. 873
Ball, Terence, ed. *Political Theory and Praxis: New Perspectives.* Reviewed by Tracy Strong. 149
Baloyra, Enrique A., and John D. Martz. *Political Attitudes in Venezuela: Societal Cleavages and Political Opinion.* Reviewed by David E. Blank. 528
Banks, Arthur S., ed. *Political Handbook of the World: 1979.* Annotation. 894
———. Review of Vincent A. Mahler, *Dependency Approaches to International Political Economy: A Cross-National Study.* 1141
Banting, Keith G. *Poverty, Politics and Policy: Britain in the 1960's.* Reviewed by Paul Kantor. 1102
Barbagli, M., et al. *Fluidità Elettorale e Classi Sociali in Italia: 1968-1976.* Reviewed by Raymond Seidelman. 836
Barber, James D., ed. *Race for the Presidency: The Media and the Nominating Process.* Reviewed by Cliff Zukin. 495
Bardach, Eugene. Review of Robert Stobaugh and Daniel Yergin, eds., *Energy Future: Report of the Energy Project at The Harvard Business School.* 517
Bark, Dennis L. Review of A. W. DePorte, *Europe between the Super-Powers: The Enduring Balance.* 580
Barromi, Joel, et al. *Israel-Latin American Relations.* Reviewed by Edward B. Glick. 878
Barros, James. Review of U Thant, *View from the UN: The Memoirs of U Thant.* 603
Barry, Donald D., et al., eds. *Soviet Law After Stalin:* Vol. 1, *The Citizen and the State in Contemporary Soviet Law;* Vol. 2, *Social Engineering Through Law.* Reviewed by Peter Vanneman. 837
Barsh, Russell L., and James Y. Henderson. *The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty.* Reviewed by Janna Merrick. 1075
Baskin, Darryl. Review of Philip Abbott, *Furious Fancies: American Political Thought in the Post-Liberal Era.* 1052
Batatu, Hanna. *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers.* Reviewed by James A. Bill. 529
Baylen, Joseph O., and Norbert J. Grossman, eds. *Biographical Dictionary of Modern British Radicals:* Vol. 1, *1770-1830.* Reviewed by Jorgen S. Rasmussen. 530
Beal, Larry V., and Wolfram F. Hanrieder. *Words and Arms: A Dictionary of Security and Defense Terms.* Annotation. 894
Beck, Paul A. Review of Kristi Andersen, *The Creation of a Democratic Majority, 1928-1936.* 185
Beer, Lawrence W., ed. *Constitutionalism in Asia: Asian Views of the American Influence.* Reviewed by Willard H. Elsbree. 531
Beitz, Charles R. *Political Theory and International Relations.* Reviewed by Terry Nardin. 795
Bellhouse, Mary L. Review of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Reveries of the Solitary Walker.* Translated by Charles E. Butterworth. 808
Benjamin, Gerald, and Robert H. Connery. *Rockefeller of New York: Executive Power in the Statehouse.* Reviewed by Sarah M. Morehouse. 191
Benjamin, Roger. *The Limits of Politics: Collective Goods and Political Change in Postindustrial Societies.* Reviewed by Garry D. Brewer. 1104
Bennett, Gordon, with Ken Kieke and Ken Yoffy. *Huadong: The Story of a Chinese People's Commune.* Reviewed by David M. Lampton. 224
Benokraitis, Nijole V., and Joe R. Feagin. *Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunity: Action, Inaction, Reaction.* Reviewed by Allan P. Sindler. 186
Bensel, Richard F. "Creating the Statutory State: The Implications of a Rule of Law Standard in American Politics." 734
Beres, Louis R. Review of R. Michael M'Gonigle and Mark W. Zacher, *Pollution, Politics, and International Law: Tankers at Sea.* 883
Berg, Annette, and David Goodman, trans. Jürgen Domes, *China after the Cultural Revolution: Politics between Two Party Congresses.* Reviewed by Lowell Dittmer. 537
Berg, Larry L. Review of Richard A. Berk, et al., *A Measure of Justice: An Empirical Study of Changes in the California Penal Code, 1955-1971.* 187
Bergsten, C. Fred, et al. *American Multinationals and American Interests.* Reviewed by Michael Doyle. 286
Berk, Richard A., et al. *A Measure of Justice: An Empirical Study of Changes in the California Penal Code, 1955-1971.* Reviewed by Larry L. Berg. 187
Berki, R. N., and J. E. S. Hayward, eds. *State and Society in Contemporary Europe.* Reviewed by Valerie Bunce. 1117
Berman, Larry. *The Office of Management and Budget and the Presidency, 1921-1979.* Re-

viewed by John R. Gist. 496
Berns, Walter. *For Capital Punishment: Crime and the Morality of the Death Penalty.* Reviewed by Ernest van den Haag. 470
Berry, R. Albert, et al., eds., *Politics of Compromise: Coalition Government in Colombia.* Reviewed by John D. Martz. 1104
Bielasiak, Jack. "Policy Choices and Regional Equality among the Soviet Republics." 394
Bill, James A. Review of Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers.* 529
———, and Carl Leiden. *Politics in the Middle East.* Reviewed by Don Peretz. 837
Bissell, Richard E., and Chester A. Crocker, eds. *South Africa into the 1980s.* Reviewed by Gwendolen M. Carter. 1105
Blair, John M. *The Control of Oil.* Reviewed by Charles F. Doran. 188
Blair, John P., and David Nachmias, ed. *Fiscal Retrenchment and Urban Policy.* Reviewed by Timothy G. O'Rourke. 813
Blake, David H. Review of Bruce M. Russett and Elizabeth C. Hanson, *Interest and Ideology: The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen.* 1097
Blank, David E. Review of Enrique A. Baloyra and John D. Martz, *Political Attitudes in Venezuela: Societal Cleavages and Political Opinion.* 528
Blanksten, George I. Review of Robert J. Alexander. *Juan Domingo Perón: A History.* 222
Blasier, Cole, and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, eds. *Cuba in the World.* Reviewed by Andres Suarez. 225
Blechman, Barry M., and Stephen S. Kaplan, et al. *Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument.* Reviewed by Robert L. Butterworth. 497
Bloom, Allan, trans. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile or On Education.* Reviewed by Terrence E. Cook. 490
Blydenburgh, John C. Review of R. J. Johnston, *Political, Electoral, and Spatial Systems: An Essay in Political Geography.* 799
Bobrow, Davis B. Review of Garry D. Brewer and Martin Shubik, *The War Game: A Critique of Military Problem Solving.* 152
———, et al. *Understanding Foreign Policy Decisions: The Chinese Case.* Reviewed by Thomas J. Price. 873
Bogue, Allan G., et al., eds. *The History of American Electoral Behavior.* Reviewed by Everett C. Ladd, Jr. 216
Boles, Janet K. *The Politics of the Equal Rights Amendment: Conflict and the Decision Process.* Reviewed by Irene Diamond. 190
Bone, Hugh A. Review of David Butler and Austin Ranney, eds., *Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory.* 228
Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds. *Political Participation in Latin America:* Vol. 2, *Politics and the Poor.* Reviewed by John D. Powell. 570
Booth, Ken. *Strategy and Ethnocentrism.* Reviewed by Richard Smoke. 578
Bouchier, David. *Idealism and Revolution: New Ideologies of Liberation in Britain and the United States.* Reviewed by Larry D. Spence. 151
Boulay, Harvey. Review of J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Ellen J. Hollingsworth, *Dimensions in Urban History: Historical and Social Science Perspectives on Middle-Size American Cities.* 824
Bourdieu, Pierre. *Algeria 1960: The Disenchantment of the World: The Sense of Honour, The Kabyle House or The World Reversed.* Translated by Richard Nice. Reviewed by Clement H. Moore. 532
Bowen, Elinor R. Review of Michael P. Smith, *The City and Social Theory.* 1066
Boyd, Gavin. Review of Michael B. Yahuda, *China's Role in World Affairs.* 607
Boyd, Steven R. *The Politics of Opposition: Antifederalists and the Acceptance of the Constitution.* Reviewed by Gordon Lloyd. 1076
Brackman, Harold, et al. *A Measure of Justice: An Empirical Study of Changes in the California Penal Code, 1955-1971.* Reviewed by Larry L. Berg. 187
Brahmanand, ed. Jayaprakash Narayan, *Towards Total Revolution:* Vol. 1, *Search for an Ideology;* Vol. 2, *Politics in India;* Vol. 3, *India and her Problems;* Vol. 4, *Total Revolution.* Reviewed by Leo E. Rose. 1123
Brams, Steven J. *The Presidential Election Game.* Reviewed by Bert A. Rockman. 814
Brand, Jack. *The National Movement in Scotland.* Reviewed by Charles L. Taylor. 226
Brann, Eva T. H. *Paradoxes of Education in a Republic.* Reviewed by Walter Nicgorski. 471
Braunthal, Gerard. Review of Honoré M. Catudal, Jr., *A Balance Sheet of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin: Evaluation and Documentation.* 288
Brayton, Abbott A. Review of Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War Revisited.* 884
Brecher, Michael, ed. *Studies in Crisis Behavior.* Reviewed by Robert C. North. 579
Brewer, Garry D. Review of Roger Benjamin, *The Limits of Politics: Collective Goods and Political Change in Postindustrial Societies.* 1104
———, and Martin Shubik. *The War Game: A Critique of Military Problem Solving.* Reviewed by Davis B. Bobrow. 152
Brisbin, Richard A., Jr. Review of John C. Livingston, *Fair Game? Inequality and Affirmative Action.* 828
Brody, Richard A. Review of Kay L. Schlozman and Sidney Verba, *Injury to Insult: Unemployment, Class and Political Response.* 832
Brofoss, Karl E., and Andrew T. Cowart. *Decisions, Politics and Change: A Study of Norwegian Urban Budgeting.* Reviewed by Bertil L. Hanson. 1110
Broh, C. Anthony. Review of William P. Kreml, *The Anti-Authoritarian Personality.* 171
Bromke, Adam, and Derry Novak, eds. *The*

Communist States in the Era of Detente, 1971-1977. Reviewed by Donald R. Kelley. 227
Brown, Bernard E. Review of Ezra N. Suleiman, *Elites in French Society: The Politics of Survival.* 276
Brown, MacAlister. Review of Allan E. Goodman, *The Lost Peace: America's Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War.* 290
Brown, Seyom, *The Crises of Power: An Interpretation of United States Foreign Policy During the Kissinger Years.* Reviewed by Roy M. Melbourne. 816
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. "An Expected Utility Theory of International Conflict." 917
Bunce, Valerie J. "The Succession Connection: Political Cycles and Political Change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe." 966
———. Review of J. E. S. Hayward and R. N. Berki, eds., *State and Society in Contemporary Europe.* 1117
———. Review of Grey Hodnett, *Leadership in the Soviet National Republics: A Quantitative Study of Recruitment Policy.* 245
Bupp, Irvin C. Review of Dorothy Nelkin, ed., *Controversy: The Politics of Technical Decisions.* 261
Burg, Steven L. Review of Ihor Kamenetsky, ed., *Nationalism and Human Rights: Processes of Modernization in the USSR.* 248
Burns, James MacGregor. *Leadership.* Reviewed by Lester G. Seligman. 153
Butler, David, and Austin Ranney, eds. *Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory.* Reviewed by Hugh A. Bone. 228
Butterworth, Charles E., trans. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Reveries of the Solitary Walker.* Reviewed by Mary L. Bellhouse. 808
———. Review of Edward W. Said, *Orientalism;* and Bryan S. Turner, *Marx and the End of Orientalism.* 174
Butterworth, Robert L. Review of Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, et al., *Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument.* 497

Cabán, Pedro A. Review of José J. Villamil, ed., *Transnational Capitalism and National Development: New Perspectives on Dependence.* 890
Cain, Bruce E. Review of H. M. Drucker, *Doctrine and Ethos in the Labour Party.* 840
Callaghy, Thomas M., and Carl G. Rosberg, eds. *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment.* Reviewed by Frances Hill. 1126
Calleo, David P. Review of Karl Kaiser and Hans-Peter Schwarz, eds., *America and Western Europe: Problems and Prospects.* 295
Campbell, Colin, and George J. Szablowski. *The Super-Bureaucrats: Structure and Behaviour in Central Agencies.* Reviewed by Bert A. Rockman. 533
Campbell, John C. Review of Gary D. Allinson, *Suburban Tokyo: A Comparative Study in Politics and Social Change.* 835
Cannizzo, Cynthia. Review of Keith L. Nelson and Spencer C. Olin, Jr., *Why War?: Ideology, Theory, and History.* 594
Cantori, Louis J. Review of Raymond W. Baker, *Egypt's Uncertain Revolution Under Nasser and Sadat.* 224
Caporaso, James A. Review of Neil R. Richardson, *Foreign Policy and Economic Dependence.* 302
Carlton, David, et al., eds. *Terrorism: Theory and Practice.* Reviewed by Michael Stohl. 577
Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. "The Two Faces of Issue Voting." 78
Carpenter, William M., et al., eds. *Strategy and Security in Northeast Asia.* Reviewed by Hong N. Kim. 876
Carras, Mary C. *Indira Gandhi in the Crucible of Leadership: A Political Biography.* Reviewed by William L. Richter. 534
Carter, Gwendolen M. Review of Richard E. Bissel and Chester A. Crocker, eds., *South Africa into the 1980s.* 1105
Cassinelli, C. W. Review of Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China.* 571
Casstevens, Thomas W., and Allison M. Swem. Communication. 788
Catudal, Honoré M., Jr. *A Balance Sheet of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin: Evaluation and Documentation.* Reviewed by Gerard Braunthal. 288
Caws, Peter. *Sartre: The Arguments of the Philosophers.* Reviewed by William S. Corlett, Jr. 1053
Ceaser, James W. *Presidential Selection: Theory and Development.* Reviewed by William Crotty. 817
Chaffee, Wilber A., Jr. Review of Gino Germani, *Marginality.* 1113
Chalmers, Douglas A. Review of Richard A. Fagen, ed., *Capitalism and the State in U.S.-Latin American Relations.* 1135
Chan, Steve, et al. *Understanding Foreign Policy Decisions: The Chinese Case.* Reviewed by Thomas J. Price. 873
Chapman, John W., and J. Roland Pennock, eds. *Compromise in Ethics, Law, and Politics: Nomos XXI.* Reviewed by Donald A. Strickland. 807
———, eds. *Constitutionalism: Nomos XX.* Reviewed by Harvey Wheeler. 1061
Charlton, Sue Ellen M. Review of George A. Codding, Jr. and William Safran, *Ideology and Politics: The Socialist Party of France.* 535
Chou, Ikua. Review of Harry G. Gelber, *Technology, Defense, and External Relations in China, 1975-1978.* 1112
Chu, Godwin C., and Francis L. K. Hsu, eds. *Moving a Mountain: Cultural Change in China.* Reviewed by Alan P. L. Liu. 838
Cicak, Fedor I. Review of Ellen T. Comisso, *Workers' Control Under Plan and Market: Implications of Yugoslav Self-Management.* 1109
Citrin, Jack. Review of Sidney Verba, et al., *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison.* 278

Clark, Cal. Review of Ronald H. Linden, *Bear and Foxes: The International Relations of the East European States, 1965-1969.* 590
Clarke, Duncan L. *Politics of Arms Control: The Role and Effectiveness of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.* Reviewed by John H. Esterline. 818
Clarke, Harold D. Review of Colin Mellors, *The British MP: A Socio-economic Study of the House of Commons.* 255
———, et al. *Citizen Politicians-Canada: Party Officials in a Democratic Society.* Reviewed by Ronald G. Landes. 845
Claude, Richard P. Review of Maurice Cranston, *What Are Human Rights?* 289
Clausen, Aage R. Review of Jerrold E. Schneider, *Ideological Coalitions in Congress.* 215
Cochran, Charles L. Review of Ross D. Eckert, *The Enclosure of Ocean Resources: Economics and the Law of the Sea.* 581
Cocks, Peter. Review of Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World-Economy: Essays by Immanuel Wallerstein.* 306
Codding, George A., Jr., and William Safran. *Ideology and Politics: The Socialist Party of France.* Reviewed by Sue Ellen M. Charlton. 535
Cohen, David K., and Charles E. Lindblom. *Usable Knowledge: Social Science and Social Problem Solving.* Reviewed by Robert F. Rich. 803
Cohen, G. A. *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense.* Reviewed by Alan Gilbert. 156
Cohen, Raymond. *Threat Perception in International Crisis.* Reviewed by Charles Lockhart. 1134
Cole, Richard L. Review of Patrick D. Larkey, *Evaluating Public Programs: The Impact of General Revenue Sharing on Municipal Government.* 204
Collier, David, ed. *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America.* Reviewed by Mitchell A. Seligson. 1107
Comisso, Ellen T. *Workers' Control Under Plan and Market: Implications of Yugoslav Self-Management.* Reviewed by Fedor I. Cicak. 1109
Connery, Robert H., and Gerald Benjamin. *Rockefeller of New York: Executive Power in the Statehouse.* Reviewed by Sarah M. Morehouse. 191
Connor, Walker. Review of D. John Grove, ed., *Global Inequality: Political and Socioeconomic Perspectives.* 877
Conradt, David P. Review of Gerhard Lehmbruch, *Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat.* 1118
Conway, M. Margaret. Review of Ralph M. Goldman, *Search for Consensus: The Story of the Democratic Party.* 195
Cook, Terrence E. Review of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Émile or On Education.* Translated by Allan Bloom. 490
Corbetta, P., et al. *Fluidità Elettorale e Classi and Reality in World Politics.* Reviewed by Kenneth W. Thompson. 294
Corbetta, P., et al., *Fluidità Elettorale e Classi Sociali in Italia: 1968-1976.* Reviewed by Raymond Seidelman. 836
Corlett, William S., Jr. Review of Peter Caws, *Sartre: The Arguments of the Philosophers.* 1053
Cottam, Richard W. Review of Anthony D. S. Smith, *Nationalism in the Twentieth Century.* 491
Cowart, Andrew T., and Karl E. Brofoss. *Decisions, Politics and Change: A Study of Norwegian Urban Budgeting.* Reviewed by Bertil L. Hanson. 1110
Crabb, Cecil V., Jr. Review of Robert C. Johansen, *The National Interest and the Human Interest: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy.* 1086
Cranston, Maurice. *What Are Human Rights?* Reviewed by Richard P. Claude. 289
Crighton, Elizabeth H. Review of David L. Kirp, *Doing Good by Doing Little: Race and Schooling in Britain.* 844
Crocker, Chester A., and Richard E. Bissell, eds. *South Africa into the 1980s.* Reviewed by Gwendolen M. Carter. 1105
Crotty, William. Communication. 468
———. Review of James W. Ceaser, *Presidential Selection: Theory and Development.* 817
Crouch, Colin. *Class Conflict and the Industrial Relations Crisis: Compromise and Corporatism in the Policies of the British State.* Reviewed by B. Guy Peters. 536
Cuddington, John T., et al. *Tariffs, Quotas, and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism.* Reviewed by Wayne Lewis. 873
Cunningham, Noble, Jr., ed. *Circular Letters of Congressmen to Their Constituents 1789-1829.* 3 vols. Reviewed by Samuel Kernell. 819
Curti, Merle. *Human Nature in American Thought: A History.* Reviewed by Alan P. Grimes. 1054

Dale, Richard. Review of Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee, *Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change?* 1102
Dallek, Robert. *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945.* Reviewed by Bruce Russett. 498
Dalton, Russel J. "Reassessing Parental Socialization: Indicator Unreliability Versus Generational Transfer." 421
Damico, Alfonso J. *Individuality and Community: The Social and Political Thought of John Dewey.* Reviewed by John D. Lewis. 158
Danford, John W. *Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy: A Reexamination of the Foundations of Social Science.* Reviewed by David D. Laitin. 159
Davies, James C. Review of Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, *The Biology of Peace and War: Men, Animals, and Aggression (Krieg und Frieden aus der Sicht der Verhaltensforschung).* 796
Davis, David H. Review of Hans H. Landsberg, et al., *Energy: The Next Twenty Years;* and Sam Schurr, et al., *Energy in America's Future.* 505
Davis, Lane. Review of Alan H. Goldman, *Justice and Reverse Discrimination.* 478

Davis, Raymond G., and Marvin A. Harder. *The Legislature as an Organization: A Study of the Kansas Legislature.* Reviewed by John G. Grumm. 199

Deardorff, Alan V., et al. *Tariffs, Quotas, and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism.* Reviewed by Wayne Lewis. 873

Dearlove, John. *The Reorganization of British Local Government: Old Orthodoxies and a Political Perspective.* Reviewed by Jerry A. Webman. 847

de Beer, E. S., ed. *The Correspondence of John Locke:* Vol. 3, *Letters Nos. 849-1241;* Vol. 4, *Letters Nos. 1242-1701.* Reviewed by Robert H. Horwitz. 160

Deering, Christopher J. Review of Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, *Foreign Policy By Congress.* 822

Dekmejian, Richard H. Review of Ann M. Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917-1939: The Frustration of a Nationalist Movement.* 1139

DeLancey, Mark W. Review of Oyeleye Oyediran, ed., *Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule, 1966-79.* 1124

Deloria, Vine, Jr. Review of Francis G. Hutchins, *Mashpee: The Story of Cape Cod's Indian Town.* 1084

DeLue, Steven M. "Aristotle, Kant and Rawls on Moral Motivation in a Just Society." 385

Delzell, Charles F. Review of A. James Gregor, *Young Mussolini and the Intellectual Origins of Fascism;* and A. James Gregor, *Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship.* . . 1114

DeNardo, James. "Turnout and the Vote: The Joke's on the Democrats." 406

DePorte, A. W. *Europe between the Super-Powers: The Enduring Balance.* Reviewed by Dennis L. Bark. 580

Derthick, Martha. *Policymaking for Social Security.* Reviewed by Joyce M. Mitchell. . . . 500

Destler, I. M. *Making Foreign Economic Policy.* Reviewed by R. Harrison Wagner. 1077

———, et al. *The Textile Wrangle: Conflict in Japanese-American Relations, 1969-1971.* Reviewed by Charles Lipson. 229

Devine, Donald J. Review of Russell G. Fryer, *Recent Conservative Political Thought: American Perspectives.* 475

de Weydenthal, Jan B. *The Communists of Poland: An Historical Outline.* Reviewed by Andrzej Korbonski. 231

Diamond, Irene. Review of Janet K. Boles, *The Politics of the Equal Rights Amendment: Conflict and the Decision Process.* 190

Dienel, Peter C. *Die Planungszelle.* Reviewed by Charles R. Foster. 839

Dietz, Henry. Review of Carmelo Mesa-Lago, *Social Security in Latin America: Pressure Groups, Stratification, and Inequality.* 256

Dinerstein, Herbert S. Review of Christer Jönsson, *Soviet Bargaining Behavior: The Nuclear Test Ban Case.* 293

Dirlam, Joel B., et al. *Tariffs, Quotas, and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism.* Reviewed by Wayne Lewis. 873

Dittmer, Lowell. Review of Jürgen Domes, *China after the Cultural Revolution: Politics between Two Party Congresses.* Translated by Annette Berg and David Goodman. 537

Domes, Jürgen. *China after the Cultural Revolution: Politics between Two Party Congresses.* Translated by Annette Berg and David Goodman. Reviewed by Lowell Dittmer. 537

Domínguez, Jorge I. *Cuba: Order and Revolution.* Reviewed by Richard R. Fagen. 538

Doran, Charles F. Review of John M. Blair, *The Control of Oil;* and Robert Engler, *The Brotherhood of Oil: Energy Policy and the Public Interest.* 188

———, and Wes Parsons. "War and the Cycle of Relative Power." 947

Dorn, Edwin. *Rules and Racial Equality.* Reviewed by Robert H. Stern. 1078

Dornan, James E., Jr., et al., eds. *Strategy and Security in Northeast Asia.* Reviewed by Hong N. Kim. 876

Dorrill, William F. Review of Robert G. Sutter, *China-Watch: Toward Sino-American Reconciliation.* 889

Dowty, Alan. Review of Shlomo Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective.* 285

Doyle, Michael. Review of C. Fred Bergsten, et al., *American Multinationals and American Interests.* 286

Drath, Viola H. *Germany in World Politics.* Reviewed by Wayne C. Thompson. 540

Dresang, Dennis L. Review of David Nachmias and David H. Rosenbloom, *Bureaucratic Culture: Citizens and Administrators in Israel.* 260

Drucker, H. M. *Doctrine and Ethos in the Labour Party.* Reviewed by Bruce E. Cain. 840

Dubois, Philip L. Review of Leonard J. Theberge, ed., *The Judiciary in a Democratic Society.* 218

Dunn, James. *Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future.* Reviewed by Lyman T. Sargent. 161

Dunn, John, ed. *West African States: Failure and Promise, A Study in Comparative Politics.* Reviewed by Richard L. Sklar. 232

East, Maurice A., et al., eds. *Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies.* Reviewed by William Pang-yu Ting. 473

Eckert, Ross D. *The Enclosure of Ocean Resources: Economics and the Law of the Sea.* Reviewed by Charles L. Cochran. 581

Edgmon, Terry D. Review of Richard J. Tobin, *The Social Gamble: Determining Acceptable Levels of Air Quality.* 521

Edwards, George C. III. *Presidential Influence in Congress.* Reviewed by David C. Kozak. 1079

Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irenäus. *The Biology of Peace and War: Men, Animals, and Aggression (Krieg und Frieden aus der Sicht der Verhaltensforschung).* Translated by Eric Mosbacher. Reviewed by James C. Davies. 796

Eidlin, Fred H. Review of Martin McCauley, *Marxism-Leninism in the German Democratic Republic: The Socialist Unity Party (SED).* 852

Einhorn, Eric S. Review of Stein Rokkan, ed., *Scandinavian Political Studies,* Vol. 12/77. 268

Eldersveld, Samuel J., and Bashiruddin Ahmed. *Citizens and Politics: Mass Political Behavior in India.* Reviewed by Aruna N. Michie. 233

Eldridge, Albert F. *Images of Conflict.* Reviewed by Betty A. Nesvold. 1054

Elections Research Center. Richard M. Scammon and Alice V. McGillivray, eds., *America Votes 13: A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics,* Vol. 13. Annotation. 896

Elliff, John T. *The Reform of FBI Intelligence Operations.* Reviewed by Richard E. Morgan. 501

El Mallakh, Rageai, and John Waterbury. *The Middle East in the Coming Decade: From Wellhead to Well-Being?* Reviewed by Frederic C. Pearson. 307

Elsbree, Willard H. Review of Lawrence W. Beer, ed., *Constitutionalism in Asia: Asian Views of the American Influence.* 531

Elshtain, Jean B. Review of Gertrude A. Steuernagel, *Political Philosophy as Therapy: Marcuse Reconsidered.* 1068

Ely, John H. *Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review.* Reviewed by Tinsley E. Yarbrough. 1080

Engler, Robert. *The Brotherhood of Oil: Energy Policy and the Public Interest.* Reviewed by Charles F. Doran. 188

Epstein, Leon D. "What Happened to the British Party Model" APSA Presidential Address, 1979. 9

Erbring, Lutz. Review of Dieter Oberndoerfer, ed., *Waehlerverhalten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Studien zu ausgewaehlten Problemen der Wahlforschung aus Anlass der Bundestagswahl 1976.* 563

Esterline, John H. Review of Duncan L. Clarke, *Politics of Arms Control: The Role and Effectiveness of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.* 818

Etheredge, Lloyd S. *A World of Men: The Private Sources of American Foreign Policy.* Reviewed by David Garnham. 192

Eulau, Heinz, and John C. Wahlke, eds. *The Politics of Representation: Continuities in Theory and Research.* Reviewed by James A. Stimson. 477

Evans, Ernest. *Calling a Truce to Terror: The American Response to International Terrorism* Reviewed by Edward Mickolus. 874

Evans, Peter. *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil.* Reviewed by Peter McDonough. 234

Fagen, Richard R., ed. *Capitalism and the State in U.S.-Latin American Relations.* Reviewed by Douglas A. Chalmers. 1135

________. Review of Jorge I. Domínguez, *Cuba: Order and Revolution.* 538

Falco, Maria J., ed. *Through the Looking-Glass: Epistemology and the Conduct of Inquiry—An Anthology.* Reviewed by Eugene F. Miller. 797

Falkowski, Lawrence S., ed. *Psychological Models of International Politics.* Reviewed by Robert Mandel. 1136

Falla, P. S., trans. Lesnek Kolakowsky, *Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution:* Vol. 1, *The Founders;* Vol. 2, *The Golden Age;* Vol. 3, *The Breakdown.* Reviewed by Theodore M. Norton. 799

Feagin, Joe R., and Nijole V. Benokraitis. *Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunity: Action, Inaction, Reaction.* Reviewed by Allan P.. Sindler. 186

Feaver, George. Review of Norman Mackenzie, ed., *The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb:* Vol. 1, *Apprenticeships, 1873-1892;* Vol. 2, *Partnership, 1892-1912;* Vol. 3, *Pilgrimage, 1912-1947.* 251

Feeley, Malcolm M. *The Process Is the Punishment: Handling Cases in a Lower Criminal Court.* Reviewed by Barton M. Atkins. 820

Feld, Werner J. Review of James P. O'Leary, *Systems Theory and Regional Integration: The "Market Model" of International Politics.* 300

Feldbrugge, F. J. M., ed. *The Constitutions of the USSR and the Union Republics: Analyses, Texts, Reports.* Annotation. 894

Feldman, Elliot J., and Neil Nevitte, eds. *The Future of North America: Canada, the United States, and Quebec Nationalism.* Reviewed by Lawrence LeDuc. 541

Fenton, John. Review of Mary T. Hanna, *Catholics and American Politics.* 823

Ferkiss, Victor. Review of Ernest B. Haas, et al., *Scientists and World Order: The Uses of Technical Knowledge in International Organizations.* 291

Finkelstein, Lawrence S. Review of Robert E. Riggs and I. Jostein Mykletun, *Beyond Functionalism: Attitudes toward International Organization in Norway and the United States.* 596

Finer, S. E. *The Changing British Party System, 1945-1979.* Reviewed by C. F. Poke. 1110

________, ed. *Five Constitutions.* Annotation. . 894

Fishkin, James S. Communication. 1049

________. *Tyranny and Legitimacy: A Critique of Political Theories.* Reviewed by Paul F. Kress. 801

________. Review of David L. Schaefer, *Justice or Tyranny: A Critique of John Rawls's "A Theory of Justice."* 176

________, and Peter Laslett, eds. *Philosophy, Politics and Society.* 5th ser. Reviewed by Paul F. Kress. 801

Flanigan, William H., et al., eds. *The History of American Electoral Behavior.* Reviewed by Everett C. Ladd, Jr. 216

Fleming, Marie. *The Anarchist Way to Socialism: Elisee Reclus and Nineteenth-Century*

European Anarchism. Reviewed by Gary Prevost. 474
Foltz, William J. Review of Ali A. Mazrui, *Political Values and the Educated Class in Africa*. 554
Foster, Charles R. Review of Peter C. Dienel, *Die Planungszelle*. 839
Foster, John L. Review of Marshall W. Myer, *Changes in Public Bueaucracies*. 830
Foster, Richard B., et al., eds. *Strategy and Security in Northeast Asia*. Reviewed by Hong N. Kim. 876
Fowler, Linda L. Review of Michael J. Malbin, ed., *Parties, Interest Groups and Campaign Finance Laws*. 1092
Fowler, Robert B. Review of Frank E. Manuel and Fritzie P. Manuel, *Utopian Thought in the Western World*. 484
Fowlkes, Diane L., and Jerry Perkins. "Opinion Representation versus Social Representation: or, Why Women Can't Run as Women and Win." 92
Fox, Douglas M. Review of Karl E. Meyer, *The Art Museum: Power, Money, Ethics;* and Dick Netzer, *The Subsidized Muse: Public Support for the Arts in the United States*. 509
Fox, William T. R. Review of Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*. 492
Fralin, Richard. *Rousseau and Representation: A Study of the Development of His Concept of Political Institutions*. Reviewed by Roger D. Masters. 161
Franck, Thomas M., and Edward Weisband. *Foreign Policy By Congress*. Reviewed by Christopher J. Deering. 822
Franda, Marcus. *India's Rural Development: An Assessment of Alternatives*. Reviewed by Manindra K. Mohapatra. 1111
———. Review of A. H. Somjee, *The Democratic Process in a Developing Society*. 862
Franklin, Mark N., and Anthony Mughan. Communication. 462
Frears, J. R., and Jean-Luc Parodi. *War Will Not Take Place: The French Parliamentary Elections, March 1978*. Reviewed by John S. Ambler. 542
Freedman, James O. *Crisis and Legitimacy: The Administrative Process and American Government*. Reviewed by Paul P. Van Riper. 193
Freeman, Gary P. *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and British Experience, 1945-1975*. Reviewed by Donley T. Studlar. 235
———. Review of Ira Sharkansky, *Wither the State? Politics and Public Enterprise in Three Countries*. 859
Friedgut, Theodore H. *Political Participation in the USSR*. Reviewed by Thomas Remington. 544
Friedman, Robert S. Review of Richard A. Lester, *Reasoning About Discrimination: The Analysis of Professional and Executive Work in Federal Antibias Programs*. 1089
Frohlich, Norman, et al. Communication. 791
Frohock, Fred M. "Rationality, Morality and Impossibility Theorems." 373
Fryer, Russell G. *Recent Conservative Political Thought: American Perspectives*. Reviewed by Donald J. Devine. 475
Frykenberg, Robert E., ed. *Land Tenure and Peasant in South Asia*. Reviewed by Mary F. Katzenstein. 545
Fukui, Haruhiro. Review of T. J. Pempel, *Patterns of Japanese Policymaking: Experiences from Higher Education*. 265
———, et al. *The Textile Wrangle: Conflict in Japanese-American Relations, 1969-1971*. Reviewed by Charles Lipson. 229

Gabin, Stanford B. *Judicial Review and the Reasonable Doubt Test*. Reviewed by Neil D. McFeeley. 1081
Gadbois, George H., Jr. Review of James Jupp, *Sri Lanka: Third World Democracy*. 550
Galnoor, Itzhak, ed. *Government Secrecy in Democracies*. Reviewed by Leon V. Sigal. 236
Gandy, D. Ross. *Marx and History: From Primitive Society to the Communist Future*. Reviewed by Ronald J. Hunt. 163
Gans, Herbert J. *Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek, and Time*. Reviewed by Michael J. Robinson. 194
Garnham, David. Review of Lloyd S. Etheredge, *A World of Men: The Private Sources of American Foreign Policy*. 192
Garson, G. David. *Group Theories of Politics*. Reviewed by Harmon Zeigler. 477
———. Review of A. W. Wright, *G. D. H. Cole and Socialist Democracy*. 870
Gelber, Harry G. *Technology, Defense, and External Relations in China, 1975-1978*. Reviewed by Ikua Chou. 1112
George, Alexander L. *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice*. Reviewed by David S. McLellan. 1082
Germani, Gino. *Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism*. Reviewed by A. James Gregor. 163
———. *Marginality*. Reviewed by Wilber A. Chaffee, Jr. 1113
Germino, Dante. Review of John M. Maguire, *Marx's Theory of Politics*. 483
Gerner, Kristian, et al. *Studying Boundary Conflicts: A Theoretical Framework*. Reviewed by Randolph M. Siverson. 602
Gibson, James L., et al., eds. *Accountability in Urban Society: Public Agencies Under Fire*. Reviewed by Robert T. Golembiewski. 197
Giddens, Anthony. *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis*. Reviewed by James Miller. 1055
Gilbert, Alan. Review of G. A. Cohen, *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense*. 156
Giliomee, Hermann, and Heribert Adam. *Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change;* Reviewed by Richard Dale. 1102
Ginsberg, Benjamin. Review of Edward S.

Greenberg, *Understanding Modern Government: The Rise and Decline of the American Political Economy.* 196

Ginsburgs, George, et al., eds. *Soviet Law After Stalin:* Vol. 1, *The Citizen and the State in Contemporary Soviet Law;* Vol. 2, *Social Engineering Through Law.* Reviewed by Peter Vanneman. 837

Gist, John R. Review of Larry Berman, *The Office of Management and Budget and the Presidency, 1921-1979.* 496

Gitelman, Zvi. Review of Thomas E. Sawyer, *The Jewish Minority in the Soviet Union.* 569

Gleijeses, Piero. *The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt and American Intervention.* Reviewed by Jerome Slater. 238

Glick, Edward B. Review of Edy Kaufman, et al., *Israel-Latin American Relations.* 878

Gochman, Charles S. Review of Charles Lockhart, *Bargaining in International Conflicts.* 299

Godson, Roy, and Stephen Haseler. *"Eurocommunism": Implications for East and West.* Reviewed by R. Neal Tannahill. 240

Goldman, Alan H. *Justice and Reverse Discrimination.* Reviewed by Lane Davis. 478

Goldman, Ralph M. *Search for Consensus: The Story of the Democratic Party.* Reviewed by M. Margaret Conway. 195

Golembiewski, Robert T. Review of Scott Greer, et al., eds., *Accountability in Urban Society: Public Agencies Under Fire.* 197

Goodman, Allan E. *The Lost Peace: America's Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War.* Reviewed by MacAlister Brown. 290

Goodman, David, and Annette Berg, trans. Jürgen Domes, *China after the Cultural Revolution: Politics between Two Party Congresses.* Reviewed by Lowell Dittmer. 537

Gould, David J. Review of Albert Tévoédjrè, *Poverty: Wealth of Mankind.* 602

Graham, George J., Jr. Review of George Mace, *Locke, Hobbes, and the Federalist Papers: An Essay on the Genesis of the American Political Heritage.* 482

Graves, Daniel R. Review of Mary F. Katzenstein, *Ethnicity and Equality: The Shiv Sena Party and Preferential Policies in Bombay.* 843

Gray, Virginia. Review of Diane D. Kincaid, ed., *Silent Hattie Speaks: The Personal Journal of Senator Hattie Caraway.* 1088

Grayson, J. Paul. Review of Richard A. Preston, ed., *Perspectives on Revolution and Evolution.* 566

Greenberg, Edward S. *Understanding Modern Government: The Rise and Decline of the American Political Economy.* Reviewed by Benjamin Ginsberg. 196

Greenstein, Fred I. Review of Elizabeth W. Marvick, ed., *Psychopolitical Analysis: Selected Writings of Nathan Leites.* 804

Greer, Scott, et al., eds. *Accountability in Urban Society: Public Agencies Under Fire.* Reviewed by Robert T. Golembiewski. 197

Gregor, A. James. *Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship.* Reviewed by Charles F. Delzell. 1114

———. *Young Mussolini and the Intellectual Origins of Fascism.* Reviewed by Charles F. Delzell. 1114

———. Review of Gino Germani, *Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism.* 163

Greiffenhagen, Martin, and Sylvia Greiffenhagen. *Ein schwieriges Vaterland; Zur Politischen Kultur Deutschlands.* Reviewed by Kai Hildebrandt. 1115

Greiffenhagen, Sylvia, and Martin Greiffenhagen. *Ein schwieriges Vaterland; Zur Politischen Kultur Deutschlands.* Reviewed by Kai Hildebrandt. 1115

Grew, Raymond, ed. *Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States.* Reviewed by Craig McCaughrin. 546

Griffith, Ernest S., and Charles R. Adrian. *A History of American City Government: The Formation of Traditions, 1775-1870.* Reviewed by Raymond E. Owen. 494

Griffith, William E. *The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany.* Reviewed by Wolfram F. Hanrieder. 547

Grimes, Alan P. Review of Merle Curti, *Human Nature in American Thought: A History.* 1054

Gripp, Richard C. Review of Simon McInnes, et al., eds., *The Soviet Union and East Europe into the 1980's: Multidisciplinary Perspectives.* 254

———. Review of Peter Vanneman, *The Supreme Soviet: Politics and the Legislative Process in the Soviet Political System.* 277

Grofman, Bernard. Review of Nancy M. Henley, *Body Politics: Power, Sex, and Nonverbal Communication.* 165

Grondbjerg, Kirsten, et al. *Poverty and Social Change.* Reviewed by Edgar Litt. 198

Grossman, Norbert J., and Joseph O. Baylen, eds. *Biographical Dictionary of Modern British Radicals:* Vol. 1, *1770-1830.* Reviewed by Jorgen S. Rasmussen. 530

Grove, D. John, ed. *Global Inequality: Political and Socioeconomic Perspectives.* Reviewed by Walker Connor. 877

Grow, Michael. *Scholars' Guide to Washington D.C. for Latin American and Caribbean Studies.* Annotation. 895

Grow, Roy F. Review of Andrew Gyorgy and James A. Kuhlman, eds., *Innovation in Communist Systems.* 241

Grumm, John G. Review of Marvin A. Harder and Raymond G. Davis, *The Legislature as an Organization: A Study of the Kansas Legislature.* 200

Gruner, Erich, et al. *Die Wahlen in den Schweizerischen Nationalrat 1848-1919: Wahlrecht, Wahlsystem, Wahlbeteiligung, Verhalten von Wählern und Parteien, Wahlthemen und Wahlkämpfe; Les Élections au Conseil national suisse 1848-1919: Droit et système électoral, Participation au scrutin, Comportement de l'électorat et des partis. Thèmes dominants et données majeures des* *campagnes électorales.* 3 vols. Reviewed by Arend Lijphart. 549

Guertner, Gary L. Review of Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976.* 1093

Guetzkow, Harold. Review of J. David Singer, ed., *The Correlates of War:* Vol. 1, *Research Origins and Rationale;* Vol. 2, *Testing Some Realpolitik Models.* 1145

Gummett, Philip, and Ron Johnson, eds. *Directing Technology: Politics for Promotion and Control.* Reviewed by Jerome E. Milch. 549

Gunlicks, Arthur B. Review of R. E. M. Irving, *The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe.* 842

Gunnell, John G. Review of Eugene Kamenka and Alice Ehr-Soon Tay, eds., *Justice: Ideas and Ideologies.* 1056

Gunther, Richard. Review of David E. Albright, ed., *Communism and Political Systems in Western Europe.* 526

Gusteson, Raymond H. Review of John F. Martin, *Civil Rights and the Crisis of Liberalism: The Democratic Party 1945-1976.* 829

Gyorgy, Andrew, and James A. Kuhlman, eds. *Innovation in Communist Systems.* Reviewed by Roy F. Grow. 241

Haas, Ernest B., et al. *Scientists and World Order: The Uses of Technical Knowledge in International Organizations.* Reviewed by Victor Ferkiss. 291

Haberer, Joseph. Review of Spencer R. Weart. *Scientists in Power.* 1130

Hagopian, Mark N. Review of Jack J. Roth, *The Cult of Violence: Sorel and the Sorelians.* 1063

Hammond, John L. *The Politics of Benevolence: Revival Religion and American Voting Behavior.* Reviewed by Paul Kleppner. 502

Hammond, Paul Y. Review of Douglas Kinnard, *President Eisenhower and Strategic Management: A Study in Defense Politics.* 203

Handelman, John R. Review of Angus W. McDonald, Jr., *The Urban Origins of Rural Revolution: Elites and the Masses in Hunan Province, China, 1911-1927.* 555

Hanna, Mary T. *Catholics and American Politics.* Reviewed by John Fenton. 823

Hanrieder, Wolfram F., ed. *West German Foreign Policy: 1949-1979.* Reviewed by Richard D. Partch. 1137

———. Review of William E. Griffith, *The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany.* 547

———, and Larry V. Beal. *Words and Arms: A Dictionary of Security and Defense Terms.* Annotation. 894

Hansen, Roger D. *Beyond the North-South Stalemate.* Reviewed by Bahgat Korany. 582

———, et al. *Tariffs, Quotas, and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism.* Reviewed by Wayne Lewis. 873

Hanson, Bertil L. Review of Andrew T. Cowart and Karl E. Brofoss, *Decisions, Politics and Change: A Study of Norwegian Urban Budgeting.* 1110

Hanson, Elizabeth C., and Bruce M. Russett. *Interest and Ideology: The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen.* Reviewed by David H. Blake. 1097

Harder, Marvin A., and Raymond G. Davis. *The Legislature as an Organization: A Study of the Kansas Legislature.* Reviewed by John G. Grumm. 199

Harpham, Edward J. Review of Alan Wolfe, *The Limits of Legitimacy: Political Contradictions of Contemporary Capitalism.* 182

Haseler, Stephen, and Roy Godson. *"Eurocommunism": Implications for East and West.* Reviewed by R. Neal Tannahill. 240

Haungs, Peter, ed. *Res Publica: Studien zum Verfassungswesen.* Reviewed by Donald P. Kommers. 242

Haviland, H. Field. Review of Evan M. Wilson, *Decision on Palestine: How the U.S. Came to Recognize Israel.* 1100

Hawker, Geoffrey, et al. *Politics and Policy in Australia.* Reviewed by Lawrence Mayer. 841

Hawley, Willis D. Review of Gary Orfield, *Must We Bus? Segregated Schools and National Policy.* 211

Hayek, F. A. *Law, Legislation, and Liberty:* Vol. 3, *The Political Order of a Free People.* Reviewed by David L. Schaefer. 165

Hayward, J. E. S., and R. N. Berki, eds. *State and Society in Contemporary Europe.* Reviewed by Valerie Bunce. 1117

Heard, Kenneth A., and Timothy M. Shaw, eds. *The Politics of Africa: Dependence and Development.* Reviewed by Rodger Yeager. 860

Heberle, Klaus H. Review of Francis M. Wilhoit, *Quest for Equality in Freedom.* 811

Hechler, Ken. *Toward the Endless Frontier: History of the Committee on Science and Technology, 1959-79.* Reviewed by Charles O. Jones. 1083

Hedlund, Ronald, et al., eds. *Accountability in Urban Society: Public Agencies Under Fire.* Reviewed by Robert T. Golembiewski. 197

Heisler, Martin O. Review of Walter Laqueur, *A Continent Astray: Europe 1970-1978.* 879

Heller, H. Robert, et al. *Tariffs, Quotas, and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism.* Reviewed by Wayne Lewis. 873

Hellman, Ronald G., et al., eds. *Politics of Compromise: Coalition Government in Colombia.* Reviewed by John D. Martz. 1104

Helm, Jutta A. Review of Gordon Smith, *Democracy in Western Europe: Parties and Politics in the Federal Republic.* 1128

Henderson, James Y., and Russell L. Barsh. *The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty.* Reviewed by Janna Merrick. 1075

Henley, Nancy M. *Body Politics: Power, Sex, and Nonverbal Communication.* Reviewed by Bernard Grofman. 165

Henrikson, Göran, et al. *Studying Boundary Conflicts: A Theoretical Framework.* Re-

viewed by Randolph M. Siverson. 602
Hensley, Thomas R. Review of Gary B. Ostrower, *Collective Insecurity: The United States and the League of Nations During the Early Thirties*. 512
Heradstveit, Daniel. *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Psychological Obstacles to Peace.* Reviewed by Noel Kaplowitz. 1138
Hermann, Charles F., et al., eds. *Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies.* Reviewed by William Pang-yu Ting. 473
Herring, Ronald J. Review of Samuel L. Popkin, *The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam.* 565
Hey, John D. *Britain in Context.* Annotation. 894
Hicks, Ursula K. *Federalism: Failure and Success. A Comparative Study.* Reviewed by Richard H. Leach. 243
Higginbotham, A. Leon, Jr. *In the Matter of Color: Race and the American Legal Process, The Colonial Period.* Reviewed by A. E. Keir Nash. 200
Hildebrandt, Kai. Review of Martin Greiffenhagen and Sylvia Greiffenhagen, *Ein schwieriges Vaterland; Zur Politischen Kultur Deutschlands.* 1115
Hill, Frances. Review of Carl G. Rosberg and Thomas M. Callaghy, eds., *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Assessment.* 1126
Hill, Robert S. Communication. 1046
Hinckley, Barbara. "The American Voter in Congressional Elections." 641
Hoadley, John F. "The Emergence of Political Parties in Congress, 1789-1803." 757
Hochberg, Leonard. Review of Charles P. Kindleberger, *Economic Response: Comparative Studies in Trade, Finance, and Growth.* 552
Hodnett, Grey. *Leadership in the Soviet National Republics: A Quantitative Study of Recruitment Policy.* Reviewed by Valerie Bunce. 245
Hofstetter, C. Richard, et al. *Voting in Indiana: A Century of Persistence and Change.* Reviewed by Austin Ranney. 1085
Hollingsworth, Ellen J., and J. Rogers Hollingsworth. *Dimensions in Urban History: Historical and Social Science Perspectives on Middle-Size American Cities.* Reviewed by Harvey Boulay. 824
Hollingsworth, J. Rogers, and Ellen J. Hollingsworth. *Dimensions in Urban History: Historical and Social Science Perspectives on Middle-Size American Cities.* Reviewed by Harvey Boulay. 824
Holmquist, Frank. Review of Bismarck U. Mwansasu and Cranford Pratt, eds., *Towards Socialism in Tanzania.* 562
Holtzman, Abraham. Review of Graham K. Wilson, *Unions in American National Politics.* 834
Hoole, Francis W. *Evaluation Research and Development Activities.* Reviewed by David Nachmias. 168
Horowitz, Ruth L. *Political Ideologies of Organized Labor: The New Deal Era.* Reviewed by John Oh Ra. 503
Horst, Thomas, et al. *American Multinationals and American Interests.* Reviewed by Michael Doyle. 286
Horwitz, Robert H. Review of E. S. de Beer, ed., *The Correspondence of John Locke:* Vol. 3, *Letters Nos. 849-1241;* Vol. 4, *Letters Nos. 1242-1701.* 160
Houseman, Gerald L. *The Right of Mobility.* Reviewed by William C. Louthan. 825
Hsu, Francis L. K., and Godwin C. Chu, eds. *Moving A Mountain: Cultural Change in China.* Reviewed by Alan P. L. Liu. 838
Huckshorn, Robert J. Review of Gary C. Jacobson, *Money in Congressional Elections.* 1086
Hudson, Darril. Review of C. H. Mike Yarrow, *Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation.* 308
Hunt, Ronald J. Review of D. Ross Gandy, *Marx and History: From Primitive Society to the Communist Future.* 163
Hurewitz, J. C. Review of P. J. Vatikiotis, *Nasser and His Generation.* 576
Hurwitz, Leon. Review of Uriel Rosenthal, *Political Order: Rewards, Punishments and Political Stability.* 269
Hutchins, Francis G. *Mashpee: The Story of Cape Cod's Indian Town.* Reviewed by Vine Deloria, Jr. 1084
Hutchinson, Martha C. *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962.* Reviewed by Peter R. Knauss. 246
Hutter, Horst. *Politics as Friendship: The Origins of Classical Notions of Politics in the Theory and Practice of Friendship.* Reviewed by James M. Rhodes. 169
Hyneman, Charles S., et al. *Voting in Indiana: A Century of Persistence and Change.* Reviewed by Austin Ranney. 1085

Ike, Nobutaka. Review of Ezra F. Vogel, *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America.* 280
Immerwahr, John. Communication. 781
Ince, Basil A., ed. *Contemporary International Relations of the Caribbean.* Reviewed by Harold Molineu. 583
The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. *Southeast Asian Affairs 1979.* Annotation. 895
Irving, R. E. M. *The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe.* Reviewed by Arthur B. Gunlicks. 842

Jackman, Robert W. Review of Michael D. Ward, *The Political Economy of Distribution: Equality versus Inequality.* 181
Jacobson, Gary C. *Money in Congressional Elections.* Reviewed by Robert J. Huckshorn. 1086
Jahn, Egbert, ed. *Soviet Foreign Policy: Its Social and Economic Conditions.* Reviewed by Joseph L. Nogee. 292
James, Dorothy B. Review of Terrence R. Tutchings, *Rhetoric and Reality: Presidential Commissions and the Making of Public Policy.* 1099

Jancar, Barbara W. *Women under Communism.* Reviewed by Ellen Mickiewicz. 247

Jenkins, Christopher, et al., trans. David G. Marr, ed., *Reflections from Captivity: Phan Boi Chau's "Prison Notes" and Ho Chi Minh's "Prison Diary."* Reviewed by Benedict J. Kerkvliet. 253

Jennings, M. Kent. "Comment on Richard Merelman's 'Democratic Politics and the Culture of American Education." 333

Jensen, Lloyd. Review of Robin Ranger, *Arms and Politics, 1958-1978: Arms Control in a Changing Political Context.* 595

Joes, Anthony J. Review of Leonard R. Weinberg, *After Mussolini: Italian Neo-Fascism and the Nature of Fascism.* 1130

Johansen, Robert C. *The National Interest and the Human Interest: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy.* Reviewed by Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. 1086

Johansson, Rune, et al. *Studying Boundary Conflicts: A Theoretical Framework.* Reviewed by Randolph M. Siverson. 602

Johnson, D. Gale, et al. *Tariffs, Quotas, and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism.* Reviewed by Wayne Lewis. 873

Johnson, Karen. Review of A. John Simmons, *Moral Principles and Political Obligations.* 1066

Johnston, R. J. *Political, Electoral, and Spatial Systems: An Essay in Political Geography.* Reviewed by John C. Blydenburgh. 799

Johnston, Ron, and Philip Gummett, eds. *Directing Technology: Policies for Promotion and Control.* Reviewed by Jerome E. Milch. 549

Jones, Charles O. Review of R. Douglas Arnold, *Congress and the Bureaucracy: A Theory of Influence.* 494

________. Review of Ken Hechler, *Toward the Endless Frontier: History of the Committee on Science and Technology, 1959-79.* 1083

Jones, Gary L. Review of Richard Tuck, *Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development.* 1073

Jones, Rochelle, and Peter Woll. *The Private World of Congress.* Reviewed by Sidney Wise. 826

Jönsson, Christer. *Soviet Bargaining Behavior: The Nuclear Test Ban Case.* Reviewed by Herbert S. Dinerstein. 293

Jordan, Robert S., with Michael W. Bloome. *Political Leadership in NATO: A Study in Multinational Diplomacy.* Reviewed by Edward A. Kolodziej. 584

Joynt, Carey B., and Percy E. Corbett. *Theory and Reality in World Politics.* Reviewed by Kenneth W. Thompson. 294

Jung, Hwa Yol. *The Crisis of Political Understanding: A Phenomenological Perspective in the Conduct of Political Inquiry.* Reviewed by Horst Mewes. 479

Jupp, James. *Sri Lanka: Third World Democracy.* Reviewed by George H. Gadbois, Jr. 550

Juviler, Peter H. Review of Robert G. Wesson, *Lenin's Legacy: The Story of the CPSU.* 281

Kadarkay, Apad. Review of Derek Sayer, *Marx's Method: Ideology, Science and Critique in Capital.* 490

Kaiser, Karl, and Hans-Peter Schwarz, eds. *America and Western Europe: Problems and Prospects.* Reviewed by David P. Calleo. ... 295

Kalleberg, Arthur L. Review of A. P. Simonds, *Karl Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge.* 179

Kamenetsky, Ihor, ed. *Nationalism and Human Rights: Processes of Modernization in the USSR.* Reviewed by Steven L. Burg. 248

________. Review of Edward Allworth, ed., *Nationality Group Survival in Multi-Ethnic States: Shifting Support Patterns in the Soviet Baltic Region.* 222

Kamenka, Eugene, and Alice Erh-Soon Tay, eds. *Justice: Ideas and Ideologies.* Reviewed by John G. Gunnell. 1056

Kaminsky, Elijah B.-Z. Review of Peter H. Merkl, ed., *Western European Party Systems: Trends and Prospects.* 1122

Kanet, Roger E. Review of Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, ed., *Perspectives for Change in Communist Societies.* 267

Kann, Mark E. Review of Chantal Mouffe, ed., *Gramsci and Marxist Theory.* 1059

Kanter, Arnold. *Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective.* Reviewed by Aaron Wildavsky. 202

Kantor, Paul. Review of Keith G. Banting, *Poverty, Politics and Policy: Britain in the 1960's.* 1102

Kaplan, Morton A. *Towards Professionalism in International Theory: Macrosystem Analysis.* Reviewed by Andrew K. Semmel. 585

Kaplan, Stephen S., and Barry M. Blechman, et al. *Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument.* Reviewed by Robert L. Butterworth. 497

Kaplowitz, Noel. Review of Daniel Heradstveit, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Psychological Obstacles to Peace.* 1138

Karsten, Peter. Review of John P. Lovell, *Neither Athens nor Sparta? The American Service Academies in Transition.* 508

Katzenstein, Mary F. *Ethnicity and Equality: The Shiv Sena Party and Preferential Policies in Bombay.* Reviewed by Daniel R. Graves. 843

________. Review of Robert E. Frykenberg, ed., *Land Tenure and Peasant in South Asia.* ... 545

Kaufman, Edy. *Uruguay in Transition: From Civilian to Military Rule.* Reviewed by Ronald McDonald. 551

________, et al. *Israel-Latin American Relations.* Reviewed by Edward B. Glick. 878

Kedward, H. R. *Resistance in Vichy France: A Study of Ideas and Motivation in the Southern Zone 1940-1942.* Reviewed by John F. Sweets. 249

Kelley, Donald R. Review of Adam Bromke and Derry Novak, eds., *The Communist States in the Era of Detente, 1971-1977.* 227

Kenworthy, Eldon. Review of James Petras, *Critical Perspectives on Imperialism and Social Class in the Third World.* 885

Keohane, Nannerl O. Review of Sarah S.

Schramm, *Plow Women Rather Than Reapers: An Intellectual History of Feminism in the United States.* 177

Keohane, Robert O., et al. *Tariffs, Quotas, and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism.* Reviewed by Wayne Lewis. 873

Kerkvliet, Benedict J. Review of David G. Marr, ed., *Reflections from Captivity: Phan Boi Chau's "Prison Notes" and Ho Chi Minh's "Prison Diary."* Translated by Christopher Jenkins, et al. 253

Kernell, Samuel. Review of Noble Cunningham, Jr., ed., *Circular Letters of Congressmen to Their Constituents 1789-1829.* 3 vols. 819

Khalifa, Ali M. *The United Arab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentation.* Reviewed by Roy E. Thoman. 844

Kilmann, Ralph H., and Ian I. Mitroff. *Methodological Approaches to Social Sciences.* Reviewed by Henry Teune. 805

Kim, Hong N. *Scholars' Guide to Washington D.C. for East Asian Studies.* Annotation. 895

———. Review of Richard B. Foster, et al., eds., *Strategy and Security in Northeast Asia.* 876

Kim, Jae-On, et al. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison.* Reviewed by Jack Citrin. 278

Kim, Samuel S. *China, the United Nations and World Order.* Reviewed by Sheldon W. Simon. 586

Kim, Young C. Review of Rodger Swearingen, *The Soviet Union and Postwar Japan: Escalating Challenge and Response.* 305

Kincaid, Diane D., ed. *Silent Hattie Speaks: The Personal Journal of Senator Hattie Caraway.* Reviewed by Virginia Gray. 1088

Kindleberger, Charles P. *Economic Response: Comparative Studies in Trade, Finance, and Growth.* Reviewed by Leonard Hochberg. 552

King, Anthony. Review of Seymour M. Lipset, ed., *The Third Century: America as a Post-Industrial Society.* 1090

Kinnard, Douglas. *President Eisenhower and Strategic Management: A Study in Defense Politics.* Reviewed by Paul Y. Hammond. 203

Kirp, David L. *Doing Good by Doing Little: Race and Schooling in Britain.* Reviewed by Elizabeth H. Crighton. 844

Klehr, Harvey E. *Communist Cadre: The Social Background of the American Communist Party Elite.* Reviewed by Paul A. Smith. 504

Kleppner, Paul. Review of John L. Hammond, *The Politics of Benevolence: Revival Religion and American Voting Behavior.* 502

Klingman, David. "Temporal and Spatial Diffusion in the Comparative Analysis of Social Change." 123

Kloman, Erasmus H., ed. *Cases in Accountability: The Work of the GAO.* Reviewed by Joseph Pois. 510

Knauer, James T. "Motive and Goal in Hannah Arendt's Concept of Political Action." 721

Knauss, Peter R. Review of Martha C. Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962.* 246

Knei-Paz, Baruch. *The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky.* Reviewed by Ladis K. D. Kristof. 170

Kocis, Robert A. "Reason, Development, and the Conflicts of Human Ends: Sir Isaiah Berlin's Vision of Politics." 38

———. Review of Alan Ryan, ed., *The Idea of Freedom: Essays in Honour of Isaiah Berlin.* 810

Kofele-Kale, Ndiva, ed. *An African Experiment in Nation Building: The Bilingual Cameroon Republic Since Reunification.* Reviewed by Christian P. Potholm. 1118

Kofmehl, Kenneth. Review of Joseph Pois, *Watchdog on the Potomac: A Study of the Comptroller General of the United States.* 512

Kolakowsky, Lesnek. *Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution:* Vol. 1, *The Founders;* Vol. 2, *The Golden Age;* Vol. 3, *The Breakdown.* Translated by P. S. Falla. Reviewed by Theodore M. Norton. 799

Kolodziej, Edward A. Review of Robert S. Jordan with Michael W. Bloome, *Political Leadership in NATO: A Study in Multinational Diplomacy.* 584

Kommers, Donald P. Review of Peter Haungs, ed., *Res Publica: Studien zum Verfassungswesen.* 242

Korany, Bahgat. Review of Roger D. Hansen, *Beyond the North-South Stalemate.* 582

Korb, Lawrence J. Review of Franklin D. Margiotta, ed., *The Changing World of the American Military.* 209

Korbonski, Andrzej. Review of Jan B. de Weydenthal, *The Communists of Poland: An Historical Outline.* 231

Kornberg, Allan, et al. *Citizen Politicians-Canada: Party Officials in a Democratic Society.* Reviewed by Ronald G. Landes. 845

Kozak, David C. Review of George C. Edwards III, *Presidential Influence in Congress.* 1079

Kraft, Michael E. Review of David W. Orr and Marvin S. Soroos, eds., *The Global Predicament: Ecological Perspectives on World Order.* 1142

Kramnick, Isaac, ed. *Is Britain Dying? Perspectives on the Current Crisis.* Reviewed by Joel D. Wolfe. 846

Krasner, Stephen D. *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy.* Reviewed by John G. Ruggie. 296

Kraynak, Robert P. "John Locke: From Absolutism to Toleration." 53

Kreml, William P. *The Anti-Authoritarian Personality.* Reviewed by C. Anthony Broh. 171

Kress, Paul F. Review of Peter Laslett and James S. Fishkin, eds., *Philosophy, Politics and Society.* 5th ser.; and James S. Fishkin, *Tyranny and Legitimacy: A Critique of Political Theories.* 801

Kringen, John A., et al. *Understanding Foreign Policy Decisions: The Chinese Case.* Reviewed by Thomas J. Price. 873

Kristof, Ladis K. D. Review of Baruch Knei-Paz, *The Social and Political Thought of Leon*

Trotsky. 170
Kruskal, William H., and Judith M. Tanur, eds. *International Encyclopedia of Statistics.* 2 vols. Annotation. 895
Kuhlman, James A., and Andrew Gyorgy, eds. *Innovation in Communist Systems.* Reviewed by Roy F. Grow. 241
Kunsman, Charles, Jr. Review of William S. Livingston and William R. Louis, eds., *Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands since the First World War.* 533
Kurth, James R. Review of Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State.* 524
Kyvig, David E. *Repealing National Prohibition.* Reviewed by Harry R. Mahood. 828

Ladd, Everett C., Jr. Review of Joel H. Sibley, et al., eds., *The History of American Electoral Behavior.* 216
Lagroye, Jacques, and Vincent Wright, eds. *Local Government in Britain and France: Problems and Prospects.* Reviewed by Jerry A. Webman. 847
Laitin, David D. Review of John W. Danford, *Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy: A Reexamination of the Foundations of Social Science.* 159
Lambright, W. Henry. *Technology Transfer to Cities: Process of Choice at the Local Level.* Reviewed by Michael L. Vasu. 505
Lampton, David M. Review of Gordon Bennett with Ken Kieke and Ken Yoffy, *Huadong: The Story of a Chinese People's Commune.* 224
Landes, Ronald G. Review of Allan Kornberg, et al., *Citizen Politicians-Canada: Party Officials in a Democratic Society.* 845
Landsberg, Hans H., et al. *Energy: The Next Twenty Years.* Reviewed by David H. Davis. 505
LaPalombara, Joseph. Communication. 139
Laqueur, Walter. *A Continent Astray: Europe 1970-1978.* Reviewed by Martin O. Heisler. 879
Larkey, Patrick D. *Evaluating Public Programs: The Impact of General Revenue Sharing on Municipal Government.* Reviewed by Richard L. Cole. 204
Larson, David L. *United States Foreign Policy Toward Yugoslavia, 1943-1963.* Reviewed by Paul E. Zinner. 1088
Laslett, Peter, and James S. Fishkin, eds. *Philosophy, Politics and Society.* 5th ser. Reviewed by Paul F. Kress. 801
Laswell, Harold D., with Merritt B. Fox. *The Signature of Power: Buildings, Communication, and Policy.* Reviewed by Linda L. Schluter. 480
Lau, Richard R., et al. "Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting." 670
Lauren, Paul G., ed. *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy.* Reviewed by Joan K. Wadlow. 880
Lawrence, Robert, ed. *New Dimensions to Energy Policy.* Reviewed by Pietro S. Nivola. 506
Leach, Richard H. Review of Ursula K. Hicks, *Federalism: Failure and Success. A Comparative Study.* 243
LeDuc, Lawrence. Review of Elliot J. Feldman and Neil Nevitte, eds., *The Future of North America: Canada, the United States, and Quebec Nationalism.* 541
Lee, Hong Yung. Review of Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949-1977.* 1121
Lefever, Ernest W. *Nuclear Arms in the Third World: U.S. Policy Dilemma.* Reviewed by Michael J. Sullivan III. 587
Legum, Colin, ed., with Haim Shaked. *Middle East Contemporary Survey:* Vol. 2, 1977-1978. Annotation. 895
Lehmbruch, Gerhard. *Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat.* Reviewed by David P. Conradt. 1118
Leiden, Carl. Review of John Waterbury, *Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley.* 893
———, and James A. Bill. *Politics in the Middle East.* Reviewed by Don Peretz. 837
Leonardi, Robert. Review of Rudolph L. Tökés, ed., *Eurocommunism and Détente.* 605
Lerman, Arthur J. *Taiwan's Politics: The Provincial Assemblyman's World.* Reviewed by Sheldon Appleton. 250
Lesch, Ann M. *Arab Politics in Palestine: 1917-1939: The Frustration of a Nationalist Movement.* Reviewed by Richard H. Dekmejian. 1139
Lesser, Selma, et al. *A Measure of Justice: An Empirical Study of Changes in the California Penal Code, 1955-1971.* Reviewed by Larry L. Berg. 187
Lester, Richard A. *Reasoning About Discrimination: The Analysis of Professional and Executive Work in Federal Antibias Programs.* Reviewed by Robert S. Friedman. 1089
Le Vine, Victor T., and Timothy W. Luke. *The Arab-African Connection: Political and Economic Realities.* Reviewed by Brian Weinstein. 589
Levy, David W., and Melvin I. Urofsky, eds. *Letters of Louis D. Brandeis:* Vol. 4, *1916-1921: Mr. Justice Brandeis;* Vol. 5, *1921-1941: Elder Statesman.* Reviewed by Robert G. Seddig. 833
Lewis, John D. Review of Alfonso J. Damico, *Individuality and Community: The Social and Political Thought of John Dewey.* 158
Lewis, Wayne. Review of Walter Adams, et al., *Tariff, Quotas and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism.* 873
Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and John R. Alford. "Can Government Regulate Safety? The Coal Mine Example." 745
Lijphart, Arend. Review of Erich Gruner et al., *Die Wahlen in den Schweizerischen Nationalrat 1848-1919: Wahlrecht, Wahlsystem, Wahlbeteiligung, Verhalten von Wählern und Parteien, Wahlthemen und Wahlkämpfe; Les Élections au Conseil national suisse 1848-1919: Droit et système électoral, Participation au scrutin, Comportement de l'électorat et des partis, Thèmes dominants et données majeures des campagnes électorales.* 3 vols. 549

Lilie, Stuart A. Review of Michael Margolis, *Viable Democracy*. 1057

Lindblom, Charles E., and David K. Cohen. *Usable Knowledge: Social Science and Social Problem Solving*. Reviewed by Robert F. Rich. 803

Linden, Ronald H. *Bear and Foxes: The International Relations of the East European States, 1965-1969*. Reviewed by Cal Clark. . . 590

Link, Arthur, ed. *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson:* Vol. 27, *1913;* Vol. 28, *1914;* Vol. 29, *1913-14;* Vol. 30, *1914;* Vol. 31, *1914;* Vol. 32, *1915*. Annotation. 896

Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan, eds. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*. Reviewed by Philippe C. Schmitter. 849

Lipset, Seymour M., ed. *Emerging Coalitions in American Politics*. Reviewed by Richard F. Schier. 205

________, ed. *The Third Century: America as a Post-Industrial Society*. Reviewed by Anthony King. 1090

Lipson, Charles. Review of I. M. Destler, et al., *The Textile Wrangle: Conflict in Japanese-American Relations, 1969-1971*. 229

Litt, Edgar. Review of Kirsten Grondbjerg, et al., *Poverty and Social Change*. 198

________, and Michael Parkinson. *US and UK Educational Policy: A Decade of Reform*. Reviewed by Edward P. Morgan. 1119

Liu, Alan P. L. Review of Godwin C. Chu and Francis L. K. Hsu, eds., *Moving A Mountain: Cultural Change in China*. 838

Livingston, John C. *Fair Game? Inequality and Affirmative Action*. Reviewed by Richard A. Brisbin, Jr. 828

Livingston, William S., and William R. Louis, eds. *Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands since the First World War*. Reviewed by Charles Kunsman, Jr. 553

Lloyd, Gordon. Review of Steven R. Boyd, *The Politics of Opposition: Antifederalists and the Acceptance of the Constitution*. 1076

Lockhart, Charles. *Bargaining in International Conflicts*. Reviewed by Charles S. Gochman. 229

________. Review of Raymond Cohen, *Threat Perception in International Crisis*. 1134

Losman, Donald L. *International Economic Sanctions: The Cases of Cuba, Israel, and Rhodesia*. Reviewed by Neil R. Richardson. 591

Lotito, Barbara, trans. Victor Alba, *Transition in Spain: From Franco to Democracy*. Reviewed by Goldie Shabad. 221

Louis, William R., and William S. Livingston, eds. *Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands since the First World War*. Reviewed by Charles Kunsman, Jr. 553

Louthan, William C. Review of Gerald L. Houseman, *The Right of Mobility*. 825

Lovell, John P. *Neither Athens nor Sparta? The American Service Academies in Transition*. Reviewed by Peter Karsten. 508

Loveman, Brian. Review of Barbara Stallings, *Class Conflict and Economic Development in Chile, 1953-1973*. 862

Lowi, Theodore J. *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States*, 2nd ed. Reviewed by Norman C. Thomas. 206

Luke, Timothy W., and Victor T. Le Vine. *The Arab-African Connection: Political and Economic Realities*. Reviewed by Brian Weinstein. 589

Lupo, Alan. *Liberty's Chosen Home: The Politics of Violence in Boston*. Reviewed by John F. Stack, Jr. 207

Lustick, Ian. "Explaining the Variable Utility of Disjointed Incrementalism: Four Propositions." 342

Lyons, W. E. Review of Dale R. Marshall, ed., *Urban Policy Making*. 1093

Mace, George. *Locke, Hobbes, and the Federalist Papers: An Essay on the Genesis of the American Political Heritage*. Reviewed by George J. Graham, Jr. 482

Mackenzie, Norman, ed. *The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb:* Vol. 1, *Apprenticeships, 1873-1892;* Vol. 2, *Partnership, 1892-1912;* Vol. 3, *Pilgrimage, 1912-1947*. Reviewed by George Feaver. 251

Macridis, Roy C. Review of Annette E. Stiefbold, *The French Communist Party in Transition: PCF-CPSR Relations and the Challenge to Soviet Authority*. 274

Maggs, Peter, et al., eds. *Soviet Law After Stalin:* Vol. 1, *The Citizen and the State in Contemporary Soviet Law;* Vol. 2, *Social Engineering Through Law*. Reviewed by Peter Vanneman. 837

Maguire, John M. *Marx's Theory of Politics*. Reviewed by Dante Germino. 483

Mahler, Vincent A. *Dependency Approaches to International Political Economy: A Cross-National Study*. Reviewed by Arthur S. Banks. 1141

Mahood, Harry R. Review of David E. Kyvig, *Repealing National Prohibition*. 828

Malbin, Michael J., ed. *Parties, Interest Groups, and Campaign Finance Laws*. Reviewed by Linda L. Fowler. 1092

Mandel, Robert. Review of Lawrence S. Falkowski, ed., *Psychological Models of International Politics*. 1136

Mandelbaum, Michael. *The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976*. Reviewed by Gary L. Guertner. . 1093

Mann, Thomas E., and Raymond E. Wolfinger. "Candidates and Parties in Congressional Elections." 617

Mansbridge, Jane. Review of Carole Pateman, *The Problems of Political Obligation: A Critical Analysis of Liberal Theory*. 488

Mansfield, Harvey C., Sr. Review of James P. Pfiffner, *The President, the Budget, and Congress: Impoundment and the 1974 Budget Act*. 831

Mansfield, Harvey C., Jr. Review of Michael J. G. McGrath, ed., *Liberalism and the Modern Polity: Essays in Contemporary Political Theory*. 172

Manuel, Frank E., and Fritzie P. Manuel. *Utopian Thought in the Western World.* Reviewed by Robert B. Fowler. 484

Manuel, Fritzie P., and Frank E. Manuel. *Utopian Thought in the Western World.* Reviewed by Robert B. Fowler. 484

Marcum, John A. *The Angolan Revolution:* Vol. 2, *Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962-1976).* Reviewed by Herbert F. Weiss. 592

Marcus, George, et al. Communication. 783

Margiotta, Franklin D., ed. *The Changing World of the American Military.* Reviewed by Lawrence J.. Korb. 209

Margolis, Michael. *Viable Democracy.* Reviewed by Stuart A. Lilie. 1057

———. Review of Herbert E. Alexander, *Financing the 1976 Election.* 812

Markus, Vasyl. Review of V. Stanley Vardys, *The Catholic Church, Dissent and Nationality in Soviet Lithuania.* 867

Marr, David G., ed. *Reflections from Captivity: Phan Boi Chau's "Prison Notes" and Ho Chi Minh's "Prison Diary."* Translated by Christopher Jenkins, et al. Reviewed by Benedict J.. Kerkvliet. 253

Marshall, Dale R., ed. *Urban Policy Making.* Reviewed by W. E. Lyons. 1093

Martin, John F. *Civil Rights and the Crisis of Liberalism: The Democratic Party 1945-1976.* Reviewed by Raymond H.. Gusteson. 829

Martin, Robert E. Review of William J. Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions.* 523

Martz, John D. Review of R. Albert Berry, et al., eds., *Politics of Compromise: Coalition Government in Colombia.* 1104

———, and Enrique A. Baloyra. *Political Attitudes in Venezuela: Societal Cleavages and Political Opinion.* Reviewed by David E. Blank. 528

Marvick, Elizabeth W., ed. *Psychopolitical Analysis: Selected Writings of Nathan Leites.* Reviewed by Fred I. Greenstein. 804

Masters, Roger D. Review of Richard Fralin, *Rousseau and Representation: A Study of the Development of His Concept of Political Institutions.* 161

Mauzy, Diane K., and R. S. Milne. *Politics and Government in Malaysia.* Reviewed by Karl von Vorys. 560

Mavrinac, Albert A. Review of Anastase-Jean Metaxas, *Systémismes et Politique.* 805

Mayer, Lawrence. Review of Geoffrey Hawker, et al., *Politics and Policy in Australia.* 841

Mazmanian, Daniel A., and Jeanne Nienaber. *Can Organizations Change?: Environmental Protection, Citizen Participation, and the Corps of Engineers.* Reviewed by Walter A. Rosenbaum. 210

Mazrui, Ali A. *Political Values and the Educated Class in Africa.* Reviewed by William J. Foltz. 554

McCaughrin, Craig. Review of Raymond Grew, ed., *Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States.* 546

McCauley, Martin. *Marxism-Leninism in the German Democratic Republic: The Socialist Unity Party (SED).* Reviewed by Fred H. Eidlin. 852

McCulloch, Rachel, et al. *Tariffs, Quotas, and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism.* Reviewed by Wayne Lewis. 873

McDonald, Angus W., Jr. *The Urban Origins of Rural Revolution: Elites and the Masses in Hunan Province, China, 1911-1927.* Reviewed by John R. Handelman. 555

McDonald, Ronald. Review of Edy Kaufman, *Uruguay in Transition: From Civilian to Military Rule.* 551

McDonough, Peter. Review of Peter Evans, *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil.* 234

McFeeley, Neil D. Review of Sanford B. Gabin, *Judicial Review and the Reasonable Doubt Test.* 1081

McGillivray, Alice V., and Richard M. Scammon, eds. (Elections Research Center). *America Votes 13: A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics,* Vol. 13. Annotation. 896

McGrath, Michael J. G., ed. *Liberalism and the Modern Polity: Essays in Contemporary Political Theory.* Reviewed by Harvy C. Mansfield, Jr. 172

Mcgrath, William, et al., eds. *The Soviet Union and East Europe into the 1980's: Multidisciplinary Perspectives.* Reviewed by Richard C. Gripp. 254

McGregor, James P. Review of Rudolf L. Tőkés, ed., *Opposition in Eastern Europe.* . . 866

McHenry, Dean E., Jr. *Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages: The Implementation of a Rural Development Strategy.* Reviewed by Joel Samoff. 1120

McInnes, Simon, et al., eds. *The Soviet Union and East Europe into the 1980's: Multidisciplinary Perspectives.* Reviewed by Richard C. Gripp. 254

McKinnon, Ronald I., et al. *Tariffs, Quotas, and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism.* Reviewed by Wayne Lewis. 873

McLellan, David S. Review of Alexander L. George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice.* 1082

McMillen, Donald H. *Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949-1977.* Reviewed by Hong Yung Lee. 1121

McNeill, William H., and Ruth S. Adams, eds. *Human Migration: Patterns and Policies.* Reviewed by Rosemarie Rogers. 881

McVey, Ruth T., ed., with Adrienne Suddard. *Southeast Asian Transitions: Approaches Through Social History.* Reviewed by Donald E. Weatherbee. 556

Meier, Kenneth J. Review of Michael L. Vasu, *Politics and Planning: A National Study of American Planners.* 521

Melbourne, Roy M. Review of Seyom Brown, *The Crises of Power: An Interpretation of United States Foreign Policy During the Kis-*

singer Years. 816
Mellor, John W., ed. *India: A Rising Middle Power.* Reviewed by Theodore P. Wright, Jr. 882
Mellors, Colin. *The British MP: A Socio-economic Study of the House of Commons.* Reviewed by Harold D. Clarke. 255
Melzer, Arthur M. "Rousseau and the Problem of Bourgeois Society." 1018
Merelman, Richard M. "Democratic Politics and the Culture of American Education." 319
———. "A Reply to Jennings." 338
Merkl, Peter H., ed. *Western European Party Systems: Trends and Prospects.* Reviewed by Elijah B.-Z. Kaminsky. 1122
Merrick, Janna. Review of Russel L. Barsh and James Y. Henderson, *The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty.* 1075
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. *Social Security in Latin America: Pressure Groups, Stratification, and Inequality.* Reviewed by Henry Dietz. 256
———, and Cole Blasier, eds. *Cuba in the World.* Reviewed by Andres Suarez. 225
Metaxas, Anastase-Jean. *Systémismes et Politique.* Reviewed by Albert A. Mavrinac. 805
Mewes, Horst. Review of Hwa Yol Jung, *The Crisis of Political Understanding. A Phenomenological Perspective in the Conduct of Political Inquiry.* 479
Meyer, Karl E. *The Art Museum: Power, Money, Ethics.* Reviewed by Douglas M. Fox. 509
Meyer, Marshall W. *Changes in Public Bureaucracies.* Reviewed by John L. Foster. 830
Mezey, Michael L. *Comparative Legislatures.* Reviewed by John E. Schwarz. 557
M'Gonigle, R. Michael, and Mark W. Zacher. *Pollution, Politics, and International Law: Tankers at Sea.* Reviewed by Louis R. Beres. 883
Michie, Aruna N. Review of Samuel J. Eldersveld and Bashiruddin Ahmed, *Citizens and Politics: Mass Political Behavior in India.* 233
Mickiewicz, Ellen. Review of Barbara W. Jancar, *Women under Communism.* 247
Mickolus, Edward. Review of Ernest Evans, *Calling a Truce to Terror: The American Response to International Terrorism.* 874
Midlarsky, Manus I. Review of George H. Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System.* 301
Milch, Jerome E. Review of Ron Johnston and Philip Gummett, eds., *Directing Technology: Policies for Promotion and Control.* 549
Miller, David W. *Queen's Rebels: Ulster Loyalism in Historical Perspective.* Reviewed by Robert St.-Cyr. 558
Miller, Eugene F. Review of Maria J. Falco, ed., *Through the Looking-glass: Epistemology and the Conduct of Inquiry—An Anthology.* 797
Miller, Harris N. Review of S. A. Walkland, ed., *The House of Commons in the Twentieth Century: Essays by Members of the Study of Parliament Group.* 868
Miller, James. Review of Anthony Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis.* 1055
Miller, William L. *Electoral Dynamics in Britain since 1918.* Reviewed by W. Phillips Shively. 257
Milne, R. S., and Diane K. Mauzy. *Politics and Government in Malaysia.* Reviewed by Karl von Vorys. 560
Mitchell, Joyce M. Review of Martha Derthick, *Policymaking for Social Security.* 500
Mitra, Subrata K. *Governmental Instability in Indian States: West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab.* Reviewed by Richard Sisson. 853
Mitroff, Ian I., and Ralph H. Kilmann. *Methodological Approaches to Social Sciences.* Reviewed by Henry Teune. 805
Mladenka, Kenneth R. "The Urban Bureaucracy and the Chicago Political Machine: Who Gets What and the Limits to Political Control." 991
Mlynář, Zdeněk. *Nachtfrost: Erfahrungen auf dem Weg vom realen zum menschlichen Sozialismus.* Reviewed by Jiri Valenta. 258
Moe, Terry M. *The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups.* Reviewed by David B. Truman. 1058
Mohapatra, Manindra K. Review of Marcus Franda, *India's Rural Development: An Assessment of Alternatives.* 1111
Molineu, Harold. Review of Basil A. Ince, ed., *Contemporary International Relations of the Caribbean.* 583
Moore, Barrington, Jr. *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt.* Reviewed by John C. Wahlke. 485
Moore, Clement H. Review of Pierre Bourdieu, *Algeria 1960: The Disenchantment of the World, The Sense of Honour, The Kabyle House or The World Reversed.* Translated by Richard Nice. 532
Moore, John E. Review of Frank Stacey, *Ombudsmen Compared.* 272
Moran, Theodore, et al. *American Multinationals and American Interests.* Reviewed by Michael Doyle. 286
Morehouse, Sarah M. Review of Robert H. Connery and Gerald Benjamin, *Rockefeller of New York: Executive Power in the Statehouse.* 191
Moreton, N. Edwina. *East Germany and the Warsaw Alliance: The Politics of Detente.* Reviewed by C. Bradley Scharf. 593
Morgan, David R., and John P. Pelissero. "Urban Policy: Does Political Structure Matter?" 999
Morgan, Edward P. Review of Edgar Litt and Michael Parkinson, *US and UK Educational Policy: A Decade of Reform.* 1119
Morgan, Richard E. Review of John T. Elliff, *The Reform of FBI Intelligence Operations.* 501
Mork, Gordon R. Review of Dirk Stegmann, et al., eds., *Industrielle Gesellschaft und politisches System: Beiträge zur politischen Sozialgeschichte.* 273
Mosbacher, Eric, trans. Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt,

The Biology of Peace and War: Men, Animals, and Aggression (Krieg und Frieden aus der Sicht der Verhaltensforschung). Reviewed by James O. Davies. 796
Mosher, Frederick C. *The GAO: The Quest for Accountability in American Government.* Reviewed by Joseph Pois. 510
Most, Benjamin A., and Harvey Starr. "Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics, and the Spread of War." 932
Mouffe, Chantal, ed. *Gramsci and Marxist Theory.* Reviewed by Mark E. Kann. 1059
Mower, A. Glenn, Jr. *The United States, The United Nations, and Human Rights.* Reviewed by James A. Stegenga. 831
Mughan, Anthony, and Mark N. Franklin. Communication. 462
Muller, Edward N. *Aggressive Political Participation.* Reviewed by Kendall L. Baker. 486
________. Review of Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution.* 1071
Murillo, C. Gabriel, and Elisabeth Ungar B. *Política, Vivienda Popular y el Proceso de Toma de Decisiones en Colombia: Análisis de la Coyuntura Actual y Viabilidad de las Soluciones Propuestas Durante el Frente Nacional.* Reviewed by Reid Reading. 561
Murphy, Paul L. *World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States.* Reviewed by Robert J. Steamer. 1094
Musolf, Lloyd D., and Joel Smith, eds. *Legislatures in Development: Dynamics of Change in New and Old States.* Reviewed by Marvin G. Weinbaum. 1128
Mwansasu, Bismarck U., and Cranford Pratt, eds. *Towards Socialism in Tanzania.* Reviewed by Frank Holmquist. 562
Mykletun, I. Jostein, and Robert E. Riggs. *Beyond Functionalism: Attitudes toward International Organization in Norway and the United States.* Reviewed by Lawrence S. Finkelstein. 596

Nachmias, David. Review of Francis W. Hoole, *Evaluation Research and Development Activities.* 168
________, and John P. Blair, eds. *Fiscal Retrenchment and Urban Policy.* Reviewed by Timothy G. O'Rourke. 813
________, and David H. Rosenbloom. *Bureaucratic Culture: Citizens and Administrators in Israel.* Reviewed by Dennis L. Dresang. 260
Narayan, Jayaprakash. *Towards Total Revolution:* Vol. 1, *Search for an Ideology;* Vol. 2, *Politics in India;* Vol. 3, *India and Her Problems;* Vol. 4, *Total Revolution.* Edited by Brahmanand. Reviewed by Leo E. Rose. ... 1123
Nardin, Terry. Review of Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations.* 795
Nash, A. E. Keir. Review of A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., *In the Matter of Color: Race and the American Legal Process, The Colonial Period.* 200
Nathan, Richard P. Review of Aaron Wildavsky, *Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis.* 522
Neher, Clark D. Review of Douglas Pike, *History of Vietnamese Communism, 1925-1976.* 564
Nelkin, Dorothy, ed. *Controversy: The Politics of Technical Decisions.* Reviewed by Irvin C. Bupp. 261
Nelson, Keith L., and Spencer C. Olin, Jr. *Why War?: Ideology, Theory, and History.* Reviewed by Cynthia Cannizzo. 594
Nesvold, Betty A. Review of Albert F. Eldridge, *Images of Conflict.* 1054
Netzer, Dick. *The Subsidized Muse: Public Support for the Arts in the United States.* Reviewed by Douglas M. Fox. 509
Nevitte, Neil, and Elliot J. Feldman, eds. *The Future of North America: Canada, the United States, and Quebec Nationalism.* Reviewed by Lawrence LeDuc. 541
Nice, Richard, trans. Pierre Bourdieu, *Algeria 1960: The Disenchantment of the World, The Sense of Humour, The Kabyle House or The World Reversed.* Reviewed by Clement H. Moore. 532
Nicgorski, Walter. Review of Eva T. H. Brann, *Paradoxes of Education in a Republic.* 471
Nichols, Mary P. Review of Ellen M. Wood and Neal Wood, *Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory: Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in Social Context.* 183
Nichols, Ray. *Treason, Tradition, and the Intellectual: Julien Benda and Political Discourse.* Reviewed by Robert J. Pranger. 173
Nie, Norman H., et al. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison.* Reviewed by Jack Citrin. 278
Nienaber, Jeanne, and Daniel A. Mazmanian. *Can Organizations Change?: Environmental Protection, Citizen Participation, and the Corps of Engineers.* Reviewed by Walter A. Rosenbaum. 210
Nivola, Pietro S. Review of Robert Lawrence, ed., *New Dimensions to Energy Policy.* 506
Nogee, Joseph L. Review of Egbert Jahn, ed., *Soviet Foreign Policy: Its Social and Economic Conditions.* 292
Noonan, Lowell G. Review of Anthony Smith, ed., *Television and Political Life: Studies in Six European Countries.* 572
North, Robert C. Review of Michael Brecher, ed., *Studies in Crisis Behavior.* 579
Norton, Theodore M. Review of Lesnek Kolakowsky, *Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution:* Vol. 1, *The Founders;* Vol. 2, *The Golden Age;* Vol. 3, *The Breakdown.* Translated by P. S. Falla. 799
Novak, Derry, and Adam Bromke, eds. *The Communist States in the Era of Detente, 1971-1977.* Reviewed by Donald R. Kelley. .. 227

Oberndoerfer, Dieter, ed. *Waehlerverhalten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Studien zu ausgewaehlten Problemen der Wahlforschung aus Anlass der Bundestagswahl 1976.* Reviewed by Lutz Erbring. 563

O'Brien, Phil, et al. *Chile: The State and Revolution.* Reviewed by Arturo Valenzuela. 855
O'Connor, Patrick F., et al. *Voting in Indiana: A Century of Persistence and Change.* Reviewed by Austin Ranney. 1085
Odetola, Theophilus O. *Military Politics in Nigeria: Economic Development and Political Stability.* Reviewed by Sam C. Sarkesian. ... 262
Okin, Susan M. *Women in Western Political Thought.* Reviewed by Alan Ritter. 806
Oldberg, Ingmar, et al. *Studying Boundary Conflicts: A Theoretical Framework.* Reviewed by Randolph M. Siverson. 602
O'Leary, James P. *Systems Theory and Regional Integration: The "Market Model" of International Politics.* Reviewed by Werner J. Feld. 300
Olin, Spencer C., Jr., and Keith L. Nelson. *Why War?: Ideology, Theory, and History.* Reviewed by Cynthia Cannizzo. 594
Olson, David J. Review of W. Michael Reisman, *Folded Lies: Bribery, Crusades, and Reforms.* 514
Oppenheimer, Joe, et al. Communication. 791
Ordeshook, Peter C. "Political Disequilibrium and Scientific Inquiry: A Comment on William Riker's 'Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions.' " 447
Orfield, Gary. *Must We Bus? Segregated Schools and National Policy.* Reviewed by Willis D. Hawley. 211
Ornstein, Norman J. Review of Leroy N. Rieselbach, ed., *Legislative Reform: The Policy Impact.* 515
O'Rourke, Timothy G. Review of John P. Blair and David Nachmias, eds., *Fiscal Retrenchment and Urban Policy.* 813
Orr, David W., and Marvin S. Soroos, eds. *The Global Predicament: Ecological Perspectives on World Order.* Reviewed by Michael E. Kraft. 1142
Osgood, Robert E. *Limited War Revisited.* Reviewed by Abbott A. Brayton. 884
Ostrom, Charles W., Jr. Communication. 787
Ostrom, Vincent. Review of David Schuman, *The Ideology of Form: The Influence of Organizations in America.* 178
Ostrower, Gary B. *Collective Insecurity: The United States and the League of Nations During the Early Thirties.* Reviewed by Thomas R. Hensley. 512
Overholt, William H., ed. *The Future of Brazil.* Reviewed by Ronald M. Schneider. 263
Owen, Raymond E. Review of Charles R. Adrian and Ernest S. Griffith, *A History of American City Government: The Formation of Traditions, 1775-1870.* 494
Oyediran, Oyeleye, ed. *Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule, 1966-79.* Reviewed by Mark W. DeLancey. 1124

Paarlberg, Robert L., ed., with Eul Y. Park and Donald L. Wyman. *Diplomatic Dispute: U.S. Conflict With Iran, Japan, and Mexico.* Reviewed by Charles A. Raith. 1143
Packenham, Robert A. Communication. 138
________. Review of Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective.* 864
Padgett, John F. "Bounded Rationality in Budgetary Research." 354
Page, Benjamin I. *Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections: Rational Man and Electoral Democracy.* Reviewed by John H. Aldrich. 212
Parisi, A., et al. *Fluidità Elettorale e Classi Sociali in Italia: 1968-1976.* Reviewed by Raymond Seidelman. 836
Parkinson, Michael, and Edgar Litt. *US and UK Educational Policy: A Decade of Reform.* Reviewed by Edward P. Morgan. 1119
Parodi, Jean-Luc, and J. R. Frears. *War Will Not Take Place: The French Parliamentary Elections, March 1978.* Reviewed by John S. Ambler. 542
Parry, Geraint, ed. *John Locke.* Reviewed by Richard Ashcraft. 487
Parsons, Wes, and Charles F. Doran. "War and the Cycle of Relative Power." 947
Partch, Richard D. Review of Wolfram F. Hanrieder, ed., *West German Foreign Policy: 1949-1979.* 1137
Pateman, Carole. *The Problem of Political Obligation: A Critical Analysis of Liberal Theory.* Reviewed by Jane Mansbridge. 488
Paul, David W. *The Cultural Limits of Revolutionary Politics: Change and Continuity in Socialist Czechoslovakia.* Reviewed by Otto Ulč. 264
Pearson, Frederic S. Review of John Waterbury and Ragaei El Mallakh, *The Middle East in the Coming Decade: From Wellhead to Well-Being?* 307
Pechman, Joseph A., ed. *Setting National Priorities: Agenda for the 1980s.* Reviewed by Randall B. Ripley. 1095
Peled, Yoav. "Rousseau's Inhibited Radicalism: An Analysis of His Political Proposals in Light of His Economic Ideas." 1034
Pelissero, John P., and David R. Morgan, "Urban Policy: Does Political Structure Matter?" 999
Pempel, T. J. *Patterns of Japanese Policymaking: Experiences from Higher Education.* Reviewed by Haruhiro Fukui. 265
Penniman, Howard R., ed. *The Australian National Elections of 1977.* Reviewed by Henry S. Albinski. 1125
Pennock, J. Roland. *Democratic Political Theory.* Reviewed by Giovanni Sartori. 1060
________, and John W. Chapman, eds. *Compromise in Ethics, Law, and Politics: Nomos XXI.* Reviewed by Donald A. Strickland. ... 807
________, and John W. Chapman, eds. *Constitutionalism: Nomos XX.* Reviewed by Harvey Wheeler. 1061
Peretz, Don. Review of James A. Bill and Carl Leiden, *Politics in the Middle East.* 837
Perkins, Jerry, and Diane L. Fowlkes. "Opinion

Representation versus Social Representation: or, Why Women Can't Run as Women and Win." 92
Peters, B. Guy. Review of Colin Crouch, *Class Conflict and the Industrial Relations Crisis: Compromise and Corporatism in the Policies of the British State.* 536
———, and Richard Rose. *Can Government Go Bankrupt?* Reviewed by Edward R. Tufte. 567
Peters, John G., and Susan Welch. "The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections." 697
Peterson, Paul. Review of Gary Thom, *Bringing the Left Back Home: A Critique of American Social Criticism.* 1070
Petras, James. *Critical Perspectives on Imperialism and Social Class in the Third World.* Reviewed by Eldon Kenworthy. 885
Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr. Review of Alan Platt, *The U.S. Senate and Strategic Arms Policy 1969-1977;* and Alan Platt and Lawrence D. Weiler, eds., *Congress and Arms Control.* 213
Pfiffner, James P. *The President, the Budget, and Congress: Impoundment and the 1974 Budget Act.* Reviewed by Harvey C. Mansfield, Sr. 831
Pierce, Roy. Review of Vincent Wright, ed., *Conflict and Consensus in France.* 871
Piereson, James, et al. Communication. 783
Pike, Douglas. *History of Vietnamese Communism, 1925-1976.* Reviewed by Clark D. Neher. 564
Platt, Alan. *The U.S. Senate and Strategic Arms Policy 1969-1977.* Reviewed by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. 213
———, and Lawrence D. Weiler, eds. *Congress and Arms Control.* Reviewed by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. 213
Poggi, Gianfranco. *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction.* Reviewed by Charles Tilly. 266
Pois, Joseph. *Watchdog on the Potomac: A Study of the Comptroller General of the United States.* Reviewed by Kenneth Kofmehl. 512
———. Review of Frederick C. Mosher. *The GAO: The Quest for Accountability in American Government;* and Erasmus H. Kloman, ed., *Cases in Accountability: The Work of the GAO.* 510
Poke, C. F. Review of S. E. Finer, *The Changing British Party System, 1945-1979.* 1110
Popkin, Samuel L. *The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam.* Reviewed by Ronald J. Herring. 565
Porter, David L. *The Seventy-sixth Congress and World War II, 1939—1940.* Reviewed by Leroy N. Rieselbach. 1096
Potholm, Christian P. Review of Ndiva Kofele-Kale, ed., *An African Experiment in Nation Building: The Bilingual Cameroon Republic Since Reunification.* 1118
Potichnyj, Peter J., et al., eds. *The Soviet Union and East Europe into the 1980's: Multidisciplinary Perspectives.* Reviewed by Richard C. Gripp. 254
Powell, John D. Review of Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, eds., *Political Participation in Latin America:* Vol. 2, *Politics and the Poor.* 570
Pranger, Robert J. Review of Ray Nichols, *Treason, Tradition, and the Intellectual: Julien Benda and Political Discourse.* 173
Pratt, Cranford, and Bismarck U. Mwansasu, eds. *Towards Socialism in Tanzania.* Reviewed by Frank Holmquist. 562
Presser, Stanley. Communication. 459
Preston, Richard A., ed. *Perspectives on Revolution and Evolution.* Reviewed by J. Paul Grayson. 566
Prevost, Gary. Review of Marie Fleming, *The Anarchist Way to Socialism: Elisee Reclus and Nineteenth-Century European Anarchism.* 474
Price, Thomas J. Review of Davis B. Bobrow, et al., *Understanding Foreign Policy Decisions: The Chinese Case.* 873

Quester, George H. *Offense and Defense in the International System.* Reviewed by Manus I. Midlarsky. 301

Ra, Jong Oh. Review of Ruth L. Horowitz, *Political Ideologies of Organized Labor: The New Deal Era.* 503
Rae, Douglas. "An Altimeter for Mr. Escher's Stairway: A Comment on William H. Riker's 'Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions.' " 451
Rai, Kul B. Review of Ghanshyam Shah, *Protest Movements in Two Indian States: A Study of the Gujarat and Bihar Movements.* 859
Raith, Charles A. Review of Robert L. Paarlberg, ed., with Eul Y. Park and Donald L. Wyman, *Diplomatic Dispute: U.S. Conflict With Iran, Japan, and Mexico.* 1143
Rakove, Milton L. *We Don't Want Nobody Nobody Sent: An Oral History of the Daley Years.* Reviewed by Charles R. Adrian. 1096
Rakowska-Harmstone, Teresa, ed. *Perspectives for Change in Communist Societies.* Reviewed by Roger E. Kanet. 267
Ranger, Robin. *Arms and Politics, 1958-1978: Arms Control in a Changing Political Context.* Reviewed by Lloyd Jensen. 595
Ranney, Austin, ed. *The Past and Future of Presidential Debates.* Reviewed by Robert Agranoff. 513
———. Review of Charles S. Hyneman, et al., *Voting in Indiana: A Century of Persistence and Change.* 1085
———, and David Butler, eds. *Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory.* Reviewed by Hugh A. Bone. 228
Ransom, Harry H. "Being Intelligent about Secret Intelligence Agencies." Review essay. 141
Rasmussen, Jorgen S. Review of Joseph O. Baylen and Norbert J. Grossman, eds., *Bio-*

graphical Dictionary of Modern British Radicals: Vol. 1, *1770-1830*. 530
Reading, Reid. Review of Gabriel Murillo C. and Elisabeth Ungar B., *Pólitica, Vivienda Popular y el Proceso de Toma de Decisiones Colombia: Análisis de la Coyuntura Actual y Viabilidad de las Soluciones Propuestas Durante el Frente Nacional*. 561
Reisman, W. Michael. *Folded Lies: Bribery, Crusades, and Reforms.* Reviewed by David J. Olson. 514
Remington, Thomas. Review of Theodore H. Friedgut, *Political Participation in the USSR.* 544
Rhodes, James M. Review of Horst Hutter, *Politics as Friendship: The Origins of Classical Notions of Politics in the Theory and Practice of Friendship*. 169
Rich, Robert F. Review of Charles E. Lindblom and David K. Cohen, *Usable Knowledge: Social Science and Social Problem Solving*. 803
Richardson, Neil R. *Foreign Policy and Economic Dependence.* Reviewed by James A. Caporaso. 302
———. Review of Donald L. Losman, *International Economic Sanctions: The Cases of Cuba, Israel, and Rhodesia*. 591
Richter, William L. Review of Mary C. Carras, *Indira Gandhi in the Crucible of Leadership: A Political Biography*. 534
Rieselbach, Leroy N., ed. *Legislative Reform: The Policy Impact.* Reviewed by Norman J. Ornstein. 515
———. Review of David L. Porter, *The Seventy-sixth Congress and World War II, 1939-1940*. 1096
Riggs, Robert E., and I. Jostein Mykletun. *Beyond Functionalism: Attitudes toward International Organization in Norway and the United States.* Reviewed by Lawrence S. Finkelstein. 596
Riker, William H. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions." 432
———. "A Reply to Ordeshook and Rae." 456
Riley, Patrick. Review of Donald P. Verene, ed., *Symbol, Myth and Culture: Essays and Lectures of Ernest Cassirer, 1935-1945*. 1073
Ripley, Randall B. Review of Joseph A. Pechman, ed., *Setting National Priorities: Agenda for the 1980s*. 1095
Ritter, Alan. Review of Susan M. Okin, *Women in Western Political Thought*. 806
Robinson, Michael J. Review of Herbert J. Gans, *Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek, and Time*. 194
Rochlin, Gene I. *Plutonium, Power, and Politics: International Arrangements for the Disposition of Spent Nuclear Fuel.* Reviewed by Harold Sprout. 597
Rockman, Bert A. Review of Steven J. Brams, *The Presidential Election Game*. 814
———. Review of Colin Campbell and George J. Szablowski, *The Super-Bureaucrats: Structure and Behaviour in Central Agencies*. 533
Roddick, Jackie, et al. *Chile: The State and Revolution.* Reviewed by Arturo Valenzuela. 855
Rogers, Rosemarie. Review of William H. McNeill and Ruth S. Adams, eds., *Human Migration: Patterns and Policies*. 881
Ro'i, Yaacov, ed. *The Limits to Power: Soviet Policy in the Middle East.* Reviewed by Alvin Z. Rubinstein. 598
Rokkan, Stein, ed. *Scandinavian Political Studies,* Vol. 12/77. Reviewed by Eric S. Einhorn. 268
Rosberg, Carl G., and Thomas M. Callaghy, eds. *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment.* Reviewed by Frances Hill. 1126
Rose, Leo E. Review of Jayaprakash Narayan, *Towards Total Revolution:* Vol. 1, *Search for an Ideology;* Vol. 2, *Politics in India;* Vol. 3, *India and her Problems;* Vol. 4, *Total Revolution.* Edited by Brahmanand. 1123
Rose, Richard, and B. Guy Peters. *Can Government Go Bankrupt?* Reviewed by Edward R. Tufte. 567
Rosenbaum, Walter A. Review of Daniel A. Mazmanian and Jeanna Nienaber, *Can Organizations Change?: Environmental Protection, Citizen Participation, and the Corps of Engineers*. 210
Rosenberg, David A., ed. *Marcos and Martial Law in the Philippines.* Reviewed by Robert L. Youngblood. 854
Rosenberg, Mark B. Review of Ian Roxborough, *Theories of Underdevelopment*. 1064
Rosenbloom, David H., and David Nachmias. *Bureaucratic Culture: Citizens and Administrators in Israel.* Reviewed by Dennis L. Dresang. 260
Rosenthal, Donald B. Review of Ann Schulz, *Local Politics and Nation-States: Case Studies in Politics and Policy*. 858
Rosenthal, Uriel. *Political Order: Rewards, Punishments and Political Stability.* Reviewed by Leon Hurwitz. 269
Rosi, Eugene J. Review of Thomas W. Wolfe, *The SALT Experience*. 606
Rossi, Ernest E. Review of Alan S. Zuckerman, *The Politics of Faction: Christian Democratic Rule in Italy*. 1133
Roth, Jack J. *The Cult of Violence: Sorel and the Sorelians.* Reviewed by Mark N. Hagopian. 1063
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *Emile or On Education.* Translated by Allan Bloom. Reviewed by Terrence E. Cook. 490
———. *The Reveries of the Solitary Walker.* Translated by Charles E. Butterworth. Reviewed by Mary L. Bellhouse. 808
Rowat, Donald C., ed. *Administrative Secrecy in Developed Countries.* Reviewed by Herbert G. Wilcox. 568
Roxborough, Ian, et al. *Chile: The State and Revolution.* Reviewed by Arturo Valenzuela. 855
———. *Theories of Underdevelopment.* Reviewed by Mark B. Rosenberg. 1064
Rubinstein, Alvin Z. Review of Yaacov Ro'i, ed., *The Limits to Power: Soviet Policy in the*

Middle East. 598
Ruggie, John G. Review of Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy.* 296
Rugh, William A. *The Arab Press: News Media and Political Process in the Arab World.* Reviewed by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod. 857
Rummel, R. J. *Understanding Conflict and War:* Vol. 4, *War, Power, Peace.* Reviewed by Harvey Starr. 1144
Russell, Robert W. Review of Jonathan D. Aronson, *Money and Power: Banks and the World Monetary System.* 284
Russett, Bruce M. Review of Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945.* 498
________, and Elizabeth C. Hanson. *Interest and Ideology: The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen.* Reviewed by David H. Blake. 1097
Ryan, Alan, ed. *The Idea of Freedom: Essays in Honour of Isaiah Berlin.* Reviewed by Robert A. Kocis. 810

Sabrosky, Judith A. *From Rationality to Liberation: The Evolution of Feminist Ideology.* Reviewed by Mary L. Shanley. 1065
Safran, William, and George A. Codding, Jr. *Ideology and Politics: The Socialist Party of France.* Reviewed by Sue Ellen M. Charlton. 535
Said, Edward W. *Orientalism.* Reviewed by Charles E. Butterworth. 174
Salkever, Stephen G. Communication. 1047
________. " 'Cool Reflexion' and the Criticism of Values: Is, Ought, and Objectivity in Hume's Social Science." 70
Salmore, Stephen A., et al., eds. *Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies.* Reviewed by William Pang-yu Ting. 473
Salomon, Kim, et al. *Studying Boundary Conflicts: A Theoretical Framework.* Reviewed by Randolph M. Siverson. 602
Samoff, Joel. Review of Dean E. McHenry, Jr., *Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages: The Implementation of a Rural Development Strategy.* 1120
Sargent, Lyman T. Review of James Dunn, *Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future.* 161
Sarkesian, Sam C., ed. *Defense Policy and the Presidency: Carter's First Years.* Reviewed by William P. Snyder. 516
________. Review of Theophilus O. Odetola, *Military Politics in Nigeria: Economic Development and Political Stability.* 262
Sartori, Giovanni. Review of J. Roland Pennock, *Democratic Political Theory.* 1060
Sato, Hideo, et al. *The Textille Wrangle: Conflict in Japanese-American Relations, 1969-1971.* Reviewed by Charles Lipson. 229
Sawyer, Thomas E. *The Jewish Minority in the Soviet Union.* Reviewed by Zvi Gitelman. ... 569
Sayer, Derek. *Marx's Method: Ideology, Science and Critique in* Capital. Reviewed by Arpad Kadarkay. 490
Sbragia, Alberta. Review of Douglas E. Ashford, ed., *Comparing Public Policies: New Concepts and Methods.* 527
Scammon, Richard M., and Alice V. McGillivray, eds. (Elections Research Center). *America Votes 13: A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics,* Vol. 13. Annotation. 896
Schadee, H. M. A., et al. *Fluidità Elettorale e Classi Sociali in Italia: 1968-1976.* Reviewed by Raymond Seidelman. 836
Schaefer, David L. Communication. 1048
________. *Justice or Tyranny: A Critique of John Rawls's "A Theory of Justice."* Reviewed by James Fishkin. 176
________. Review of F. A. Hayek, *Legislation, and Liberty:* Vol. 3, *The Political Order of a Free People.* 165
Scharf, C. Bradley. Review of N. Edwina Moreton, *East Germany and the Warsaw Alliance: The Politics of Detente.* 593
Schichor, Yitzhak. *The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy 1949-1977.* Reviewed by Peter Van Ness. 886
Schier, Richard F. Review of Seymour M. Lipset, ed., *Emerging Coalitions in American Politics.* 205
Schlozman, Kay L., and Sidney Verba. *Injury to Insult: Unemployment, Class and Political Response.* Reviewed by Richard A. Brody. .. 832
Schluter, Linda L.Review of Harold D. Lasswell with Merritt B. Fox, *The Signature of Power: Buildings, Communication, and Policy.* 480
Schmidhauser, John R. Review of Harold J. Spaeth, *Supreme Court Policy Making: Explanation and Prediction.* 217
Schmitter, Philippe C. Review of Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes.* 849
Schneider, Jerrold E. *Ideological Coalitions in Congress.* Reviewed by Aage R. Clausen. ... 215
Schneider, Ronald M. Review of William H. Overholt, ed., *The Future of Brazil.* 263
Schoultz, Lars. Review of Gary W. Wynia, *Argentina in the Postwar Era: Politics and Economic Policy Making in a Divided Society.* 282
Schramm, Sarah S. *Plow Women Rather Than Reapers: An Intellectual History of Feminism in the United States.* Reviewed by Nannerl O. Keohane. 177
Schrodt, Philip A. Communication. 1048
Schubert, Glendon. Communication 467
Schulz, Ann. *Local Politics and Nation-States: Case Studies in Politics and Policy.* Reviewed by Donald B. Rosenthal. 858
Schuman, David. *The Ideology of Form: The Influence of Organizations in America.* Reviewed by Vincent Ostrom. 178
Schurr, Sam, et al. *Energy in America's Future.* Reviewed by David H. Davis. 505
Schwarz, Hans-Peter, and Karl Kaiser, eds. *America and Western Europe: Problems and Prospects.* Reviewed by David P. Calleo. ... 295
Schwarz, John E. "Exploring a New Role in

Policy Making: The British House of Commons in the 1970s." 23

________. Review of Michael L. Mezey, *Comparative Legislatures*. 557

Sears, David O., et al. "Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting." 670

Seddig, Robert G. Review of Melvin I. Urofsky and David W. Levy, eds., *Letters of Louis D. Brandeis:* Vol. 4, *1916-1921: Mr. Justice Brandeis;* Vol. 5, *1921-1941: Elder Statesman*. 833

Seidelman, Raymond. Review of M. Barbagli, et al., *Fluidità Elettorale e Classi Sociali in Italia: 1968-1976*. 836

Seligman, Lester G. Review of James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership*. 153

Seligson, Mitchell A. Review of David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*. 1107

________, and John A. Booth, eds. *Political Participation in Latin America:* Vol. 2, *Politics and the Poor*. Reviewed by John D. Powell. 570

Semmel, Andrew K. Review of Morton A. Kaplan, *Towards Professionalism in International Theory: Macrosystem Analysis*. 585

Serfaty, Simon, ed. *The Foreign Policies of the French Left*. Reviewed by Frank L. Wilson. 1127

Shabad, Goldie. Review of Victor Alba, *Transition in Spain: From Franco to Democracy*. Translated by Barbara Lotito. 221

Shaffer, William R. Communication. 789

Shah, Ghanshyam. *Protest Movements in Two Indian States: A Study of the Gujarat and Bihar Movements*. Reviewed by Kul B. Rai. 859

Shanley, Mary L. Review of Judith A. Sabrosky, *From Rationality to Liberation: The Evolution of Feminist Ideology*. 1065

Shapira, Yoram, et al. *Israel-Latin American Relations*. Reviewed by Edward B. Glick. 878

Shapiro, Martin. Review of Maurice Van Gerpen, *Privileged Communication and the Press: The Citizen's Right to Know versus the Law's Right to Confidential News Source Evidence*. 219

Sharkansky, Ira. *Wither the State? Politics and Public Enterprise in Three Countries*. Reviewed by Gary Freeman. 859

Shaw, Timothy M., and Kenneth A. Heard, eds. *The Politics of Africa: Dependence and Development*. Reviewed by Rodger Yeager. 860

Shefter, Martin. Review of Douglas Yates. *The Ungovernable City*. 219

Shively, W. Phillips. Review of William L. Miller, *Electoral Dynamics in Britain since 1918*. 257

Shubik, Martin, and Garry D. Brewer. *The War Game: A Critique of Military Problem Solving*. Reviewed by Davis B. Bobrow. 152

Sibley, Joel H., et al., eds. *The History of American Electoral Behavior*. Reviewed by Everett C. Ladd, Jr. 216

Sigal, Leon V. Review of Itzhak Galnoor, ed., *Government Secrecy in Democracies*. 236

Sigmund, Paul E. *The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976*. Reviewed by Arturo Valenzuela. 855

Silver, Morris, and Richard D. Auster. *The State as a Firm: Economic Forces in Political Development*. Reviewed by Gerald Strom. 470

Simmons, A. John. *Moral Principles and Political Obligations*. Reviewed by Karen Johnson. 1066

Simon, Sheldon W. ed. *The Military and Security in the Third World: Domestic and International Impacts*. Reviewed by Ellen Stern and Miles D. Wolpin. 303

________. Review of Samuel S. Kim, *China, the United Nations and World Order*. 586

Simonds, A. P. *Karl Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge*. Reviewed by Arthur L. Kalleberg. 179

Sims, Harold. Review of Peter H. Smith, *Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth-Century Mexico*. 270

Sindler, Allan P. Review of Nijole V. Benokraitis and Joe R. Feagin, *Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunity: Action, Inaction, and Reaction*. 186

Singer, J. David, ed. *The Correlates of War:* Vol. 1, *Research Origins and Rationale;* Vol. 2, *Testing Some Realpolitik Models*. Reviewed by Harold Guetzkow. 1145

Sisson, Richard. Review of Subrata K. Mitra, *Governmental Instability in Indian States: West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab*. 853

Siverson, Randolph M. Review of Sven Tägil, et al., *Studying Boundary Conflicts: A Theoretical Framework*. 602

Sklar, Richard L. Review of John Dunn, ed., *West African States: Failure and Promise, A Study in Comparative Politics*. 232

Skocpol, Theda. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*. Reviewed by C. W. Cassinelli. 571

Slater, Jerome. Review of Piero Gleijeses, *The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt and American Intervention*. 238

Smith, Anthony, ed. *Television and Political Life: Studies in Six European Countries*. Reviewed by Lowell G. Noonan. 572

Smith, Anthony D. S. *Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*. Reviewed by Richard W. Cottam. 491

Smith, Eric R. A. N. "The Levels of Conceptualization: False Measures of Ideological Sophistication." 685

Smith, Gordon. *Democracy in Western Germany: Parties and Politics in the Federal Republic*. Reviewed by Jutta A. Helm. 1128

Smith, Gordon W., et al. *Tariffs, Quotas, and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism*. Reviewed by Wayne Lewis. 873

Smith, Jeffrey, et al. Communication. 791

Smith, Joel, et al. *Citizen Politicians-Canada: Party Officials in a Democratic Society*. Reviewed by Ronald G. Landes. 845

________, and Lloyd D. Musolf, eds. *Legislatures in Development: Dynamics of Change in New and Old States*. Reviewed by Marvin

G. Weinbaum. 1128
Smith, Michael P. *The City and Social Theory.* Reviewed by Elinor R. Bowen. 1066
Smith, Paul A. Review of Harvey E. Klehr, *Communist Cadre: The Social Background of the American Communist Party Elite.* 504
Smith, Peter H. *Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth-Century Mexico.* Reviewed by Harold Sims. 270
Smith, R. F. I., et al. *Politics and Policy in Australia.* Reviewed by Lawrence Mayer. 841
Smith, Russ. Review of David E. Wilson, *The National Planning Idea in U.S. Public Policy: Five Alternative Approaches.* 1099
Smith, Tony. *The French Stake in Algeria, 1945-1962.* Reviewed by John Waterbury. 272
Smoke, Richard. Review of Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism.* 578
Smouts, Marie-Claude. *La France à l'ONU: Premiers Rôles et Second Rang.* Reviewed by Robert S. Wood. 888
Snyder, William P. Review of Sam C. Sarkesian, ed., *Defense Policy and the Presidency: Carter's First Years.* 516
Solaún, Mauricio, et al., eds. *Politics of Compromise: Coalition Government in Colombia.* Reviewed by John D. Martz. 1104
Solem, Erik. *The Nordic Council and Scandinavian Integration.* Reviewed by Stanley Anderson. 599
Solomon, Peter H., Jr. *Soviet Criminologists and Criminal Policy: Specialists in Policy-Making.* Reviewed by David L. Williams. 573
Somjee, A. H. *The Democratic Process in a Developing Society.* Reviewed by Marcus Franda. 862
Soroos, Marvin S., and David W. Orr, eds. *The Global Predicament: Ecological Perspectives on World Order.* Reviewed by Michael E. Kraft. 1142
Spaeth, Harold J. *Supreme Court Policy Making: Explanation and Prediction.* Reviewed by John R. Schmidhauser. 217
Spegele, Roger D. "Deconstructing Methodological Falsificationism in International Relations." 104
Spence, Larry D. Review of David Bouchier, *Idealism and Revolution: New Ideologies of Liberation in Britain and the United States.* 151
Sprout, Harold. Review of Gene I. Rochlin, *Plutonium, Power, and Politics: International Arrangements for the Disposition of Spent Nuclear Fuel.* 597
Stacey, Frank. *Ombudsmen Compared.* Reviewed by John E. Moore. 272
Stack, John F., Jr. Review of Alan Lupo, *Liberty's Chosen Home: The Politics of Violence in Boston.* 207
Stallings, Barbara. *Class Conflict and Economic Development in Chile, 1953-1973.* Reviewed by Brian Loveman. 862
Starr, Harvey. Review of R. J. Rummel, *Understanding Conflict and War:* Vol. 4, *War, Power, Peace.* 1144
———, and Benjamin A. Most. "Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics, and the Spread of War." 932
Starr, John B. *Continuing the Revolution: The Political Thought of Mao.* Reviewed by Raymond F. Wylie. 1067
St.-Cyr, Robert. Review of David W. Miller, *Queen's Rebels: Ulster Loyalism in Historical Perspective.* 558
Steamer, Robert J. Review of Paul L. Murphy, *World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States.* 1094
Stegenga, James A. Review of A. Glenn Mower, Jr., *The United States, the United Nations, and Human Rights.* 831
Stegmann, Dirk, et al., eds. *Industrielle Gesellschaft und politisches System: Beiträge zur politischen Sozialgeschichte.* Reviewed by Gordon R. Mork. 273
Steiner, Jürg. Review of Hans Vogel, *Der Kleinstaatt in der Weltpolitik: Aspekte der schweizerischen Aussenbeziehungen im internationalen Vergleich.* 891
Stepan, Alfred. *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective.* Reviewed by Robert A. Packenham. 864
———, and Juan J. Linz, eds. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes.* Reviewed by Philippe C. Schmitter. 849
Stern, Ellen, and Miles D. Wolpin. Review of Sheldon W. Simon, ed., *The Military and Security in the Third World: Domestic and International Impacts.* 303
Stern, Robert H. Review of Edwin Dorn, *Rules and Racial Equality.* 1078
Stern, Robert M., et al. *Tariffs, Quotas, and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism.* Reviewed by Wayne Lewis. 873
Steuernagel, Gertrude A. *Political Philosophy as Therapy: Marcuse Reconsidered.* Reviewed by Jean B. Elshtain. 1068
Stiefbold, Annette E. *The French Communist Party in Transition: PCF-CPSR Relations and the Challenge to Soviet Authority.* Reviewed by Roy C. Macridis. 274
Stimson, James A. Review of Heinz Eulau and John C. Wahlke, eds., *The Politics of Representation: Continuities in Theory and Research.* 477
———, and Edward G. Carmines. "The Two Faces of Issue Voting." 78
Stobaugh, Robert, and Daniel Yergin, eds. *Energy Future: Report of the Energy Project at The Harvard Business School.* Reviewed by Eugene Bardach. 517
Stoessinger, John G. *Crusaders and Pragmatists: Movers of Modern American Foreign Policy.* Reviewed by Stephen G. Walker. 1098
Stohl, Michael. Review of Yonah Alexander, et al., eds., *Terrorism: Theory and Practice.* 577
Stone, Clarence N. "Systemic Power in Community Decision Making: A Restatement of Stratification Theory." 978
Street, David, et al. *Poverty and Social Change.* Reviewed by Edgar Litt. 198
Strickland, Donald A. Review of J. Roland Pen-

nock and John W. Chapman, eds., *Compromise in Ethics, Law, and Politics: Nomos XXI.* 807

Strom, Gerald. Review of Richard D. Auster and Morris Silver, *The State as a Firm: Economic Forces in Political Development.* 470

Strong, Tracy. Review of Terrence Ball, ed., *Political Theory and Praxis: New Perspectives.* 149

Studlar, Donley T. Review of Gary P. Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and British Experience, 1945-1975.* 235

Stultz, Newell M. *Transkei's Half Loaf: Race Separatism in South Africa.* Reviewed by M. Crawford Young. 574

Suarez, Andres. Review of Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, eds., *Cuba in the World.* 225

Suleiman, Ezra N. *Elites in French Society: The Politics of Survival.* Reviewed by Bernard E. Brown. 276

Sullivan, John, et al. Communication. 783

Sullivan, Michael J. III. Review of Ernest W. Lefever, *Nuclear Arms in the Third World: U.S. Policy Dilemma.* 587

Sundelius, Bengt. *Managing Transnationalism in Northern Europe.* Reviewed by Stanley Anderson. 599

Sutter, Robert G. *China-Watch: Toward Sino-American Reconciliation.* Reviewed by William F. Dorrill. 889

Suttles, Gerald D., et al. *Poverty and Social Change.* Reviewed by Edgar Litt. 198

Swearingen, Rodger. *The Soviet Union and Postwar Japan: Escalating Challenge and Response.* Reviewed by Young C. Kim. 305

Sweeney, Richard J., et al. *Tariffs, Quotas, and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism.* Reviewed by Wayne Lewis. 873

Sweets, John F. Review of H. R. Kedward, *Resistance in Vichy France: A Study of Ideas and Motivation in the Southern Zone 1940-1942.* 249

Swem, Allison M., and Thomas W. Casstevens. Communication. 788

Szablowski, George J., and Colin Campbell. *The Super-Bureaucrats: Structure and Behaviour in Central Agencies.* Reviewed by Bert A. Rockman. 533

Taborsky, Edward. Review of Jiri Valenta, *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision.* 867

Tägil, Sven, et al. *Studying Boundary Conflicts: A Theoretical Framework.* Reviewed by Randolph M. Siverson. 602

Tannahill, R. Neal. *The Communist Parties of Western Europe: A Comparative Study.* Reviewed by David M. Wood. 575

————. Review of Roy Godson and Stephen Haseler, *"Eurocommunism": Implications for East and West.* 240

Tanur, Judith M., and Willliam H. Kruskal, eds. *International Encyclopedia of Statistics.* 2 vols. Annotation. 895

Tay, Alice Erh-Soon, and Eugene Kamenka, eds. *Justice: Ideas and Ideologies.* Reviewed by John G. Gunnell. 1056

Taylor, Charles L. Review of Jack Brand, *The National Movement in Scotland.* 226

Teaford, Jon C. *City and Suburb: The Political Fragmentation of Metropolitan America, 1850-1970.* Reviewed by David G. Temple. 518

Temple, David G. Review of Jon C. Teaford, *City and Suburb: The Political Fragmentation of Metropolitan America, 1850-1970.* 518

Teune, Henry. Review of Ian I. Mitroff and Ralph H. Kilmann, *Methodological Approaches to Social Sciences.* 805

Tévoédjrè, Albert. *Poverty: Wealth of Mankind.* Reviewed by David J. Gould. 602

Thant, U. *View from the UN: The Memoirs of U Thant.* Reviewed by James Barros. 603

Theberge, Leonard J., ed. *The Judiciary in a Democratic Society.* Reviewed by Philip L. Dubois. 218

Thom, Gary. *Bringing the Left Back Home: A Critique of American Social Criticism.* Reviewed by Paul Peterson. 1070

Thoman, Roy E. Review of Ali M. Khalifa, *The United Arab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentation.* 844

Thomas, Norman C. Review of Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States.* 2nd ed. 206

Thompson, Dennis F. "Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem of Many Hands." 905

Thompson, Kenneth W. Review of Carey B. Joynt and Percy E. Corbett, *Theory and Reality in World Politics.* 294

Thompson, Wayne C. Review of Viola H. Drath, *Germany in World Politics.* 540

Thong, Huynh Sahn, et al., trans. David G. Marr, ed., *Reflections from Captivity: Phan Boi Chau's "Prison Notes" and Ho Chi Minh's "Prison Diary."* Reviewed by Benedict J. Kerkvliet. 253

Tilly, Charles. *From Mobilization to Revolution.* Reviewed by Edward N. Muller. 1071

————. Review of Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction.* 266

Ting, William Pang-yu. Review of Maurice A. East, et al., eds., *Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies.* 473

Tobin, Gary A., ed. *The Changing Structure of the City: What Happened to the Urban Crisis.* Reviewed by Benjamin Baker. 519

Tobin, Richard J. *The Social Gamble: Determining Acceptable Levels of Air Quality.* Reviewed by Terry D. Edgmon. 521

Tökés, Rudolf L., ed. *Eurocommunism and Détente.* Reviewed by Robert Leonardi. 605

————, ed. *Opposition in Eastern Europe.* Reviewed by James P. McGregor. 866

Tollison, Robert D., et al. *Tariffs, Quotas, and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism.* Reviewed by Wayne Lewis. 873

Truman, David B. Review of Terry M. Moe, *The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups.* 1058

Tuck, Richard. *Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development.* Reviewed by Gary L. Jones. 1073

Tufte, Edward R. Review of Richard Rose and B. Guy Peters, *Can Government Go Bankrupt?* 567

Turner, Bryan S. *Marx and the End of Orientalism.* Reviewed by Charles E. Butterworth. 174

Tutchings, Terrence R. *Rhetoric and Reality: Presidential Commissions and the Making of Public Policy.* Reviewed by Dorothy B. James. 1099

Tuyet, Tran Khanh, et al., trans. David G. Marr, ed., *Reflections from Captivity: Phan Boi Chau's "Prison Notes" and Ho Chi Minh's "Prison Diary."* Reviewed by Benedict J. Kerkvliet. 253

Tyler, Tom R., et al. "Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting." 670

Ulč, Otto. Review of David W. Paul, *The Cultural Limits of Revolutionary Politics: Change and Continuity in Socialist Czechoslovakia.* 264

Ungar B., Elisabeth, and Gabriel Murillo C. *Política, Vivienda Popular y el Proceso de Toma de Decisiones en Colombia: Análisis de la Coyuntura Actual y Viabilidad de las Soluciones Propuestas Durante el Frente Nacional.* Reviewed by Reid Reading. 561

Urofsky, Melvin I., and David W. Levy, eds. *Letters of Louis D. Brandeis:* Vol. 4, *1916-1921: Mr. Justice Brandeis;* Vol. 5, *1921-1941: Elder Statesman.* Reviewed by Robert G. Seddig. 833

Valenta, Jiri. *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision.* Reviewed by Edward Taborsky. 867

———. Review of Zdeněk Mlynář, *Nachtfrost: Erfahrungen auf dem Weg vom realen zum menschlichen Sozialismus.* 258

Valenzuela, Arturo. Review of Ian Roxborough, et al., *Chile: The State and Revolution;* and Paul E. Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976.* 855

van den Haag, Ernest. Review of Walter Berns, *For Capital Punishment: Crime and the Morality of the Death Penalty.* 470

Van Gerpen, Maurice. *Privileged Communication and the Press: The Citizen's Right to Know versus the Law's Right to Confidential News Source Evidence.* Reviewed by Martin Shapiro. 219

Vanneman, Peter. *The Supreme Soviet: Politics and the Legislative Process in the Soviet Political System.* Reviewed by Richard C. Gripp. 277

———. Review of Donald D. Barry, et al., eds., *Soviet Law After Stalin:* Vol. 1, *The Citizen and the State in Contemporary Soviet Law;* Vol. 2, *Social Engineering Through Law.* 837

Van Ness, Peter. Review of Yitzhak Schichor. *The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy 1949-1977.* 886

Van Riper, Paul P. Review of James O. Freedman, *Crisis and Legitimacy: The Administrative Process and American Government.* 193

Vardys, V. Stanley. *The Catholic Church, Dissent and Nationality in Soviet Lithuania.* Reviewed by Vasyl Markus. 867

Vasu, Michael L. *Politics and Planning: A National Study of American Planners.* Reviewed by Kenneth J.. Meier. 521

———. Review of W. Henry Lambright, *Technology Transfer to Cities: Process of Choice at the Local Level.* 505

Vatikiotis, P. J. *Nasser and His Generation.* Reviewed by J. C. Hurewitz. 576

Verba, Sidney, et al. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison.* Reviewed by Jack Citrin. 278

———, and Kay L. Schlozman. *Injury to Insult: Unemployment, Class and Political Response.* Reviewed by Richard A. Brody. 832

Verene, Donald P., ed. *Symbol, Myth and Culture: Essays and Lectures of Ernst Cassirer, 1935-1945.* Reviewed by Patrick Riley. 1073

Villamil, José J., ed. *Transnational Capitalism and National Development: New Perspectives on Dependence.* Reviewed by Pedro A. Cabán. 890

Vogel, Ezra F. *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America.* Reviewed by Nobutaka Ike. 280

Vogel, Hans. *Der Kleinstaatt in der Weltpolitik: Aspekte der schweizerischen Aussenbeziehungen im internationalen Vergleich.* Reviewed by Jürg Steiner. 891

von Vorys, Karl. Review of R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, *Politics and Government in Malaysia.* 560

Voorhis, Robert A. Communication. 465

Wadlow, Joan K. Review of Paul G. Lauren, ed., *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy.* 880

Wagner, R. Harrison. Review of I. M. Destler, *Making Foreign Economic Policy.* 1077

Wahlke, John C. Review of Barrington Moore, Jr., *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt.* 485

———, and Heinz Eulau, eds. *The Politics of Representation: Continuities in Theory and Research.* Reviewed by James A. Stimson. 477

Walker, Stephen G. Review of John G. Stoessinger, *Crusaders and Pragmatists: Movers of Modern American Foreign Policy.* 1098

Walkland, S. A., ed. *The House of Commons in the Twentieth Century: Essays by Members of the Study of Parliament Group.* Reviewed by Harris N. Miller. 868

Wallerstein, Immanuel. *The Capitalist World-Economy: Essays by Immanuel Wallerstein.* Reviewed by Peter Cocks. 306

Waltz, Kenneth N. Communication. 793

————. *Theory of International Politics.* Reviewed by William T. R. Fox. 492

Wanat, John. Communication. 784

Ward, Michael D. *The Political Economy of Distribution: Equality versus Inequality.* Reviewed by Robert W. Jackman. 181

Warnecke, Steven J., ed. *International Trade and Industrial Policies: Government Intervention and an Open World Economy.* Reviewed by John Zysman. 892

Waterbury, John. *Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley.* Reviewed by Carl Leiden. 893

————. Review of Tony Smith, *The French Stake in Algeria, 1945-1962.* 272

————, and Ragaei El Mallakh. *The Middle East in the Coming Decade: From Wellhead to Well-Being?* Reviewed by Frederic S. Pearson. 307

Weart, Spencer R. *Scientists in Power.* Reviewed by Joseph Haberer. 1130

Weatherbee, Donald E. Review of Ruth T. McVey, ed., with Adrienne Suddard, *Southeast Asian Transitions: Approaches Through Social History.* 556

Weatherford, M. Stephen. Communication. ... 460

Webman, Jerry A. Review of Jacques Lagroye and Vincent Wright, eds., *Local Government in Britain and France: Problems and Prospects;* and John Dearlove, *The Reorganization of British Local Government: Old Orthodoxies and a Political Perspective.* 847

Weiler, Lawrence D., and Alan Platt, eds. *Congress and Arms Control.* Reviewed by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. 213

Weinbaum, Marvin G. Review of Joel Smith and Lloyd D. Musolf, eds., *Legislatures in Development: Dynamics of Change in New and Old States.* 1128

Weinberg, Leonard B. *After Mussolini: Italian Neo-Fascism and the Nature of Fascism.* Reviewed by Anthony J. Joes. 1130

Weinstein, Brian. Review of Victor T. Le Vine and Timothy W. Luke, *The Arab-African Connection: Political and Economic Realities.* 589

Weisband, Edward, and Thomas M. Franck. *Foreign Policy By Congress.* Reviewed by Christopher J. Deering. 822

Weiss, Herbert F. Review of John A. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution:* Vol. 2, *Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962-1976).* 592

Welch, Susan, and John G. Peters. "The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections." 697

Weller, Patrick, et al. *Politics and Policy in Australia.* Reviewed by Lawrence Mayer. ... 841

Wendt, Bernd-Jürgen, et al., eds. *Industrielle Gesellschaft und politisches System: Beiträge zur politischen Sozialgeschichte.* Reviewed by Gordon R. Mork. 273

Wendt, Frantz. *Nordisk Raad 1952-1978.* Reviewed by Stanley Anderson. 599

Wesson, Robert G. *Lenin's Legacy: The Story of the CPSU.* Reviewed by Peter H. Juviler. ... 281

Wheeler, Harvey. Review of J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., *Constitutionalism: Nomos XX.* 1061

White, Stephen K. "Reason and Authority in Habermas: A Critique of the Critics." 1006

Wiarda, Howard J., ed. *The Continuing Struggle for Democracy in Latin America.* Reviewed by Robert J. Alexander. 1131

Wilcox, Herbert G. Review of Donald C. Rowat, ed., *Administrative Secrecy in Developed Countries.* 568

Wildavsky, Aaron. *Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis.* Reviewed by Richard P. Nathan. 522

————. Review of Arnold Kanter, *Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective.* 202

Wilhoit, Francis M. *Quest for Equality in Freedom.* Reviewed by Klaus H. Heberle. 811

Wilkinson, Paul, et al., eds. *Terrorism: Theory and Practice.* Reviewed by Michael Stohl. ... 577

Willett, Thomas D., et al. *Tariffs, Quotas, and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism.* Reviewed by Wayne Lewis. 873

Williams, David L. Review of Peter H. Solomon, Jr., *Soviet Criminologists and Criminal Policy: Specialists in Policy-Making.* 573

Williams, Mary P., et al. *Scientists and World Order: The Uses of Technical Knowledge in International Organizations.* Reviewed by Victor Ferkiss. 291

Wilson, David E. *The National Planning Idea in U.S. Public Policy: Five Alternative Approaches.* Reviewed by Russ Smith. 1099

Wilson, Evan B. *Decision on Palestine: How the U.S. Came to Recognize Israel.* Reviewed by H. Field Haviland. 1100

Wilson, Frank L. Review of Simon Serfaty, ed., *The Foreign Policies of the French Left.* 1127

Wilson, Graham K. *Unions in American National Politics.* Reviewed by Abraham Holtzman. 834

Wilson, William J. *The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions.* Reviewed by Robert E. Martin. 523

Wise, Sidney. Review of Rochelle Jones and Peter Woll, *The Private World of Congress.* 826

Witt, Elder, ed. *Congressional Quarterly's Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court.* Annotation. ... 896

Witt, Peter-Christian, et al., eds. *Industrielle Gesellschaft und politisches System: Beiträge zur politischen Sozialgeschichte.* Reviewed by Gordon R. Mork. 273

Wolfe, Alan. *The Limits of Legitimacy: Political Contradictions of Contemporary Capitalism.* Reviewed by Edward J. Harpham. 182

Wolfe, Joel D. Review of Isaac Kramnick, ed., *Is Britain Dying? Perspectives on the Current Crisis.* 846

Wolfe, Thomas W. *The SALT Experience.* Reviewed by Eugene J. Rosi. 606

Wolfinger, Raymond E., and Thomas E. Mann. "Candidates and Parties in Congressional Elections." 617

Woll, Peter, and Rochelle Jones. *The Private World of Congress.* Reviewed by Sidney Wise. 826

Wolpin, Miles D., and Ellen Stern. Review of Sheldon W. Simon, ed., *The Military and Security in the Third World: Domestic and International Impacts.* 303
Wood, David M. Review of R. Neal Tannahill, *The Communist Parties of Western Europe: A Comparative Study.* 575
Wood, Ellen M., and Neal Wood. *Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory: Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in Social Context.* Reviewed by Mary P. Nichols. 183
Wood, Neal, and Ellen M. Wood. *Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory: Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in Social Context.* Reviewed by Mary P. Nichols. 183
Wood, Robert S. Review of Marie-Claude Smouts, *La France à l'ONU: Premiers Rôles et Second Rang.* 888
Wright, A. W. *G. D. H. Cole and Socialist Democracy.* Reviewed by G. David Garson. 870
Wright, Theodore P., Jr. Review of John W. Mellor, ed., *India: A Rising Middle Power.* 882
Wright, Vincent, ed. *Conflict and Consensus in France.* Reviewed by Roy Pierce. 871
———, and Jacques Lagroye, eds. *Local Government in Britain and France: Problems and Prospects.* Reviewed by Jerry A. Webman. 847
Wylie, Raymond F. Review of John B. Starr, *Continuing the Revolution: The Political Thought of Mao.* 1067
Wynia, Gary W. *Argentina in the Postwar Era: Politics and Economic Policy Making in a Divided Society.* Reviewed by Lars Schoultz. 282

Yack, Bernard. "The Rationality of Hegel's Concept of Monarchy." 709
Yahuda, Michael B. *China's Role in World Affairs.* Reviewed by Gavin Boyd. 607
Yarbrough, Tinsley E. Review of John H. Ely, *Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review.* 1080
Yarrow, C. H. Mike. *Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation.* Reviewed by Darril Hudson. 308
Yates, Douglas. *The Ungovernable City.* Reviewed by Martin Shefter. 219
Yeager, Rodger. Review of Timothy M. Shaw and Kenneth A. Heard, eds., *The Politics of Africa: Dependence and Development.* 860
Yergin, Daniel. *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State.* Reviewed by James R. Kurth. 524
———, and Robert Stobaugh, eds. *Energy Future: Report of the Energy Project at The Harvard Business School.* Reviewed by Eugene Bardach. 517
Young, M. Crawford. Review of Newell M. Stultz, *Transkei's Half Loaf: Race Separatism in South Africa.* 574
Young, Oran, et al. Communication. 791
Youngblood, Robert L. Review of David A. Rosenberg, ed., *Marcos and Martial Law in the Philippines.* 854

Zacher, Mark W., and R. Michael M'Gonigle. *Pollution, Politics, and International Law: Tankers at Sea.* Reviewed by Louis R. Beres. 883
Zeigler, Harmon. Review of G. David Garson, *Group Theories of Politics.* 477
Zinner, Paul E. Review of David L. Larson, *United States Foreign Policy Toward Yugoslavia, 1943—1963.* 1088
Zinnes, Dina. Communication. 140
Zuckerman, Alan S. *The Politics of Faction: Christian Democratic Rule in Italy.* Reviewed by Ernest E. Rossi. 1133
Zuckert, Michael. Communication. 1050
Zukin, Cliff. Review of James D. Barber, ed., *Race for the Presidency: The Media and the Nominating Process.* 495
Zysman, John. Review of Steven J. Warnecke, ed., *International Trade and Industrial Policies: Government Intervention and an Open World Economy.* 892

CONTENTS

Number 1—March 1980

What Happened to the British Party Model? .... Leon D. Epstein 9
APSA Presidential Address, 1979
Exploring a New Role in Policy Making: The British House of Commons in the 1970s .... John E. Schwarz 23
Reason, Development, and the Conflicts of Human Ends: Sir Isaiah Berlin's Vision of Politics .... Robert A. Kocis 38
John Locke: From Absolutism to Toleration .... Robert P. Kraynak 53
"Cool Reflexion" and the Criticism of Values: Is, Ought, and Objectivity in Hume's Social Science .... Stephen G. Salkever 70
The Two Faces of Issue Voting .... Edward G. Carmines & James A. Stimson 78
Opinion Representation versus Social Representation: Or, Why Women Can't Run as Women and Win .... Jerry Perkins & Diane L. Fowlkes 92
Deconstructing Methodological Falsificationism in International Relations .... Roger D. Spegele 104
Temporal and Spatial Diffusion in the Comparative Analysis of Social Change .... David Klingman 123
Communications 138
Editorial Note 140
Review Essay—*Being Intelligent about Secret Intelligence Agencies* .... Harry Howe Ransom 141
Book Reviews
- Political Theory and Methodology 149
- American Politics 185
- Comparative Politics 221
- International Politics 284

Number 2—June 1980

Democratic Politics and the Culture of American Education .... Richard M. Merelman 319
- Comment .... M. Kent Jennings 333
- Reply .... Richard M. Merelman 338

Explaining the Variable Utility of Disjointed Incrementalism: Four Propositions .... Ian Lustick 342
Bounded Rationality in Budgetary Research .... John F. Padgett 354
Rationality, Morality, and Impossibility Theorems .... Fred M. Frohock 373
Aristotle, Kant and Rawls on Moral Motivation in a Just Society .... Steven M. DeLue 385
Policy Choices and Regional Equality among the Soviet Republics .... Jack Bielasiak 394
Turnout and the Vote .... James DeNardo 406
Reassessing Parental Socialization: Indicator Unreliability versus Generational Transfer .... Russell J. Dalton 421
Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions .... William H. Riker 432
- Comment .... Peter C. Ordeshook 447
- Comment .... Douglas W. Rae 451
- Reply .... William H. Riker 456

Communications 459
Editorial Note 469
Book Reviews
- Political Theory and Methodology 470
- American Politics 494
- Comparative Politics 526
- International Politics 577

Number 3—September 1980

Candidates and Parties in Congressional Elections ... Thomas E. Mann & Raymond E. Wolfinger 617
A Comparison of Voting for U.S. Senator and Representative in 1978 ... Alan I. Abramowitz 633
The American Voter in Congressional Elections ... Barbara Hinckley 641
A Dynamic Model of Presidential Nomination Campaigns ... John H. Aldrich 651
Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting ... David O. Sears et al. 670
The Levels of Conceptualization: False Measures of Ideological Sophistication ... Eric R. A. N. Smith 685
The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections ... John G. Peters & Susan Welch 697
The Rationality of Hegel's Concept of Monarchy ... Bernard Yack 709
Motive and Goal in Hannah Arendt's Concept of Political Action ... James T Knauer 721
Creating the Statutory State: The Implications of a Rule of Law Standard in American Politics ... Richard F. Bensel 734
Can Government Regulate Safety? The Coal Mine Example ... Michael S. Lewis-Beck 745
The Emergence of Political Parties in Congress, 1789-1803 ... John F. Hoadley 757
Communications ... 780
Editorial Note ... 793

Book Reviews

Political Theory and Methodology ... 795
American Politics ... 812
Comparative Politics ... 835
International Politics ... 873
Reference Sources ... 894

Number 4—December 1980

Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem of Many Hands ... Dennis F. Thompson 905
An Expected Utility Theory of International Conflict ... Bruce Bueno de Mesquita 917
Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics, and the Spread of War ... Benjamin A. Most & Harvey Starr 932
War and the Cycle of Relative Power ... Charles F. Doran & Wes Parsons 947
The Succession Connection: Political Cycles and Political Change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe ... Valerie Jane Bunce 966
Systemic Power in Community Decision Making: A Restatement of Stratification Theory ... Clarence N. Stone 978
The Urban Bureaucracy and the Chicago Political Machine: Who Gets What and the Limits to Political Control ... Kenneth R. Mladenka 991
Urban Policy: Does Political Structure Matter? ... David R. Morgan & John P. Pelissero 999
Reason and Authority in Habermas: A Critique of the Critics ... Stephen K. White 1006
Rousseau and the Problem of Bourgeois Society ... Arthur M. Melzer 1018
Rousseau's Inhibited Radicalism: An Analysis of His Political Thought in Light of His Economic Ideas ... Yoav Peled 1034
Communications ... 1046
Editorial Note ... 1050

Book Reviews

Political Theory and Methodology ... 1052
American Politics ... 1075
Comparative Politics ... 1102
International Politics ... 1134
Index to Vol. 74 ... 1149

Three Harper & Row textbooks—well worth re-election in 1981.

Still the ideal overview for short courses in American Government and politics—

Prewitt & Verba's

PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

Third Edition

This revised edition is more effective than ever in helping students grasp complex problems through an easy-to-understand approach. Focusing on the relationship between the economy and the political system, it shows how the issue of equality permeates political life. Now includes a new chapter on the bureaucracy; a combined chapter incorporating the most up-to-date research on parties and elections; and coverage of affirmative action and women's rights. Instructor's manual and Test Bank. 1980. 366 pages. ISBN 0-06-045278-1. Paper.

A novel approach to "what counts" in American politics today—

Christenson's

AMERICAN POLITICS: Understanding What Counts

Written by a political scientist with a journalism background, AMERICAN POLITICS covers all topics critical to an understanding of American government. Taking an issues approach, it includes such distinctive features as a chapter entitled "In Defense of Politicians" that examines politicians in a more constructive light than do most Americans and that shows a greater concern than usual for the ethical dimensions of politics and politicians. Instructor's Manual. February 1980. 341 pages. ISBN 0-06-041259-3.

The best introduction to both the theory and the practice of public administration gets better with every edition—

Nigro & Nigro's

MODERN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION *Fifth Edition*

Outstanding features of the fifth edition include full chapters on legislative administration, judicial administration, plus rules and regulations not to be found in any other text. New material on reverse discrimination and the politics of organization, as well as coverage of administrations' ethics and collective bargaining, is also provided. Instructor's Manual. 1979. 481 pages. ISBN 0-06-044844-X.

Harper & Row

To request examination copies, write to Suite 3D, Harper & Row, 10 East 53d St., New York, N.Y., 10022, or contact your local Harper & Row representative. Please include course title, enrollment, and present text.

Hundreds of Instructors and Thousands of Students have made "KOUSOULAS" a standard textbook for the Introductory Course to Political Science

4th REVISED EDITION

ON GOVERNMENT and POLITICS

D. George KOUSOULAS

"In the process of teaching Introduction to Political Science courses, a recurrent problem was the lack of a satisfactory core text which covered the substantive topics of the discipline in such a way that the beginning student can understand. . . . Under these circumstances, a fourth edition of Professor Kousoulas' *On Government and Politics* would be well-received. A highly commendable work, it covers the essential subject-matter of political science lucidly and succinctly. The overall systemic input-output framework is judiciously presented: the student is skillfully introduced to the leading theoretical approach to the study of politics without, however, being over-burdened by unnecessary jargon. In itself, this is no mean accomplishment. . . . More significantly, the chapters follow each other in logical sequence. The transition from one chapter to the next is smooth and coherent.

"It is due to its many remarkable features that this reviewer had chosen Kousoulas's volume as his main text in the Introduction to Political Science course at the University of Colorado."

University of Colorado

"Kousoulas is simply a better-written, more intelligent book than its closest competitors."

University of Minnesota

On Government
and Politics

ighlights:

IE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND ITS COMPO-
ENTS. Power and its Sources. Influence, Author-
. The Essence of Politics.

LITICAL POWER; CONCENTRATION AND
IFFUSION: Freedom and Social Control. Six
iteria of Diffusion. Objectives of Social Control.
"Diffusion Scale."

IE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS: The
aking of Constitutional Rules. Contemporary
ate Structures. Formal Structures and Political
ality.

IE MAKING OF A POLITICAL BEING: Politi-
l Culture. Political Socialization. Contemporary
eologies.

JBLIC OPINION AS A POLITICAL FACTOR:
rmation of Public Opinion. Operational Publics.
mpling and Measurement.

ESSURE GROUPS: Types and Activities. Fac-
rs determining degrees of influence. Methods of
ction. Targets.

LITICAL PARTIES: Party Systems in a Pluralis-
Setting. Features. Monopolistic Party Systems.

IE DECISION MAKERS: Reaching for the Top.
lectoral Systems. The Use of Force.

ECISION-MAKING: Participation in a Mass So-
ety. Command Politics. Representation. Partici-
tory Politics. The Process of Decision-making.

GISLATURES AND EXECUTIVES: The Func-
ns of Legislatures. The Executive Machinery and
Functions. Democratic and Restrictive Execu-
es.

IE STATE BUREAUCRACY: Recruitment and
rsonnel Policies. The Functions of State Bu-
aucracies. Bureaucracy and Power.

ADJUDICATION AND ENFORCEMENT: The Functions of the Judiciary. The Political Role of Judges. The Machinery of Enforcement.

THE CONTENT OF RULES AND DECISIONS: Preservation of Order, Control of Change. Mobilization of Resources. Distribution of Benefits. Allocation of Costs. Regulation of Activities and Relationships. Political Roles.

GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY: Market and Command Economies. Essential Differences of economic Systems. Government and Economic Development. Multinationals, International Agreements and Organizations.

PUBLIC POLICY AND DEFENCE: The Quest for Security. Spending for Armaments. The Machinery of Security. Abuse of Military Power. The Military; Modernization, and Repression.

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: The Makers of Foreign Policy. Determinants of Power and Influence. Techniques for Exercising Power and Influence. Paramilitary Intervention. International Law; Limited Scope. The United Nations. Other International Organizations.

Discussion Questions
Annotated Bibliography
Glossary of Terms
Instructor's Manual

Duxbury Press
6 Bound Brook Court
North Scituate, Massachusetts 02060

BROOKS/COLE
PUBLISHING COMPANY

A DIVISION OF WADSWORTH PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC.

KOUSOULAS

Water Resources Planning in New England

Stuart G. Koch

A book about the impact of public participation on the quality of U.S. public policy and the accountability of bureaucratic officials, focusing on New England water resources policy. $12.00

The Local Politics of Rural Development

Peasant and Party-State in Zambia

Michael Bratton

Examines the part played by local-level organizations of the African one-party state in the achievement of goals of rural development. $17.00

The Model Country

José Batlle y Ordoñez of Uruguay, 1907–1915

Milton I. Vanger

Describes Batlle's preparations to make Uruguay a model country, his election, and historic second presidency. "Well-written throughout"—*Library Journal. A Brandeis book*. $25.00

A Plough in Field Arable

Western Agribusiness in Third World Agriculture

Sarah Potts Voll

Explores Third World agricultural enterprises involving Western interests in an attempt to identify key elements of successful large-scale projects. *A University of New Hampshire book*. $12.00

University Press of New England

Hanover, New Hampshire and London, England

TEXTS ON AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, FROM McGRAW-HILL

THE AMERICAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT,
Fourteenth Edition

John Ferguson, Emeritus, Pennsylvania State University; and **Dean E. McHenry,** Emeritus, University of California at Santa Cruz
1981, 544 pages (tent.), $15.95 (tent.)

This celebrated text offers a complete description and an objective analysis of the major institutions and central processes of American national government. Updated to include contemporary developments, the book is redesigned and now features a more open and inviting format. Instructor's Manual.

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT,
Fourteenth Edition

John Ferguson and **Dean E. McHenry**
1981, 656 pages (tent.), $16.95 (tent.)

In this text, the institutional approach is applied to the national, state, and local government. This book is updated to include recent developments, and benefits from an improved format. Instructor's Manual.

Prices subject to change.

COLLEGE DIVISION
McGraw-Hill
Book Company
1221 Avenue of the Americas
New York, N.Y. 10020

LIBERTY IN THE BALANCE, Fifth Edition

H. Frank Way, University of California
1981, 144 pages (tent.), $6.95 (tent.)

Thoroughly revised, this popular supplement to American government courses deals with the courts, the judicial process, and questions of discrimination, equal opportunity, and criminal justice.

THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM, Fifth Edition

C. Herman Pritchett, University of California
1981, 144 pages (tent.), $6.95 (tent.)

This updated study of the constitution and its relation to government and politics now includes the most recent statistics and research findings.

POLITICS AND VOTERS,
Fifth Edition

Hugh A. Bone, Emeritus, University of Washington; and **Austin Ranney,** American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
1981, 135 pages (tent.), $6.95 (tent.)

Here's a popular supplement dealing with political parties and elections, now updated to reflect recent research and statistics.

The Soviet Union since Stalin
Edited by Stephen F. Cohen, Alexander Rabinowitch, and Robert Sharlet
"These thoughtful essays . . . raise and intelligently discuss most of the major issues (continuity vs. change, de-Stalinization, economic reform, regional development, Eastern Europe, and policy toward the West) with which Stalin's successors have had to contend." —*Foreign Affairs*
cloth $22.50 paper $7.95


THE
SOVIET
UNION
SINCE
STALIN
Edited by
Stephen F. Cohen
Alexander Rabinowitch
Robert Sharlet

Eurocommunism between East and West
Edited by Vernon V. Aspaturian, Jiri Valenta, and David P. Burke
Timely, well-researched essays that elaborate the historical and ideological antecedents of Eurocommunism and explore its current implications for Eastern Europe, Asia, NATO, and the United States. Emphasizes the significance of Eurocommunism for the worldwide communist movement and for pluralistic, Western-style systems.
cloth $32.50 paper $9.95


EUROCOMMUNISM
BETWEEN
EAST AND WEST
EDITED BY
Vernon V. Aspaturian
Jiri Valenta
David P. Burke

East European Integration and East-West Trade
Edited by Paul Marer and John Michael Montias
These analytical and theoretical studies by leading authorities in the fields of international trade, economics, and East European affairs establish a comprehensive, up-to-date, and balanced Western perspective on foreign trade in the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe.
$22.50


East European Integration
and East-West Trade

Soviet Energy Technologies
Planning, Policy, Research and Development
By Robert W. Campbell
Detailed discussions of all major Soviet energy capabilities. Focuses on the research and development structures and their effectiveness, the availability of resources, and comparisons with U.S. and other Western technologies. A thoughtful evaluation with broad implications for future development.
$22.50

INDIANA
UNIVERSITY
PRESS
Tenth and Morton Streets, Bloomington, Indiana 47405

Available at bookstores or send $1.50 postage and handling for first book, 25¢ for each additional book, to order from publisher.

VIET NAM . . .
Time to Look Back



Why Viet Nam?
Prelude to America's Albatross
Archimedes L.A. Patti

"Patti's long-awaited account of what he saw and learned as OSS representative in Hanoi in 1945 is an extremely important contribution to our understanding of the origins of a 30-year war that has changed the course of recent history. One can only read it with pain and anguish, thinking of what might have been had the United States valued the principles of self-determination it professed instead of committing its resources to oppression and destruction." —*Noam Chomsky* $19.95, illustrated

When Governments Collide
Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1968
Wallace J. Thies

A detailed account of the interplay of United States diplomatic and military policy to North Vietnam during 1964-1968. "This extensive study of foreign policy making during the Johnson Administration illustrates the unanticipated difficulties that arise when one government attempts to coerce another." —*Library Journal* $20.00

The Development of Capitalism in Colonial Indochina (1870-1940)
Martin J. Murray

This is the first attempt by a Western writer at a systematic and comprehensive analysis of capitalism in Indochina, and goes far toward explaining the backwardness of Indochinese economic structures after 70 years of capitalist "development." $29.50

The Rational Peasant
The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam
Samuel Popkin

"A model of clarity . . . I know of no contemporary social scientist who has put the case for the political economy view more convincingly." —*F. G. Bailey* "A stimulating and valuable contribution." —*Charles Tilly* $14.95 cloth, $4.95 paper

Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885-1925
David G. Marr

"Marr has made excellent use of his sources of information, and has produced a book which is a real contribution to the history of Vietnam." —*Asian Affairs* $20.00 cloth, $8.95 paper, illustrated

At bookstores

University of California Press

Berkeley 94720

Turn To Wiley For New Approaches... And Basic Sources

THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION

A Critical Analysis of Liberal Theory

Carole Pateman

Is a participatory democratic system the key to a truly democratic American future? This controversial and important book challenges the widespread assumption that a bond of political obligation exists between citizens and the state in a liberal democracy. Marshalling empirical evidence as well as philosophical arguments, Pateman argues that political obligation is an *insoluble problem* in the liberal democratic state and can only be solved within the context of a participatory democracy. The text provides an incisive survey of all the relevant issues, from the classical theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau to more recent arguments of Hegel, Rawls, and others. Pateman's approach and his conclusions differ substantially from nearly all other books in this area, making this work an especially rewarding one.

1979 205 pp. (1-99699-8) $27.95

PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT HANDBOOK FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

George J. Washnis, *National Academy of Public Administration*

"The definitive information reference tool in the productivity improvement area.... Essential reading for those involved with political, management, and administrative processes."—*Bernie Hillenbrand, Executive Director, National Association of Counties*

Based on a major federally funded project, this authoritative nuts-and-bolts manual spells out *for the first time ever* the proven tools and techniques that enable city, county, and state governments to evaluate and improve their productivity. It pools the detailed expertise of over 300 practitioners and specialists in virtually every area of government—from public works to mass transit to human services. More than 200 Project Briefs make this a basic tool for policymakers, officials, educators, students.

1980 1,492 pp. (1-04638-8) $49.95

AMERICA'S GOVERNMENTS

A Fact Book of Census Data on the Organization, Finances, and Employment of Federal, State, and Local Governments

Compiled by Richard P. Nathan & Mary M. Nathan

Now the vital characteristics of the 80,000 federal, state, and local governments can be determined and compared at a glance. This sourcebook brings together the most useful and up-to-date information from a large variety of Census Bureau documents.

"Every student of federalism and intergovernmental relations will welcome this volume... clear and coherently organized."
—*Prof. Samuel H. Beer, Harvard University*

"Political scientists, journalists, government officials, and many others will find *America's Governments* a valuable reference for a range of information on the nation's multitude of governments..."—*John Herbers, The New York Times Washington Bureau*

1979 332 pp. (1-05671-5) $19.95

TIMES, SPACES, AND PLACES

A Chronogeographic Perspective

D.N. Parkes & N.J. Thrift

As the first major exposition of a new approach in human geography, this work establishes *time* to be an essential, multi-faceted component of behavior on all scales—from individual to large city complex. It demonstrates that recognition of temporal as well as spatial components is integral to the planning, design, analysis, and control of places. Much of the material presented here has not appeared previously. *Time, Spaces, and Places* is a practical resource for urban and regional planners, sociologists, political scientists, human ecologists, and others. It also serves as an undergraduate or graduate text with a fresh viewpoint.

April 1980 527 pp. (1-27616-2) $64.75

Order through your bookstore or write to
John Storojev, Dept. 1-7237

WILEY-INTERSCIENCE
A division of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
605 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10158
In Canada: 22 Worcester Road, Rexdale, Ontario

Prices subject to change without notice.

PRAEGER

entering our fourth decade

THE AGING OF COMMUNISM
Robert Wesson
180 pp., 1980, $18.95, ISBN 0-03-057053-0

PUBLIC POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE SOVIET UNION
edited by **Gordon B. Smith**
240 pp., 1980, $23.95, ISBN 0-03-057726-8
Paperback edition: $9.95, ISBN 0-03-057727-6

THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF EAST EUROPE
New Approaches
edited by **Ronald H. Linden**
ca. 290 pp., 1980, $27.95, ISBN 0-03-052756-2

SOVIET POLITICS IN THE BREZHNEV ERA
edited by **Donald R. Kelley**
282 pp., 1980, $21.95, ISBN 0-03-046626-1
Paperback edition: $9.95, ISBN 0-03-046621-0

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
An Uneasy Alliance
Galia Golan
304 pp., 1980, $24.95, ISBN 0-03-057319-X

MEDIA AND THE RUSSIAN PUBLIC
Ellen Propper Mickiewicz
ca. 175 pp., 1980, ca. $19.95, ISBN 0-03-057681-4
Paperback edition: ca. $8.95, ISBN 0-03-057679-2

THE SOVIET MARRIAGE MARKET
Mate-Selection in Russia and the USSR
Wesley Andrew Fisher
320 pp., 1980, $29.95, ISBN 0-03-045346-1

CONTEMPORARY SOVIET SOCIETY
Sociological Perspectives
edited by **Jerry G. Pankhurst** and **Michael Paul Sacks**
ca. 310 pp., 1980, ca. $18.95, ISBN 0-03-055916-2
Paperback edition: ca. $8.95, ISBN 0-03-055911-1

WORK AND LEISURE IN THE SOVIET UNION
A Time-Budget Analysis
Jiri Zuzanek
440 pp., 1980, $26.95, ISBN 0-03-056292-9

Send for our FREE catalogue!
Order from:
PRAEGER PUBLISHERS
521 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10175



Unfinished Democracy
Harrell R. **Rodgers**, Jr., University of Houston
Michael **Harrington**, Queens College, CUNY

Rodgers and Harrington offer a fresh approach for your introductory American government course with this solidly documented, contemporary analysis. The text investigates the public's important role in the political process and analyzes why it has limited control over political institutions and public officials. A policy orientation drawn from the authors' expertise in the fields of crime, civil rights, poverty, and economics illustrates the interaction between politics and economics. Available January 1981, 640 pages, illustrated, hardbound and softbound, with Instructor's Manual and Study Guide.

America's Democracy
The Ideal and the Reality
Fred R. Harris, University of New Mexico
© 1980, 655 pages, illustrated, hardbound, with Instructor's Manual and Study Guide

American Government and Politics Today
Third Edition
Charles P. Sohner / Helen P. Martin
El Camino College
© 1980, 435 pages, illustrated, softbound with Instructor's Manual and Study Guide

Political Economy
A Critique of American Society
Scott McNall
University of Kansas, Lawrence
Available March 1981,
260 pages, softbound

For further information write
Jennifer Toms, Department SA
1900 East Lake Avenue
Glenview, Illinois 60025

Scott, Foresman and Company

Announcing . . .

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP DIRECTORY

with

Biographical Information

Published October 1980

The Directory will list individual members of the American Political Science Association and such information as their current position, institutional affiliation, address, phone number, highest degree, and fields of specialization.

The price will be $10 for APSA members and $12 for non-members.

Order Form

Please send _________ copies of the Membership Directory at $8 each to:

____
NAME

____
ADDRESS

____
CITY STATE ZIP

Order from:

Membership Directory/APSA
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, 1969-1970

A Case-Study of Limited Local War

YAACOV BAR-SIMAN-TOV. With documents, Middle Eastern newspaper accounts, transcripts of radio broadcasts, and interviews with key decision makers, Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov identifies the complex factors that affected the expansion of the 1969-1970 Israeli-Egyptian War, the patterns of bargaining between Israel, Egypt, and the Super-Powers, and the substantial problems involved in terminating the war. 269 pages, $19.50

Northern Ireland

A Psychological Analysis

KEN HESKIN. Drawing on modern social psychology, Ken Heskin offers a thought-provoking analysis of Northern Ireland's conflicts and tensions. Showing how historical, cultural, economic, and political influences have combined to form the area's characteristic ambience, and examining the attitudes of both the Protestant and Roman Catholic communities in the province, the author assesses the psychological effects that have accumulated over a decade of civil conflict. 192 pages, $17.50

Power and Accountability

HAROLD M. WILLIAMS AND IRVING S. SHAPIRO. In *Power and Accountability,* Chairman Harold M. Williams of the Securities and Exchange Commission and Irving S. Shapiro, a leading executive of a major U.S. corporation, explore from opposing viewpoints the issue of corporate accountability. This is the latest volume in the *Benjamin F. Fairless Lectures,* sponsored by Carnegie-Mellon University. 64 pages, $8.00

Now in paperback:

The Weak in the World of the Strong

The Developing Countries in the International System

ROBERT L. ROTHSTEIN. "In this major study of relations between industrial and developing societies, the author argues that parallel and complementary changes are required in rich and poor states, in internal and in international society, if the developing world is to be successfully integrated into the international system."
—*Foreign Affairs* 378 pages, $9.00 paperback

To order send check or money order to **Dept. JN** at the address below, including $1.30 per order for postage and handling.

Columbia
University Press
136 South Broadway,
Irvington, New York 10533

Courtesy
Harvard Law School

James M. Landis

Dean of the Regulators

Donald A. Ritchie

James Landis became the most important and controversial figure in the history of the federal regulatory process. Ritchie's superbly documented book analyzes the contributions of Landis' public career and the personal weaknesses that eventually undermined it.
$17.50

China's Development Experience in Comparative Perspective

Robert Dernberger, Editor

While comparing China's economic development policies to those of other countries, this book clearly identifies the features that make China unique. International experts examine areas of China's development program cited as success stories.
Harvard East Asian Series, 93 and
A Social Science Research Council Study
$30.00

Now in paper—

The Arab World

Fourth Edition of The United States and the Arab World

William R. Polk

"An indispensable reference work for those interested in the Arabs and the American view of them. . ."—*The Washington Post*
American Foreign Policy Library
paper, $8.95; cloth, $22.50

The Pope, His Banker, and Venice

Felix Gilbert

"This book will command the interest and appreciation of both Renaissance scholars and general readers."
—*Professor David Herlihy*
Harvard University

$12.50

Insurrection or Loyalty

The Breakdown of the Spanish American Empire

Jorge I. Domínguez

Why did some Spanish American colonies choose insurrection while others chose loyalty to Spain during the first quarter of the nineteenth century? Domínguez compares Chile, Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela and finds that the answer lies in the relationship between elites participating in politics and local governments responding to them and in the characteristics of relationships between ethnic groups prior to the wars of independence period.
Center for International Affairs
$29.50

Representative Democracy

Public Policy and Midwestern Legislatures in the Late Nineteenth Century

Ballard C. Campbell

Through an analysis of late-nineteenth-century state legislatures in Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin, Ballard Campbell has written what one expert has called "the best book on legislative politics, past or present." His comparison of partisan, economic, urban, ethnocultural, and regional influences on legislative behavior will serve as a model for all future studies. $20.00

Harvard University Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Special Interest Group


WHY THEY CALL IT POLITICS
ROBERT SHERRILL
Public Opinion in American Politics
W. Lance Bennett
THE POLITICS OF POWER
IRA KATZNELSON
MARK KESSELMAN
India
Government and Politics in a Developing Nation
Third Edition
Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr.

Why They Call It Politics

A Guide to America's Government

THIRD EDITION

ROBERT SHERRILL

The Third Edition of this provocative introduction to politics is the ideal companion or alternative to standard American government texts. Fully up to date, the textbook provides perspectives on the daily realities of American political life, especially on the functions—and malfunctions—of the major centers of power.
Paperbound. 382 pages

Public Opinion in American Politics

W. LANCE BENNETT, University of Washington

The author has based this comprehensive and contemporary text on the theory that public opinion can be used as a basic tool for the analysis of our political system. He explains how public opinion is formed and expressed within the three distinct spheres of the individual, the everyday political arena, and the overall political culture; and how it is central to the conduct of practical politics.
Paperbound. 420 pages

The Politics of Power

A Critical Introduction to American Government

SECOND EDITION

IRA KATZNELSON, University of Chicago
MARK KESSELMAN, Columbia University

Departing from the traditional approach for the introductory course, this text examines politics, policy, and society as they are shaped by the relationships between corporate capitalism and government. The authors stress throughout the fundamental inequalities that exist in our society and include such topics as today's overcrowded political agenda and recent trends in urban politics.
Paperbound. 435 pages

India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation

THIRD EDITION

ROBERT L. HARDGRAVE, JR.,
University of Texas, Austin

This brief textbook introduces students to the problems of political and economic development through a careful consideration of the political structure and processes of modern India. The Third Edition reflects such recent events as the parliamentary elections of January 1980 and the return to power of Indira Gandhi.
Paperbound. 285 pages

HBJ

HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH, INC.
New York •San Diego •Chicago •San Francisco •Atlanta

FROM CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY PRESS

Coming your way in 1981

Lawrence C. Dodd, Indiana Univ., and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, Univ. of Houston

Congress Reconsidered, Second Edition

CQ is happy to be publishing the second edition of this highly successful collection of essays on Congress. The revision contains 14 new articles, 5 revised or updated ones and an analysis of the 1980 congressional elections.

January 1981. Approx. 400 pages. Tentative price $7.50.

Walter A. Rosenbaum, University of Florida

Energy, Politics, and Public Policy

Written in a lively style with numerous case studies, this book discusses both U.S. energy policy formulation and the existing policy, and the possibly evolution of that policy. Major energy sources are discusses in detail.

February 1981. Approximately 225 pages. Tentative price $7.50.

Lawrence Baum, Ohio State University

The Supreme Court

This book is a short but comprehensive examination of the personnel, process, politics, and policymaking of the Court. It makes an excellent introduction to constitutional law and a fine choice for judicial process and Supreme Court courses.

January 1981. 248 pages. Tentative price $7.50.

George E. Hale and Marian Lief Palley, both University of Delaware

Politics and Federal Grants

The process and politics of the widespread use of intergovernmental grants to achieve public policy goals are examined in this text. It is excellent for courses on intergovernmental relations and state and local politics and government.

February 1981. Approx. 250 pages. Tentative price $7.50.

Available Now!

George C. Edwards III, Texas A & M University

Implementing Public Policy

Even well-conceived public policies can and do go wrong in the implementation stage; Edwards identifies and discusses four variables that influence implementation — communication, resources, dispositions, and bureaucratic structure — and goes on to examine remedies for poor implementation.

August 1980. 181 pages. $6.95.

If you're considering these books for course adoption, write for a complimentary copy to:

Patti Silver, College Services Coordinator
Congressional Quarterly Inc.
1414 22nd St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037

The Irony of Democracy Endures! . . . Unto a Fifth Edition . . .

Coming in February 1981—

THE IRONY OF DEMOCRACY:
AN UNCOMMON INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN POLITICS, 5TH EDITION

by **Thomas R. Dye**, Florida State University;
and **L. Harmon Zeigler**, University of Oregon

Nearly 2,000 colleges and universities across the nation have discovered "the irony of democracy" within the pages of this provocative introductory text by Thomas Dye and Harmon Zeigler. The authors contribute a unique reinterpretation to the study of American government: **that elites, not masses, govern America**—a viewpoint that has stood the test of time, numerous administrations in Washington, and four editions.

The authors describe elitism from its historical beginnings to today's corporate and government elites, the Congressional and "liberal" establishments, and state and local power structures. They cover all the standard topics of introductory American politics, but put them in a thought- provoking new light.

Here's what's new in the text that has so successfully challenged students to rethink what democracy in the U.S. is all about:

• an entire new chapter on public policy and the bureaucratic elite • a new section on PAC's and how they affect political parties • a number of new topics that includes: agenda setting in the mass media, presidential primaries and the deterioration of political parties, the new "single interest" group politics, the president as symbolic leader, TV's liberal bias, the political power of the feminist movement, the growth of federal power in inter-governmental relations.

This February, take the opportunity to find out for yourself what has made THE IRONY OF DEMOCRACY such an uncommon introduction to American politics.

February 1981. Approximately 400 pages. 7⅜ x 9¼. Paperbound. Instructor's Manual, Test Items.

For more information on these texts or to request a copy of the Duxbury Political Science catalog, write: Box APSR-D-DEC 80

DUXBURY PRESS

A Division of Wadsworth, Inc. • 555 Abrego Street • Monterey, California 93940

More Provocative Politics from Duxbury Press . . .

American Government and Politics

New in 1981 —

AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

by **Kenneth M. Dolbeare**, University of Massachusetts

. . . a major text/anthology that illustrates the origins and development of American political ideas with a broad, thoughtfully collected sampling of writings by important American political thinkers . . . head notes for each selection . . . summary essays by the author/editor.

January 1981. Approximately 600 pages. 7⅜ x 9¼. Casebound.

Introduction to Political Science

Just Published —

POLITICS FOR HUMAN BEINGS, 2ND EDITION

by **Ralph P. Hummel**, Brooklyn College; and **Robert A. Isaak**, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, Bologna, Italy

. . . an inventive, practical introductory text that puts people back into politics, ethics back into political science, and students back into the classroom . . . case studies . . . tools for analysis . . . many new topics.

September 1980. 350 pages. 6⅜ x 9¼. Paperbound. Teacher's Manual.

New in 1980—

THE DRAMAS OF POLITICAL LIFE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF GOVERNANCE

by **James N. Rosenau**, University of Southern California

. . . an insightful introductory text dedicated to the proposition that a rigorous discussion of political institutions, dynamics, and ideas need not be sleep-inducing! . . . case studies . . . discussion questions.

Spring 1980. 283 pages. 6⅜ x 9¼. Paperbound.

Comparative Politics & International Relations

Just Published—

INDIVIDUALS AND WORLD POLITICS, 2ND EDITION

by **Robert A. Isaak**, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, Bologna, Italy

. . . an intriguing introduction to global politics through a close examination of the lives of eight major "movers and shakers" in the arena of 20th-century world relations . . . extensively revised and updated . . . case studies.

November 1980. 208 pages. 6⅜ x 9¼. Paperbound.

Just Published—

THE SOVIET CRUCIBLE: THE SOVIET SYSTEM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, 5TH EDITION

by **Samuel Hendel**, Professor Emeritus, CUNY and Trinity College

. . . an insightful collection of documents, classical writings, and commentaries that offers students of the Soviet system a remarkably penetrating view of that system's principles and practices . . . revised and updated from cover to cover.

October 1980. 450 pages. 6⅜ x 9¼. Paperbound.

DUXBURY PRESS



Domestic Intelligence
MONITORING DISSENT IN AMERICA
BY RICHARD E. MORGAN

Domestic Intelligence

MONITORING DISSENT IN AMERICA

By Richard E. Morgan

The past decade has revealed a number of infamous and illegal practices used by federal law enforcement agencies to monitor political dissent in the United States. Morgan is concerned with the tension between the need to protect privacy and political dissent and the need for the government to protect the community. He concludes that intelligence operations aimed at anticipating criminal activity are necessary in a complex, highly vulnerable society, and can be conducted responsibly with proper guidelines and oversight mechanisms.
208 pp., $6.95 paper, $13.95 cloth



The Population of the South
Edited by Dudley L. Poston Jr. Robert H. Weller
Preface by Daniel O. Price

The Population of the South

STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN SOCIAL DEMOGRAPHIC CONTEXT

Edited by Dudley L. Poston, Jr., and Robert H. Weller
Preface by Daniel O. Price

The southern population, unique in its socioeconomic and cultural characteristics, has always been a topic of major interest with U.S. demographers. *The Population of the South* reports on some of the most pertinent research dealing with fertility, mortality, and migration and the factors which influence these components. A number of the contributors trace patterns of demographic change in the South showing convergence with the rest of the United States. Questions are raised about whether the present convergence represents a permanent trend—possibly due to increased communication—or whether further divergence may be expected in the future.
288 pp., $25.00

Mobility and Integration in Urban Argentina

CÓRDOBA IN THE LIBERAL ERA

By Mark D. Szuchman

Between the 1870s, when the great influx of European immigrants began, and the start of World War I, Argentina underwent a radical alteration of its social composition and patterns of economic productivity. Szuchman examines the occupational, residential, educational, and economic patterns of mobility of some four thousand men, women, and children who resided in Córdoba, Argentina's most important interior city, during this changeful era.
290 pp., $19.95



The Politics of Population in Brazil
Elite Ambivalence and Public Demand

The Politics of Population in Brazil

ELITE AMBIVALENCE AND PUBLIC DEMAND

By Peter McDonough and Amaury DeSouza

The population of Brazil has increased tenfold, from 10 to over 100 million, in the last 100 years, nearly half of this increase occurring since World War II. *The Politics of Population in Brazil* examines the attitudes toward population planning of Brazilian government officials and other elites in comparison with the mass public opinion. The authors' findings that elites seriously underestimate the desire for family planning services, while the public views birth control as a basic issue, represent an important contribution on a timely issue.
192 pp., $19.95

University of Texas Press
P.O. BOX 7819 AUSTIN, TEXAS 78712

Social Justice in the Liberal State

Bruce A. Ackerman

Certain to become the most important work in political theory since John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice*, this book presents a brilliantly original, compelling vision of a just society—a world in which each of us may live his own life in his own way without denying the same right to others. Full of provocative discussions of issues ranging from education to abortion, it makes fascinating reading for anyone concerned with the future of the liberal democratic state.

"Nobody who reads [this] book can fail to be provoked by the author's ingenious arguments into reexamining previously unquestioned beliefs on topics as wide apart as education and immigration."—Brian Barry, University of Chicago
$17.50

Class, Religion, and Local Politics in Wilhelmine Germany

The Centre Party in Wurttemberg before 1914

David Blackbourn

Between 1890 and 1912 the Catholic Centre Party was the largest single party in the German Reichstag. Rivaling the SPD as a mass organization, it played a crucial role in the rapidly developing Wilhelmine state. This book analyzes the political significance of the Centre Party within both a national and a local context. It is an elegant and lucid examination of politics at work, of manipulation from above, and of pressures from below. $25.00

Yale
Yale University Press
New Haven and London

The New Senate

Liberal Influence on a Conservative Institution, 1959–1972

Michael Foley

The United States Senate has long been regarded as a conservative institution for conservative members. Michael Foley presents a vivid picture of how a group of liberal senators elected in the 1950s and 1960s changed the Senate and were themselves changed in the process. Based on extensive interviews with senators, their staffs, and a host of observers on Capitol Hill, as well as on the written record, this book will undoubtedly become the standard work on the Senate today. $17.95

Manipulatory Politics

Robert E. Goodin

In an effort to introduce moral considerations into the study of power, Goodin focuses on the notion of manipulation. He begins by surveying various techniques of manipulatory politics, such as lying, rhetorical trickery, symbolic rewards, political rituals, and the rigging of "obvious" solutions to problems. Of the twenty distinct strategies that he uncovers, only a few offer any serious threat, and he concludes with a discussion of their common characteristics so that other forms of manipulation can be better detected in the future. $17.95

Class and Economic Change in Kenya

The Making of an African Petite Bourgeoisie, 1905–1970

Gavin Kitching

In this penetrating study, Kitching combines a richly detailed historical analysis of the processes that transformed the political economy of colonial and post-colonial Kenya with a provocative and searching theoretical discussion in which he explores the implications of this analysis from a Marxist perspective. $35.00

Little, Brown Books Are Always Good Politics

COLLEGE DIVISION
LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY
34 Beacon Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02106

GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA: People, Politics, and Policy

By Robert L. Lineberry. Cloth/601 pages/16.95/with Study Guide, Instructor's Manual/and *computerized* Test Bank. This is the new American Government text that everyone's talking about—and adopting! It offers thorough, balanced coverage of political behavior, processes, and institutions—with a unique and timely focus on three of the most *crucial policy arenas* in America today: equality, the economy, and energy/environment. Be sure to examine GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA!

THE STATE OF THE PRESIDENCY

2nd Edition, by Thomas E. Cronin. Paper/417 pages/$7.95. The reviewers have praised it as "exceptionally intelligent," "brilliantly perceptive," and "perhaps the best general textbook on the Presidency yet written." Cronin's comprehensive appraisal of the paradoxes and politics of the American presidency has been entirely updated and now addresses such timely issues as the presidential selection process and the decline of presidential leadership.

PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA

4th Edition, by Frank J. Sorauf. Cloth/436 pages/$14.95. This well-known survey of political parties and the party system examines *all* aspects of party organization, voters, and officeholders. The Fourth Edition incorporates new facts, events, and research throughout, including new material on the historical development of parties and the modern phenomenon of party decline.

AMERICAN PARTIES IN DECLINE

By William J. Crotty & Gary C. Jacobson. Paper/267 pages/$6.95. The decline of political parties in America and the implications this "collapse" holds for our political system is the subject of this unique paperback. The authors explore the rise of an issue-oriented electorate, the weakening of party loyalty and influence in Congress, and recent attempts at revitalizing parties through reform.

POLITICS AND POLICY IN STATES AND COMMUNITIES

By John J. Harrigan. Cloth/475 pages/ $15.95/with Instructor's Manual. Discussions of state government and local government are *integrated* in this superb new text to give students a thorough—and realistic—look at political institutions and policy making. Professor Harrigan, author of the well-known POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE METROPOLIS, includes coverage of such key policy arenas as law enforcement, education, welfare, and the environment.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
The People's Business

By J. D. Williams. Cloth/585 pages/ $15.95/with Instructor's Manual. This lively text proposes that, in addition to mastering administrative theory and organizational skills, a successful manager must understand what makes *people* tick. The author dramatizes key concepts and issues in public administration with many vivid examples, ranging from the politics of budgeting to morale problems in bureaucracies.

COMPARATIVE POLITICS TODAY: A World View

2nd Edition, Gabriel A. Almond & G. Bingham Powell, Jr., General Editors. Cloth/562 pages/$16.95/with Instructor's Manual. This widely-used introductory text compares and evaluates the political institutions, processes, and policies of modern nations, through 7 diverse country studies by area specialists. The Second Edition features a new chapter on West Germany, timely coverage of dissent in the USSR, and more material on policy strategies and their consequences.

THE CIVIC CULTURE REVISITED

Gabriel A. Almond & Sidney Verba, General Editors. Paper/421 pages/$8.95. This *retrospective evaluation* of Almond and Verba's 1963 work, THE CIVIC CULTURE, updates that pioneering study of the political belief systems of Germany, England, Mexico, Italy, and the United States. Contemporary chapters on each nation were contributed by country specialists, and new critical essays by the editors assess the methodology of the original publication.

POLITICS IN ENGLAND

3rd Edition, by Richard Rose. Paper/ 392 pages/$7.95. Incorporating a wealth of previously unpublished research, this study of political processes and institutions in contemporary England has been thoroughly updated. The Third Edition offers increased coverage of policy making and implementation, plus new material on the 1979 elections, England's economic troubles, and its prospects for the 1980s.

POLITICS IN CHINA

2nd Edition, by James R. Townsend. Paper/380 pages/$7.95. In its new edition, this analysis of the institutions and processes of Chinese politics has three important bonuses: coverage of events through the Spring of 1979; a new periodization of political history and a new assessment of the Maoist model; and more emphasis on the international context of Chinese politics.

"Democracy has no more persistent or insidious foe than the money power..."—Viscount Bryce

THE POWER OF MONEY

A Political-Economic Analysis
with Special Emphasis on the
American Political System
by Henry L. Bretton

Money, a dynamic material substance, is also a formidable social and political force. Yet recognition of the full range of money's political potential has eluded writers from antiquity to modern times.

In *The Power of Money,* Henry L. Bretton uncovers the reasons for this by analyzing writings of the great theorists in such various disciplines as economics, philosophy, theology, law, sociology, psychology, and political science.

A veritable "anatomy of the power of money," this is the first book to examine in depth the centrality of money in state and society. It also shows how this power affects political democracy as practised in the United States and offers recommendations on how money's destructive forces may be contained.

HENRY L. BRETTON, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the State University of New York College at Brockport, is the author of books on power and politics.

418 pages *$12.95 paperback/$34.00 cloth*
Examination copies are available. The instructor will be billed and billing will be cancelled upon receipt of an order for 6 or more copies from the institution or its bookstore.

STATE UNIVERSITY OF
NEW YORK PRESS
P.O. Box 4830, Hampden Station
Baltimore, MD 21211

NEW FROM CHANDLER & SHARP

THE ENTERPRISE
OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Dwight Waldo, Woodrow Wilson Institute
224 pp., 6 x 9", paper $6.95
ISBN 0-88316-537-6

"This volume is a product of my final semester at Syracuse University. It is a review and summing up of four decades of involvement with public administration.

"The eleven lectures serve their ostensible purpose reasonably well, I judge. A formal comprehensiveness is given by the fact that the series begins with a look at history, treats a number of contemporary matters, and concludes with a look toward the future." From the *Preface.*

THE COLLAPSE OF LIBERAL EMPIRE

Paul N. Goldstene, CSU, Sacramento
160 pp., 6 x 9", paper $5.95
ISBN 0-88316-540-6

American political attitudes have been and remain overwhelmingly liberal, argues Goldstene, but most liberals do not understand the ideology of liberalism as it applies to the current American order. The impact of the postindustrial political economy, and the power of the corporate giants, has rendered past liberal power relationships inoperable, and calls for a reexamination of liberal beliefs in view of present realities. Goldstene explores the potential of modern science as a means of preserving the liberal commitment to balance.

Instructors wishing to consider these books for adoption should write to
Chandler & Sharp Publishers, Dept. W, 11A Commercial Blvd., Novato, CA 94947
(415) 883-2353

Housing Policies | Regulatory Agencies | Changing Bureaucracies

Important Books on Current Concerns

FROM AUBURN HOUSE

Condominiums Conversion's Effects on a Community

John R. Dinkelspiel, Joel Uchenick, and **Herbert L. Selesnick** all of Harbridge House, Incorporated.

Condominiums provides a unique examination of the motivations and attitudes of the willing and unwilling participants in the condominium conversion process — developers, bankers, apartment dwellers, condominium buyers, and town officials. The results of over 1200 interviews with the various participants are empirically analyzed and presented in a discussion of conversion's social, demographic, and fiscal effects on a community. The book also presents and develops several novel analytic approaches and suggests policy issues that should be examined as communities assess conversion's effects on their specific situations.

JANUARY 1981
HARDBOUND $19.95

Regulatory Politics and Electric Utilities

Douglas D. Anderson, Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration.

The author challenges the conventional wisdom that characterizes regulatory agencies as "captured" by the very industries they regulate. After describing the structures, premises, and workings of regulatory agencies, he offers an alternative conceptualization of the regulatory process and evaluates the impact of external constraints and the nature of tasks performed. Case studies used to support the author's conclusions are restructuring of private utility rates incorporating peak-load pricing and lifeline rate proposals by the New York Public Service Commission and the California Public Utilities Commission.

FEBRUARY 1981
HARDBOUND $19.95

Postal Reorganization Managing the Public's Business

John T. Tierney, Georgetown University

Professor Tierney presents a detailed study of the largest (non-military) governmental agency in the world and explores the difficulties of managing a businesslike enterprise in a governmental setting. The author uses the Postal Service case to examine the general operation and control of government agencies. Those interested in Public Administration will be particularly engaged by the book's analyses of collective bargaining's impact on a federal agency, political obstacles to achieving cost controls and productivity improvements in government enterprise, and the problems attendant to fashioning a 200-year-old government bureaucracy into a more "businesslike" organization.

FEBRUARY 1981
HARDBOUND $19.95

To order, please write:

AUBURN HOUSE
PUBLISHING COMPANY
131 Clarendon Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02116
Telephone 617-247-2650

- Please add postage and handling charges: $1.00 per book for multi-copy orders, $1.50 for single copy orders. Massachusetts residents add 5% sales tax.
- Orders from individuals must be accompanied by payment.
- Academic examination copies are available at 50% of regular price. Payment will be refunded upon evidence of multi-copy purchase from Auburn House for class use.
- Master Charge and Visa accepted for orders over $15. When ordering by credit card, please include card's number and expiration date.

Presenting
The Newly Revised

APSA GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM
for members and their eligible dependents

Lower rates ● Increased benefits
● Five years step rate premium payments guarantee
● Greater benefits at older ages

Plan Highlights:

☐ Two plans of life insurance:
  Plan A—up to $25,000
  Plan B—up to $50,000

☐ Rates reduced 33 percent effective November 1, 1979.

☐ Life-time coverage as long as you are a member of APSA.

☐ Death benefit doubled for members regardless of age event of accidental death. Also includes accidental dismemberment and loss of sight benefits.

☐ Waiver of your payment if you become totally disabled before the age of 60.

☐ Right to convert group term insurance to an individual policy of permanent insurance.

☐ Becoming a member of an insurance plan that is over 25 years old.

Write for plan details and an application:

American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 483-2512

THE BACKYARD REVOLUTION
Understanding the New Citizen Movement

HARRY C. BOYTE

"... a journey of discovery and elation ... a throbbing catalogue of civic opportunities to get involved and extend the depths and frontiers of self-government."
— Ralph Nader

"Anyone concerned with social change must read this book!"
— Michael Harrington

For those who care deeply about democracy and how to attain it, this book is absolutely the essential starting point."
—Lawrence Goodwyn

288 pp. ISBN 0-87722-192-8
$14.95

INTO THE DARK
Hannah Arendt and Totalitarianism

STEPHEN J. WHITFIELD

"... the most intellectually exciting book I've read in years."—*Dwight Macdonald*

Hannah Arendt's special accomplishment was to help ensure that the torment of totalitarianism would not be forgotten, even though no complete understanding of it is possible. This book is an exploration of her theory of totalitarianism, its roots in contemporary European political thought, and its consequences in the context of American culture and experience.

"... thoughtful, informative, and fair-minded."—*Irving Howe*

338 pp. November
ISBN 0-87722-188-X $18.95

POLICY AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN
The Limits of Consensus

DOUGLAS E. ASHFORD

"A provocative and stimulating book. Professor Ashford focuses on some of the major current problems in British politics and government; his analysis and critiques should be a valuable contribution to understanding the issues."—William Plowden, Director-General, Royal Institute of Public Administration

"Brilliant. Ashford sweeps you along in an inquiry that never lets up, looking at familiar facts from new angles and revealing crucial and unexpected connections."—Samuel H. Beer, Harvard University

In the series, Policy and Politics in Industrial States, edited by Douglas E. Ashford, Peter J. Katzenstein, and T. J. Pempel.

400 pp. December
ISBN 0-87722-194-4 cloth $19.50
-195-2 paper $9.95

Temple University Press
Broad and Oxford Streets • Philadelphia, Pa. 19122

"A dazzling new work by one of the best writers in the English language in any category!"
—*Chicago Tribune*



Wit and animation, erudition and penetrating insights are the unmistakable hallmarks of Galbraith's writing—and never more so than in this spirited collection which probes the current preoccupations of the American community. Whether discussing the recent economic climate or contemporary swindlers, Nixon's memoirs or Evelyn Waugh's novels, Galbraith's pithy and pointed essays will challenge and charm readers of all political persuasions. "Galbraith has never been more diverse in subject matter... never more Galbraithian in pure, enjoyable artistry!"
—*Boston Globe*

MERIDIAN / F544 / $5.95

At all bookstores or send $5.95 plus $.75 for postage and handling to: New American Library, P.O. Box 999, Bergenfield, N.J. 07621

Write to the NAL Education Department at the following address for a free History and Social Studies catalog.

NEW AMERICAN LIBRARY
NAL
TIMES MIRROR
1633 Broadway
New York 10019

CHATHAM HOUSE
Publishers, Inc

THE ELECTION OF 1980
GERALD M. POMPER AND ASSOCIATES

The first book on the election by the team that produced the highly acclaimed work on '76. Based on current polling data, the volume includes essays by Ross Baker, Charles Jacob, Carey McWilliams, Henry Plotkin, and Gerald Pomper. New to this volume is an essay on opinion trends in 1980 by Dr. Kathleen Frankovic of the CBS/New York Times Poll. Reserve your copy now!

0-934540-09-8 $6.95 *paper* 0-934540-10-1 $12.95 *cloth*

NOTES TO A NEW ADMINISTRATION
ON FEDERAL REORGANIZATION

EDITED BY PETER SZANTON

Public dissatisfaction with the performance of the federal government faces the incoming President and each cabinet member and federal agency head. These original essays by Alan L. Dean, I. M. Destler, Lester M. Salamon, Allen Schick, Harold Seidman, and Peter Szanton assess the probable costs and benefits of alternative reforms of the structure, processes, and staffing of the federal government.

0-934540-11-X $12.95 *paper*

MANAGING FISCAL STRESS
THE CRISIS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

EDITED BY CHARLES H. LEVINE

"This is a fine and timely statement about an unhappy reality. It contains a lot of practical knowledge, drawn from sound systematic analyses."

William J. Siffin
Indiana University

0-934540-02-1 $11.95 *paper*

DO PARTIES MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
RICHARD ROSE

"An innovative, incisive, and highly readable analysis of how British party government functioned in the context of a declining economy and consensual political customs."

Leon D. Epstein
University of Wisconsin

0-934540-08-X $8.95 *paper*

For further information, contact: **Edward Artinian**, publisher,
CHATHAM HOUSE PUBLISHERS, INC.
Box One, Chatham, New Jersey 07928 Telephone (201) 635-2059

Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1929-1976

Robert A. Pastor

Pastor offers the fullest published description of U.S. foreign economic policy over the last fifty years and a new theoretical explanation for the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. $24.50

Second Edition—

The Rise of Fascism

F. L. Carsten

In addition to updating throughout, Carsten has provided a new chapter on neofascism with current information on the resurgence of movements in Germany, Italy, and Great Britain. $18.50

Hegemony and Revolution

Antonio Gramsci's Political and Cultural Theory

Walter L. Adamson

Although Gramsci's writings are widely read in Europe, especially for the light they throw on contemporary "eurocommunist" parties, they are less known in America. In this first full-length study in English, Adamson untangles the complicated network of themes of Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks*. $20.00

Introduction to Critical Theory—Horkheimer to Habermas

David Held

"The first book to present clearly the thought of the Frankfurt School as a whole. . . . a major contribution to the history of social thought, to sociological theory, and to Marxist theory. . . . a splendid piece of work." —*Mark Poster* $32.50 cloth, $12.75 paper

Management and Ideology

The Legacy of the International Scientific Management Movement

Judith A. Merkle

From its obscure beginning as a system for organizing machine shops, Scientific Management has grown into the major technocratic ideology of the twentieth century. Merkle offers a provocative study of the movement's growth. $18.50

The World of the Citizen in Republican Rome

Claude Nicolet

"Far and away the best examination of the fabric of social and political life in the Roman Republic." —*Erich Gruen* "Attractive and readable." —*Journal of Roman Studies* $50.00

Peasant China in Transition

The Dynamics of Development toward Socialism, 1949-1956

Vivienne Shue

Shue demonstrates that China's swift agricultural collectivization can be understood only in the context of several rural economic policies that preceded it. Her analysis establishes a new benchmark for assessing agrarian reform movements in Third World countries. $25.75

University of
California Press
Berkeley 94720

ANNOUNCING

The Franklin Watts College Division

(Formerly New Viewpoints)

New! Available Now:

AN END TO HIERARCHY AND COMPETITION

***Administration in the Post-Affluent World* 2nd Ed.**

FREDERICK C. THAYER, University of Pittsburgh

Hailed with enthusiasm when it was first published in 1973, this book has been thoroughly revised and updated. An important feature is the new introduction, "Hierarchy and the Human Brain." The author believes that hierarchy must be abandoned, and calls for a radical restructuring of society and government along non-hierarchical lines. "Thayer is a dreamer," says *Choice*, "but he is an insightful dreamer....His work deserves serious attention." Index. $7.95 Paper. 531-05631-7

Recently published:

AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES

DAVID H. EVERSON, Sangamon State University

In this election year, many people have begun to wonder about the future of America's political parties. This insightful evaluation of the traditional two-party system examines some of the problems that threaten our political party structure, the major changes that have occurred in the presidential nomination process, and the nationalization of two-party competition. The author describes likely developments and emphasizes the need for a more responsible electorate. Diagrams, Index. 1980.
$15.00 Hardcover. 531-05414-4. $7.95 Paper. 531-05628-7

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

HAROLD W. CHASE, ROBERT T. HOLT, and JOHN E. TURNER,
all of the University of Minnesota

The arms race... the energy crunch... the pollution of our environment... Can America's political institutions successfully meet these and other challenges of the future? To answer this question, the authors pinpoint problem areas in current American politics and analyze what can be learned from other countries' experiences in order to improve the effectiveness of U.S. political institutions. 1979.
$12.95 Hardcover. 531-05406-3. $6.95 Paper. 531-05617-1

A Classic:

THE NAZI SEIZURE OF POWER

The Experience of a Single German Town, 1930–35

WILLIAM SHERIDAN ALLEN, SUNY, Buffalo

1973. $5.95 Paper. 531-06439-5

We welcome manuscripts or project ideas for basic political science courses. Please contact Will Davison, Executive Editor, Dept.PD

College Division, Franklin Watts

730 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10019

A GROLIER COMPANY

KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS

Thomas Sowell

“A brilliant book...The ideas are original and penetrating; the examples ingenious and apt; the exposition lucid and absorbing. Sowell illuminates how every society operates. In the process he also shows how the performance of our own society can be improved.”
—*Milton Friedman, Hoover Institution*
“A great book...It should be required reading for every social scientist, philosopher, intellectual, and politician.”
—*James Buchanan, Center for Study of Public Choice*
“Sowell is a brilliant and profoundly knowledgeable social scientist...One cannot praise too highly the combination of perspective, insight, and detailed learning.”—*Robert Nisbet, Columbia University*
$18.50

THE POLITICS OF REGULATION

James Q. Wilson, Editor

“A superb job of unravelling the myriad political influences upon the regulatory process...Covering 9 regulatory agencies with a summary piece by Wilson, the authors seek to discover how agency goals are determined, conflict resolved or managed, standards set, and policy enforced.”—*Robert B. Reich, The New Republic*
$18.95

WEALTH AND POVERTY

George Gilder

“A really remarkable analysis of American social and economic policy that demolishes a host of pieties as to the causes of poverty and the conditions that overcome it. It should be read widely and have wide influence.”—*Nathan Glazer, Harvard University*
“In George Gilder’s hands the dismal science of economics becomes ennobling.”—*Paul Craig Roberts*
$16.95

BASIC BOOKS, INC.
10 East 53rd Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

Human Rights Concerns from Princeton

The National Interest and the Human Interest

An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy

Robert Johansen

"A book of major importance. Johansen moves far beyond pious platitudes in a rigorous analysis of the contrast between professed and implicit values in foreign policy. His call for 'global humanism' is supported by four superb case studies of U.S. action in regard to strategic arms limitation, human rights in Chile, aid to India, and marine pollution."—Gaddis Smith, Foreign Affairs.
Center of International Studies, Princeton University.
Cloth, $32.50. Paperback, $6.95

Reasoning About Discrimination

The Analysis of Professional and Executive Work in Federal Antibias Programs

Richard A. Lester

Developing an analytical basis for judging sex, race, and age discrimination in professional and executive employment, Richard Lester examines federal antibias programs applied in the 1970s. Drawing heavily on the results of systematic research, enforcement actions by the agencies, and court cases, he criticizes the analytical underpinning of the programs and suggests means for improving their suitability for professional and executive workers.
$17.50

Basic Rights

Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy

Henry Shue

Which human rights ought to be the first honored and the last sacrificed? In the first systematic attempt by an American philosopher to address this issue as it relates to U.S. foreign policy, Henry Shue proposes an original conception of basic rights that illuminates both the nature of moral rights generally and the determination of which specific rights are the basic ones.
Sponsored by the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Maryland at College Park.
Cloth, 17.50. Paperback, $4.95

Princeton University Press

Princeton, New Jersey 08540

New Books for the Political Scientist

Being Number One: Rebuilding the U. S. Economy
Gail Garfield Schwartz** and **Pat Choate
160pp. ISBN 0-669-04308-7 $14.95

Taxing and Spending Policy
edited by **Warren J. Samuels,** Michigan State University, and **Larry L. Wade,** University of California
A Policy Studies Organization Book
208pp. ISBN 0-669-03469-x $19.95

Three Faces of Pluralism
Political, Ethnic, and Religious
edited by **Stanislaw Ehrlich,** University of Warsaw, and **Graham Wootton,** Tufts University
232pp. code 03274-3 $18.95

Network Television and the Public Interest
A Preliminary Inquiry
edited by **Michael Botein** and **David Rice,** New York Law School
ISBN 0-669-02927-0 Now Available

State and Local Taxation of the Mining Industry
edited by **Robert Conrad,** Duke University, and **Bryce Hool,** State University of New York at Stony Brook
ISBN 0-669-04104-1 Now Available

Tokyo and Washington
Dilemmas of a Mature Alliance
Frederick L. Shiels, Mercy College
208pp. ISBN 0-669-03378-2 $20.50

Innovation, Competition, and Government Policy in the Semiconductor Industry
Robert W. Wilson, Peter K. Ashton, and **Thomas P. Egan**
A Charles River Associates Research Study
240pp. ISBN 0-669-03995-0 $21.95

The Economics of VAT
Preserving Efficiency, Capitalism, and Social Progress
Richard W. Lindholm, University of Oregon
208pp. ISBN 0-669-04111-4 $19.95

The Organizational Politics of Criminal Justice
Policy in Context
Virginia Gray, University of Minnesota, and **Bruce Williams,** The Pennsylvania State University
192pp. ISBN 0-669-02108-3 $17.50

Forthcoming

The Analysis of Policy Impact
edited by **John G. Grumm,** Wesleyan University, and **Stephen L. Wasby,** State University of New York at Albany
A Policy Studies Organization Book
ISBN 0-669-03951-9 Spring 1981

Implementing Public Policy
edited by **Dennis J. Palumbo,** and **Mike Harder**
A Policy Studies Organization Book
ISBN 0-669-04305-2 Spring 1981

The Nationalization of State Government
edited by **Jerome J. Hanus,** The American University
ISBN 0-669-04334-6 Spring 1981

Securing U. S. Energy Supplies
The Private Sector as an Instrument of Public Policy
William G. Prast, Atlantis Energy and Economic Services, Inc.
ISBN 0-669-03305-7 Spring 1981

Effective Policy Implementation
edited by **Daniel A. Mazmanian,** Pomona College, and **Paul A. Sabatier,** University of California, Davis
A Policy Studies Organization Book
ISBN 0-669-03311-1 Spring 1981

Governance of Public Enterprise
A Case Study of Urban Mass Transit
Neil W. Hamilton, William Mitchell College of Law, and **Peter R. Hamilton,** Colorado College
ISBN 0-669-03867-9 Spring 1981

HEATH

LexingtonBooks
D. C. Heath and Company
125 Spring Street
Lexington, MA 02173
(617) 862-6650 (212) 924-6460
Call our toll-free number
800 428-8071

from LexingtonBooks

New Books from Iowa Press

IN THE EYE OF THE STORM: Kurt Riezler and the Crises of Modern Germany by Wayne C. Thompson. $17.95. "This biography of a man who actually reflected and refracted events better than many of his contemporaries provides many insights into the tangled maze of German, Russian, and European politics." —*Konrad H. Jarausch, University of Missouri-Columbia*

THE AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS, 1776-1848: Sociopolitical and Ideological Aspects, edited with introduction by Jaroslaw Pelenski. Proceedings of the Second Conference of Polish and American Historians. $17.50. "This is an important work for scholars whose interests are in Eastern Europe, as well as for those concerned with the period, 1770-1850."—*R. R. Palmer, Yale University*

HERBERT HOOVER: *The Great War and Its Aftermath 1914-23,* edited by Lawrence E. Gelfand. $17.95. "Based on the latest Hoover scholarship, these essays contribute more to a comprehensive and fair evaluation of Hoover's early years as a public figure than all previously published accounts."—*Joan Hoff Wilson, Arizona State University.*

University of Iowa Press **Iowa City, Iowa 52242**

The Dean of Political Cartoonists



takes incisive aim at pomposity and propaganda

HERBLOCK ON ALL FRONTS

Cartoons and commentary by HERBLOCK

America's #1 political cartoonist, winner of three Pulitzer Prizes, zeroes in on the personalities and events of the past decade–from Nixon in the White House to the Russians in Afghanistan–with a choice new collection that leavens the gloom-and-doom with laughter.

NAL BOOKS H389/$14.95

Write to the NAL Education Department at the following address for a free History and Social Studies Catalog.

NAL TIMES MIRROR

NEW AMERICAN LIBRARY
1633 Broadway, New York 10019

St. Martin's Press

New in 1981...

World Politics: Trend and Transformation

CHARLES W. KEGLEY, *University of South Carolina,* and **EUGENE R. WITTKOPF,** *University of Florida*

World Politics: Trend and Transformation is a comprehensive introduction to international relations and to the global problems and policy issues which have emerged since the Second World War. Taking a holistic point of view, Kegley and Wittkopf explore the historical roots of today's problems and capture the interlocking nature of the major controversies of contemporary international politics — The East-West dispute, the North-South controversy, energy scarcities, nuclear proliferation, war, terrorism, arms control, international law, and more.

Alternative perspectives on issues are presented to broaden students' understanding of world politics and to increase their awareness of the different, often conflicting, visions of global political "reality." Conceptual and theoretical discussions are supported throughout with empirical information drawn from a variety of sources and often presented in convenient graphic and tabular form.

Instructor's Manual available.

CONTENTS

Part I: The Interplay of Transforming Political Forces. 1. World Politics in Transition: An Analytical Overview. 2. Images of World Politics in Transition.

Part II: The Interplay of World Political Actors. 3. The East-West Conflict: The Evolution of a Global Confrontation. 4. Global Inequalities: Background to the North-South Conflict. 5. The Rise of Nonstate Actors: International Organizations and Multinational Corporations.

Part III: The Interplay of Transnational Policy Issues. 6. The Transformation of the International Political Economy: Perspectives from the First World. 7. The Transformation of the International Political Economy: Second and Third World Perspectives. 8. The Population – Food Equation: Global Trends in Population Growth and Food Supplies. 9. The Energy Tangle and Resource Power.

Part IV: The Interplay of Arms and Violence. 10. The Quest for National Security: Trends in Military Capabilities. 11. War and Other Forms of Violent Conflict in World Politics. 12. The Balance of Power, Arms Control, and Interstate Violence: Trends in the Military Dimensions of Peace. 13. International Law and Organization and the Control of International Violence: Trends in the Political Dimensions of Peace.

Part V: World Politics in Transition. 14. Macropolitics in Transition: The Analysis of Global Transformation. 15. The Global Predicament: Ten Questions for a Tense Era.

February 1981 about 500 pages paperbound $11.95 (tentative)

To request a complimentary examination copy, please write (specifying
course, present text, and approximate enrollment) to:

St. Martin's Press ● P.O. Box 5352 ● New York, N.Y. 10163

St. Martin's Press

Forthcoming . . .

At Issue: Politics in the World Arena, *Third Edition*

edited by STEVEN L. SPIEGEL, *University of California, Los Angeles*

At Issue is a collection of lively, readable articles that explore the major issues in current world politics. The Third Edition includes 35 selections, 29 of them new in this edition, arranged in four parts; each part opens with an introduction by Professor Spiegel. In choosing the articles, Professor Spiegel's foremost criteria were readability; the extent to which articles informed students and might be relevant to a variety of international problems; how well they represented a broad spectrum of ideological and national views; and how well they might withstand the constant change of events. The book provides appealing reading for courses in World Politics, International Relations, and American Foreign Policy.

Praise for the Second Edition:

"Very useful selection of articles. I thought I would have to assign several books and articles to cover the issues I want to get into, including 'North-South' and 'Oil.' Instead, almost all of it is right here." —Thomas Turner, Wheeling College

"An excellent selection of absolutely first-rate articles!" —Gary J. Buckley, Northern Arizona University

February 1981 about 450 pages paperbound $8.95 (tentative)

The Politics of International Economic Relations *Second Edition*

JOAN EDELMAN SPERO, *Columbia University* and *U.S. Ambassador to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations*

Thoroughly revised and updated, the Second Edition of this well-recieved text explores the interaction between politics and economics in international relations. Among the issues addressed are the international monetary system, trade, multinational corporations, and oil. Dr. Spero examines the political processes by which nations have sought to manage their international economic relations in the years since World War II.

Praise for the First Edition:

"Her ability to integrate descriptions, including relevant history, with analysis is particularly impressive." —Michael G. Schechter, Michigan State University

"The author writes with great clarity; she has a splendid grasp of the material she is covering; she has selected for her consideration the most important topics in international economic relations." —Carl Kreider, Goshen College

February 1981 about 350 pages paperbound $8.95 (tentative)

American Government: A Brief Introduction, *Third Edition*

MAX J. SKIDMORE, *Southwest Missouri State University*, and MARSHALL CARTER WANKE

American Government is a brief, comprehensive, and flexible core text for the introductory American government course. Among the changes in the Third Edition are new chapters on bureaucracy and on public policy, and complete coverage of the 1980 presidential campaign and election.

Praise for the Second Edition:

"An excellent, objective, well-written, reasonably priced textbook for a one-semester course." ***—Paul G. Steinbicker, University of Dayton***

Instructor's Manual available.

February 1981 about 250 pages paperbound $7.95 (tentative)

Technology and Man's Future, *Third Edition*

edited by ALBERT TEICH, *The American Association for the Advancement of Science*

Technology and Man's Future includes twenty-one articles, eleven of them new to this edition, by scientists, social scientists, and philosophers. The unifying theme of the anthology is the impact of technology on man and society. The Third Edition takes into account the technology restraints that have appeared in recent years: the dangers of nuclear energy, the scarcity of oil, and environmental pollution by both.

Praise for the Second Edition:

"Students have liked it as much as I have."
—Howard P. Segal, University of Michigan at Ann Arbor

"A splendid collection, well organized."
—John M. Koller, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

February 1981 about 356 pages paperbound $7.95 (tentative)

Research Methods in the Social Sciences, *Second Edition*

DAVID NACHMIAS and CHAVA NACHMIAS, *University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee*

A basic text for courses in social science research methods, this widely praised book has been updated and expanded, taking into account the advice of both instructors and students who have used the First Edition. New chapters in the Second Edition cover the conceptual foundations of research, research design of pre- and quasi-experiments, questionnaire construction, and scaling and index construction.

Study Guide and Instructor's Manual available with the new edition.

February 1981 about 575 pages hardbound $16.95 (tentative)

Research Methods in the Social Sciences
Alternate Second Edition Without Statistics

CHAVA NACHMIAS and DAVID NACHMIAS, *University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee*

This alternate version of **Research Methods in the Social Sciences** provides a text for instructors who do not teach statistics as part of the research methods course.

Study Guide and Instructor's Manual available.

February 1981 about 350 pages hardbound $14.95 (tentative)

To request a complimentary examination copy, please write (specifying)
course, present text, and approximate enrollment) to:

St. Martin's Press ● P.O. Box 5352 ● New York, N.Y. 10163

Multinationals in Latin America

THE POLITICS OF NATIONALIZATION

Paul E. Sigmund

A TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND STUDY

The rapid increase in the number of nationalizations of foreign-owned concerns in Asia, Africa, and Latin America in recent years had led some observers to predict the impending demise of the multinational corporation in the Third World. Attempting to slow this trend, the U.S. government has used its diplomatic influence to defend American-based multinationals and the Congress has passed legislation aimed at deterring the expropriation of U.S.-owned companies. In this new book, Paul E. Sigmund challenges the notion of a rising tide of nationalization, arguing that, in Latin America at least, most of the exposed enclaves in the extractive industries that were the major targets of the economic nationalists have now been taken over, removing the major irritants affecting the relations of Third World governments with foreign investors. Instead of the previous conflict relationship, he perceives the beginnings of a new era of bargaining between Third World governments and foreign investors, in which there is a diminished role for the U.S. government and a mutual recognition by investors and host governments of the benefits to be secured by a bargaining relationship. Professor Sigmund's study makes a major theoretical contribution to the understanding of inter-American relations, providing insights which will be of interest to students of U.S. foreign policy, Latin-American studies, and economic development, as well as to business people involved in foreign investment.

444 pages; cloth $22.50; paperback $6.50

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN PRESS

114 North Murray Street, Madison, Wisconsin 53715

The New Leaders in American Government and Politics

American Government: Institutions and Policies

James Q. Wilson, Harvard University
1980 Cloth 683 pages
Student Handbook/ Instructor's Guide/ Test Item File

A significant achievement in American government education, this text answers the questions "Who governs?" and "To what ends?" in a remarkably judicious and timely manner. James Q Wilson's skillful, comprehensive, and analytical coverage of governmental institutions and processes is incorporated in the text's lucid explanations of *how* and *why* major policy decisions are made. A useful **Election Supplement** will be available in May 1981 for a thorough analysis of the 1980 presidential election and results.

Contemporary Readings in American Government

Edited by Byron W. Daynes, DePauw University
and Raymond Tatalovich, Loyola University of Chicago
1980 Paper 352 pages

Fifty-two articles, essays, and Supreme Court cases reflect up-to-the-minute political issues from a number of perspectives.

Forthcoming. . .

American Politics: Policies, Power, and Change

Fourth Edition
Kenneth M. Dolbeare, University of Massachusetts, Amherst and
Murray J. Edelman, University of Wisconsin
March 1981 Paper 592 pages
Student Guide/ Instructor's Guide

Completely updated and expanded, this text takes a critical look at American political institutions, values, and issues. It questions our government's public policies and their consequences, while challenging familiar myths, cliches, and stereotypes.

A Preface to Politics

Third Edition
David Schuman, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
December 1980 Paper 272 pages

A witty and enticing approach to fundamental political questions.

Urban America and Public Policies

Second Edition
Marian L. Palley, University of Delaware and
Howard A. Palley, University of Maryland
January 1981 Paper 304 pages

The authors argue convincingly that America's urban problems are national problems — unseparable from the whole of American politics and society.

Political Research: A Methodological Sampler

Betty H. Zisk, Boston University
January 1981 Paper 352 pages

A lively thorough introduction to the broad range of techniques used in political science research.

D. C. HEATH AND COMPANY
College Division
125 Spring Street
Lexington, Massachusetts 02173

The Political Philosophy of the Frankfurt School

By GEORGE FRIEDMAN. Taking a close look at the ideas of this group of German scholars and social critics, Friedman focuses on three issues: the origins of their thought, the manner in which they posed the problems of modern society, and the way they sought to solve these problems. $17.50

Agriculture, Bureaucracy, and Military Government in Peru

By PETER S. CLEAVES and MARTIN J. SCURRAH. In 1968, Peruvian military leaders took control of the national government, initiating a series of measures that attracted international attention. The most surprising policy effected by the regime—the new agrarian reform—proved to be the most radical and far-reaching in Latin America in recent history. In this volume, Cleaves and Scurrah provide a detailed and perceptive analysis of the history, implementation, and impact of the Peruvian agrarian reform. $22.50

Science, Technolgy, and National Policy

By THOMAS J. KUEHN and ALAN L. PORTER. This is the first collection of essays to deal with technology as it relates to, and is influenced by, public policy-making. Bringing together twenty-five of the most significant papers on this topic, the editors seek to provide a broad perspective, to sample the full spectrum of core concerns in technology policy, and to stimulate critical thinking. $9.95 paper; $35.00 cloth

New in paperback–

Central Asians Under Russian Rule

A Study in Culture Change

By ELIZABETH BACON $5.95 paper

Federalists in Dissent

Imagery and Ideology in Jeffersonian America

By LINDA K. KERBER $4.95 paper

The Jeffersonian Persuasion

Evolution of a Party Ideology

By LANCE BANNING $5.95 paper

Introduction to the Reading of Hegel

Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit

By ALEXANDRE KOJEVE. Assembled by Raymond Queneau, edited by Allan Bloom, translated by James H. Nichols, Jr. $7.95 paper

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS
P.O. Box 250, Ithaca, New York 14850

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN UPDATE:

Comparative Government: Politics of Industrialized and Developing Nations

Karl W. Deutsch, Jorge I. Domínguez,
and **Hugh Heclo,** all of Harvard University
About 494 pages/paperbound/Early 1981

Here is an authoritative, up-to-date introduction to the politics of sixteen nations. In their descriptive, empirical discussion, Deutsch, Domínguez, and Heclo present contemporary issues as well as historical background. In addition to the standard nations, this book briefly covers Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, India, Nigeria, Egypt, and Iran.

For ease of comparison, the text is organized by countries and each country is treated within a consistent framework.

Capitol, Courthouse, and City Hall
Sixth Edition

Robert L. Morlan, University of Redlands
David L. Martin, Auburn University
About 480 pages/paperbound/Just published

The new Sixth Edition of *Capitol, Courthouse, and City Hall* provides broad coverage of state and local politics in sound, readable articles written from many, often conflicting, points of view.

Morlan and Martin combine realistic accounts by practitioners with analyses by outstanding scholars. Over half the articles are new, addressing issues such as tax reform, public employee unionization, the expanding political roles of Hispanics and blacks, and problems of representation.

Public Administration: Concepts and Cases, Second Edition

Richard J. Stillman, II
George Mason University
494 pages/paperbound/1980

Stillman shows the relationship between theory and practice by systematically integrating important writings with contemporary case studies.

Practicing Texas Politics
Fourth Edition

Eugene W. Jones, Angelo State University
Joe E. Ericson, Stephen F. Austin State University
Lyle C. Brown, Baylor University
Robert S. Trotter, Jr., El Centro College
575 pages/paperbound/Instructor's Manual
Study Guide by **Lyle C. Brown** and **Sidney E. Young**
1980

Politics and Government: How People Decide Their Fate
Third Edition

Karl. W. Deutsch, Harvard University
With contributions by **Roy M. Hofheinz, Jr., Edwin O. Reischauer,** and **Van R. Whiting, Jr.**
683 pages/hardbound/Instructor's Manual/1980

An authoritative, up-to-date, comprehensive introduction.

American Government: Policy and Process, Third Edition

Robert L. Morlan, University of Redlands
474 pages/paperbound/Instructor's Manual/1979

Global Politics

James Lee Ray, University of New Mexico
416 pages/hardbound/Instructor's Manual/1979

Latin American Politics and Development

Howard J. Wiarda and **Harvey F. Kline**
Both of University of Massachusetts, Amherst
525 pages/hardbound/1979

Before the Law: An Introduction to the Legal Process, Second Edition

John Bonsignore, et al.
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
545 pages/paperbound/1979

Introduction to Law and the Legal System, Second Edition

Harold J. Grilliot, University of Cincinnati
589 pages/hardbound/Instructor's Manual/1979

For adoption consideration, request examination copies from your regional Houghton Mifflin office.

Houghton Mifflin

Dallas, TX 75234 Geneva, IL 60134 Hopewell, NJ 08525
Palo Alto, CA 94304 Boston, MA 02107

MARX'S POLITICS

Communists and Citizens

Alan Gilbert

Gilbert argues that Marx did not, as traditional economic determinists would have it, develop his theories in isolation from political events and historical circumstances. He shows how Marx constantly re-examined and modified his theories to reflect political lessons learned from his own activities. "Marx the man of action emerges much more coherently and with greater verisimilitude in these pages than anywhere else I have seen." —Mark Poster $19.00

THE POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT OF ADOLESCENTS

Roberta S. Sigel and Marilyn B. Hoskin

This study of high school seniors in the post-Watergate period uses a sample of 1,000 to determine their participation in, emotions toward, and cognition of, the political system. Gender, social class, personality, and political environment are variables considered. Only 36 percent were found to be politically active and most seemed to think politics were irrelevant. $22.00

BURMESE POLITICS

The Dilemma of National Unity

Josef Silverstein

Silverstein examines the political problems posed by the diversity of ethnic groups in Burma, each with its own language and culture. He considers the various strategies for unification adopted by different governments in the last thirty-five years and suggests that the best opportunity for unity, an opportunity that never was seized, came just after World War II. $23.00

RUTGERS
UNIVERSITY
PRESS

30 College Avenue • New Brunswick, NJ 08903

New books in political science
from Johns Hopkins

China under Threat

The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy

Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang

"A benchmark in the field of Chinese foreign policy analysis."—*Allen S. Whiting, University of Michigan*

China under Threat takes a new approach to the making of foreign policy behind the Great Wall by considering the philosophical, methodological, and experiential standpoints of Chinese policymakers. Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang base their arguments on a study of Chinese politics during five major crises: the Korean War, the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis, the Sino-Indian border war in 1962, the Vietnam War, and the 1969 Sino-Soviet border disputes. **$22.95**

The Nation at War

Arthur A. Stein

In *The Nation at War,* Arthur A. Stein undertakes a much-needed evaluation of war as a public policy. In light of empirical data concerning domestic changes during wartime, Stein develops a theory linking wartime mobilization to national cohesion, concentration of production and government control, and inequality in the distribution of goods and services. What emerges is a sound, well-balanced argument that offers new and often provocative conclusions about the effects of armed conflict on a nation and its citizenry. **$12.95**

A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems

Richard S. Katz

This book develops a theoretical model of the differences in the cohesion, ideological behavior, and issue-orientation of Western parliamentary parties on the basis of the electoral systems under which they compete. Included are case studies of forty-nine political parties in fourteen Western democracies. **$12.95**

Johns Hopkins

The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland 21218

Students, professors, and those interested in the study of politics and government
are invited to become members of the
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

JOIN APSA

Membership Publications:

The American Political Science Review: quarterly journal of scholarly articles and book reviews in political science;

PS: quarterly journal of association news and articles of professional concern;

The News: quarterly newspaper on educational materials and methods.

Membership Services:

APSA Personnel Service: currently lists the largest number of political science teaching and research positions.

Annual Meeting: annual reports and papers on research in the discipline of political science.

Name ____________________

Mailing Address ____________________

____

____________________ Zip __________

This is an application for membership. Upon receipt of this form the Association will mail you a membership card and begin a year's membership.

Student	$12 ☐
Annual:	
If your annual income is under $12,000	$25 ☐
$12,000-14,999	$30 ☐
$15,000-19,999	$35 ☐
$20,000-24,999	$40 ☐
$25,000-29,999	$45 ☐
Over $30,000	$50 ☐

Add $3 for foreign postage.

Please send with remittance to:

Membership Secretary
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

5 outstanding texts for a new year

1 The Politics of American National Government

4th edition

David C. Saffell

The new edition of this successful core text features coverage of public policy-making, all new "point of view" readings, and expanded material on management of the economy. It offers the most up-to-date coverage of American Government available, including the latest policy on energy, education, and human rights, and a description and analysis of the 1980 elections.

February 1981, approx. 560 pages, paper. Student Guide. Instructor's Manual.

2 American Government: Strategy and Choice

Peter H. Aranson

This new introductory text uses the principle of rational choice to explain and predict governmental decisions and political actions in the U.S. It combines the latest advances in public choice and positive political theory.

March 1981, approx. 600 pages, casebound. Instructor's Manual.

3 Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II:

Imperial and Global

Alvin Z. Rubinstein

Professor Rubinstein's new book offers a concise, up-to-date account of the evolution, aims, and impact of Soviet policy, emphasizing development since 1945. Each chapter traces continuity and change through the Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev periods.

1981, 304 pages, casebound and paper. Available now.

4 Dynamics of Public Bureaucracy:

An Introduction to Public Management, 2nd edition

Fred A. Kramer

Newly updated, this introductory text stresses organization theory and clientele politics for understanding American public administration. Students will appreciate the minimal use of bureaucratic jargon and material on recent civil service reforms.

April 1981, approx. 480 pages, casebound.

5 Perspectives on Public Bureaucracy:

A Reader on Public Bureaucracy, 3rd edition

Fred A. Kramer

Organization theory and change is the focus of this successful reader for Intro to Public Administration and Public Management courses. The new third edition features twelve classic articles by respected observers of public and private sector organizations, including five fresh essays on the role of power in public management.

February 1981, approx. 256 pages, paper.

~

Prices slightly higher outside the United States and subject to change without notice.

~

For further information, or to order an examination copy, please write to Ms. Sara Black, Dept. J5380-PO.

Winthrop Publishers, Inc.
17 DUNSTER ST. CAMBRIDGE, MA. 02138


American Political Science Association
STORMING WASHINGTON
An Intern's Guide to National Government
Stephen E. Frantzich

ORDER FORM

Single copies are available for $2.00 each, prepaid.

Bulk Orders	APSA Departmental Service Member	Non-Member
☐ 10 copies	$15.00	$17.50
☐ 25 copies	31.25	37.50
☐ 50 copies	50.00	62.50

Send to: ____

____

____ Zip________

Return this form with check to:

"Storming Washington"
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

World Development Report 1980
THE WORLD BANK

World Development Report, 1980, with its Statistical Annex, World Development Indicators, is the third in an annual series designed to present to the public a continuing assessment of world development issues at the national and international levels. This year's *Report* looks at two major challenges facing developing countries at the start of the decade. First, they must try to continue the economic and social progress of the past thirty years under international conditions that look less helpful than a decade or even a year ago. Second, they must struggle to relieve the plight of those 800 million people living in absolute poverty who have benefited too little from past progress. The *Report* examines important aspects of the difficulties and the prospects in both areas, looking as far ahead as 2000, but paying particular attention to the next five to ten years.

CONTENTS

1. Introduction
I. ADJUSTMENT AND GROWTH IN THE 1980's
  2. The outlook for developing countries
    Adjustment and recovery. Factors affecting growth. Regional growth in the 1980's.
  3. International problems and policies
    Energy. Trade. Capital flows.
II. POVERTY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
  4. Poverty, growth and human development
    Dimensions of poverty. Three decades of poverty reduction. Poverty and growth. Sources of growth. Raising the incomes of the poor.
  5. Human development issues and policies
    Education. Health. Nutrition. Fertility. The seamless web.
  6. Implementing human development programs: some practical lessons
    Political support. Easing the financial constraint. Developing administrative strengths. Ensuring that services are used. International assistance. The importance of persistence.
  7. Priorities and progress in regional perspective
    Issues for Planners. Sub-Saharan Africa. South Asia. Middle-income regions. Lessons for planning.
  8. Summary and conclusions
  Statistical appendix to Part I
  Bibliographical note
ANNEX WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
  Text tables
  Statistical appendix tables
  Figures
  Boxes

1980 **176 pp.; tables, charts** **cloth $13.50 paper $5.75**

Oxford University Press
200 Madison Avenue New York, New York 10016

Oxford University Press

The New Federalism

Second Edition

Michael D. Reagan, University of California, Riverside, and **John G. Sanzone,** California State University, Chico. This timely study provides an overview of the intergovernmental fiscal system, emphasizing grants-in-aid and revenue sharing as two approaches to intergovernmental relations. The new edition contains a discussion of block grants, paying particular attention to CETA and the Housing and Community Development Act and presents relevant legislative enactments and pertinent judicial decisions.

January 1981 208 pp. paper $3.95

Politics, Position, and Power

The Dynamics of Federal Organization

Third Edition

Harold Seidman, University of Connecticut. Combining scholarship with government experience, Professor Seidman presents an inside view of federal administration as it affects, and is affected by, competing forces for power, position, and political advantage. The third edition includes new and revised statistics and references, and examines new subjects such as President Carter's "bottom-up" reorganization of the executive branch.

1980 384 pp. paper $5.95

Workers in Industrial America

Essays on the 20th-Century Struggle

David Brody, University of California, Davis. "The thorough, sober and persuasive analysis found in these essays reconfirms Brody's position as the leading historian of the twentieth-century labor movement in America."—David Montgomery, Yale University. "The most brilliant and insightful analysis of the changing status of workers and their unions in the United States during the twentieth century."—John Braeman, University of Nebraska, Lincoln

1980 (paper, January 1981) 272 pp.
cloth $14.95 paper $3.95

The Turbulent Era

Riot and Disorder in Jacksonian America

Michael Feldberg, Boston University. In analyzing the collective violence that beset American cities during the first half of the nineteenth century, Professor Feldberg analyzes the sociological, psychological, political, and historical causes of riot, disorder, and violence.

1980 144 pp. cloth $8.95 paper $2.95

The Judicial Process

An Introductory Analysis of the Courts of the United States, England, and France

Fourth Edition

Henry J. Abraham, University of Virginia. "The author's insights, analytical skills and comparative perspectives reach new heights of excellence in this superb 4th edition. Professor Abraham has not only written the definitive volume of our time on the judicial process; he has written it with verve and grace that match its meticulous thoroughness."—Victor G. Rosenblum, Northwestern University School of Law

1980 640 pp. cloth $15.95 paper $8.95

Popular Justice

A History of American Criminal Justice

Samuel Walker, University of Nebraska at Omaha. "A vivid description and analysis of our criminal justice system, warts and all. An excellent short survey."—Norman Dorsen, New York University. "An excellent and timely study—clearly formulated, succinct, critical, historically informed."—Ruben G. Rumbaut, University of California, San Diego

1980 304 pp. cloth $12.95 paper $4.95

Sentencing

Edited by **Hyman Gross,** Cambridge University, and **Andrew von Hirsch,** Rutgers University. This collection of readings in the current literature addresses the issue of disparity in sentencing in the context of its historical and philosophical background, as well as of the contemporary debates over the aims, modalities, and severity of punishment. Such special problems as plea bargaining, indeterminacy and parole, and capital punishment are also treated.

January 1981 416 pp. cloth $19.95
paper $9.95

International Relations in a Changing World

Joseph Frankel. This comprehensive text provides an analytical description of international relations today. The author examines the increase in numbers and importance of emerging nations, multinational corporations, and terrorist groups. He pays special attention to the nature of the superpowers, their foreign policies, and interaction.

1979 (paper, 1980) 220 pp. cloth $14.50
paper $4.95

Oxford Paperbacks

The Majority Finds Its Past
Placing Women in History
Gerda Lerner, Sarah Lawrence College
January 1981 256 pp. Galaxy Book 624 $5.95

Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution
A Political Biography, 1888-1938
Stephen F. Cohen, Princeton University
1980 548 pp.; 24 illus. Galaxy Book 593 $6.95

A New Deal for Blacks
The Emergence of Civil Rights as a National Issue
Harvard Sitkoff, University of New Hampshire
1980 416 pp. Galaxy Book 627 $6.95

The Prophet Armed
Trotsky: 1879-1921
Isaac Deutscher
1980 560 pp. Galaxy Book 605 $8.95

The Prophet Unarmed
Trotsky: 1921-1929
Isaac Deutscher
1980 512 pp. Galaxy Book 607 $8.95

The Prophet Outcast
Trotsky: 1929-1940
Isaac Deutscher
1980 560 pp. Galaxy Book 607 $8.95

Days of Sorrow and Pain
Leo Baeck and the Berlin Jews
Leonard Baker
1980 448 pp.; 51 illus. Galaxy Book 611 $7.95

From Brown to Bakke
The Supreme Court and School Integration: 1954-1978
J. Harvie Wilkinson III
1980 384 pp. Galaxy Book 634 $6.95

Black Detroit and the Rise of the U.A.W.
August Meier and **Elliott Rudwick,** both of Kent State University
1980 304 pp.; plates Galaxy Book 632 $6.95

In the Matter of Color
Race and the American Legal Process
The Colonial Period
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
1980 544 pp.; illus. Galaxy Book 608 $6.95

Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945
Robert Dallek, University of California, Los Angeles
January 1981 672 pp. Galaxy Book 628 $9.95

America in Vietnam
Guenter Lewy, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
1980 544 pp. Galaxy Book 601 $7.95

The Philosophy of the American Revolution
Morton F. White, Institute for Advanced Study
1980 320 pp. Galaxy Book 625 $6.95

The Populist Moment
A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in America
Lawrence Goodwyn, Duke University
1978 384 pp. Galaxy Book 536 $6.95

Many of these fine books are also available in cloth.

Prices are subject to change.

Oxford University Press
200 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016

Economic Growth and Employment in China

THOMAS G. RAWSKI. Recent experience in many developing countries shows that progress in industrialization often fails to generate adequate employment opportunities. This investigation into the relationship between economic growth and employment in China shows that the world's largest developing nation has made significant strides toward the goal of full employment through the ability of the labor-rich farm sector to absorb a large portion of the labor force. (*World Bank Research Publications*)

1979 200 pp.; maps; tables cloth $12.50 paper $4.95

Principles of Public International Law

Third Edition

IAN BROWNLIE. "An excellent and useful book. The coverage of Brownlie's text is probably the most comprehensive brief treatment of the main topics in international law."—Richard Falk, Department of Politics, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University. This thoroughly revised new edition reflects recent developments in various areas of the law, including the law of the sea, state immunity, and the status of foreign investments. The second edition was awarded the Certificate of Merit of the American Society of International Law.

1980 772 pp. cloth $46.00 paper $27.50

TUC

The Growth of a Pressure Group 1868-1976

ROSS M. MARTIN. This book traces the political career of the Trades Union Congress over more than a century—from the time when TUC spokesmen humbly petitioned members of Parliament to the present when they bargain with Prime Ministers. The TUC's changing relations with ministers and government departments, with Parliament, the trade unions and the major political parties are all recounted.

1980 400 pp. $42.00

British Interparty Conferences

A Study of the Procedure of Conciliation in British Politics 1867-1921

JOHN D. FAIR. British interparty conferences were an informal procedure adopted on at least a dozen occasions between 1867 and 1921 to encourage conciliation between political parties. Making use of original letters and documents, Professor Fair presents a clear and balanced account of the value and limitations of conciliation as a method for achieving a legislative settlement, a greater national unity, or perhaps even peace.

1980 352 pp. $49.00

Basic Community Laws

BERNARD RUDDEN and DERRICK WYATT. A collection of Basic Community Laws selected and organized to provide the indispensable foundation for a study of the European Community is available for the first time. The volume includes the Treaty of Rome arranged to incorporate later developments in the Merger Treaty, the Budget Treaties, the Treaties of Accession, the new measures on Direct Elections, the institutional and general provisions governing the Coal and Steel Community, the major acts on the Court of Justice on Community resources and on fundamental rights.

1980 296 pp. cloth $37.50 paper $14.95

Prices are subject to change.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016
SINCE 1478

CAMBRIDGE

Stalin's Successors

Leadership, Stability and Change in the Soviet Union

Seweryn Bialer

"A major interpretation of the Soviet experience since Lenin.... This is an outstanding work."
—*Myron Rush, Cornell University*

"A comprehensive, careful and convincing account of the Soviet political system.... Americans who worry about the future course of Soviet foreign policy in world affairs, and about an appropriate Western strategy, cannot afford to ignore this scholarly and absorbing volume."
—*Stanley Hoffmann, Professor of Government, Harvard University*

"Seweryn Bialer is probably the most perceptive observer of Soviet politics, society, and foreign policy writing today.... His book is a superb and well documented piece of scholarship."
—*Richard H. Ullman, Professor of International Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University*

"Dr. Bialer is one of the truly seminal scholars and writers on the Soviet Union. This book is a distillate of some of his most interesting and original reflections on the Soviet system. I believe that both general readers and professional students of the Soviet Union will find in it stimulating insights and much food for thought."
—*Marshall Shulman, Special Advisor on Soviet Affairs to the Secretary of State*

$19.95

Liberal Equality

Amy Gutmann

Professor Gutmann examines the tension that has existed between the two major strands of liberal thinking, tracing their foundations through the views of liberal theorists from Locke to Rawls and relating them to their different underlying conceptions of human nature.

"Gutmann's central problem... is well handled in this serious and probing account of the ways political philosophy since Locke has dealt with the concept.... Recommended for all serious students of contemporary political philosophy and social problems." —*Library Journal*

Hardcover $34.95 Paper $10.95

Soviet Dissent in Historical Perspective

Marshall S. Shatz

Using autobiographical and literary sources, Shatz traces the relations between the Russian state and the educated classes from the Czarist period to the present. His analysis explores the reasons why dissidents became nonconformists or rebels; and shows how pre-Stalinist patterns are repeating themselves in the post-Stalinist period. $19.95

The Diplomacy of Ideas

U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938–1950

Frank A. Ninkovich

Ninkovich provides a narrative history of the use of cultural relations in U.S. foreign policy and an analysis of the link between foreign policy attitudes and American institutional structures. His book shows how the U.S. made the transition from relative diplomatic passivity in the 1930's to global activism by 1950. $24.95

Cambridge University Press

32 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

F. E. PEACOCK PUBLISHERS, INC.
ANNOUNCES THREE NEW TEXTS FOR YOUR COURSES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
By Thomas P. Murphy and Contributors

This text, intended for the beginning student in public administration, provides a comprehensive introduction to that topic. In doing so it maintains a critical awareness of the similarities and differences between administration in the public and private sectors; between public administration at the federal, state, and local levels, as well as in the non-profit sector; and of the interplay between professional and non-professional career fields existing in the public sector.

February 1981	c. 517 pages	c. $14.95 cloth

THE NEW PUBLIC PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION
Second Edition
By Felix A. Nigro, University of Georgia, and Lloyd G. Nigro, Georgia State University

This is a thorough revision of a highly successful text providing a complete treatment of the many important developments in public personnel administration since publication of the first edition in 1976, including the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.

February 1981	c. 325 pages	c. $12.95 cloth

GUIDE TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
By Debbie Cutchin, University of Georgia

This guide is a systematic treatment of over 275 basic facts, theories, and concepts of public administration arranged in alphabetical order. Current federal legislation and policies, a broad range of organization and administrative theories, and commonly used public administration terms and a discussion of the significance or usage is included for each item.

March 1981	c. 150 pages	c. $4.95 paper

F. E. PEACOCK PUBLISHERS, INC./ITASCA, IL 60143

FROM F. E. PEACOCK PUBLISHERS, INC.
New for 1981

THE FOUNDING OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
By Martin Diamond

This small text consists of chapters 1, 3, 4, and 5 from The Democratic Republic by Diamond, Garfinkel and Fisk. The intent of the book is to provide the students with a fuller understanding of our unique political foundation than can be obtained from existing introductory texts.
March 1981 c. 150 pages c. $6.95 paper

The Third Edition of **Norman R. Luttbeg's**
PUBLIC OPINION AND PUBLIC POLICY

The articles, original and seminal, reprinted here explore five models whereby government policy might reflect the preferences of that government's public. A final section explores the many implications of successful and unsuccessful political linkage between public opinion and public policy.
January 1981 c. 500 pages c. $11.95 paper

PEOPLE, STATES, AND WORLD ORDER
By Louis René Beres, Purdue University

PEOPLE, STATES, AND WORLD ORDER is an undergraduate level textbook that integrates a compelling treatment of our planetary predicament with a coherent strategy for planetary renewal. This strategy, which is called "world order," flows from a framework of analysis that is global in orientation and directed toward the nurturance of such basic values as peace, social justice, economic well-being and ecological stability.
March 1981 c. 300 pages c. $7.95 paper

F. E. PEACOCK PUBLISHERS, INC./ITASCA, IL 60143



research support for political scientists

A GUIDE TO SOURCES OF FUNDS FOR RESEARCH FELLOWSHIPS, GRANTS AND CONTRACTS

ORDER FORM

Please send me ____________ copies of *Research Support for Political Scientists.*

Enclosed is my check for $____________ to cover the cost at $4.00 each.

Name ______________________________

Address ______________________________

______________________________ Zip ____________

All orders must be prepaid.

Return to:

The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

“The most stimulating and contemporary American government text on the market”* …now revised to present a strikingly up-to-date portrait of political America in the 1980s!

Democracy Under Pressure

An Introduction to the American Political System

FOURTH EDITION

MILTON C. CUMMINGS, JR., The Johns Hopkins University
DAVID WISE, author and political analyst

Through ten years and three editions, Cummings and Wise's Democracy Under Pressure has been described with enthusiasm as “provocative,” “realistic,” “balanced,” “straightforward,” “up-to-date,” “candid,” and “complete.” Now, in a new Fourth Edition, the book continues to be one of the most comprehensive and readable texts on the market — a stunning blend of scholarship and style.

Revised to reflect the very latest political developments, the Fourth Edition of Democracy Under Pressure will include fully integrated coverage of:

- the **1980 presidential primaries, final campaign, and election**
- important decisions made in the closing months of the **1980 Supreme Court** term
- far-reaching implications of **1980 Census** data

In addition, the authors take into account recent changes in public attitudes toward government, and pressures within the political system itself that have developed over the last few years. They give specific attention to such new topics as:

- the economic pressures induced by inflation and scarce resources
- the presidency as “an arena for failure”
- growing tension between the President and Congress
- foreign policy and the decline of our “usable” powers
- increasing influence of media on politics

Completely redesigned with a larger page size, the Fourth Edition has a bolder, more open look than ever before. And, more than 375 photographs, cartoons, graphs, and tables (many of which are new to this edition) appear throughout the text. As in previous editions, there are boxed quotes, annotated bibliographies at the end of each chapter, and appendices containing the Constitution and a list of U.S. Presidents. Two new features — a summary at the end of each chapter and a glossary of terms and definitions at the end of the book — make this new edition even easier for students to use.

684 pages (probable)
Publication: April 1981
Study Guide, Test Booklet with Lecture and Discussion Topics and Learning Objectives

*comment on the Third Edition

HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH, INC.
New York • San Diego • Chicago • San Francisco • Atlanta

ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION

Bernard H. Siegan

"Siegan, like Locke and some more modern writers, realizes that control of property and its disposition may be a basic liberty without which no other can survive or be meaningful."—Philip B. Kurland, University of Chicago

Cloth $TBA January

THE DIPLOMACY OF SILENCE

The American Foreign Service, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War, 1933-1947

Hugh De Santis

"De Santis offers a thorough and original analysis of the American diplomats who played crucial roles in the formative years of the Cold War."—Akira Iriye, Department of History, University of Chicago

"It is fascinating, analytically keen, awesomely thorough in its coverage of sources, and extremely well-written."—Alexander L. George, Stanford University

Cloth 280 pages $23.00 December

BLACK REPRESENTATION AND URBAN POLICY

Albert K. Karnig and Susan Welch

"This work, the first of its kind, provides valuable information about a newly and rapidly developing process of black politization."
—Charles V. Hamilton, Columbia University

In light of the recent dramatic growth in the number of black elected officials, the authors address the questions: What condition promotes blacks' chances of winning election to public office? And does the election of blacks to municipal office have an effect on urban policy?

Cloth 200 pages $20.00 January

THE LIMITS OF PROFESSIONAL POWER

National Health Care in the Federal Republic of Germany

Deborah A. Stone

"The theme of professional participation in politics has sociological and political science interest; it is here that Stone's work is so impressive, weaving the concerns about professional associations, norms, and pressure group power together into a readable whole. . . . [This] is a careful rendering of a controversial policy arena on a cross-national basis, an important contribution to cross-national policy learning, and an interesting book of comparative policy analysis."
—Theodore Marmor, Yale University

Cloth 244 pages $TBA January

THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE

Blacks and Changing American Institutions

Second Edition

William Julius Wilson

This new paperback edition includes an Afterword in which Professor Wilson not only reflects on the debate surrounding his book, but also presents a provocative discussion of race, class, and social policy.

Winner of the Sydney M. Spivack Award of the American Sociological Association

Paper 224 pages $5.95 November

Still available in cloth.

University of Chicago Press Chicago 60637

French Politics and Public Policy

edited by Philip Cerny,
University of York,
and Martin Schain,
New York University

"This fine collection of essays will give the readers an overview of France as it has become after twenty-two years of the Fifth Republic, and particularly in the period of economic slowdown of the late 1970's. The views offered in this volume are always informed, often incisive, and remarkably balanced."—from the foreword by Stanley Hoffman

In an authoritative study of the structure and function of the French state, Cerny and Schain begin by analyzing the party political environment, the social context of political power, and the actual processes by which decisions are made, and go on to present a detailed examination of the substance of French public policy.

1980 ISBN 0-312-30509-5 about 280 pp., cloth $20.00

Political China Observed
A Western Perspective

Peter Harris, *University of Hong Kong*

In a penetrating study of post-Maoist Chinese politics, Peter Harris places the new technocratic and more conservative leadership within its broad historical context. He goes on to examine the structure and influence of the party, the state, and the army, and analyzes the potential effects of the new orientation in Chinese politics on China's relations with the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain.

1980 ISBN 0-312-62212-0 229 pp., cloth $28.00

Japan's Economic Aid

Alan G. Rix

This book provides an up-to-date, comprehensive investigation of Japan's economic aid policy. Alan Rix examines in depth the development of Japanese aid programs, the relationship between the national government and foreign aid, and the impact of external factors on Japan's foreign aid policies.

1980 ISBN 0-312-44063-4 286 pp., cloth $32.50

West Germany
Politics and Society

David Childs, *University of Nottingham,* and Jeffrey Johnson, *City of Birmingham Polytechnic*

This book provides a thorough and up-to-date survey of West Germany's political, social and economic institutions. The authors investigate such essential features of West German politics and society as the Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*), political parties, the Bundestag and government, and go on to give serious attention to those aspects often neglected: the armed forces, welfare services, education, the role of women, the economy and industrial relations, and the maintenance of law and order.

1980 ISBN 0-312-86300-4 about 250 pp., cloth $25.00

Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR
Essays Dedicated to Leonard Schapiro

edited by T. H. Rigby, Archie Brown and Peter Reddaway

Written by former students and colleagues of Leonard Schapiro, this book explores the sources of political notoriety in the Soviet Union, the manner in which power is distributed and exercised there, and the making and execution of Soviet policy. Combining new theoretical approaches with case studies demonstrating the operation of authority, power and policy over time and in different sectors of the system, the book presents a wide range of interpretative viewpoints on the dynamics of the Soviet political system.

1980 ISBN 0-312-06122-6 about 192 pp., cloth $25.00

Political Culture and Soviet Politics

Stephen White, *University of Glasgow*

Drawing on a wide range of Soviet sociological literature and unique emigré sources, Stephen White has written the first full-length study of contemporary political culture in the Soviet Union. He pays particular attention to the Marxist-Leninist education program, nationalist subcultures, and the political development and changes that have come with successive generations since 1917.

1980 ISBN 0-312-62249-X 256 pp., cloth $22.50

To order these books for your library at 20% discount,
please write: **St. Martin's Press** Post Office Box 5352 New York, NY 10163

Just published!

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: IDEAS AND ISSUES

David R. Berman, Arizona State University and
John C. Bollens, UCLA

A well integrated, stimulating reader. Every selection keyed to the original overview essay. Each series of readings preceded by a solid introduction that provides background and raises important questions.

Reagan and Humphrey on the presidency. Anderson on presidential-congressional relations. Appraisal of Carter as administrator. ERA amendment, sex discrimination in education, abortion issue, trends in American foreign policy, U.S. foreign aid, judicial gatekeeping, national energy problem, political image makers, reviving political parties, reforming campaign finance, and others.

paper, $6.95

POLITICS, PARTIES, AND POWER

John Goldbach, California State University, Northridge,
and Michael J. Ross, Eastern Illinois University

An American politics book for the 1980s. Considers the ways policies are introduced and extended through the media, persuasion, and protest activity. Presents approaches aimed at winning office. Major parts are Parties and Interest Groups, Campaigns, Voters and Elections, Political Communication: The Media, Political Actors and Leaders, Coalitions and Issues, and Political Problems and Party Prospects. Detailed instructor's manual. Available to adopters.

paper, $10.95; cloth, $15.95

POLITICAL CORRUPTION: POWER, MONEY, AND SEX

John C. Bollens, UCLA, and Henry J. Schmandt, St. Louis University

An important book for American government, politics, and public administration courses. Understanding political corruption, The crooked road of the past, Watergate, Hypocrisy and wrongdoing, For sale – the executive branch, The imperial bureaucrat, The police, Even the judiciary, Sex and politics, Responding to the problem, Where do we go from here?

paper, $6.95; cloth, $9.95

Also recently published

PEOPLE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Phillip Present, California State University, Northridge **paper, $7.50**

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND POLICYMAKING, Alan Saltzstein, California State University, Fullerton **paper, $7.50**

For adoption consideration, request examination copies from Derek Johnson, Marketing Manager. Give course number and title and when text adoption decisions will be made.

PALISADES PUBLISHERS
P.O. Box 744, Dept. V
Pacific Palisades, CA. 90272

NEO
CONSERVATIVES
The men who are changing America's politics
Peter Steinfels

THE NEOCONSERVATIVES

The men who are changing America's politics

by PETER STEINFELS

"A sober, analytical study...scrupulously pursues fair and balanced judgment." —***Wall Street Journal***

"A sensitive, analytically acute and delightfully devastating dissection of Irving Kristol, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Daniel Bell and lesser members of the Public Interest/Commentary *school."* —***The Nation***

The first serious analysis and critique of the leaders of a new, intellectually based conservatism. Placing their writings in the context of American conservative tradition and contemporary political thought, Peter Steinfels reveals the movement's underlying premises and suggests reasons for its dramatic emergence and success. Winner of ALA Notable Book Award.

#0-671-41384-8 $5.95



THE WAY THE WORLD WORKS

by JUDE WANNISKI

"Wanniski constructs a political program, sketches a new political economy...The reader has been helped to glimpse the choices that must be made if public policy is to foster economic growth...Other writers on public policy have not yet seen the problem as clearly as Wanniski." —**Roger Starr, *Commentary***

Jude Wanniski's **The Way The World Works** offers the clearest explanation of the neoconservative economic model which states that low taxes are the key to the wealth and welfare of nations. Essential reading for a thorough understanding of the economic alternatives facing our nation's policy-makers.

# 0-671-24849-9 $5.95

A guide to the use of **The Way The World Works** in the college course is available free. Copies may be obtained by sending a self-addressed envelope to Educational Services, address below.



GANDHI

A Memoir

by WILLIAM L. SHIRER

"On my shelves I have about eight feet of volumes about or by Gandhi; one would think it impossible to add to them. Yet here is another—brief, touching, affectionate, personal—that somehow tells us more about this enigmatic political saint than most of the academics." —**James Cameron,**
New York Times Book Review

In the early 1930's, reporter William Shirer met Mahatma Gandhi giving him unprecedented access to one of the key figures of modern history. In his memoir, Shirer recounts Gandhi's explanation of his political and personal actions and his visions for the future of India and the world.

#0-671-25080-9 $4.95
Coming in January 1981.

Examination copies of paperbacks are available by writing to Education & Library Services, address below. On university letterhead, indicate the title and estimated enrollment of the course for which you are considering adopting the book. Normally a $1.00 service charge for each book must accompany the request. However, if your request also includes the name and date of this journal, the $1.00 service charge will be waived. For a complete catalog of books in your subject area, send request to same address.

Touchstone
The Measure of Quality paperbacks

SIMON & SCHUSTER • 1230 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS • NEW YORK, N.Y. 10020

Sandra Baxter &
Marjorie Lansing

Women
and Politics
THE INVISIBLE MAJORITY

"This landmark study exposes the differences between women's and men's voting patterns—and just may hold the key to presidential elections. Whether you're a voter or an expert on voting you can't afford to miss it."

—**Gloria Steinem**

"For those millions of women who want to change the condition of their lives and that of their families *Women and Politics* is indispensable reading."

—**Mildred Jeffrey**

"...an excellent, compact summary of the accumulating information about the changing voting behavior and political role of women in American politics. It would be of interest not only to specialists in political studies but to all those who follow the changing dynamics of American politics."

—**David S. Broder**

$18.50

**The University of
Michigan Press**
Dept. SO P.O. Box 1104
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106



Liberty*Press* Liberty*Classics*

The Politicization of Society

Edited by Kenneth S. Templeton, Jr.

Distinguished scholars examine the central problem of modern society—the growth of the state—and its significance for the individual. Essays by Robert L. Carneiro, Felix Morley, Murray N. Rothbard, William Marina, Robert A. Nisbet, Jacques Ellul, Giovanni Sartori, Michael Oakeshott, Donald M. Dozer, Herbert Butterfield, John A. Lukacs, Jonathan R. T. Hughes, Butler D. Shaffer, and F. A. Hayek. Introduction by R. M. Hartwell. Hardcover $10.00, Paperback $4.50

The Keynesian Episode

By W. H. Hutt

A fresh masterpiece of economic history and analysis, by one of the leading critics of Keynesianism. Hutt looks back to tell us why Lord Keynes' economic doctrines had such great appeal—with such disastrous results—and looks ahead to tell us how to restore a sound economy. Hardcover $10.00, Paperback $4.50.

Can Capitalism Survive?

By Benjamin A. Rogge

Penetrating, witty, and wise prescriptions for our day. Rogge is Distinguished Professor of Political Economy at Wabash College. "Provocative"—*Library Journal.* "Delightful"—*Personal Finance.* "Well-reasoned, gracefully written, and gently humorous"—*National Review.* Hardcover $9.00, Paperback $3.50

Free and Unequal

By Roger J. Williams

One of the world's leading biochemists presents the evidence that no two human beings are ever born alike, nor do they become alike. A persuasive argument for human liberty, free of scientific jargon. "Eminently humane and he makes his principal points powerfully"—Ashley Montagu in the *New York Times.* Hardcover $8.00, Paperback $3.50.

E Pluribus Unum *The Formation of the American Republic 1776-1790*

By Forrest McDonald

Having won their independence from England, the American colonies faced a new question of paramount importance: Would this be politically one nation, or would it not? *E Pluribus Unum* is a provocative and spirited look at how that question came to be answered. "Fresh, vivid, and penetrating"—*New York Times Book Review.* "Original and stimulating"—*American Historical Review.* Hardcover $8.00, Paperback $3.50.

Reflections on History

By Jacob Burckhardt

Thought-provoking essays by the Swiss historian and humanist who foresaw the coming of collectivism. "One of the most original minds of the nineteenth century"—*American Historical Review.* "A guided tour through the history of civilization"—*Saturday Review of Literature.* Hardcover $9.00, Softcover $4.00.

We pay postage, but require prepayment, on orders from individuals. Please allow four to six weeks for delivery. To order these books, or for a copy of our catalog, write:
Liberty*Press*/Liberty*Classics*
7440 North Shadeland, Dept. 713
Indianapolis, Indiana 46250

Liberty*Press*
Liberty*Classics*


F. A. Hayek
The Counter-Revolution of Science
Studies on the Abuse of Reason

The Counter-Revolution of Science
Studies on the Abuse of Reason

By F. A. Hayek

"Never will the mind of man penetrate deeper into error than when he is continuing on a road which has led him to great success," says Nobel Laureate F. A. Hayek. In this book he provides a penetrating analysis of the intellectual errors responsible for many theoretical and social difficulties: the substitution of *scientism* for true science and the use of *scientistic* rather than truly *scientific* method.

Professor Hayek shows how the use of scientistic methods has undermined the study of society while sowing the seeds of the tyranny of social engineering and the totalitarian state. Hardcover $9.00, Paperback $4.00.

We pay postage, but require prepayment, on orders from individuals. Please allow four to six weeks for delivery. To order this book, or for a copy of our catalog, write:
Liberty*Press*/Liberty*Classics*
7440 North Shadeland, Dept. 714
Indianapolis, Indiana 46250